r?- 


THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 
REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA 


BOOKS  BY  B.  L.  PUTNAM  WE  ALE 

POLITICAL 

Manchu  &  Muscovite 

The  Re-Shaping  of  the  Fab  East  (2  volumes) 

The  Teuce  in  the  East  and  Its  Aftermath 

The  Coming  Struggle  in  Eastern  Asia 

The  Conflict  of  Colour 

The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China 

ROMANTIC 

Indiscreet  Letters  from  Peking 

The  Forbidden  Boundary. 

The  Human  Cobweb 

The  Unknown  God 

The  Romance  of  a  Few  Dayi 

The  Revolt 

The  Eternal  Priestess 

The  Altar  Fire 


Genkkai/  Fi:xc;    Kio-ciiaxc,    I'kesidkxt    of    the    Rf:prBi.i( 


THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 
REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA 


BY 

B.  L.  PUTNAM  WEALE 


WITH  ILLUSTRATIONS 


NEW  YORK 

DODD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY 

1917 


Copyright,  1917 
Bt  DODD,  mead  and  company.  Inc. 


PREFACE 

This  volume  tells  everything  that  the  student  or  the 
casual  reader  needs  to  know  about  the  Chinese  Question. 
It  is  sufficiently  exhaustive  to  show  very  clearly  the 
new  forces  at  work,  and  to  bring  some  realisation  of  the 
great  gulf  which  separates  the  thinking  classes  of  to-day 
from  the  men  of  a  few  years  ago;  whilst,  at  the  same 
time,  it  is  sufficiently  condensed  not  to  overwhelm  the 
reader  with  too  great  a  multitude  of  facts. 

Particular  attention  may  be  devoted  to  an  imique 
feature — namely,  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  documenta- 
tion which  affords  a  sharp  contrast  between  varying 
types  of  Eastern  brains.  Thus,  in  the  INIemorandum  of 
the  Black  Dragon  Society  (Chapter  VII)  we  have  a 
very  clear  and  illuminating  revelation  of  the  Japanese 
political  mind  which  has  been  trained  to  consider  prob- 
lems in  the  modern  Western  way,  but  which  remains 
saturated  with  theocratic  ideals  in  the  sharpest  conflict 
with  the  Twentieth  Century,  In  the  pamphlet  of  Yang 
Tu  (Chapter  VIII)  which  launched  the  ill-fated  Mon- 
archy Scheme  and  contributed  so  largely  to  the  dramatic 
death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  we  have  an  essentially  Chinese 
mentality  of  the  reactionary  or  corrupt  type  which  ex- 
presses itself  both  on  home  and  foreign  issues  in  a  naively 
dishonest  way,  helpful  to  future  diplomacy.  In  the 
Letter  of  Protest  (Chapter  X)  against  the  revival  of 
Imperialism  written  by  Liang  Ch'i-chao — the  most  bril- 


vi  PREFACE 

liant  scholar  living — we  have  a  Chinese  of  the  New  or 
Liberal  China,  who  in  spite  of  a  complete  ignorance 
of  foreign  languages  shows  a  marvellous  grasp  of  politi- 
cal absolutes,  and  is  a  harbinger  of  the  great  days  which 
must  come  again  to  Cathay.  In  other  chapters  dealing 
with  the  monarchist  plot  we  see  the  official  mind  at  work, 
the  telegraphic  despatches  exchanged  between  Peking 
and  the  provinces  being  of  the  highest  diplomatic  inter- 
est. These  documents  prove  conclusively  that  although 
the  Japanese  is  more  practical  than  the  Chinese — and 
more  concise — there  can  be  no  question  as  to  which  brain 
is  the  more  fruitful. 

Coupled  with  this  discussion  there  is  much  matter 
giving  an  insight  into  the  extraordinary  and  calamitous 
foreign  ignorance  about  present-day  China,  an  ignorance 
which  is  just  as  marked  among  those  resident  in  the 
country  as  among  those  who  have  never  visited  it.  The 
whole  of  the  material  grouped  in  this  novel  fashion 
should  not  fail  to  bring  conviction  that  the  Far  East, 
with  its  500  millions  of  people,  is  destined  to  play  an  im- 
portant role  in  postbellum  history  because  of  the  new 
type  of  modern  spirit  which  is  being  there  evolved.  The 
influence  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
writer,  cannot  fail  to  be  ultimately  world-wide  in  view 
of  the  practically  unlimited  resources  in  man-power 
which  it  disposes  of. 

In  the  Appendices  will  be  found  every  document  of 
importance  for  the  period  of  under  examination, — 1911 
to  1917.  The  writer  desires  to  record  his  indebtedness 
to  the  columns  of  The  Peking  Gazette,  a  newspaper 
which  under  the  brilliant  editorship  of  Eugene  Ch'en — 
a  pure  Chinese  born  and  educated  under  the  British 
flag — has  fought  consistently  and  victoriously  for  Lib- 


PREFACE  vii 

eralism  and  Justice  and  has  made  the  Republic  a  reahty 
to  countless  thousands  who  otherwise  would  have  refused 
to  believe  in  it. 

Putnam  Weale. 
Peking,  June,  1917. 


CONTENTS 

CHAFTEB  PAGE 

I     General  Introduction      .      .      .      ...      .        1 

II     The  Enigma  of  Yuan  Shih-kai     ..,.,..     21 

III  The  Dream  Republic 39 

(From  the  Manchu  Abdication  to  the  dissolu- 
tion of  Parliament) 

IV  The  Dictator  at  Work 58 

(From  the  Coup  d'etat  of  the  4th.  Nov.  1913  to 
the  outbreak  of  the  World-war,  1.  August, 
1914) 

V     The  Factor  of  Japan  .      .     ,..     >,     ....     71 

VI     The  Twenty-one  Demands 88 

VII     The  Origin  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands     .      .    123 

VIII     The  Monarchist  Plot 145 

1°  The  Pamphlet  of  Yang  Tu 

IX     The  Monarchy  Plot .   173 

2°  Dr.  Goodnow's  Memorandum 

X     The  Monarchy  Movement  Is  Opposed     .      .      .    191 
The  Appeal  of  the  Scholar  Liang  Chi-chao 

XI     The  Dream  Empire 216 

("The  People's  Voice"  and  the  action  of  the 
Powers) 

XII     "The  Third  Revolution"       ......   236 

The  Revolt  of  Yunnan 

XIII     "The  Third  Revolution"    {continued)  .      .      .   249 
Downfall  and  Death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTEl  PAGE 

XIV     The  New  Regime— from  1916  to  1917     .      .      .271 

XV  The  Republic  in  Collision  with  Reality:  Two 
Typical  Instances  of  "Foreign  Aggres- 
sion"       292 

XVI     China  and  the  War     . 309 

XVII  The  Final  Problem  : — Remodelling  the  Polit- 
ico-economic Relationship  Between  China 
AND  the  W^orld 370 

Appendices — Dqcuments  and  Memoranda    ,      .  393 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

General  Feng  Kuo-chang,  President  of  the  Republic 

Frontispiece 

FACINQ 
PAGE 

President  Yuan  Shih-kai,  photographed  immediately  after 
his  inauguration  as  Provisional  President,  March  10, 
1912 24 

The  late  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  .      .      .      ....     32 

The  National  Assembly  sitting  as  a  National  Convention 
engaged  on  the  Draft  of  the  Permanent  Constitution. 
Specially  photographed  by  permission  of  the  Speaker 
for  the  present  work 44 

View  from  rear  of  hall  of  The  National  Assembly  sitting 
as  a  National  Convention  engaged  on  the  Draft  of  the 
Permanent  Constitution.  Specially  photographed  by 
permission  of  the  Speaker  for  the  present  work  .      .      52 

The  Re-opening  of  Parliament  on  August  1,  1916,  after 

three  years  of  Dictatorial  Rule 60 

The  original  Constitutional  Drafting  Committee  of  1913. 
Photographed  on  the  steps  of  the  Temple  of  Heaven 
where  the  Draft  was  completed 66 

Village  mummers:  elaborate  festivals  occur  in  China  in 
Spring  and  Autumn  to  celebrate  the  Fruitfulness  of 
the  Earth,  every  temple  and  every  village  having  its 
own  celebration 74! 

Toilers  of  the  Plain.     Country  produce  being  hauled  to 

the  city T* 

A  Manchu  woman  grinding  grain 82 

Silk-reeling  done  in  the  open  under  the  walls  of  Peking     .     82 

xi 


xii  ILLUSTRATIONS 


FACINa 
PAGE 


Ruins  of  the  famous  Yuan  Ming  Yuan  Palace  outside 
Peking.  Built  for  the  Manchu  sovereigns  by  the 
Jesuit  fathers,  and  destroyed  by  the  Allies  in  1860  .      98 

Modern  Peking:  a  run  on  a  bank 98 

Modern  Peking:  the  Palace  entrance  lined  with  troops. 

Note  the  new-type  Chinese  policeman  in  foreground  .    110 

Peasants  raising  water  by  the  oldest  method  in  the  world  .    126 

Transporting  grain  by  donkey  in  the  roadless  country     .    126 

The  Peerless  Lake  of  the  Summer  Palace  near  Peking  .      .    138 

Another  view  of  the  Peerless  Lake  of  the  Summer  Palace 

near  Peking 138 

Chinese  art-forms:  a  beautiful  gateway      .....    150 

Dragon  and  clouds  perfectly  represented  in  a  marble  col- 
umn    150 

The  "P'ai  Lou,"  or  Memorial  Arch  which  is  a  conspicuous 

feature  in  Northern  China 164j 

A    princely    burial-ground,    the    memorial    tablets    being 

placed  on  the  backs  of  giant  marble-tortoises      .      .    lG4s 

The  bas-relief  in  a  Peking  Temple,  well-illustrating  Indo- 
Chinese  influences 182 

The  scholar  Liang  Ch'i-chao,  sometimes  Minister  of  Justice 

and  the  foremost  "Brain"  in  China 200 

Model  Military  Police  in  Peking  under  the  command  of 
General  Munthe,  a  Norwegian,  raised  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Legation  Quarter 218 

March-post  of  an  Infantry  Division 226 

The  Yunnan  Rebellion  of  1915-16  which  led  to  the  down- 
fall of  Yuan  Shih-kai:  a  big  junk  loaded  with  sup- 
plies passing  up  the  Rapids  of  the  Upper  Yangtsze  .    238 

3?he  Rapids  of  the  Upper  Yangtsze 238 


ILLUSTRATIONS  xiii 

FACINa 
PAGE 

General  Tsai-ao,   the  hero   of  the  Yunnan  Rebellion  of 

1915-16,  who  died  from  the  effects  of  the  campaign  .   244! 

Liang  Shih-yi,  who  was  the  power  behind  Yuan  Shih-kai, 

now  proscribed  and  living  in  exile  at  Hongkong  .      .   256 

The  funeral  of  Yuan  Shih-kai — the  catafalque  over  the 

coffin  on  its  way  to  the  railway  station      ....   262 

The  funeral  of  Yuan  Shih-kai — the  procession  passing 
down  the  great  Palace  approach  with  the  famous 
Ch'ien  Men  (gate)  in  the  distance 262 

An  encampment  of  "the  Punitive  Expedition"  of  1916  on 

the  Upper  Yangtsze 274 

Revival  of  the  Imperialistic  worship  of  Heaven  by  Yuan 
Shih-kai  in  1914.  Scene  on  the  Altar  of  Heaven  with 
sacrificial  officers  clothed  in  costumes  dating  from 
2000  years  ago 274 

A  Presidential  Review  of  Troops  in  the  Southern  Hungting 

Park  outside  Peking :  arrival  of  the  President       .      .   286 

President  Li  Yuan-hung       . 294) 

President  Li  Yuan-hung  and  the  General  Staff  watching 

the  Review 302 

Assault  of  the  Republican  Troops  on  the  Imperial  Palace 

in  Peking,  July  12,  1917 :  scaling  the  Palace  walls    .    320 

Eastern  Palace  entrance:  Peking,  after  assault  of  the  Re- 
publican Troops,  July  12,  1917 320 

The  Premier  General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  head  of  the  Cabinet 

which  decided  to  declare  war  on  Germany  ....   354 

The  famous,  or  infamous,  General  Chang  Hsun,  the  lead- 
ing reactionary  in  China  to-day,  who  still  commands 
a  force  of  30,000  men  astride  of  the  Pukow  Railway  .   380 


THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 
REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA 


THE  FIGHT  FOR 
THE  REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA 

CHAPTER  I 

GENERAL   INTRODUCTION 

The  revolution  which  broke  out  in  China  on  the  10th 
October,  1911,  and  which  was  completed  with  the  abdi- 
cation of  the  Manchu  Dynasty  on  the  12th  February, 
1912,  though  acclaimed  as  highly  successful,  was  in  its 
practical  aspects  something  very  different.  With  the 
proclamation  of  the  Repubhc,  the  fiction  of  autocratic 
rule  had  truly  enough  vanished;  yet  the  tradition  sur- 
vived and  with  it  sufficient  of  the  essential  machinery  of 
Imperialism  to  defeat  the  nominal  victors  until  the 
death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai. 

The  movement  to  expel  the  Manchus,  who  had  seized 
the  Dragon  Throne  in  1644  from  the  expiring  Ming 
Dynasty,  was  an  old  one.  Historians  are  silent  on  the 
subject  of  the  various  secret  plots  which  were  always 
being  hatched  to  achieve  that  end,  their  silence  being 
due  to  a  lack  of  proper  records  and  to  the  difficulty  of 
establishing  the  simple  truth  in  a  country  where  rumour 
reigns  supreme.  But  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  fa- 
mous Ko-lao-hui,  a  Secret  Society  with  its  headquarters 
in  the  remote  province  of  Szechuan,  owed  its  origin  to 
the  last  of  the  Ming  adherents,  who  after  waging  a 
desperate  guerilla  warfare  from  the  date  of  their  ex- 
pulsion from  Peking,  finally  fell  to  the  low  level  of  in- 


2  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

citing  assassinations  and  general  unrest  in  the  vain  hope 
that  they  might  some  day  regain  their  heritage.  At 
least,  we  know  one  thing  definitely:  that  the  attempt 
on  the  life  of  the  Emperor  Chia  Ching  in  the  Peking 
streets  at  the  beginning  of  the  Nineteenth  Century  was 
a  Secret  Society  plot,  and  brought  to  an  abrupt  end  the 
pleasant  habit  of  travelling  among  their  subjects  which 
the  great  Manchu  Emperors  K'anghsi  and  Ch'ien  Lung 
had  inaugurated  and  always  pursued  and  which  had  so 
largely  encouraged  the  growth  of  personal  loyalty  to  a 
foreign  House. 

From  that  day  onwards  for  over  a  century  no  Em- 
peror ventured  out  from  behind  the  frowning  Walls  of 
the  Forbidden  City  save  for  brief  annual  ceremonies 
such  as  the  Worship  of  Heaven  on  the  occasion  of  the 
Winter  Solstice,  and  during  the  two  "flights" — first,  in 
1860  when  Peking  was  occupied  by  an  Anglo-French 
expedition  and  the  Court  incontinently  sought  sanctu- 
ary in  the  mountain  Palaces  of  Jehol;  and,  again,  in 
1900,  when  with  the  pricking  of  the  Boxer  bubble  and 
the  arrival  of  the  International  relief  armies,  the  Impe- 
rial Household  was  forced  along  the  stony  road  to  far- 
off  Hsianfu. 

The  effect  of  this  immurement  was  soon  visible; 
the  Manchu  rule,  which  was  emphatically  a  rule  of  the 
sword,  was  rapidly  so  weakened  that  the  emperors  be- 
came no  more  than  rois  faineants  at  the  mercy  of  their 

ministers.^     The  history  of  the  Nineteenth  Century  is 

1  As  there  is  a  good  deal  of  misunderstanding  on  the  subject  of  the  Man- 
chus  an  explanatory  note  is  useful. 

The  Manchu  people,  who  belong  to  the  Mongol  or  Turanian  Group,  num- 
ber at  the  maximum  five  million  souls.  Their  distribution  at  the  time  of 
the  revolution  of  1911  was  roughly  as  follows:  In  and  around  Peking  say 
two   millions;    in   posts   through    China   say   one-half  million, — or   possibly 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  3 

thus  logically  enough  the  history  of  successive  collapses. 
Not  only  did  overseas  foreigners  openly  thunder  at  the 
gateways  of  the  empire  and  force  an  ingress,  but  native 
rebellions  were  constant  and  common.  Leaving  minor 
disturbances  out  of  account,  there  were  during  this  pe- 
riod two  huge  Mahommedan  rebellions,  besides  the  cata- 
clysmic Taiping  rising  which  lasted  ten  years  and  is 
supposed  to  have  destroyed  the  unbelievable  total  of 
one  hundred  million  persons.  The  empire,  torn  by  in- 
ternecine warfare,  surrendered  many  of  its  essential 
prerogatives  to  foreigners,  and  by  accepting  the  princi- 
ple of  extraterritoriahty  prepared  the  road  to  ultimate 
collapse. 

How  in  such  circumstances  was  it  possible  to  keep 
alive  absolutism?  The  answer  is  so  curious  that  we 
must  be  explicit  and  exhaustive. 

The  simple  truth  is  that  save  during  the  period  of 
vigour  immediately  following  each  foreign  conquest 
(such  as  the  Mongol  conquest  in  the  Thirteenth  Century 
and  the  Manchu  in  the  Seventeenth)  not  only  has  there 
never  been  any  absolutism  properly  so-called  in  China, 
but  that  apart  from  the  most  meagre  and  inefficient  tax- 
collecting  and  some  rough-and-ready  policing  in  and 
around  the  cities  there  has  never  been  any  true  govern- 

three-quarters  of  a  million;  in  Manchuria  Proper— the  home  of  the  race — 
say  two  or  two  and  a  half  millions.  The  fighting  force  was  composed  in 
this  fashion:  When  Peking  fell  into  their  hands  in  1644  as  a  result  of 
a  stratagem  combined  with  dissensions  among  the  Chinese  themselves,  the 
entire  armed  strength  was  re-organized  in  Eight  Banners  or  Army  Corps, 
each  corps  being  composed  of  three  racial  divisions,  (1)  pure  Manchus, 
(2)  Mongols  who  had  assisted  in  the  conquest  and  (3)  Northern  Chinese 
who  had  gone  over  to  the  conquerors.  These  Eight  Banners,  each  com- 
manded by  an  "iron-capped"  Prince,  represented  the  authority  of  the  Throne 
and  had  their  headquarters  in  Peking  with  small  garrisons  throughout  the 
provinces  at  various' strategic  centres^  These  garrisons  had  entirely  ceased 
to  have  any  value  before  the  18th  Century  had  closed  and  were  therefore 
purely  ceremoninl  and  symbolic,  all  the  fighting  being  done  by  special 
Chinese  corps  which  were  raised  as  necessity  arose. 


4  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

ing  at  all  save  what  the  people  did  for  themselves  or 
what  they  demanded  of  the  officials  as  a  protection 
against  one  another.  Any  one  who  doubts  these  state- 
ments has  no  inkling  of  those  facts  which  are  the  crown 
as  well  as  the  foundation  of  the  Chinese  group-system, 
and  which  must  be  patiently  studied  in  the  village-life 
of  the  country  to  be  fitly  appreciated.  To  be  quite 
frank,  absolutism  is  a  myth  coming  down  from  the  days 
of  Kublai  Khan  when  he  so  proudly  built  his  Khan- 
haligh  (the  Cambaluc  of  Marco  Polo  and  the  forebear 
of  modern  Peking)  and  filled  it  with  his  troops  who  so 
soon  vanished  like  the  snows  of  winter.  An  elaborate 
pretence,  a  deliberate  policy  of  make-believe,  ever  since 
those  days  invested  Imperial  Edicts  with  a  majesty 
which  they  have  never  really  possessed,  the  effacement 
of  the  sovereign  during  the  Nineteenth  Century  con- 
tributing to  the  legend  that  there  existed  in  the  capital  a 
Grand  and  Fearful  Panjandrum  for  whom  no  miracle 
was  too  great  and  to  whom  people  and  officials  owed 
trembling  obedience. 

In  reality,  the  office  of  emperor  was  never  more  than 
a  politico-religious  concept,  translated  for  the  benefit 
of  the  masses  into  socio-economic  ordinances.  These 
pronouncements,  cast  in  the  form  of  periodic  homilies 
called  Edicts,  were  the  ritual  of  government ;  their  pur- 
pose was  instructional  rather  than  mandatory;  they 
were  designed  to  teach  and  keep  alive  the  State-theory 
that  the  Emperor  was  the  High  Priest  of  the  Nation 
and  that  obedience  to  the  morality  of  the  Golden  Age, 
which  had  been  inculcated  by  all  the  philosophers  since 
Confucius  and  Mencius  flourished  twenty-five  cen- 
turies ago,  would  not  only  secure  universal  happiness 
but  contribute  to  national  greatness. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  5 

The  office  of  Emperor  was  thus  heavenly  rather  than 
terrestrial,  and  suasion,  not  arms,  was  the  most  potent 
argument  used  in  everyday  life.  The  amazing  reply 
{i.  e.,  amazing  to  foreigners)  made  by  the  great  Em- 
peror K'ang-hsi  in  the  tremendous  Eighteenth  Century 
controversy  between  the  Jesuit  and  the  Dominican  mis- 
sionaries, which  ruined  the  prospects  of  China's  ever 
becoming  Roman  Catholic  and  which  the  Pope  refused 
to  accept — that  the  custom  of  ancestor-worship  was 
political  and  not  religious — was  absolutely  correct,  'poli- 
tics in  China  under  the  Empire  being  only  a  system  of 
national  control  exercised  by  inculcating  obedience  to 
forebears.  The  great  efforts  which  the  Manchus  made 
from  the  end  of  the  Sixteenth  Century  (when  they  were 
still  a  small  Manchurian  Principality  striving  for  the 
succession  to  the  Dragon  Throne  and  launching  des- 
perate attacks  on  the  Great  Wall  of  China)  to  receive 
from  the  Dalai  Lama,  as  well  as  from  the  lesser  Pontiffs 
of  Tibet  and  Mongolia,  high-sounding  religious  titles, 
prove  conclusively  that  dignities  other  than  mere  posses- 
sion of  the  Throne  were  held  necessary  to  give  solidity 
to  a  reign  which  began  in  militarism  and  which  would 
collapse  as  the  Mongol  rule  had  collapsed  by  a  mere 
Palace  revolution  unless  an  effective  moral  title  were 
somehow  won. 

Nor  was  the  Manchu  military  Conquest,  even  after 
they  had  entered  Peking,  so  complete  as  has  been  repre- 
sented by  historians.  The  Manchus  were  too  small  a 
handful,  even  with  their  Mongol  and  Chinese  auxil- 
iaries, to  do  more  than  defeat  the  Ming  armies  and 
obtain  the  submission  of  the  chief  cities  of  China.  It  is 
well-known  to  students  of  their  administrative  methods, 
that  whilst  they  reigned  over  China  they  ruled  only  in 


6  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

company  with  the  Chinese,  the  system  in  force  being  a 
dual  control  which,  beginning  on  the  Grand  Council  and 
in  the  various  great  Boards  and  Departments  in  the 
capital,  proceeded  as  far  as  the  provincial  chief  cities, 
but  stopped  short  there  so  completely  and  absolutely 
that  the  huge  chains  of  villages  and  burgs  had  their 
historic  autonomy  virtually  untouched  and  lived  on  as 
they  had  always  lived.  The  elaborate  system  of  exam- 
inations, with  the  splendid  official  honours  reserved  for 
successful  students  which  was  adopted  by  the  Dynasty, 
not  only  conciliated  Chinese  society  but  provided  a  vast 
body  of  men  whose  interest  lay  in  maintaining  the  new 
conquest;  and  thus  Literature,  which  had  always  been 
the  door  to  preferment,  became  not  only  one  of  the  in- 
struments of  government,  but  actually  the  advocate 
of  an  alien  rule.  With  their  persons  and  properties 
safe,  and  their  women-folk  protected  by  an  elaborate  set 
of  capitulations  from  being  requisitioned  for  the  harems 
of  the  invaders,  small  wonder  if  the  mass  of  Chinese 
welcomed  a  firm  administration  after  the  frightful  dis- 
orders which  had  torn  the  country  dm'ing  the  last  days 
of  the  Mings.^ 

It  was  the  foreigner,  arriving  in  force  in  China  after 
the  capture  of  Peking  and  the  ratification  of  the  Tientsin 
Treaties  in  1860,  who  so  greatly  contributed  to  making 
the  false  idea  of  Manchu  absolutism  current  through- 
out the  world ;  and  in  this  work  it  was  the  foreign  diplo- 
mat, coming  to  the  capital  saturated  with  the  tradition 
of  European  absolutism,  who  played  a  not  unimportant 

1  This  most  interesting  point — the  immunity  of  Chinese  women  from 
forced  marriage  with  Manchus — has  been  far  too  little  noticed  by  his- 
torians though  it  throws  a  flood  of  light  on  the  sociological  aspects  of  the 
Manchu  conquest.  Had  that  conquest  been  absolute  it  would  have  been 
impossible  for  the  Chinese  people  to  have  protected  their  womenfolk  in 
such  a  significant  way. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  7 

part.  Investing  the  Emperors  with  an  authority  with 
which  they  were  never  really  clothed  save  for  cere- 
monial purposes  (principally  perhaps  because  the  Court 
was  entirely  withdrawn  from  view  and  very  insolent  in 
its  foreign  intercourse)  a  conception  of  High  Mighti- 
ness was  spread  abroad  reminiscent  of  the  awe  in  which 
Eighteenth  Century  nabobs  spoke  of  the  Great  Mogul  of 
India.  Chinese  officials,  quickly  discovering  that  their 
easiest  means  of  defence  against  an  irresistible  pressure 
was  to  take  refuge  behind  the  august  name  of  the  sover- 
eign, played  their  role  so  successfully  that  until  1900  it 
was  generally  believed  by  Europeans  that  no  other  form 
of  government  than  a  despotism  sans  phrase  could  be 
dreamed  of.  Finding  that  on  the  surface  an  Imperial 
Decree  enjoyed  the  majesty  of  an  Ukaze  of  the  Czar, 
Europeans  were  ready  enough  to  interpret  as  best  suited 
their  enterprises  something  which  they  entirely  failed  to 
construe  in  terms  expressive  of  the  negative  nature  of 
Chinese  civilization;  and  so  it  happened  that  though  the 
government  of  China  had  become  no  government  at  all 
from  the  moment  that  extraterritoriality  destroyed  the 
theory  of  Imperial  inviolability  and  infallibility,  the 
miracle  of  turning  state  negativism  into  an  active  gov- 
erning element  continued  to  work  after  a  fashion  be- 
cause of  the  disguise  which  the  immense  distances 
afforded. 

Adequately  to  explain  the  philosophy  of  distance  in 
China,  and  what  it  has  meant  historically,  would  require 
a  whole  volume  to  itself;  but  it  is  sufficient  for  our  pur- 
pose to  indicate  here  certain  prime  essentials.  The  old 
Chinese  were  so  entrenched  in  their  vastnesses  that  with- 
out the  play  of  forces  which  were  supernatural  to  them, 
2.  e.^  the  steam-engine,  the  telegraph,  the  armoured  war- 


8  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

vessel,  etc.,  their  daily  lives  could  not  be  affected.  Left 
to  themselves,  and  assisted  by  their  own  methods,  they 
knew  that  blows  struck  across  the  immense  roadless 
spaces  were  so  diminished  in  strength,  by  the  time  they 
reached  the  spot  aimed  at,  that  they  became  a  mere 
mockery  of  force;  and,  just  because  they  were  so  value- 
less, paved  the  way  to  effective  compromises.  Being 
adepts  in  the  art  which  modern  surgeons  have  adopted, 
of  leaving  wounds  as  far  as  possible  to  heal  themselves, 
they  trusted  to  time  and  to  nature  to  solve  political 
differences  which  western  countries  boldly  attacked  on 
very  different  principles.  Nor  were  they  wrong  in  their 
view.  From  the  capital  to  the  Yangtsze  Valley  (which 
is  the  heart  of  the  countiy),  is  800  miles,  that  is  far 
more  than  the  mileage  between  Paris  and  Berlin. 
From  Peking  to  Canton  is  1,400  miles  along  a  hard 
and  difficult  route;  the  journey  to  Yunnan  by  the 
Yangtsze  river  is  upwards  of  2,000  miles,  a  distance 
greater  than  the  greatest  march  ever  undertaken  by 
Napoleon.  And  when  one  speaks  of  the  Outer  Do- 
minions— IMongolia,  Tibet,  Turkestan — for  these  hun- 
dreds of  miles  it  is  necessary  to  substitute  thousands,  and 
add  there  to  difficulties  of  terrain  which  would  have  dis- 
heartened even  Roman  Generals. 

Now  the  old  Chinese,  accepting  distance  as  the 
supreme  thing,  had  made  it  the  starting-point  as  well  as 
the  end  of  their  government.  In  the  perfected  viceregal 
system  which  grew  up  under  the  Ming  Dynasty,  and 
which  was  taken  over  by  the  Manchus  as  a  sound  and 
admirable  governing  principle,  though  they  superim- 
posed their  own  military  system  of  Tartar  Generals,  we 
have  the  plan  that  nullified  the  great  obstacle.  Author- 
ity of  every  kind  was  delegated  by  the  Throne  to  various 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  9 

distant  governing  centuries  in  a  most  complete  and 
sweeping  manner,  each  group  of  provinces,  united  under 
a  viceroy,  being  in  everything  but  name  so  many  inde- 
pendent linked  commonwealths,  called  upon  for  matric- 
ular  contributions  in  money  and  grain  but  otherwise 
left  severely  alone.^  The  chain  which  bound  provincial 
China  to  the  metropolitan  government  was  therefore  in 
the  last  analysis  finance  and  nothing  but  finance;  and 
if  the  system  broke  down  in  1911  it  was  because  financial 
reform — to  discount  the  new  forces  of  which  the  steam 
engine  was  the  symbol — had  been  attempted,  like  mili- 
tary reform,  both  too  late  and  in  the  wrong  way,  and 
instead  of  strengthening,  had  vastly  weakened  the 
authority  of  the  Throne. 

In  pursuance  of  the  reform-plan  which  became  pop- 
ular after  the  Boxer  Settlement  had  allowed  the  court 
to  return  to  Peking  from  Hsianfu,  the  viceroys  found 
their  most  essential  prerogative,  which  was  the  con- 
trol of  the  provincial  purse,  largely  taken  from  them 
and  handed  over  to  Financial  Commissioners  who  were 
directly  responsible  to  the  Peking  Ministry  of  Finance, 
a  Department  which  was  attempting  to  replace  the 

1  A  very  interesting  proof — and  one  that  has  never  been  properly  ex- 
posed— iof  the  astoundingly  rationalistic  principles  on  which  the  Chinese 
polity  is  founded  is  to  be  seen  in  the  position  of  priesthoods  in  China. 
Unlike  every  other  civilization  in  the  world,  at  no  stage  of  the  development 
of  the  State  has  it  been  necessary  for  religion  in  China  to  intervene  between 
the  rulers  and  the  ruled,  saving  the  people  from  oppression.  In  Europe 
without  the  supernatural  barrier  of  the  Church,  the  position  of  the  common 
people  in  the  Middle  Ages  would  have  been  intolerable,  and  life,  and  virtue 
totally  unprotected.  Buckle,  in  his  "History  of  Civilization,"  like  other 
extreme  radicals,  has  failed  to  understand  that  established  religions  have 
paradoxically  been  most  valuable  because  of  their  vast  secular  powers, 
exercised  under  the  mask  of  spiritual  authority.  Without  this  ghostly  re- 
straint rulers  would  have  been  so  oppressive  as  to  have  destroyed  their 
peoples.  The  two  greatest  monuments  to  Chinese  civilization,  then  consist  of 
these  twin  facts;  first,  that  the  Chinese  have  never  had  the  need  for  such 
supernatural  restraints  exercised  by  a  privileged  body,  and  secondly,  that 
they  are  absolutely  without  any  feeling  of  class  or  caste — prince  and  pauper 
meeting  on  terms  of  frank  and  humorous  equality — the  race  thus  being  the 
only  pure  and  untinctured  democracy  the  world  has  ever  known. 


10  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

loose  system  of  matricular  contributions  by  the  Eu- 
ropean system  of  a  directly  controlled  taxation  every 
penny  of  which  would  be  shown  in  an  annual  Budget. 
No  doubt  had  time  been  vouchsafed,  and  had  European 
help  been  enlisted  on  a  large  scale,  this  change  could 
ultimately  have  been  made  successful.  But  it  was  pre- 
cisely time  which  was  lacking;  and  the  Manchus  con- 
sequently paid  the  penalty  which  is  always  paid  by  those 
who  delay  until  it  is  too  late.  The  old  theories  having 
been  openly  abandoned,  it  needed  only  the  promise  of 
a  Parliament  completely  to  destroy  the  dignity  of  the 
Son  of  Heaven,  and  to  leave  the  viceroys  as  mere  hos- 
tages in  the  hands  of  rebels.  A  few  short  weeks  of  re- 
bellion was  sufficient  in  1911  to  cause  the  provinces  to 
revert  to  their  condition  of  the  earlier  centuries  when 
they  had  been  vast  unfettered  agricultural  communities. 
And  once  they  had  tasted  the  joys  of  this  new  inde- 
pendence, it  was  impossible  to  conceive  of  their  becom- 
ing "obedient"  again. 

Here  another  word  of  explanation  is  necessary  to 
show  clearly  the  precise  meaning  of  regionalism  in 
China. 

What  had  originally  created  each  province  was  the 
chief  city  in  each  region,  such  cities  necessarily  being 
the  walled  repositories  of  all  increment.  Greedy  of 
territory  to  enhance  their  wealth,  and  jealous  of  their 
power,  these  provincial  capitals  throughout  the  ages  had 
left  no  stone  unturned  to  extend  their  influence  in  every 
possible  direction  and  bring  under  their  economic  con- 
trol as  much  land  as  possible,  a  fact  which  is  abundantly 
proved  by  the  highly  diversified  system  of  weights  and 
measures  throughout  the  land  deliberately  drawn-up 
to  serve  as  economic  barriers.     River-courses,  moun- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  11 

tain-ranges,  climate  and  soil,  no  doubt  assisted  in 
governing  this  expansion,  but  commercial  and  financial 
greed  was  the  principal  force.  Of  this  we  have  an  ex- 
ceedingly interesting  and  conclusive  illustration  in  the 
struggle  still  proceeding  between  the  three  Manchurian 
provinces,  Fengtien,  Kirin  and  Heilungchiang,  to  seize 
the  lion's  share  of  the  virgin  land  of  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia  which  has  an  "open  frontier"  of  rolling 
prairies.  Having  the  strongest  provincial  capital — 
Moukden — it  has  been  Fengtien  province  which  has 
encroached  on  the  Mongolian  grasslands  to  such  an 
extent  that  its  jurisdiction  to-day  envelops  the  entire 
western  flank  of  Kirin  province  (as  can  be  seen  in  the 
latest  Chinese  maps)  in  the  form  of  a  salamander,  effec- 
tively preventing  the  latter  province  from  controlling 
territory  that  geographically  belongs  to  it.  In  the  same 
way  in  the  land-settlement  which  is  still  going  on 
the  Mongolian  plateau  immediately  above  Peking,  much 
of  what  should  be  Shansi  territory  has  been  added  to  the 
metropolitan  province  of  Chihli.  Though  adjustments 
of  provincial  boundaries  have  been  summarily  made  in 
times  past,  in  the  main  the  considerations  we  have  indi- 
cated have  been  the  dominant  factors  in  determining 
the  area  of  each  unit. 

Now  in  many  provinces  where  settlement  is  age-old, 
the  regionalism  which  results  from  great  distances  and 
bad  communications  has  been  greatly  increased  by  race- 
admixture.  Canton  province,  which  was  largely  settled 
by  Chinese  adventurers  sailing  down  the  coast  from  the 
Yangtsze  and  intermarrying  with  Annamese  and  the 
older  autochthonous  races,  has  a  population-mass  pos- 
sessing very  distinct  characteristics,  which  sharply  con- 
flict with  Northern  traits.     Fuhkien  province  is  not  only 


12  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

as  diversified  but  speaks  a  dialect  which  is  virtually  a 
foreign  language.  And  so  on  North  and  West  of  the 
Yangtsze  it  is  the  same  story,  temperamental  differences 
of  the  highest  political  importance  being  everywhere  in 
evidence  and  leading  to  perpetual  bickerings  and  jeal- 
ousies. For  although  Chinese  civilization  resembles  in 
one  great  particular  the  Mahommedan  religion,  in  that 
it  accepts  without  question  all  adherents  irrespective  of 
racial  origin,  politically  the  effect  of  this  regionalism 
has  been  such  that  up  to  very  recent  times  the  Central 
Government  has  been  almost  as  much  a  foreign  govern- 
ment in  the  eyes  of  many  provinces  as  the  government 
of  Japan.  Money  alone  formed  the  bond  of  union;  so 
long  as  questions  of  taxation  were  not  involved,  Peking 
was  as  far  removed  from  daily  life  as  the  planet  Mars. 
As  we  are  now  able  to  see  very  clearly,  fifty  years  ago 
— that  is  at  the  time  of  the  Taiping  Rebellion — the 
old  power  and  spell  of  the  National  Capital  as  a  military 
centre  had  really  vanished.  Though  in  ancient  days 
horsemen  armed  with  bows  and  lances  could  sweep  like 
a  tornado  over  the  land,  levelling  everything  save  the 
walled  cities,  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  such  methods 
had  become  impossible.  Mongolia  and  Manchuria  had 
also  ceased  to  be  inexhaustible  reservoirs  of  warlike  men ; 
the  more  adjacent  portions  had  become  commercialized; 
whilst  the  outer  regions  had  sunk  to  depopulated  gra- 
ziers' lands.  The  Government,  after  the  collapse  of  the 
Rebellion,  being  greatly  impoverished,  had  openly 
fallen  to  balancing  province  against  province  and  per- 
sonality against  personality,  hoping  that  by  some  means 
it  would  be  able  to  regain  its  prestige  and  a  portion  of 
its  former  wealth.  Taking  down  the  ledgers  containing 
the  lists  of  provincial  contributions,  the  mandarins  of 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  13 

Peking  completely  revised  every  schedule,  redistributed 
every  weight,  and  saw  to  it  that  the  matricular  levies 
should  fall  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  crushing.  The  new 
taxation,  likiii,  which,  like  the  income-tax  in  England,  ^ 
is  in  origin  purely  a  war-tax,  by  gripping  inter-provin- 
cial commerce  by  the  throat  and  rudely  controlling  it 
by  the  barrier-system,  was  suddenly  disclosed  as  a  new 
and  excellent  way  of  making  felt  the  menaced  sover- 
eignty of  the  Manchus;  and  though  the  system  was 
plainly  a  two-edged  weapon,  the  first  edge  to  cut  was 
the  Imperial  edge;  that  is  largely  why  for  several  dec- 
ades after  the  Taipings  China  was  relatively  quiet. 

Time  was  also  giving  birth  to  another  important  de- 
velopment— important  in  the  sense  that  it  was  to  prove 
finally  decisive.  It  would  have  been  impossible  for 
Peking,  unless  men  of  outstanding  genius  had  been 
living,  to  have  foreseen  that  not  only  had  the  real  bases 
of  government  now  become  entirely  economic  control, 
but  that  the  very  moment  that  control  faltered  the  cen- 
tral government  of  China  would  openly  and  absolutely 
cease  to  be  any  government  at  all.  Modern  commercial- 
ism, already  invading  China  at  many  points  through 
the  medium  of  the  treaty-ports,  was  a  force  which  in  the 
long  run  could  not  be  denied.  Every  year  that  passed 
tended  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  modern  conditions 
were  cutting  Peking  more  and  more  adrift  from  the 
real  centres  of  power — the  economic  centres  which,  with 
the  single  exception  of  Tientsin,  lie  from  800  to  1,500 
miles  away.  It  was  these  centres  that  were  developing 
revolutionary  ideas — i.  e.,  ideas  at  variance  with  the 
Socio-economic  principles  on  which  the  old  Chinese  com- 
monwealth had  been  slowly  built  up,  and  which  foreign 
dynasties  such  as  the  Mongol  and  the  Manchu  had 


14  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

never  touched.  The  Government  of  the  post-Taiping 
period  still  imagined  that  by  making  their  hands  lie 
more  heavily  than  ever  on  the  people  and  by  tightening 
the  taxation  control — not  by  true  creative  work — they 
could  rehabilitate  themselves. 

It  would  take  too  long,  and  would  weary  the  indul- 
gence of  the  reader  to  establish  in  a  conclusive  manner 
this  thesis  which  had  long  been  a  subject  of  inquiry  on 
the  part  of  political  students.  Chinese  society,  being 
essentially  a  society  organized  on  a  credit-co-operative 
system,  so  nicely  adjusted  that  money,  either  coined  or 
fiduciary,  was  not  wanted  save  for  the  petty  daily  pur- 
chases of  the  people,  any  system  which  boldly  clutched 
at  the  financial  establishments  undertaking  the  move- 
ment of  sycee  (silver)  from  province  to  province  for 
the  settlement  of  trade-balances,  was  bound  to  be  effec- 
tive so  long  as  those  financial  establishments  remained 
unshaken. 

The  best  known  establishments,  united  in  the  great 
group  known  as  the  Shansi  Bankers,  being  the  govern- 
ment bankers,  undertook  not  only  all  the  remittances  of 
surpluses  to  Peking,  but  controlled  by  an  intricate  pass- 
book system  the  perquisites  of  almost  every  office- 
holder in  the  empire.  No  sooner  did  an  official,  under 
the  system  which  had  grown  up,  receive  a  provincial 
appointment  than  there  hastened  to  him  a  confidential 
clerk  of  one  of  these  accommodating  houses,  who  in  the 
name  of  his  employers  advanced  all  the  sums  necessary 
for  the  payment  of  the  official's  post,  and  then  proceeded 
with  him  to  his  province  so  that  moiety  by  moiety,  as 
taxation  flowed  in,  advances  could  be  paid  off  and  the 
equilibrium  re-established.  A  very  intimate  and  far- 
reaching  connection  thus  existed  between  provincial 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  15 

money-interests  and  the  official  classes.  The  practical 
work  of  governing  China  was  the  balancing  of  tax-books 
and  native  bankers'  accounts.  Even  the  "melting- 
houses,"  where  sycee  was  "standardized"  for  provincial 
use,  were  the  joint  enterprises  of  officials  and  merchants; 
bargaining  governing  every  transaction ;  and  only  when  a 
violent  break  occurred  in  the  machinery,  owing  to  famine 
or  rebellion,  did  any  other  force  than  money  intervene. 

There  was  nothing  exceptional  in  these  practices,  in 
the  use  of  which  the  old  Chinese  empire  was  merely 
following  the  precedent  of  the  Roman  Empire.  The 
vast  polity  that  was  formed  before  the  time  of  Christ 
by  the  military  and  commercial  expansion  of  Rome  in 
the  Mediterranean  Basin,  and  among  the  wild  tribes  of 
Northern  Europe,  depended  very  largely  on  the  genius 
of  Italian  financiers  and  tax-collectors  to  whom  the  rev- 
enues were  either  directly  "farmed,"  or  who  "assisted" 
precisely  after  the  Chinese  method  in  financing  officials 
and  local  administrations,  and  in  replenishing  a  central 
treasury  which  no  wealth  could  satisfy.  The  Chinese 
phenomenon  was  therefore  in  no  sense  new;  the  dearth 
of  coined  money  and  the  variety  of  local  standards  made 
the  methods  used  economic  necessities.  The  system 
was  not  in  itself  a  bad  system:  its  fatal  quality  lay  in  its 
woodenness,  its  lack  of  adaptability,  and  in  its  growing 
weakness  in  the  face  of  foreign  competition  which  it 
could  never  understand.  Foreign  competition — that 
was  the  enemy  destined  to  achieve  an  overwhelming 
triumph  and  dash  to  ruins  a  hoary  survival. 

War  with  Japan  sounded  the  first  trumpet-blast 
which  should  have  been  heeded.  In  the  year  1894,  be- 
ing faced  with  the  necessity  of  finding  immediately  a 
large  sum  of  specie  for  pm*pose  of  war,  the  native 


16  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

bankers  proclaimed  their  total  inability  to  do  so,  and  the 
first  great  foreign  loan  contract  was  signed/  Little 
attention  was  attracted  to  what  is  a  turning-point  in 
Chinese  history.  There  cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt 
that  in  1894  the  Manchus  wrote  the  first  sentences  of  an 
abdication  which  was  only  formally  pronounced  in  1912: 
they  had  inaugurated  the  financial  thraldom  under 
which  China  still  languishes.  Within  a  period  of  forty 
months,  in  order  to  settle  the  disastrous  Japanese  war, 
foreign  loans  amounting  to  nearly  fifty-five  million 
pounds  were  completed.  This  indebtedness,  amounting 
to  nearly  three  times  the  "visible"  annual  revenues  of 
the  country — that  is,  the  revenues  actually  accounted 
for  to  Peking — was  unparalleled  in  Chinese  history. 
It  was  a  gold  indebtedness  subject  to  all  sorts  of  manip- 
ulations which  no  Chinese  properly  understood.  It  had 
special  political  meaning  and  special  political  conse- 
quences because  the  loans  were  virtually  guaranteed  by 
the  Powers.  It  was  a  long-drawn  coup  d'etat  of  a 
nature  that  all  foreigners  understood  because  it  forged 
external  chains. 

The  internal  significance  was  even  greater  than  the 
external.  The  loans  were  secured  on  the  most  import- 
ant "direct"  revenues  reaching  Peking — the  Customs 
receipts,  which  were  concerned  with  the  most  vital  func- 

1  (a)  This  loan  was  the  so-called  7  per  cent  Silver  loan  of  1894  for 
Shanghai  Taels  10,000,000  negotiated  by  the  Hongkong  &  Shanghai  Bank. 
It  was  followed  in  1895  by  a  £3,000,000  Gold  6  per  cent  Loan,  then  by  two 
more  6  per  cent  loans  for  a  million  each  in  the  same  year,  making  a  total 
of  £6,635,000  sterling  for  the  bare  war-expenses.  The  Japanese  war  indem- 
nity raised  in  three  successive  issues— from  1895  to  1898 — of  £16,000,000 
each,  added  £48,000,000.  Thus  the  Korean  imbroglio  cost  China  nearly 
55  millions  sterling.  As  the  purchasing  power  of  the  sovereign  is  eight 
times  larger  in  China  than  in  Europe,  this  debt  economically  would  mean 
440  millions  in  England — say  nearly  double  what  the  ruinous  South 
African  war  cost.  It  is  by  such  methods  of  comparison  that  the  vital  na- 
ture of  the  economic  factor  in  recent  Chinese  history  is  made  clear. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  17 

tlon  in  the  new  economic  life  springing  up,  the  steam- 
borne  coasting  and  river-trade  as  well  as  the  pm-ely 
foreign  trade.  That  most  vital  function  tended  conse- 
quently to  become  more  and  more  hall-marked  as  for- 
eign; it  no  longer  depended  in  any  direct  sense  on 
Peking  for  protection.  The  hypothecation  of  these 
revenues  to  foreigners  for  periods  running  into  decades 
— coupled  with  their  administration  by  foreigners — was 
such  a  distinct  restriction  of  the  rights  of  eminent  do- 
main as  to  amount  to  a  partial  abrogation  of  sovereignty. 
That  this  was  vaguely  understood  by  the  masses  is 
now  quite  certain.  The  Boxer  movement  of  1900,  like 
the  great  proletarian  risings  which  occurred  in  Italy  in 
the  pre-Christian  era  as  a  result  of  the  impoverishment 
and  moral  disorder  brought  about  by  Roman  misgovern- 
ment,  was  simply  a  socio-economic  catastrophe  exhibit- 
ing itself  in  an  unexpected  form.  The  dying  Manchu 
dynasty,  at  last  in  open  despair,  turned  the  revolt, 
insanely  enough,  against  the  foreigner — that  is  against 
those  who  already  held  the  really  vital  portion  of  their 
sovereignty.  So  far  from  saving  itself  by  this  act,  the 
dynasty  wrote  another  sentence  in  its  death-warrant. 
Economically  the  Manchus  had  been  for  years  almost 
lost;  the  Boxer  indemnities  were  the  last  straw.  By 
more  than  doubling  the  burden  of  foreign  commitments, 
and  by  placing  the  operation  of  the  indemnities  directly 
in  the  hands  of  foreign  bankers  by  the  method  of 
monthly  quotas,  payable  in  Shanghai,  the  Peking  Gov- 
ernment as  far  hack  as  fifteen  years  ago  was  reduced 
to  being  a  government  at  thirty  days'  sight,  at  the 
mercy  of  any  shock  of  events  which  could  be  protracted 
over  a  few  monthly  settlements.  There  is  no  denying 
this  signal  fact,  which  is  probably  the  most  remarkable 


18  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

illustration  of  the  restrictive  power  of  money  which  has 
ever  been  afforded  in  the  history  of  Asia. 

The  phenomenon,  however,  was  complex  and  we  must 
be  careful  to  understand  its  workings.  A  mercantile 
curiosity,  to  find  the  parallel  for  which  we  must  go 
back  to  the  Middle  Ages  in  Europe,  when  "free  cities" 
such  as  those  of  the  Hanseatic  League  plentifully  dotted 
river  and  coast  line,  served  to  increase  the  general  diffi- 
culties of  a  situation  which  no  one  formula  could  ade- 
quately cover.  Extraterritoriality,  by  creating  the 
"treaty  port"  in  China,  had  been  the  most  powerful 
weapon  in  undermining  native  economics;  yet  at  the 
same  time  it  had  been  the  agent  for  creating  powerful 
new  counter-balancing  interests.  Though  the  increas- 
ingly large  groups  of  foreigners,  residing  under  their 
own  laws,  and  building  up,  under  their  own  specially 
protected  system  of  international  exchange,  a  new  and 
imposing  edifice,  had  made  the  hovel-like  nature  of 
Chinese  economics  glaringly  evident,  the  mercantile 
classes  of  the  New  China,  being  always  quick  to  avail 
themselves  of  money-making  devices,  had  not  only  taken 
shelter  under  this  new  and  imposing  edifice,  but  were 
rapidly  extending  it  of  their  own  accord.  In  brief,  the 
trading  Chinese  were  identifying  themselves  and  their 
major  interests  with  the  treaty-ports;  they  were  trans- 
ferring thither  their  specie  and  their  credits;  making 
huge  investments  in  land  and  properties,  under  the  aegis 
of  foreign  flags  in  which  they  absolutely  trusted.  The 
money-interests  of  the  country  knew  instinctively  that 
the  native  system  was  doomed  and  that  with  this  doom 
there  would  come  many  changes;  these  interests,  in  the 
way  common  to  money  all  the  world  over,  were  insuring 
themselves  against  the  inevitable. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  19 

The  force  of  this — pohtically — became  finally  evident 
in  1911 ;  and  what  we  have  said  in  our  opening  sentences 
should  now  be  clear.  The  Chinese  Revolution  was  an 
emotional  rising  against  the  Peking  System  because  it 
was  a  bad  and  inefficient  and  retrograde  system,  just  as 
much  as  against  the  Manchus,  who  after  all  had  adopted 
purely  Chinese  methods  and  who  were  no  more  for- 
eigners than  Scotchmen  or  Irishmen  are  foreigners  to- 
day in  England.  The  Revolution  of  1911  derived  its 
meaning  and  its  value — as  well  as  its  mandate — not 
from  what  it  proclaimed,  but  for  what  it  stood  for. 
Historically,  1911  was  the  lineal  descendant  of  1900, 
which  again  was  the  offspring  of  the  economic  collapse 
advertised  by  the  great  foreign  loans  of  the  Japanese 
war,  loans  made  necessary  because  the  Taipings  had 
disclosed  the  complete  disappearance  of  the  only  raison 
d'etre  of  Peking  sovereignty,  i.e.  the  old-time  military 
power.  The  story  is,  therefore,  clear  and  well-connected 
and  so  logical  in  its  results  that  it  has  about  it  a  finality 
suggesting  the  unrolling  of  the  inevitable. 

During  the  Revolution  the  one  decisive  factor  was 
shown  to  be  ahnost  at  once — money,  nothing  but  money. 
The  pinch  was  felt  at  the  end  of  the  first  thirty  days. 
Provincial  remittances  ceased;  the  Boxer  quotas  re- 
mained unpaid;  a  foreign  embargo  was  laid  upon  the 
Customs  funds.  The  Northern  troops,  raised  and 
trained  by  Yuan  Shih-kai,  when  he  was  Viceroy  of  the 
Metroi3olitan  province,  were,  it  is  true,  proving  them- 
selves the  masters  of  the  Yangtsze  and  South  China 
troops ;  yet  that  circumstance  was  meaningless.  Those 
troops  were  fighting  for  what  had  already  proved 
itself  a  lost  cause — the  Peking  System  as  well  as  the 
Manchu  dynasty.     The  fight  turned  more  and  more 


20  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

into  a  money-fight.  It  was  foreign  money  which 
brought  about  the  first  truce  and  the  transfer  of  the 
so-called  republican  govermnent  from  Nanking  to  Pe- 
king. In  the  strictest  sense  of  the  words  every  phase 
of  the  settlement  then  arrived  at  was  a  settlement  in 
terms  of  cash.^ 

Had  means  existed  for  rapidly  replenishing  the  Chi- 
nese Treasury  without  having  recourse  to  European 
stockmarkets  (whose  actions  are  semi-officially  con- 
trolled when  distant  regions  are  involved)  the  Republic 
might  have  fared  better.  But  placed  almost  at  once 
through  foreign  dictation  under  a  species  of  police- 
control,  which  while  nominally  derived  from  Western 
conceptions,  was  primarily  designed  to  rehabilitate  the 
semblance  of  the  authority  which  had  been  so  sensation- 
ally extinguished,  the  Republic  remained  only  a  dream ; 
and  the  world,  taught  to  believe  that  there  could  be  no 
real  stability  until  the  scheme  of  government  approxi- 
mated to  the  conception  long  formed  of  Peking  abso- 
lutism, waited  patiently  for  the  rude  awakening  which 
came  with  the  Yuan  Shih-kai  cou])  d'etat  of  4th  Novem- 
ber, 1913.  Thus  we  had  this  double  paradox;  on  the 
one  hand  the  Chinese  people  awkwardly  trying  to  be 
western  in  a  Chinese  way  and  failing:  on  the  other, 
foreign  officials  and  foreign  governments  trj^ing  to  be 
Chinese  and  making  the  confusion  worse  confounded. 
It  was  inevitable  in  such  circumstances  that  the  history 
of  the  past  six  years  should  have  been  the  history  of  a 
slow  traged}^,  and  that  almost  every  page  should  be 
written  over  with  the  name  of  the  man  who  was  the 
selected  bailiff  of  the  Powers — Yuan  Shih-kai. 

1  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  so-called  Belgian  loan,  £1,800,000  of  which 
was  paid  over  in  cash  at  the  beginning  of  1912,  was  the  instrument  which 
brought  every  one  to  terms. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  ENIGMA   OF   YUAN   SHIH-KAI 

THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  MAN  FROM  THE  OPENING  OF  HIS  CAREER  IN 

KOREA  IN  1882  TO  THE  END  OF  THE  REVOLUTION, 

12tH  FEBRUARY,  1912 

Yuan  Shih-kai's  career  falls  into  two  clear-cut  parts, 
almost  as  if  it  had  been  specially  arranged  for  the  biog- 
rapher; there  is  the  probationary  period  in  Korea,  and 
the  executive  in  North  China.  The  first  is  important 
only  because  of  the  moulding-power  which  early  in- 
fluences exerted  on  the  man's  character;  but  it  is  inter- 
esting in  another  way  since  it  affords  glimpses  of  the 
sort  of  things  which  affected  this  leader's  imagination 
throughout  his  life  and  finally  brought  him  to  irretriev- 
able ruin.  The  second  period  is  choke-full  of  action; 
and  over  every  chapter  one  can  see  the  ominous  point  of 
interrogation  which  was  finally  answered  in  his  tragic 
political  and  physical  collapse. 

Yuan  Shih-kai's  origin,  without  being  precisely  ob- 
scure, is  unimportant.  He  came  of  a  Honanese  family 
who  were  nothing  more  distinguished  than  farmers  pos- 
sessing a  certain  amount  of  land,  but  not  too  much  of 
the  world's  possessions.  The  boy  probably  ran  wild 
in  the  field  at  an  age  when  the  sons  of  high  officials  and 
literati  were  already  pale  and  anaemic  from  overmuch 
study.  To  some  such  cause  the  man  undoubtedly  owed 
his  powerful  physique,  his  remarkable  appetite,  his  gen- 
eral roughness.     Native  biographers  state  that  as  a 

21 


22  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

youth  he  failed  to  pass  his  hsiu-tsai  examinations — the 
lowest  civil  service  degree — because  he  had  spent  too 
much  time  in  riding  and  boxing  and  fencing.  An  uncle 
in  official  life  early  took  charge  of  him;  and  when  this 
relative  died  the  young  man  displayed  filial  piety  in 
accomj)anying  the  corpse  back  to  the  family  graves  and 
in  otherwise  manifesting  grief.  Through  official  con- 
nections a  place  was  subsequently  found  for  him  in  that 
public  department  under  the  Manchus  which  may  be 
called  the  mihtary  intendancy,  and  it  was  through  this 
branch  of  the  civil  service  that  he  rose  to  power.  Prop- 
erly speaking  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  never  an  army-officer ; 
he  was  a  military  official — his  highest  rank  later  on  being 
that  of  mihtary  judge,  or  better.  Judicial  Commis- 
sioner. 

Yuan  Shih-kai  first  emerges  into  public  view  in  1882 
when,  as  a  sequel  to  the  opening  of  Korea  through  the 
action  of  foreign  Powers  in  forcing  the  then  Hermit 
kingdom  to  sign  commercial  treaties,  China  began  dis- 
patching troops  to  Seoul.  Yuan  Shih-kai,  with  two 
other  officers,  commanding  in  all  some  3,000  men,  arrived 
from  Shantung,  where  he  had  been  in  the  train  of  a 
certain  General  Wu  Chang-ching,  and  now  encamped 
in  the  Korean  capital  nominally  to  preserve  order,  but 
in  reality,  to  enforce  the  claims  of  the  suzerain  power. 
For  the  Peking  Government  had  never  retreated  from 
the  position  that  Korea  had  been  a  vassal  state  ever  since 
the  Ming  Dynasty  had  saved  the  country  from  the 
clutches  of  Hideyoshi  and  his  Japanese  invaders  in  the 
Sixteenth  Century.  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  person- 
ally recommended  by  this  General  Wu  Chang-ching 
as  a  young  man  of  ability  and  energy  to  the  famous  IjI 
Hung  Chang,  who  as  Tientsin  Viceroy  and  High  Com- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  23 

missioner  for  the  Northern  Seas  was  responsible  for  the 
conduct  of  Korean  affairs.  The  future  dictator  of 
China  was  then  only  twenty-five  years  old. 

His  very  first  contact  with  practical  politics  gave  him 
a  peculiar  manner  of  viewing  political  problems.  The 
arrival  of  Chinese  troops  in  Seoul  marked  the  beginning 
of  that  acute  rivalry  with  Japan  which  finally  cul- 
minated in  the  short  and  disastrous  war  of  1894-95. 
China,  in  order  to  preserve  her  influence  in  Korea 
against  the  growing  influence  of  Japan,  intrigued  night 
and  day  in  the  Seoul  Palaces,  allying  herself  with  the 
Conservative  Court  party  which  was  led  by  the  notorious 
Korean  Queen  who  was  afterwards  assassinated.  The 
Chinese  agents  aided  and  abetted  the  reactionary  group, 
constantly  inciting  them  to  attack  the  Japanese  and 
drive  them  out  of  the  country. 

Continual  outrages  were  the  consequence.  The  Jap- 
anese legation  was  attacked  and  destroyed  by  the 
Korean  mob  not  once  but  on  several  occasions  during  a 
decade  which  furnishes  one  of  the  most  amazing  chap- 
ters in  the  history  of  Asia.  Yuan  Shih-kai,  being  then 
merely  a  junior  general  officer  under  the  orders  of  the 
Chinese  Imperial  Resident,  is  of  no  particular  import- 
ance; but  it  is  significant  of  the  man  that  he  should 
suddenly  come  well  under  the  limelight  on  the  first  pos- 
sible occasion.  On  6th  December,  1884,  leading  2,000 
Chinese  troops,  and  acting  in  concert  with  3,000  Korean 
soldiers,  he  attacked  the  Tong  Kwan  Palace  in  which 
the  Japanese  Minister  and  his  staff,  protected  by  two 
companies  of  Japanese  infantry,  had  taken  refuge  ow- 
ing to  the  threatening  state  of  affairs  in  the  capital. 
Apparently  there  was  no  particular  plan — it  was  the 
action  of  a  mob  of  soldiery  tumbling  into  a  political 


24  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

brawl  and  assisted  by  their  officers  for  reasons  which 
appear  to-day  nonsensical.  The  sequel  was,  however, 
extraordinary.  The  Japanese  held  the  Palace  gates  as 
long  as  possible,  and  then  being  desperate  exploded  a 
mine  which  killed  numbers  of  Koreans  and  Chinese  sol- 
diery and  threw  the  attack  into  confusion.  They  then 
fought  their  way  out  of  the  city  escaping  ultimately  to 
the  nearest  sea-port,  Chemulpo. 

The  explanation  of  this  extraordinary  episode  has 
never  been  made  public.  The  practical  result  was  that 
after  a  period  of  extreme  tension  between  China  and 
Japan  which  was  expected  to  lead  to  war,  that  political 
genius,  the  late  Prince  Ito,  managed  to  calm  things 
down  and  arrange  workable  modus  Vivendi.  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  who  had  gone  to  Tientsin  to  report  in  person 
to  Li  Hung  Chang,  returned  to  Seoul  triumphantly  in 
October,  1885,  as  Imperial  Resident.  He  was  then 
twenty-eight  years  old;  he  had  come  to  the  front,  no 
matter  by  what  means,  in  a  quite  remarkable  manner. 

The  history  of  the  next  nine  years  furnishes  plenty 
of  minor  incidents,  but  nothing  of  historic  importance. 
As  the  faithful  lieutenant  of  Li  Hung  Chang,  Yuan 
Shih-kai's  particular  business  was  simply  to  combat 
Japanese  influence  and  hold  the  threatened  advance  in 
check.  He  failed,  of  course,  since  he  was  plajdng  a 
losing  game;  and  yet  he  succeeded  where  he  undoubt- 
edly wished  to  succeed.  By  rendering  faithful  service 
he  established  the  reputation  he  wished  to  win;  and 
though  he  did  nothing  great  he  retained  his  post  right  up 
to  the  act  which  led  to  the  declaration  of  war  in  1894. 
Whether  he  actually  precipitated  that  war  is  still  a  mat- 
ter of  opinion.  On  the  sinking  by  the  Japanese  fleet 
of  the  British  steamer  Kowshing^  which  was  carrying 


W2 


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REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  25 

Chinese  reinforcements  from  Taku  anchorage  to  Asan 
Bay  to  his  assistance,  seeing  that  the  game  was  up,  he 
quietly  left  the  Korean  capital  and  made  his  way  over- 
land to  North  China.  That  swift,  silent  journey  home 
ends  the  period  of  his  novitiate. 

It  took  him  a  certain  period  to  weather  the  storm 
which  the  utter  collapse  of  China  in  her  armed  en- 
counter with  Japan  brought  about — and  particularly  to 
obtain  forgiveness  for  evacuating  Seoul  without  orders. 
Technically  his  offence  was  punishable  by  death — the 
old  Chinese  code  being  most  stringent  in  such  matters. 
But  by  1896  he  was  back  in  favour  again,  and  through 
the  influence  of  his  patron  Li  Hung  Chang,  he  was  at 
length  appointed  in  command  of  the  Hsiaochan  camp 
near  Tientsin,  where  he  was  promoted  and  given  the 
task  of  reforming  a  division  of  old-style  troops  and 
making  them  as  efficient  as  Japanese  soldiery.  He  had 
already  earned  a  wide  reputation  for  severity,  for  will- 
ingness to  accept  responsibility,  for  nepotism,  and  for  a 
rare  ability  to  turn  even  disasters  to  his  own  advantage 
r — all  attributes  which  up  to  the  last  moment  stood  him 
in  good  stead. 

In  the  Hsiaochan  camp  the  most  important  chapter 
of  his  life  opens;  there  is  every  indication  that  he  fully 
realized  it.  Tientsin  has  always  been  the  gateway  to 
Peking :  from  there  the  road  to  high  preferment  is  easily 
reached.  Yuan  Shih-kai  marched  steadily  forward, 
taking  the  very  first  turning-point  in  a  manner  which 
stamped  him  for  many  of  his  compatriots  in  a  way  which 
can  never  be  obliterated. 

It  is  first  necessary  to  say  a  word  about  the  troops 
of  his  command,  since  this  has  a  bearing  on  present-day 
pohtics.     The  bulk  of  the  soldiery  were  so-called  Huai 


26  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Chun — L  e.,  nominally  troops  from  the  Huai  districts, 
just  south  of  Li  Hung  Chang's  native  province  Anhui. 
These  Kiangu  men,  mixed  with  Shantung  recruits,  had 
earned  a  historic  place  in  the  favour  of  the  Manchus  ow- 
ing to  the  part  they  had  played  in  the  suppression  of  the 
Taiping  Rebellion,  in  which  great  event  General  Gor- 
don and  Li  Hung  Chang  had  been  so  closely  associated. 
They  and  the  troops  of  Hunan  province,  led  by  the 
celebrated  Marquis  Tseng  Kuo-fan,  were  "the  loyal 
troops,"  resembling  the  Sikhs  during  the  Indian  Mu- 
tiny; they  were  supposed  to  be  true  to  their  salt  to  the 
last  man.  Certainly  they  gave  proofs  of  uncustomary 
fidelity. 

In  those  military  days  of  twenty  years  ago  Yuan 
Shih-kai  and  his  henclimen  were,  however,  concerned 
with  simpler  problems.  It  was  then  a  question  of  drill 
and  nothing  but  drill.  In  his  camp  near  Tientsin  the 
future  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic  succeeded  in 
reorganizing  his  troops  so  well  that  in  a  very  short  time 
the  Hsiaochan  Division  became  known  as  a  corps  d' elite. 
The  discipline  was  so  stern  that  there  were  said  to  be 
only  two  ways  of  noticing  subordinates,  either  by  pro- 
moting or  beheading  them.  Devoting  himself  to  his 
task  Yuan  Shih-kai  gave  promise  of  being  able  to  han- 
dle much  bigger  problems. 

His  zeal  soon  attracted  the  attention  of  the  Manchu 
Court.  The  circumstances  in  Peking  at  that  time  were 
peculiar.  The  famous  old  Empress  Dowager,  Tzu- 
Hsi,  after  the  Japanese  war,  had  greatly  relaxed  her 
hold  on  the  Emperor  Kwanghsu,  who  though  still  in 
subjection  to  her,  nominally  governed  the  empire.  A 
well-intentioned  but  weak  man,  he  had  surrounded  him- 
self with  advanced  scholars,  led  by  the  celebrated  Kang 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  27 

Yu  Wei,  who  daily  studied  with  him  and  filled  him 
with  new  doctrines,  teaching  him  to  believe  that  if  he 
would  only  exert  his  power  he  might  rescue  the  nation 
from  international  ignominy  and  make  for  himself  an 
imperishable  name. 

The  sequel  was  inevitable.  In  1898  the  oriental 
world  was  electrified  by  the  so-called  Reform  Edicts,  in 
which  the  Emperor  undertook  to  modernize  China,  and 
in  which  he  exhorted  the  nation  to  obey  him.  The 
greatest  alarm  was  created  in  Court  circles  by  this 
action ;  the  whole  vast  body  of  Metropolitan  officialdom, 
seeing  its  future  threatened,  flooded  the  Palace  of  the 
Empress  Dowager  with  Secret  Memorials  praying  her 
to  resume  power.     Flattered,  she  gave  her  secret  assent. 

Things  marched  quickly  after  that.  The  Empress, 
nothing  loth,  began  making  certain  dispositions. 
Troops  were  moved,  men  were  shifted  here  and  there  in 
a  way  that  presaged  action;  and  the  Emperor,  now  thor- 
oughly alarmed  and  yielding  to  the  entreaties  of  his 
followers,  sent  two  members  of  the  Reform  Party  to 
Yuan  Shih-kai  bearing  an  alleged  autograph  order  for 
him  to  advance  instantly  on  Peking  with  all  his  troops ; 
to  surround  the  Palace,  to  secure  the  person  of  the  Em- 
peror from  all  danger,  and  then  to  depose  the  Empress 
Dowager  for  ever  from  power.  What  happened  is 
equally  well-known.  Yuan  Shih-kai,  after  an  exhaus- 
tive examination  of  the  message  and  messengers,  as  well 
as  other  attempts  to  substantiate  the  genuineness  of  the 
appeal,  communicated  its  nature  to  the  then  Viceroy  of 
Chihli,  the  Imperial  Clansman  Jung  Lu,  whose  intimacy 
with  the  Empress  Dowager  since  the  days  of  her  youth 
has  passed  into  history.  Jung  Lu  lost  no  time  in  acting. 
He  beheaded  the  two  messengers  and  personally  re- 


28  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

ported  the  whole  plot  to  the  Empress  Dowager  who  was 
akeady  fully  warned.  The  result  was  the  so-called 
coup  d'etat  of  September,  1898,  when  all  the  Reformers 
who  had  not  fled  were  summarily  executed,  and  the  Em- 
peror Kwanghsu  himself  closely  imprisoned  in  the 
Island  Palace  within  that  portion  of  the  Forbidden  City 
known  as  the  Three  Lakes,  having  (until  the  Boxer  out- 
break of  1900  carried  him  to  Hsianfu),  as  sole  com- 
panions his  two  favourites,  the  celebrated  odalisques 
"Pearl"  and  "Lustre." 

This  is  no  place  to  enter  into  the  controversial  aspect 
of  Yuan  Shih-kai's  action  in  1898  which  has  been  hotly 
debated  by  partisans  for  many  years.  For  onlookers 
the  verdict  must  always  remain  largely  a  matter  of  opin- 
ion; certainly  this  is  one  of  those  matters  which  cannot 
be  passed  upon  by  any  one  but  a  Chinese  tribunal 
furnished  with  all  the  evidence.  Those  days  which  wit- 
nessed the  imprisonment  of  Kwang  Hsu  were  great 
because  they  opened  wide  the  portals  of  the  Romance 
of  History:  all  who  were  in  Peking  can  never  forget 
the  counter-stroke ;  the  arrival  of  the  hordes  composed  of 
Tung  Fu-hsiang's  IMahommedan  cavalry — men  who  had 
ridden  hard  across  a  formidable  piece  of  Asia  at  the 
behest  of  their  Empress  and  who  entered  the  capital  in 
great  clouds  of  dust.  It  was  in  that  year  of  1898  also 
that  Legation  Guards  reappeared  in  Peking — a  few 
files  for  each  Legation  as  in  1860 — and  it  was  then  that 
clear-sighted  prophets  saw  the  beginning  of  the  end  of 
the  3Ianchu  Dynasty. 

Yuan  Shih-kai's  reward  for  his  share  in  this  counter- 
revolution was  his  appointment  to  the  governorship  of 
Shantung  province.  He  moved  thither  with  all  his 
troops  in  December,  1899.     Armed  cap-a-pie  he  was 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  29 

ready  for  the  next  act — the  Boxers,  who  burst  on 
China  in  the  Summer  of  1900.  These  men  were  akeady 
at  work  in  Shantung  villages  with  their  incantations  and 
alleged  witchcraft.  There  is  evidence  that  their  prop- 
aganda had  been  going  on  for  months,  if  not  for  years, 
before  any  one  had  heard  of  it.  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  the 
priceless  opportunity  of  studying  them  at  close  range 
and  soon  made  up  his  mind  about  certain  things.  When 
the  storm  burst,  pretending  to  see  nothing  but  mad 
fanatics  in  those  who,  realizing  the  plight  of  their  coun- 
try, had  adopted  the  war-cry  "Blot  out  the  Manchus 
and  the  foreigner,"  he  struck  at  them  fiercely,  driving 
the  whole  savage  horde  headlong  into  the  metropolitan 
province  of  Chihli.  There,  seduced  by  the  Manchus, 
they  suddenly  changed  the  inscription  on  their  flags. 
Their  sole  enemy  became  the  foreigner  and  all  his  works, 
and  forthwith  they  were  officially  protected.  Far  and 
wide  they  killed  every  white  face  they  could  find.  They 
tore  up  railways,  burnt  churches  and  chapels  and  pro- 
duced a  general  anarchy  which  could  only  have  one  end 
— European  intervention.  The  man,  sitting  on  the 
edge  of  Chinese  history  but  not  yet  identifying  himself 
with  its  main  currents  because  he  was  not  strong  enough 
for  that,  had  once  again  not  judged  wrongly.  With  his 
Korean  experience  to  assist  him,  he  had  seen  precisely 
what  the  end  must  inevitably  be. 

The  crash  in  Peking,  when  the  siege  of  the  Legations 
had  been  raised  by  an  international  army,  found  him 
alert  and  sympathetic — ready  with  advice,  ready  to 
shoulder  new  responsibilities,  ready  to  explain  away 
everything.  The  signature  of  the  Peace  Protocol  of 
1901  was  signalized  by  his  obtaining  the  viceroyalty  of 
Chihli,  succeeding  the  great  Li  Hung  Chang  himself, 


30  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

who  had  been  reappointed  to  his  old  post,  but  had  found 
active  duties  too  wearisome.  This  was  a  marvellous 
success  for  a  man  but  little  over  forty.  And  when  the 
fugitive  Court  at  length  returned  from  Hsianfu  in  1902, 
honours  were  heaped  upon  him  as  a  person  particularly 
worthy  of  honour  because  he  had  kept  up  appearances 
and  maintained  the  authority  of  the  distressed  Throne. 
As  if  in  answer  to  this  he  flooded  the  Court  with  me- 
morials praying  that  in  order  to  restore  the  power  of 
the  Dynasty  a  complete  army  of  modern  troops  be 
raised — as  nmnerous  as  possible  but  above  all  efficient. 

His  advice  was  listened  to.  From  1902  until  1907  as 
Minister  of  the  Army  Reorganization  Council — a  special 
post  he  held  simultaneously  with  that  of  metropolitan 
Viceroy — Yuan  Shih-kai's  great  effort  was  concentrated 
on  raising  an  efficient  fighting  force.  In  those  five 
years,  despite  all  financial  embarrassments.  North  China 
raised  and  equipped  six  excellent  Divisions  of  field- 
troops — 75,000  men — all  looking  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  as 
their  sole  master.  So  much  energy  did  he  display  in 
pushing  military  reorganization  throughout  the  prov- 
inces that  the  Court,  warned  by  jealous  rivals  of  his 
growing  power,  suddenly  promoted  him  to  a  post  where 
he  would  be  powerless.  One  day  he  was  brought  to 
Peking  as  Grand  Councillor  and  President  of  the  Board 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  ordered  to  hand  over  all  army 
matters  to  his  noted  rival,  the  Manchu  Tieh  Liang. 
The  time  had  arrived  to  muzzle  him.  His  last  phase 
as  a  pawn  had  come. 

Few  foreign  diplomats  calling  at  China's  Foreign 
Office  to  discuss  matters  during  that  short  period  which 
lasted  barely  a  twelve-month,  imagined  that  the  square 
resolute-looking  man  who  as  President  of  the  Board 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  31 

gave  the  same  energy  and  attention  to  consular  squab- 
bles as  to  the  reorganization  of  a  national-fighting  force, 
was  almost  daily  engaged  in  a  fierce  clandestine  struggle 
to  maintain  even  his  modest  position.  Jealousy,  which 
flourishes  in  Peking  like  the  upas  tree,  was  for  ever 
bhghting  his  schemes  and  blocking  his  plans.  He  had 
been  brought  to  Peking  to  be  tied  up;  he  was  con- 
stantly being  denounced ;  and  even  his  all  powerful  pat- 
roness, the  old  Empress  Dowager,  who  owed  so  much  to 
him,  suffered  from  constant  premonitions  that  the  end 
was  fast  approaching,  and  that  with  her  the  Dynasty 
would  die. 

In  the  Autumn  of  1908  she  took  sick.  The  gravest 
fears  quickly  spread.  It  was  immediately  reported  that 
the  Emperor  Kwanghsu  was  also  very  ill — an  ominous 
coincidence.  Very  suddenly  both  personages  collapsed 
and  died,  the  Empress  Dowager  slightly  before  the  Em- 
peror. There  is  httle  doubt  that  the  Emperor  himself 
was  poisoned.  The  legend  runs  that  as  he  expired  not 
only  did  he  give  his  Consort,  who  was  to  succeed  him  in 
the  exercise  of  the  nominal  power  of  the  Throne,  a  last 
secret  Edict  to  behead  Yuan  Shih-kai,  but  that  his  fal- 
tering hand  described  circle  after  circle  in  the  air  until 
his  followers  understood  the  meaning.  In  the  vernac- 
ular the  name  of  the  great  viceroy  and  the  word  for 
circle  have  the  same  sound;  the  gesture  signified  that 
the  dying  monarch's  last  wish  was  revenge  on  the  man 
who  had  failed  him  ten  years  before. 

An  ominous  calm  followed  this  gi-eat  break  with  the 
past.  It  was  understood  that  the  Court  was  torn  by 
two  violent  factions  regarding  the  succession  which  the 
Empress  Tzu-hsi  had  herself  decided.  The  fact  that 
another  long  Regency  had  become  inevitable  through 


32  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

the  accession  of  the  child  Hsuan  Tung  aroused  instant 
apprehensions  among  foreign  obsei*vers,  whilst  it  was 
confidently  predicted  that  Yuan  Shih-kai's  last  days  had 
come. 

The  blow  fell  suddenly  on  the  2nd  January,  1909. 
In  the  interval  between  the  death  of  the  old  Empress 
and  his  disgrace.  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  actually  promoted 
to  the  highest  rank  in  the  gift  of  the  Throne,  that  is 
made  "Senior  Guardian  of  the  Heir  Apparent"  and 
placed  in  charge  of  the  Imperial  funeral  arrangements 
— a  lucrative  appointment.  During  that  interval  it  is 
understood  that  the  new  Regent,  brother  of  the  Em- 
peror Kwang-hsu,  consulted  all  the  most  trusted  mag- 
nates of  the  empire  regarding  the  manner  in  which  the 
secret  decapitation  Decree  should  be  treated.  All  ad- 
vised him  to  be  warned  m  time,  and  not  to  venture  on  a 
course  of  action  which  would  be  condemned  both  by  the 
nation  and  by  the  Powers.  Another  Edict  was  there- 
fore prepared  simply  dismissing  Yuan  Shih-kai  from 
office  and  ordering  him  to  return  to  his  native  place. 

Every  one  remembers  that  day  in  Peking  when  pop- 
ular rumour  declared  that  the  man's  last  hour  had  come. 
Warned  on  every  side  to  beware.  Yuan  Shih-kai  left 
the  Palace  as  soon  as  he  had  read  the  Edict  of  dismissal 
in  the  Grand  Council  and  drove  straight  to  the  railway- 
station,  whence  he  entrained  for  Tientsin,  dressed  as  a 
simple  citizen.  Rooms  had  been  taken  for  him  at  a 
European  hotel,  the  British  Consulate  approached  for 
protection,  when  another  train  brought  down  his  eldest 
son  bearing  a  message  direct  from  the  Grand  Council 
Chamber,  absolutely  guaranteeing  the  safety  of  his  life. 
Accordingly  he  duly  returned  to  his  native  place  in 
Honan  province,  and  for  two  years — until  the  outbreak 


The  Late  Pkesidext  Yuan  Shih-kai 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  33 

of  the  Revolution — devoted  Mmself  sedulously  to  the  de- 
velopment of  the  large  estate  he  had  acquu-ed  with  the 
fruits  of  office.  Living  like  a  patriarch  of  old,  sur- 
rounded by  his  many  wives  and  children,  he  announced 
constantly  that  he  had  entirely  dropped  out  of  the  politi- 
cal life  of  China  and  only  desired  to  be  left  in  peace. 
There  is  reason  to  believe,  however,  that  his  henchmen 
continually  reported  to  him  the  true  state  of  affairs  and 
bade  him  bide  his  time.  Certain  it  is  that  the  firing  of 
the  first  shots  on  the  Yangtsze  found  him  alert  and 
issuing  private  orders  to  his  followers.  It  was  inevit- 
able that  he  should  have  been  recalled  to  office — and 
actually  within  one  hundred  hours  of  the  first  news  of 
the  outbreak  the  Court  sent  for  him  urgently  and  un- 
graciously. 

From  the  14(th  October,  1911,  when  he  was  appointed 
by  Imperial  Edict  Viceroy  of  Hupeh  and  Hunan  and 
ordered  to  proceed  at  once  to  the  front  to  quell  the  insur- 
rection, until  the  1st  November,  when  he  was  given 
virtually  Supreme  Power  as  President  of  the  Grand 
Council  in  place  of  Prince  Ching,  a  whole  volume  is  re- 
quired to  discuss  adequately  the  maze  of  questions 
involved.  For  the  purposes  of  this  account,  however, 
the  matter  can  be  dismissed  very  briefly  in  this  way. 
Welcoming  the  opportunity  which  had  at  last  come  and 
determined  once  for  all  to  settle  matters  decisively,  so 
far  as  he  was  personally  concerned.  Yuan  Shih-kai  de- 
liberately followed  the  policy  of  holding  back  and  de- 
laying everything  until  the  very  incapacity  marking 
both  sides — the  Revolutionists  quite  as  much  as  the 
Manchus — forced  him,  as  man  of  action  and  man  of 
diplomacy,  to  be  acclaimed  the  sole  mediator  and  saviour 
of  the  nation. 


34  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

The  detailed  course  of  the  Revolution,  and  the  pecu- 
liar manner  in  which  Yuan  Shih-kai  allowed  events 
rather  than  men  to  assert  their  mastery  has  often  been  re- 
lated and  need  not  long  detain  us.  It  is  generally  con- 
ceded that  in  spite  of  the  bravery  of  the  raw  revolution- 
ary levies,  their  capacity  was  entirely  unequal  to  the 
trump  card  Yuan  Shih-kai  held  all  the  while  in  his  hand 
— the  six  fully-equipped  Divisions  of  Field  Troops  he 
himself  had  organized  as  Tientsin  Viceroy.  It  was  a 
portion  of  this  field-force  which  captured  and  destroyed 
the  chief  revolutionary  base  in  the  triple  city  of  Hankow, 
Hanyang  and  Wuchang  in  November,  1911,  and  which 
he  held  back  just  as  it  was  about  to  give  the  coup  de 
grace  by  crossing  the  river  in  force  and  sweeping  the 
last  remnants  of  the  revolutionary  army  to  perdition. 
Thus  it  is  correct  to  declare  that  had  he  so  wished  Yuan 
Shih-kai  could  have  crushed  the  revolution  entirely  be- 
fore the  end  of  1911;  but  he  was  sufficiently  astute  to 
see  that  the  problem  he  had  to  solve  was  not  merely 
military  but  moral  as  well.  The  Chinese  as  a  nation 
were  suffering  from  a  grave  complaint.  Their  civiliza- 
tion had  been  made  almost  bankrupt  owing  to  unre- 
sisted foreign  aggression  and  to  the  native  inability  to 
cope  with  the  mass  of  accumulated  wrongs  which  a  su- 
perimposed and  exhausted  feudalism — the  Manchu 
system — had  brought  about.  Yuan  Shih-kai  knew  that 
the  Boxers  had  been  theoretically  correct  in  selecting  as 
they  first  did  the  watchword  which  they  had  first  placed 
on  their  banners — "blot  out  the  Manchus  and  all  for- 
eign things."  Both  had  sapped  the  old  civilization 
to  its  foundations.  But  the  program  they  had  pro- 
posed was  idealistic,  not  practical.  One  element  could 
be  cleared  away — the  other  had  to  be  endured.     Had 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  35 

the  Boxers  been  sensible  they  would  have  modified  their 
program  to  the  extent  of  protecting  the  foreigners, 
whilst  they  assailed  the  Dynasty  which  had  brought 
them  so  low.  The  Court  Party,  as  we  have  said,  se- 
duced their  leaders  to  acting  in  precisely  the  reverse 
sense. 

Yuan  Shih-kai  was  neither  a  Boxer,  nor  yet  a  believer 
in  idealistic  foolishness.  He  had  realized  that  the  es- 
sence of  successful  rule  in  the  China  of  the  Twentieth 
Century  was  to  support  the  foreign  point  of  view — 
nominally  at  least — because  foreigners  disposed  of  un- 
limited monetary  resources,  and  had  science  on  their 
side.  He  knew  that  so  long  as  he  did  not  openly  flout 
foreign  opinion  by  indulging  in  barefaced  assassina- 
tions, he  would  be  supported  owing  to  the  international 
reputation  he  had  established  in  1900.  Arguing  from 
these  premises,  his  instinct  also  told  him  that  an  appear- 
ance of  legality  must  always  be  sedulously  preserved 
and  the  aspirations  of  the  nation  nominally  satisfied. 
For  this  reason  he  arranged  matters  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  appear  always  as  the  instrument  of  fate.  For  this 
reason,  although  he  destroyed  the  revolutionists  on  the 
mid-Yangtsze,  to  equalize  matters,  on  the  lower 
Yangtsze  he  secretly  ordered  the  evacuation  of  Nan- 
king by  the  Imperialist  forces  so  that  he  might  have  a 
tangible  argument  with  which  to  convince  the  Manchus 
regarding  the  root  and  branch  reform  which  he  knew 
was  necessary.  That  reform  had  been  accepted  in 
principle  by  the  Throne  when  it  agreed  to  the  so-called 
Nineteen  Fundamental  Articles,  a  corpus  of  demands 
which  all  the  Northern  Generals  had  endorsed  and  had 
indeed  insisted  should  be  the  basis  of  government  be- 
fore they  would  fight  the  rebellious  South  in  1911. 


36  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  provided  he  had  been 
made  de  facto  Regent,  Yuan  Shih-kai  would  have  sup- 
ported to  the  end  a  Manchu  Monarchy.  But  the  sur- 
prising swiftness  of  the  Revolutionary  Party's  action  in 
proclaiming  the  Republic  at  Nanking  on  the  1st  Jan- 
uary, 1912,  and  the  support  which  foreign  opinion  gave 
that  venture  confused  him.  He  had  akeady  consented 
to  peace  negotiations  with  the  revolutionary  South  in  the 
middle  of  December,  1911,  and  once  he  was  drawn  into 
those  negotiations  his  policy  wavered,  the  armistice  in 
the  field  being  constantly  extended  because  he  saw  that 
the  Foreign  Powers,  and  particularly  England,  were 
averse  from  further  civil  war.  Having  dispatched  a 
former  lieutenant,  Tong  Shao-yi,  to  Shanghai  as  his 
Plenipotentiary,  he  soon  found  himself  committed  to 
a  course  of  action  different  from  what  he  had  originally 
contemplated.  South  China  and  Central  China  in- 
sisted so  vehemently  that  the  only  solution  that  was  ac- 
ceptable to  them  was  the  permanent  and  absolute  elim- 
ination of  the  Manchu  Dynasty,  that  he  himself  was 
half -convinced,  the  last  argument  necessary  being  the 
secret  promise  that  he  should  become  the  first  Presi- 
dent of  the  united  Republic.  In  the  cu'cumstances, 
had  he  been  really  loyal,  it  was  his  duty  either  to  re- 
sume his  warfare  or  resign  his  appointment  as  Prime 
Minister  and  go  into  retirement.  He  did  neither.  In 
a  thoroughly  characteristic  manner  he  sought  a  middle 
course,  after  having  vaguely  advocated  a  national  con- 
vention to  settle  the  matter.  By  specious  misrepre- 
sentation the  widow  of  the  Emperor  Kwang  Hsu — the 
Dowager  Empress  Lung  Yu  who  had  succeeded  the 
Prince  Regent  Ch'un  in  her  care  of  the  interests  of  the 
child  Emperor  Hsuan  Tung — was  induced  to  believe 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  37 

that  ceremonial  retirement  was  the  only  course  open 
to  the  Dynasty  if  the  country  was  to  be  saved  from 
disruption  and  partition.  There  is  reason  to  believe 
that  the  Memorial  of  all  the  Northern  Generals  which 
was  telegi-aphed  to  Peking  on  the  28th  January,  1912, 
and  which  advised  abdication,  was  inspired  by  him.  In 
any  case  it  was  certainly  Yuan  Shih-kai,  who  drew  up 
the  so-called  Articles  of  Favourable  Treatment  for  the 
Manchu  House  and  caused  them  to  be  telegraphed  to 
the  South,  whence  they  were  telegraphed  back  to  him 
as  the  maximum  the  Revolutionary  Party  was  pre- 
pared to  concede:  and  by  a  curious  chance  the  attempt 
made  to  assassinate  him  outside  the  Palace  Gates  ac- 
tually occurred  on  the  very  day  he  had  submitted  an 
outline  of  these  terms  on  his  bended  knees  to  the  Em- 
press Dowager  and  secured  their  qualified  acceptance. 
The  pathetic  attempt  to  confer  on  him  as  late  as  the 
26th  January  the  title  of  Marquess,  the  highest  rank  of 
nobility  which  could  be  given  a  Chinese,  an  attempt 
which  was  four  times  renewed,  was  the  last  despairing 
gesture  of  a  moribund  power.  Within  very  few  days 
the  Throne  reluctantly  decreed  its  own  abdication  in 
three  extremely  curious  Edicts  which  are  worthy  of 
study  in  the  appendix.  They  prove  conclusively  that 
the  Imperial  Family  believed  that  it  was  only  abdicating 
its  political  power,  whilst  retaining  all  ancient  cere- 
monial rights  and  titles.  Plainly  the  conception  of  a 
Republic,  or  a  People's  Government,  as  it  was  termed 
in  the  native  ideographs,  was  unintelligible  to  Peking. 
Yuan  Shih-kai  had  now  won  everything  he  wished 
for.  By  securing  that  the  Imperial  Commission  to  or- 
ganize the  Republic  and  re-unite  the  warring  sections 
was  placed  solely  in  his  hands,  he  prepared  to  give  a 


38  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

type  of  Government  about  which  he  knew  nothing  a 
trial.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  he  held  to  the  very 
end  of  his  hfe  that  he  derived  his  powers  solely  from 
the  Last  Edicts,  and  in  nowise  from  his  compact  with 
the  Nanking  Republic  which  had  instituted  the  so-called 
Provisional  Constitution.  He  was  careful,  however, 
not  to  lay  this  down  categorically  until  many  months 
later  when  his  dictatorship  seemed  undisputed.  But 
from  the  day  of  the  Manchu  Abdication  almost,  he  was 
constantly  engaged  in  calculating  whether  he  dared  risk 
everything  on  one  tlirow  of  the  dice  and  ascend  the 
Throne  himself;  and  it  is  precisely  this  which  imparts 
such  dramatic  interest  to  the  astounding  story  which 
follows. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  DREAM   REPUBLIC 

(from    the    1st    JANUARY,    1912,    TO    THE    DISSOLUTION    OF 

parliament) 

To  DESCRIBE  briefly  and  intelligibly  the  series  of  trans- 
actions from  the  1st  January,  1912,  when  the  Republic 
was  proclaimed  at  Nanking  by  a  handful  of  provincial 
delegates,  and  Dr.  Sun  Yat  Sen  elected  Provisional 
President,  to  the  coup  d'etat  of  4th  November,  1913, 
when  Yuan  Shih-kai,  elected  full  President  a  few  weeks 
previously,  after  having  acted  as  Chief  Executive  for 
twenty  months,  boldly  broke  up  Parliament  and  made 
himself  de  facto  Dictator  of  China,  is  a  matter  of  ex- 
traordinary difficulty. 

All  through  this  important  period  of  Chinese  history 
one  has  the  impression  that  one  is  in  dreamland  and 
that  fleeting  emotions  take  the  place  of  more  solid 
things.  Plot  and  counter-plot  follow  one  another  so 
rapidly  that  an  accurate  record  of  them  all  would  be 
as  wearisome  as  the  Book  of  Chronicles  itself;  whilst 
the  amazing  web  of  financial  intrigue  which  binds  the 
whole  together  is  so  complex — and  at  the  same  time  so 
antithetical  to  the  political  struggle — that  the  two 
stories  seem  to  run  counter  to  one  another,  although 
they  are  as  closely  united  as  two  assassins  pledged  to 
carry  through  in  common  a  dread  adventure.  A  huge 
agglomeration  of  people  estimated  to  number  four  hun- 
dred millions,  being  left  without  qualified  leaders  and 
told  that  the  system  of  government,  which  had  been  laid 

39 


40  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

down  by  the  Nanking  Provisional  Constitution  and  en- 
dorsed by  the  Abdication  Edicts,  was  a  system  in  which 
every  man  was  as  good  as  neighbour,  swayed  meaning- 
lessly  to  and  fro,  vainly  seeking  to  regain  the  equili- 
brium which  had  been  so  sensationally  lost.  A  litigious 
spirit  became  so  universal  that  all  authority  was  openly 
derided,  crimes  of  every  description  being  so  common 
as  to  force  most  respectable  men  to  withdraw  from 
public  affairs  and  leave  a  bare  rump  of  desperadoes  m 
power. 

Long  embarrassed  by  the  struggle  to  pay  her  for- 
eign loans  and  indemnities,  China  was  also  virtually 
penniless.  The  impossibility  of  arranging  large  bor- 
rowings on  foreign  markets  without  the  open  support 
of  foreign  governments — a  support  which  was  hedged 
round  with  conditions — made  necessary  a  system  of 
petty  expedients  under  which  practically  every  provin- 
cial administration  hypothecated  every  liquid  asset  it 
could  lay  hands  upon  in  order  to  pay  the  inordinate 
number  of  undiscij)lined  soldiery  who  littered  the  coun- 
tryside. The  issue  of  unguaranteed  paper-money  soon 
reached  such  an  immense  figure  that  the  market  was 
flooded  with  a  worthless  currency  which  it  was  unable 
to  absorb.  The  Provincial  leaders,  being  powerless  to 
introduce  improvement,  exclaimed  that  it  was  the  busi- 
ness of  the  Central  Government  as  representative  of  the 
sovereign  people  to  find  solutions;  and  so  long  as  they 
maintained  themselves  in  office  they  went  their  respec- 
tive ways  with  a  sublime  contempt  for  the  chaos  around 
them. 

What  was  this  Central  Government?  In  order  suc- 
cessfully to  understand  an  unparalleled  situation  we 
must  indicate  its  nature. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  41 

The  manoeuvres  to  which  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  so  as- 
tutely lent  himself  from  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution 
had  left  him  at  its  official  close  supreme  in  name.  Not 
only  had  he  secured  an  Imperial  Commission  from  the 
abdicating  Dynasty  to  organize  a  popular  Government 
in  obedience  to  the  national  wish,  but  having  brought 
to  Peking  the  Delegates  of  the  Nanking  Revolutionary 
Body  he  had  received  from  them  the  formal  offer  of 
the  Presidency. 

These  arrangements  had,  of  course,  been  secretly 
agreed  to  en  bloc  before  the  fighting  had  been  stopped 
and  the  abdication  proclaimed,  and  were  part  and  par- 
cel of  the  elaborate  scenery  which  officialdom  always 
employs  in  Asia  even  when  it  is  dealing  with  matters 
within  the  purview  of  the  masses.  They  had  been  made 
possible  by  the  so-called  "Article  of  Favourable  Treat- 
ment" drawn-up  by  Yuan  Shih-kai  himself,  after  con- 
sultation with  the  rebellious  South.  In  these  Capitu- 
lations it  had  been  clearly  stipulated  that  the  Manchu 
Imperial  Family  should  receive  in  perpetuity  a  Civil 
List  of  $4,000,000  Mexican  a  year,  retaining  all  their 
titles  as  a  return  for  the  surrender  of  their  political 
power,  the  bitter  pill  being  gilded  in  such  fashion  as  to 
hide  its  real  meaning,  which  alone  was  a  grave  political 
error. 

In  spite  of  this  agreement,  however,  great  mutual 
suspicion  existed  between  North  and  South  China. 
Yuan  Shih-kai  himself  was  unable  to  forget  that  the 
bold  attempt  to  assassinate  him  in  the  Peking  streets 
on  the  17th  January,  when  he  was  actually  engaged  in 
negotiating  these  very  terms  of  the  Abdication,  had  been 
apparently  inspired  from  Nanking;  whilst  the  Southern 
leaders  were  daily  reminded  by  the  vernacular  press 


42  THE  FIGHT  FOK  THE 

that  the  man  who  held  the  balance  of  power  had  always 
played  the  part  of  traitor  in  the  past  and  would  cer- 
tainly do  the  same  again  in  the  near  future. 

When  the  Delegates  came  to  Peking  in  February, 
by  far  the  most  important  matter  which  was  still  in  dis- 
pute was  the  question  of  the  oath  of  office  which  Yuan 
Shih-kai  was  called  upon  to  take  to  insure  that  he  would 
be  faithful  to  the  Republic.  The  Delegates  had  been 
charged  specifically  to  demand  on  behalf  of  the  seced- 
ing provinces  that  Yuan  Shih-kai  should  proceed  with 
them  to  Nanking  to  take  that  oath,  a  course  of  action 
which  would  have  been  held  tantamount  by  the  nation 
to  surrender  on  his  part  to  those  who  had  been  unable 
to  vanquish  him  in  the  field.  It  must  also  not  be  for- 
gotten that  from  the  very  beginning  a  sharp  and  dan- 
gerous cleavage  of  opinion  existed  as  to  the  manner 
in  which  the  powers  of  the  new  government  had  been 
derived.  South  and  Central  China  claimed,  and 
claimed  rightly,  that  the  Nanking  Provincial  Constitu- 
tion was  the  Instrument  on  which  the  Republic  was 
based:  Yuan  Shih-kai  declared  that  the  Abdication 
Edicts,  and  not  the  Nanking  Instrument  had  estab- 
lished the  Republic,  and  that  therefore  it  lay  within  his 
competence  to  organize  the  new  government  in  the 
way  which  he  considered  most  fit. 

The  discussion  which  raged  was  suddenly  terminated 
on  the  night  of  the  29th  February  (1912)  when  with- 
out any  warning  there  occurred  the  extraordinary  revolt 
of  the  3rd  Division,  a  picked  Northern  corps  who  for 
forty-eight  hours  plundered  and  burnt  portions  of  the 
capital  without  any  attempts  at  interference,  there  be- 
ing little  doubt  to-day  that  this  manoeuvre  was  delib- 
erately arranged  as  a  means  of  intimidation  by  Yuan 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  43 

Shih-kai  himself.  Although  the  disorders  assumed 
such  dimensions  that  foreign  intervention  was  nar- 
rowly escaped,  the  upshot  was  that  the  Nanking  Dele- 
gates were  completely  cowed  and  willing  to  forget  all 
about  forcing  the  despot  of  Peking  to  proceed  to  the 
Southern  capital.  Yuan  Shih-kai  as  the  man  of  the 
hour  was  enabled  on  the  10th  March,  1912,  to  take  his 
oath  in  Peking  as  he  had  wished  thus  securing  fuU 
freedom  of  action  during  the  succeeding  years.  ^ 

It  was  on  this  astounding  basis — by  means  of  an  or- 
ganized revolt — that  the  Central  Government  was  re- 
organized; and  every  act  that  followed  bears  the  mark 
of  its  tainted  parentage.  Accepting  readily  as  his 
Ministers  in  the  more  unimportant  government  De- 
partments the  nominees  of  the  Southern  Confederacy 
(which  was  now  formally  dissolved).  Yuan  Shih-kai 
was  careful  to  reserve  for  his  own  men  everything  that 
concerned  the  control  of  the  army  and  the  police,  as 
well  as  the  all-important  ministry  of  finance.  The 
framework  having  been  thus  erected,  attention  was 
almost  immediately  concentrated  on  the  problem  of 
finding  money,  an  amazing  matter  which  would  weary 
the  stoutest  reader  if  given  in  all  its  detail  but  which 
being  part  and  parcel  of  the  general  problem  must  be 
referred  to. 

1  The  defective  nature  of  this  oath  of  office  will  be  patent  at  a  glance: 
"At  the  beginning  of  the  Republic  there  are  many  things  to  be  taken 
care  of.  I,  Yuan  Shih-kai,  sincerely  wish  to  exert  my  utmost  to  promote 
the  democratic  spirit,  to  remove  the  dark  blots  of  despotism,  to  obey 
strictly  the  Constitution,  and  to  abide  by  the  wish  of  the  people,  so  as  to 
place  the  country  in  a  safe,  united,  strong,  and  firm  position,  and  to  effect 
the  happiness  and  welfare  of  the  divisions  of  the  Chinese  race.  All  these 
wishes  I  will  fulfil  without  fail.  As  soon  as  a  new  President  is  elected  by 
the  National  Assembly  I  shall  at  once  vacate  my  present  position.  With 
all  sincerity  I  take  this  oath  before  the  people  of  China. 

"Dated  the  tenth  day  of  March  in  the  First  Year  of  the  Republic  of 
China  (1912)."  (Signed)     Yuan  Shih-kai. 


44  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Certain  essential  features  can  be  very  rapidly  ex- 
posed. We  have  already  made  clear  the  purely  eco- 
nomic nature  of  the  forces  which  had  sapped  the  foun- 
dations of  Chinese  society.  Primarily  it  had  been  the 
disastrous  nature  of  Chinese  gold-indebtedness  which 
had  given  the  new  ideas  the  force  they  required  to  work 
their  will  on  the  nation.  And  just  because  the  ques- 
tion of  this  gold-indebtedness  had  become  so  serious  and 
such  a  drain  on  the  nation,  some  months  before  the  out- 
break of  the  Revolution  an  arrangement  had  been  en- 
tered into  with  the  bankers  of  four  nations  for  a  Cur- 
rency Loan  of  .£10,000,000  with  which  to  make  an  or- 
ganized effort  to  re-establish  internal  credit.  But 
this  loan  had  never  actually  been  floated,  as  a  six 
months'  safety  clause  had  permitted  a  delay  during 
which  the  Revolution  had  come.  It  was  therefore  nec- 
essary to  begin  the  negotiations  anew;  and  as  the  rich 
prizes  to  be  won  in  the  Chinese  lottery  had  attracted 
general  attention  in  the  European  financial  world 
through  the  advertisement  which  the  Revolution  had 
given  the  country,  a  host  of  alternative  loan  proposals 
now  lay  at  the  disposal  of  Peking. 

Consequently  an  extraordinary  chapter  of  bargain- 
ing commenced.  Warned  that  an  International  Debt 
Commission  was  the  goal  aimed  at  by  official  finance, 
Yuan  Shih-kai  and  the  various  parties  who  made  up 
the  Government  of  the  day,  though  disagreeing  on  al- 
most every  other  question,  were  agreed  that  this  dan- 
ger must  be  fought  as  a  common  enemy.  Though  the 
Four-Power  group  alleged  that  they  held  the  first 
option  on  all  Chinese  loans,  money  had  already  been  ad- 
vanced by  a  Franco-Belgian  Syndicate  to  the  amount 
of  nearly  two  million  pounds  during  the  critical  days  of 


Specially  Pho 


:  Present  Wohk 


r 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  45 

the  Abdication.  Furious  at  the  prospect  of  losing  their 
percentages,  the  Four  Power  group  made  the  con- 
fusion worse  confounded  by  blocking  all  competing 
proposals  and  closing  every  possible  door.  Russia  and 
Japan,  who  had  hitherto  not  been  parties  to  the  official 
consortium,  perceiving  that  participation  had  become  a 
political  necessity,  now  demanded  a  place  which  was 
grudgingly  accorded  them;  and  it  was  in  this  way  that 
the  celebrated  six-power  Group  arose. 

It  was  round  this  group  and  the  proposed  issue  of 
a  £60,000,000  loan  to  reorganize  Chinese  finance  that 
the  central  battle  raged.  The  Belgian  Syndicate,  hav- 
ing been  driven  out  of  business  by  the  financial  boy- 
cott which  the  official  group  was  strong  enough  to  or- 
ganize on  the  European  bourses,  it  remained  for  China 
to  see  whether  she  could  not  find  some  combination  or 
some  man  who  would  be  bold  enough  to  ignore  all  gov- 
ernments. 

Her  search  was  not  in  vain.  In  September  (1912) 
a  London  stockbroker,  Mr.  Birch  Crisp,  determined  to 
risk  a  brilliant  coup  by  negotiating  by  himself  a  Loan 
of  £10,000,000;  and  the  world  woke  up  one  morning 
to  learn  that  one  man  was  successfully  opposing  six 
governments.  The  recollection  of  the  storm  raised  in 
financial  circles  by  this  bold  attempt  will  be  fresh  in 
many  minds.  Every  possible  weapon  was  brought  into 
play  by  international  finance  to  secure  that  the  impu- 
dence of  financial  independence  should  be  properly 
checked;  and  so  it  happened  that  although  £5,000,000 
was  secured  after  an  intense  struggle,  it  was  soon  plain 
that  the  large  requirements  of  a  derelict  government 
could  not  be  satisfied  in  this  Quixotic  manner.  Two 
important  points  had,  however,  been  attained;  first, 


46  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

China  was  kept  financially  afloat  during  the  year  1912 
by  the  independence  of  a  single  member  of  the  London 
Stock  Exchange;  secondly,  using  this  coup  as  a  lever 
the  Peking  Government  secured  better  terms  than 
otherwise  would  have  been  possible  from  the  official 
consortium. 

Meanwhile  the  general  internal  situation  remained 
deplorable.  Nothing  was  done  for  the  provinces  whose 
paper  currency  was  depreciating  from  month  to  month 
in  an  alarming  manner ;  whilst  the  rivalries  between  the 
various  leaders  instead  of  diminishing  seemed  to  be  in- 
creasing. The  Tutuhs,  or  Military  Governors,  acting 
precisely  as  they  saw  fit,  derided  the  authority  of  Pe- 
king and  sought  to  strengthen  their  old  position  by  add- 
ing to  their  armed  forces.  In  the  capital  the  old  Man- 
chu  court,  safely  entrenched  in  the  vast  Winter  Palace 
from  which  it  has  not  even  to-day  been  ejected  (1917) 
published  daily  the  Imperial  Gazette,  bestowing  hon- 
ours and  decorations  on  courtiers  and  clansmen  and 
preserving  all  the  old  etiquette.  In  the  North-western 
provinces,  and  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  the  so- 
called  Tsung  She  Tang,  or  Imperial  Clan  Society,  in- 
trigued perpetually  to  create  risings  which  would  hasten 
the  restoration  of  the  fallen  House;  and  although 
these  intrigues  never  rose  to  the  rank  of  a  real  menace 
to  the  country,  the  fact  that  they  were  surreptitiously 
supported  by  the  Japanese  secret  service  was  a  con- 
tinual source  of  anxiety.  The  question  of  Outer  Mon- 
golia was  also  harassing  the  Central  Government.  The 
Hutuktu  or  Living  Buddha  of  Urga — the  chief  city  of 
Outer  Mongolia — had  utilized  the  revolution  to  throw 
off  his  allegiance  to  Peking;  and  the  whole  of  this  vast 
region  had  been  thrown  into  complete  disorder — which 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  47 

was  still  further  accentuated  when  Russia  on  the  21st 
October  (1912)  recognized  its  independence.  It  was 
known  that  as  a  pendent  to  this  Great  Britain  was  about 
to  insist  on  the  autonomy  of  Tibet, — a  development 
which  greatly  hurt  Chinese  pride. 

On  the  15th  August,  1912,  the  deplorable  situation 
was  well-epitomised  by  an  extraordinary  act  in  Peking, 
when  General  Chang  Cheng-wu,  one  of  the  "heroes" 
of  the  original  Wuchang  rising,  who  had  been  enticed  to 
the  capital,  was  suddenly  seized  after  a  banquet  in  his 
honour  and  shot  without  trial  at  midnight. 

This  event,  trivial  in  itself  during  times  when  judi- 
cial murders  were  common,  would  have  excited  nothing 
more  than  passing  interest  had  not  the  national  sen- 
timent been  so  aroused  by  the  chaotic  conditions.  As 
it  was  it  served  to  focus  attention  on  the  general  mal- 
administration over  which  Yuan  Shih-kai  ruled  as  pro- 
visional President.  "What  is  my  crime?"  had  shrieked 
the  unhappy  revolutionist  as  he  had  been  shot  and  then 
bayonetted  to  death.  That  query  was  most  easily  an- 
swered. His  crime  was  that  he  was  not  strong  enough 
or  big  enough  to  compete  against  more  sanguinary  men, 
his  disappearance  being  consequently  in  obedience  to 
an  universal  law  of  nature.  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  de- 
termined to  assert  his  mastery  by  any  and  every  means ; 
and  as  this  man  had  flouted  him  he  must  die. 

The  uproar  which  this  crime  aroused  was,  however, 
not  easily  appeased;  and  the  Advisory  Council,  which 
was  sitting  in  Peking  pending  the  assembling  of  the 
first  Parliament,  denounced  the  Provisional  President 
so  bitterly  that  to  show  that  these  reproaches  were  ill- 
deserved  he  invited  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  to  the  capital  treat- 
ing him  with  unparalleled  honours  and  requesting  him 


48  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

to  act  as  intermediary  between  the  rival  factions.  All 
such  manoeuvres,  however,  were  inspired  with  one  ob- 
ject,— namely  to  prove  how  nobody  but  the  master  of 
Peking  could  regulate  the  affairs  of  the  country. 

Still  no  Parliament  was  assembled.  Although  the 
Nanking  Provisional  Constitution  had  stipulated  that 
one  was  to  meet  within  ten  months  i.  e.  before  1st  No- 
vember, 1912,  the  elections  were  purposely  delayed,  the 
attention  of  the  Central  Government  being  concentrated 
on  the  problem  of  destroying  all  rivals,  and  everything 
being  subordinate  to  this  war  on  persons.  Rascals,  get- 
ting daily  more  and  more  out  of  hand,  worked  their 
will  on  rich  and  poor  alike,  discrediting  by  their  actions 
the  name  of  republicanism  and  destroying  public  con- 
fidence— which  was  precisely  what  suited  Yuan  Shih- 
kai.  Dramatic  and  extraordinary  incidents  continu- 
ally inflamed  the  public  mind,  nothing  being  too  sin- 
gular for  those  remarkable  days. 

Very  slowly  the  problem  developed,  with  everyone 
exclaiming  that  foreign  intervention  was  becoming  in- 
evitable. With  the  beginning  of  1913,  being  unable  to 
delay  the  matter  any  longer,  Yuan  Shih-kai  allowed 
elections  to  be  held  in  the  provinces.  He  was  so  badly 
beaten  at  the  polls  that  it  seemed  in  spite  of  his  military 
power  that  he  would  be  outvoted  and  outmanoeuvred 
in  the  new  National  Assembly  and  his  authority  un- 
dermined. To  prevent  this  a  fresh  assassination  was 
decided  upon.  The  ablest  Southern  leader.  Sung 
Chiao-jen,  just  as  he  was  entraining  for  Peking  with 
a  number  of  Parliamentarians  at  Shanghai,  was  coolly 
shot  in  a  crowded  railway  station  by  a  desperado  who 
admitted  under  trial  that  he  had  been  paid  £200  for 
the  job  by  the  highest  authority  in  the  land,  the  evi- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  49 

dence  produced  in  court  including  telegrams  from  Pe- 
king which  left  no  doubt  as  to  who  had  instigated  the 
murder. 

The  storm  raised  by  this  evil  measure  made  it  ap- 
pear as  if  no  parliament  could  ever  assemble  in  Peking. 
But  the  feeling  had  become  general  that  the  situation 
was  so  desperate  that  action  had  to  be  taken.  Not  only 
was  their  reputation  at  stake,  but  the  Kuomingtang  or 
Revolutionary  Party  now  knew  that  the  future  of  their 
country  was  involved  just  as  much  as  the  safety  of 
their  own  lives;  and  so  after  a  rapid  consultation  they 
determined  that  they  would  beard  the  lion  in  his  den. 
Rather  unexpectedly  on  the  7th  April  (1913)  Parlia- 
ment was  opened  in  Peking  with  a  huge  Southern  ma- 
jority and  the  benediction  of  all  Radicals.  ^  Hopes 
rose  with  mercurial  rapidity  as  a  solution  at  last  seemed 
in  sight.  But  hardly  had  the  first  formalities  been 
completed  and  Speakers  been  elected  to  both  Houses, 
than  by  a  single  dramatic  stroke  Yuan  Shih-kai  re- 
duced to  nought  these  labours  by  stabbing  in  the  back 
the  whole  theory  and  practice  of  popular  government. 

The  method  he  employed  was  simplicity  itself,  and 
it  is  peculiarly  characteristic  of  the  man  that  he  should 
have  been  so  bluntly  cynical.  Though  the  Provisional 
Nanking  Constitution,  which  was  the  "law"  of  China 
so  far  as  there  was  any  law  at  all,  had  laid  down  spe- 
cifically in  article  XIX  that  all  measures  affecting  the 
National  Treasury  must  receive  the  assent  of  Parlia- 

1  The  Parliament  of  China  is  composed  of  a  House  of  Representatives 
numbering  596  members  and  a  Senate  of  274.  The  Representatives  are 
elected  by  means  of  a  property  and  educational  franchise  which  is  esti- 
mated to  give  about  four  million  voters  (1  per  cent  of  the  population)  al- 
though in  practice  relatively  few  vote.  The  Senate  is  elected  by  the 
Provincial  Assemblies  by  direct  ballot.  In  the  opinion  of  the  writer,  the 
Chinese  Parliament  in  spite  of  obvious  shortcoming,  irf  representative  of 
the  country  in  its  present  transitional  stage. 


50  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

ment,  Yuan  Shih-kai,  pretending  that  the  small  Ad- 
visory Council  which  had  assisted  him  during  the  pre- 
vious year  and  which  had  only  just  been  dissolved,  had 
sanctioned  a  foreign  loan,  peremptorily  ordered  the 
signature  of  the  great  Reorganization  Loan  of 
£25,000,000  which  had  been  secretly  under  negotiation 
all  Winter  with  the  financial  agents  of  six  Powers,  ^ 
although  the  rupture  which  had  come  in  the  previous 
June  as  a  forerunner  to  the  Crisp  loan  had  caused  the 
general  public  to  lose  sight  of  the  supreme  importance  of 
the  financial  factor.  Parliament,  seeing  that  apart 
from  the  possibility  of  a  Foreign  Debt  Commission  be- 
ing created  something  after  the  Turkish  and  Egyptian 
models,  a  direct  challenge  to  its  existence  had  been  of- 
fered, raged  and  stormed  and  did  its  utmost  to  delay 
the  question;  but  the  Chief  Executive  having  made  up 
his  mind  shut  himself  up  in  his  Palace  and  absolutely 
refused  to  see  any  Parliamentary  representatives.  Al- 
though the  Minister  of  Finance  himself  hesitated  to 
complete  the  transaction  in  the  face  of  the  rising  storm 
and  actually  fled  the  capital,  he  was  brought  back  by 
special  train  and  forced  to  complete  the  agreement.  At 
four  o'clock  in  the  morning  on  the  25th  April  the  last 
documents  were  signed  in  the  building  of  a  foreign  bank 
and  the  Finance  Minister,  galloping  his  carriage  sud- 

1  The  American  Group  at  the  last  moment  dropped  out  of  the  Sextuple 
combination  (prior  to  the  signature  of  the  contract)  after  President  Wilson 
had  made  his  well-known  pronouncement  deprecating  the  association  of 
Americans  in  any  financial  undertakings  which  impinged  upon  the  rights 
of  sovereignty  of  a  friendly  Power, — which  was  his  considered  view  of  the 
manner  in  which  foreign  governments  were  assisting  their  nationals  to 
gain  control  of  the  Salt  Administration.  The  exact  language  the  President 
used  was  that  the  conditions  of  the  loan  seemed  "to  touch  very  nearly  the 
administrative  independence  of  China  itself,"  and  that  a  loan  thus  ob- 
tained was  "obnoxious"  to  the  principles  upon  which  the  American  govern- 
ment rests.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  President  Wilson's  dictum  will  be  uni- 
versally accepted  after  the  war  and  that  meddling  in  Chinese  affairs  will 
cease. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  51 

denly  out  of  the  compound  to  avoid  possible  bombs, 
reported  to  his  master  that  at  last — in  spite  of  the  nom- 
inal foreign  control  which  was  to  govern  the  disburse- 
ment— a  vast  sum  was  at  his  disposal  to  further  his  own 
ends. 

Safe  in  the  knowledge  that  possession  is  nine  points 
of  the  law,  Yuan  Shih-kai  now  treated  with  derision  the 
resolutions  which  Parliament  passed  that  the  transac- 
tion was  illegal  and  the  loan  agreement  null  and  void. 
Being  openly  backed  by  the  agents  of  the  Foreign 
Powers,  he  immediately  received  large  cash  advances 
which  enabled  him  to  extend  his  power  in  so  many  di- 
rections that  further  argument  with  him  seemed  use- 
less. It  is  necessary  to  record  that  the  Parliamentaiy 
leaders  had  almost  gone  down  on  their  knees  to  cer- 
tain of  the  foreign  Ministers  in  Peking  in  a  vain  at- 
tempt to  persuade  them  to  delay — as  they  could  very 
well  have  done — the  signature  of  this  vital  Agreement 
for  forty-eight  hours  so  that  it  could  be  formally  passed 
by  the  National  Assembly,  and  thus  save  the  vital  por- 
tion of  the  sovereignty  of  the  country  from  passing  un- 
der the  heel  of  one  man.  But  Peking  diplomacy  is  a 
perverse  and  disagreeable  thing;  and  the  Foreign  Min- 
isters of  those  days,  although  accredited  to  a  govern- 
ment which  while  it  had  not  then  been  formally  recog- 
nized as  a  Republic  by  any  Power  save  the  United 
States,  was  bound  to  be  so  very  shortly,  were  determined 
to  be  reactionary  and  were  at  heart  delighted  to  find 
things  running  back  normally  to  absolutism.^     High 

1  The  United  States  accorded  formal  recognition  to  the  Republic  on  the 
election  of  the  Speakers  of  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament:  the  other  Treaty 
Powers  delayed  recognition  until  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  elected  full 
President  in  October.  It  has  been  very  generally  held  that  the  long  delay 
in  foreign  recognition  of  the  Republic  contributed  greatly  to  its  internal 
troubles  by  making  every  one  doubt  the  reality  of  the  Nanking  transac- 


52  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

finance  had  at  last  got  hold  of  everything  it  required 
from  China  and  was  in  no  mood  to  relax  the  monopoly 
of  the  salt  administration  which  the  Loan  Agreement 
conferred.  Nor  must  be  the  fact  be  lost  sight  of  that 
of  the  nominal  amount  of  .£25,000,000  which  had  been 
borrowed,  fully  half  consisted  of  repayments  to  for- 
eign Banks  and  never  left  Europe.  According  to  the 
schedules  attached  to  the  Agreement,  Annex  A,  com- 
prising the  Boxer  arrears  and  bank  advances,  absorbed 
£4,  317,778 :  Annex  B,  being  so-called  provincial  loans, 
absorbed  a  further  £2,870,000:  Annex  C,  being  liabili- 
ties shortly  maturing,  amounted  to  £3,592,263:  Annex 
D,  for  disbandment  of  troops,  amounted  to  £3,000,000 : 
Annex  C,  to  cover  current  administrative  expenses  to- 
talled £5,500,000:  whilst  Annex  E  which  covered  the 
reorganization  of  the  Salt  Administration,  absorbed  the 
last  £2,000,000.  The  bank  profits  on  this  loan  alone 
amounted  to  1%  million  pounds;  whilst  Yuan  Shih-kai 
himself  was  placed  in  possession  by  a  system  of  weekly 
disbursements  of  a  sum  roughly  amounting  to  ten 
million  sterling,  which  was  amply  sufiicient  to  allow  him 
to  wreak  his  will  on  his  fellow-countrymen.  Exasper- 
ated to  the  pitch  of  despair  by  this  new  development,  the 
Central  and  Southern  provinces,  after  a  couple  of 
months'  vain  argument,  began  openly  to  arm.  On  the 
10th  July  in  Kiangse  province  on  the  river  Yangtsze 
the  Northern  garrisons  were  fired  upon  from  the  Hu- 
kow  forts  by  the  provincial  troops  under  General  Li 
liiv.  'i-chun  and  the  so-called  Second  Revolution  com- 
rnei  ^ed. 

t!oi..  Tost  important,  however,  is  the  historical  fact  that  a  group  of 
J'OMn  numbering  the  two  great  leaders  of  democracy  in  Europe — Eng- 
land and  France — did  everything  they  could  in  Peking  to  enthrone  Yuan 
Shih-kai  as  dictator. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  53 

The  campaign  was  short  and  inglorious.  The  South, 
ill-furnished  with  munitions  and  practically  penniless, 
and  always  confronted  by  the  same  well-trained  North- 
ern Divisions  who  had  proved  themselves  invincible  only 
eighteen  months  before,  fought  hard  for  a  while,  but 
never  became  a  serious  menace  to  the  Central  Gov- 
ernment owing  to  the  lack  of  co-operation  between  the 
various  Rebel  forces  in  the  field.  The  Kiangse  troops 
under  General  Li  Lieh-chun,  who  numbered  at  most 
20,000  men,  fought  stiffly,  it  is  true,  for  a  while  but  were 
unable  to  strike  with  any  success  and  were  gradually 
driven  far  back  from  the  river  into  the  mountains  of 
Kiangse  where  their  numbers  rapidly  melted  away. 
The  redoubtable  revolutionary  Huang  Hsin,  who  had 
proved  useful  as  a  propagandist  and  a  bomb-thrower 
in  earlier  days,  but  who  was  useless  in  serious  warfare, 
although  he  assumed  command  of  the  Nanking  garri- 
son which  had  revolted  to  a  man,  and  attempted  a 
march  up  the  Pukow  railway  in  the  direction  of  Tient- 
sin, found  his  effort  break  down  almost  immediately 
from  lack  of  organization  and  fled  to  Japan.  The 
Nanking  troops,  although  deserted  by  their  leader,  of- 
fered a  strenuous  resistance  to  the  capture  of  the  south- 
ern capital  which  was  finally  effected  by  the  old  reac- 
tionary General  Chang  Hsun  operating  in  conjunction 
with  General  Feng  Kuo-chang  who  had  been  dis- 
patched from  Peking  with  a  picked  force.  The  attack 
on  the  Shanghai  arsenal  which  had  been  quietly  occu- 
pied by  a  small  Northern  Garrison  during  the  months 
succeeding  the  great  loan  transaction,  although  pushed 
with  vigour  by  the  South,  likewise  ultimately  collapsed 
through  lack  of  artillery  and  proper  leadership.  The 
navy,  which  was  wholly  Southern  in  its  sympathies  and 


54  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

which  had  been  counted  upon  as  a  valuable  weapon  in 
cutting  off  the  whole  Yangtsze  Valley,  was  at  the  last 
moment  purchased  to  neutrality  by  a  liberal  use  of 
money  obtained  from  the  foreign  banks,  under,  it  is  said, 
the  heading  of  administrative  expenses!  The  turbu- 
lent city  of  Canton,  although  it  also  rose  against  the 
authority  of  Peking,  had  been  well  provided  for  by 
Yuan  Shih-kai.  A  border  General,  named  Lung  Chi- 
Kwang,  with  20,000  semi-savage  Kwangsi  troops  had 
been  moved  near  the  city  and  at  once  attacked  and  over- 
awed the  garrison.  Appointed  Military  Governor  of 
the  province  in  return  for  his  services,  this  Lung  Chi- 
kwang,  who  was  an  infamous  brute,  for  three  years 
ruled  the  South  with  heartless  barbarity,  until  he  was 
finally  ejected  by  the  great  rising  of  1916.  Thor- 
oughly disappointed  in  this  and  many  other  directions 
the  Southern  Party  was  now  emasculated;  for  the 
moneyed  classes  had  withheld  their  support  to  the  end, 
and  without  money  nothing  is  possible  in  China.  The 
1913  outbreak,  after  lasting  a  bare  two  months,  igno- 
miniously  collapsed  with  the  flight  of  every  one  of  the 
leaders  on  whose  heads  prices  were  put.  The  road  was 
now  left  open  for  the  last  step  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  in 
mind,  the  coup  against  Parliament  itself,  which  al- 
though unassociated  in  any  direct  way  with  the  rising, 
had  undoubtedly  maintained  secret  relations  with  the 
rebellious  generals  in  the  field. 

Parliament  had  further  sinned  by  appointing  a  Spe- 
cial Constitutional  Drafting  Committee  which  had  held 
its  sittings  behind  closed  doors  at  the  Temple  of  Heaven. 
During  this  drafting  of  the  Permanent  Constitution, 
admittance  had  been  absolutely  refused  to  Yuan  Shih- 
kai's  delegates  who  had  been  sent  to  urge  a  modifica- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  55 

tion  of  the  decentralization  which  had  been  such  a  char- 
acteristic of  the  Nanking  Instrument.  Such  details  as 
transpired  showed  that  the  principle  of  absolute  money- 
control  was  not  only  to  be  the  dominant  note  in  the  Per- 
manent Constitution,  but  that  a  new  and  startling  in- 
novation was  being  included  to  secure  that  a  de  facto 
Dictatorship  should  be  rendered  impossible.  Briefly, 
it  was  proposed  that  when  Parliament  was  not  actually 
in  session  there  should  be  left  in  Peking  a  special  Par- 
liamentary Committee,  charged  with  supervising  and 
controlling  the  Executive,  and  checking  any  usurpation 
of  power. 

This  was  enough  for  Yuan  Shih-kai:  he  felt  that  he 
was  not  only  an  object  of  general  suspicion  but  that  he 
was  being  treated  with  contempt.  He  determined  to 
finish  with  it  all.  He  was  as  yet,  however,  only  pro- 
visional President  and  it  was  necessary  to  show  cun- 
ning. Once  more  he  set  to  work  in  a  characteristic  way. 
By  a  liberal  use  of  money  Parliament  was  induced  to 
pass  in  advance  of  the  main  body  of  articles  the  Chap- 
ter of  the  Constitution  dealing  with  the  election  and 
term  of  office  of  the  President.  When  that  had  been 
done  the  two  Chambers  sitting  as  an  Electoral  College, 
after  the  model  of  the  French  Parliament,  being  partly 
bribed  and  partly  terrorised  by  a  military  display,  were 
induced  to  elect  him  full  President. 

On  the  10th  October  he  took  his  final  oath  of  office 
as  President  for  a  term  of  five  years  before  a  gi-eat 
gathering  of  officials  and  the  whole  diplomatic  body  in 
the  magnificent  Throne  Room  of  the  Winter  Palace. 
Safe  now  in  his  Constitutional  position  nothing  re- 
mained for  him  but  to  strike.  On  the  4th  November 
he  issued  an  arbitrary  Mandate,  which  received  the 


56  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

counter-signature  of  the  whole  Cabinet,  ordering  the 
unseating  of  all  the  so-called  Kuomingtang  or  Radical 
Senators  and  Representatives  on  the  counts  of  conspir- 
acy and  secret  complicity  with  the  July  rising  and 
vaguely  referring  to  the  filling  of  the  vacancies  thus 
created  by  new  elections/  The  Metropolitan  Police 
rigorously  carried  out  the  order  and  although  no  bru- 
tahty  was  shown,  it  was  made  clear  that  if  any  of  the 
indicted  men  remained  in  Peking  their  lives  would  be  at 
stake.  Having  made  it  impossible  for  Parliament  to 
sit  owing  to  the  lack  of  quorums.  Yuan  Shih-kai  was 
able  to  proceed  with  his  work  of  reorganization  in  the 
way  that  best  suited  him;  and  the  novel  spectacle  was 
offered  of  a  truly  Mexican  situation  created  in  the  Far 
East  by  and  with  the  assent  of  the  Powers.  It  is  sig- 
nificant that  the  day  succeeding  this  coup  d'etat  of  the 
4th  November  the  agreement  conceding  autonomy  to 
Outer  Mongolia  was  signed  with  Russia,  China  simply 
retaining  the  right  to  station  a  diplomatic  representa- 
tive at  Urga.^ 

In  spite  of  his  undisputed  power,  matters  however 
did  not  improve.  The  police-control,  judiciously  min- 
gled with  assassinations,  which  was  now  put  in  full 
vigour  was  hardly  the  administration  to  make  room  for 
which  the  Manchus  had  been  expelled ;  and  the  country 
secretly  chafed  and  cursed.  But  the  disillusionment  of 
the  people  was  complete.     Revolt  had  been  tried  in 

1  According  to  the  oflBcial  lists  published  subsequent  to  the  coup  d'etat, 
98  Senators  and  252  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  had  their 
Parliamentary  Certificates  impounded  by  the  police  as  a  result  of  the 
Mandates  of  the  4th  November,  and  were  ordered  to  leave  the  Capital.  In 
addition  34  Senators  and  54  Members  of  the  Lower  House  fled  from 
Peking  before  their  Certificates  could  be  seized.  Therefore  the  total  num- 
ber affected  by  the  proscription  was  132  Senators  and  306  Representatives. 
As  the  quorums  in  the  case  of  both  Houses  are  half  the  total  membership, 
any  further  sittings  were  thus  made  impossible. 

8  A  full  copy  of  this  agreement  will  be  found  in  the  appendix. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  57 

vain;  and  as  the  support  which  the  Powers  were  afford- 
ing to  this  regime  was  well  understood  there  was  nothing 
to  do  but  to  wait,  safe  in  the  knowledge  that  such  a 
situation  possessed  no  elements  of  permanency. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   DICTATOR  AT   WORK 

(from    the    coup    d'etat    of    the    4th    NOVEMBER,    1913,   TO    THE 
OUTBREAK    OF    THE    WORLD-WAR    IST    AUGUST, 

1914) 

With  the  Parliament  of  China  effectively  destroyed, 
and  the  turbulent  Yangtsze  Valley  dragooned  into  sul- 
len submission,  Yuan  Shih-kai's  task  had  become  so 
vastly  simplified  that  he  held  the  moment  to  have  arrived 
when  he  could  openly  turn  his  hand  to  the  problem  of 
making  himself  absolutely  supreme,  de  jure  as  well  as 
de  facto.  But  there  was  one  remaining  thing  to  be 
done.  To  drive  the  last  nail  into  the  coffin  of  the  Re- 
public it  was  necessary  to  discredit  and  virtually  im- 
prison the  man  who  was  Vice-President. 

It  is  highly  characteristic  that  although  he  had  re- 
ceived from  the  hero  of  the  Wuchang  Rising  the  most 
loyal  co-operation — a  co-operation  of  a  very  arduous 
character  since  the  Commander  of  the  Middle  Yangtsze 
had  had  to  resist  the  most  desperate  attempts  to  force 
him  over  to  the  side  of  the  rebelhon  in  July,  1913, 
nevertheless,  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  determined  to  bring 
this  man  to  Peking  as  a  prisoner  of  state. 

It  was  just  the  fact  that  General  Li  Yuan-hung  was 
a  national  hero  which  impelled  the  Dictator  to  action. 
In  the  election  which  had  been  carried  out  in  October, 
1913,  by  the  National  Assembly  sitting  as  a  National 
Convention,  in  spite  of  every  effort  to  destroy  his  influ- 

68 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  59 

ence,  the  personal  popularity  of  the  Vice-President  had 
been  such  that  he  had  received  a  large  number  of  votes 
for  the  office  of  full  President — which  had  necessitated 
not  one  but  three  ballots  being  taken,  making  most 
people  declare  that  had  there  been  no  bribery  or  intimi- 
dation he  would  have  probably  been  elected  to  the  su- 
preme office  in  the  land,  and  ousted  the  ambitious 
usurper.  In  such  circumstances  his  complete  elimina- 
tion was  deemed  an  elementary  necessity.  To  secure 
that  end  Yuan  Shih-kai  suddenly  dispatched  to  Wu- 
chang— where  the  Vice-President  had  resided  without 
break  since  1911 — the  Minister  of  War,  General  Tuan 
Chi-jui,  with  implicit  instructions  to  deal  with  the  prob- 
lem in  any  way  he  deemed  satisfactory,  stopping  short 
of  nothing  should  his  victim  prove  recalcitrant. 

Fortunately  General  Tuan  Chi-jui  did  not  belong  to 
the  ugly  breed  of  men  Yuan  Shih-kai  loved  to  sur- 
round himself  with;  and  although  he  was  a  loyal  and 
efficient  officer  the  politics  of  the  assassin  were  unknown 
to  him.  He  was  therefore  able  to  convince  the  Vice- 
President  after  a  brief  discussion  that  the  easiest  way 
out  of  the  ring  of  intriguers  and  plotters  in  which  Yuan 
Shih-kai  was  rapidly  surrounding  him  in  Wuchang  was 
to  go  voluntarily  to  the  capital.  There  at  least  he  would 
be  in  daily  touch  with  developments  and  able  to  fight  his 
own  battles  without  fear  of  being  stabbed  in  the  back; 
since  under  the  eye  of  the  foreign  Legations  even  Yuan 
Shih-kai  was  exhibiting  a  certain  timidity.  Indeed 
after  the  outcry  which  General  Chang  Cheng- wu's  ju- 
dicial murder  had  aroused  he  had  reserved  his  ugliest 
deeds  for  the  provinces,  only  small  men  being  done  to 
death  in  Peking.  Accordingly,  General  Li  Yuan-hung 
packed  a  bag  and  accompanied  only  by  an  aide-de-camp 


60  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

left  abruptly  for  the  capital  where  he  arrived  on  the 
11th  December,  1913. 

A  great  sensation  was  caused  throughout  China  by 
this  sudden  departure,  consternation  prevailing  among 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  Hupeh  (Wuchang)  army 
when  the  newspapers  began  to  hint  that  their  beloved 
chief  had  been  virtually  abducted.  Although  cordially 
received  by  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  given  as  his  personal  res- 
idence the  Island  Palace  where  the  unfortunate  Em- 
peror Kwang  Hsu  had  been  so  long  imprisoned  by  the 
Empress  Dowager  Tsu  Hsi  after  her  coup  d'etat  of 
1898,  it  did  not  take  long  for  General  Li  Yuan-hung 
to  understand  that  his  presence  was  a  source  of  embar- 
rassment to  the  man  who  would  be  king.  Being,  how- 
ever, gifted  with  an  astounding  fund  of  patience,  he 
prepared  to  sit  down  and  allow  the  great  game  which 
he  knew  would  now  unroll  to  be  played  to  its  normal 
ending.  What  General  Li  Yuan-hung  desired  above 
all  was  to  be  forgotten  completely  and  absolutely — 
springing  to  life  when  the  hour  of  deliverance  finally 
arrived.  His  policy  was  shown  to  be  not  only  psycho- 
logically accurate,  but  masterly  in  a  pohtical  sense. 
The  greatest  ally  of  honesty  in  China  has  always  been 
time,  the  inherent  decency  of  the  race  finally  discredit- 
ing scoundrehsm  in  every  period  of  Chinese  history. 

The  year  1914  dawned  with  so  many  obstacles  re- 
moved that  Yuan  Shih-kai  became  more  and  more  per- 
emptory in  his  methods.  In  February  the  young  Em- 
press Lun  Yi,  widow  of  the  Emperor  Kwang  Hsu, 
who  two  years  previously  in  her  character  of  guardian 
of  the  boy-Emperor  Hsuan  Tung,  had  been  cajoled  into 
sanctioning  the  Abdication  Edicts,  unexpectedly  ex- 
pired, her  death  creating  profound  emotion  because  it 


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REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  61 

snapped  the  last  link  with  the  past.  Yuan  Shih-kai's 
position  was  considerably  strengthened  by  this  auspi- 
cious event  which  secretly  greatly  delighted  him;  and 
by  his  order  for  three  days  the  defunct  Empress  lay  in 
State  in  the  Grand  Hall  of  the  Winter  Palace  and 
received  the  obeisance  of  countless  multitudes  who  ap- 
peared strangely  moved  by  this  hitherto  unknown  pro- 
cedure. There  was  now  only  a  nine-year  old  boy 
between  the  Dictator  and  his  highest  ambitions.  Two 
final  problems  still  remained  to  be  dealt  with:  to  give 
a  legal  form  to  a  purely  autocratic  rule,  and  to  find 
money  to  govern  the  countiy.  The  second  matter  was 
vastly  more  important  than  the  first  to  a  man  who  did 
not  hesitate  to  base  his  whole  polity  on  the  teachings  of 
Machiavelli,  legality  being  looked  upon  as  only  so  much 
political  window-dressing  to  placate  foreign  opinion  and 
prevent  intervention,  whilst  without  money  even  the 
semblance  of  the  rights  of  eminent  domain  could  not 
be  preserved.  Everything  indeed  hinged  on  the  ques- 
tion of  finding  money. 

There  was  none  in  China,  at  least  none  for  the  gov- 
ernment. Financial  chaos  still  reigned  supreme  in  spite 
of  the  great  Reorganization  Loan  of  £25,000,000,  which 
had  been  carefully  arranged  more  for  the  purpose  of 
wiping-out  international  indebtedness  and  balancing  the 
books  of  foreign  bankers  than  to  institute  a  modern 
government.  All  the  available  specie  in  the  country 
had  been  very  quietly  remitted  in  these  troubled  times 
by  the  native  merchant-guilds  from  every  part  of  China 
to  the  vast  emporium  of  Shanghai  for  safe  custody, 
where  a  sum  not  far  short  of  a  hundred  million  ounces 
now  choked  the  vaults  of  the  foreign  banks, — being  safe 
from  governmental  expropriation.     The  collection  of 


62  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

provincial  revenues  having  been  long  disorganized,  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  in  spite  of  his  military  dictatorship,  found  it 
impossible  to  secure  the  proper  resumption  of  the  pro- 
vincial remittances.  Fresh  loans  became  more  and  more 
sought  after;  by  means  of  forced  domestic  issues  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  cash  was  obtained,  but  the  country  lived 
from  hand  to  mouth  and  everybody  was  unhappy. 
Added  to  this  by  March  the  formidable  insurrection  of 
the  "White  Wolf"  bandits  in  Central  China — under  the 
legendary  leadership  of  a  man  who  was  said  to  be  invul- 
nerable— necessitated  the  mobilization  of  a  fresh  army 
which  ran  into  scores  of  battalions  and  which  was  vainly 
engaged  for  nearly  half  a  year  in  rounding-up  this 
replica  of  the  Mexican  Villa.  So  demoralized  had  the 
army  become  from  long  license  that  this  guerilla  war- 
fare was  waged  with  all  possible  slackness  until  a  chance 
shot  mortally  wounded  the  chief  brigand  and  his  im- 
mense following  automatically  dispersed.  During  six 
months  these  pests  had  ravaged  three  provinces  and 
menaced  one  of  the  most  strongly  fortified  cities  in 
Asia — the  old  capital  of  China,  Hsianfu,  whither  the 
Manchu  Court  had  fled  in  1900. 

Meanwhile  wholesale  executions  were  carried  out  in 
the  provinces  with  monotonous  regularity  and  all  at- 
tempts at  rising  ruthlessly  suppressed.  In  Peking  the 
infamous  Chih  Fa  Chu  or  Military  Court — a  sort  of 
Chinese  Star-Chamber — was  continually  engaged  in 
summarily  dispatching  men  suspected  of  conspiring 
against  the  Dictator.  Even  the  printed  word  was 
looked  upon  as  seditious,  an  unfortunate  native  editor 
being  actually  flogged  to  death  in  Hankow  for  telling 
the  truth  about  conditions  in  the  riverine  districts. 
These  cruelties  made  men  more  and  more  determined 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  63 

to  pay  off  the  score  the  very  first  moment  that  was 
possible.  Although  he  was  increasingly  pressed  for 
ready  money.  Yuan  Shih-kai,  by  the  end  of  April,  1914, 
had  the  situation  sufficiently  in  hand  to  bring  out  his 
supreme  surprise, — a  brand-new  Constitution  promul- 
gated under  the  euphonious  title  of  "The  Constitutional 
Compact." 

This  precious  document,  which  had  no  more  legality 
behind  it  as  a  governing  instrument  than  a  private  letter, 
can  be  studied  by  the  curious  in  the  appendix  where  it 
is  given  in  full:  here  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  no  such 
hocuspocus  had  ever  been  previously  indulged  in  China. 
Drafted  by  an  American  legal  adviser.  Dr.  Goodnow, 
who  was  later  to  earn  unenviable  international  notoriety 
as  the  endorser  of  the  monarchy  scheme,  it  erected  what 
it  was  pleased  to  call  the  Presidential  System ;  that  is,  it 
placed  all  power  directly  in  the  hands  of  the  President, 
giving  him  a  single  Secretary  of  State  after  the  Ameri- 
can model  and  reducing  Cabinet  Ministers  to  mere  De- 
partment Chiefs  who  received  their  instructions  from 
the  State  Department  but  had  no  real  voice  in  the  actual 
government.  A  new  provincial  system  was  likewise  ^ 
invented  for  the  provinces,  the  Tutulis  or  Governors  of 
the  Revolutionary  period  being  turned  into  Chiang  Chun 
or  Military  Officials  on  the  Manchu  model  and  provin- 
cial control  absolutely  centralized  in  their  hands,  whilst 
the  Provincial  Assemblies  established  under  the  former 
dynasty  were  summarily  abolished.  The  worship  at 
the  Temple  of  Heaven  was  also  re-established  and  so 
was  the  official  worship  of  Confucius — both  Imperial- 
istic measures — whilst  a  brand-new  ceremony,  the  wor- 
ship of  the  two  titulary  Military  Gods,  was  ordered  so 
as  to  inculcate  military  virtue!     It  was  laid  down  that 


64  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

in  the  worship  of  Heaven  the  President  would  wear  the 
robes  of  the  Dukes  of  the  Chow  dynasty,  b.  c.  1112,  a 
novel  and  interesting  republican  experiment.  Excerpts 
from  two  Mandates  which  belong  to  these  days  throw  a 
flood  of  light  on  the  kind  of  reasoning  which  was  held 
to  justify  these  developments.     The  first  declares: 

.  .  .  "In  a  Republic  the  Sovereign  Power  is  vested  in  the 
people,  and  the  main  principle  is  that  all  things  should  be  de- 
termined in  accordance  with  the  desires  of  the  majority.  These 
desires  may  be  embraced  by  two  words,  namely,  existence  and 
happiness.  I,  the  President,  came  from  my  farm  because  I 
was  unable  to  bear  the  eternal  sufferings  of  the  innocent  people. 
I  assumed  office  and  tried  vainly  to  soothe  the  violent  feelings. 
The  greatest  evil  nowadays  is  the  misunderstanding  of  true  prin- 
ciples. The  Republicans  on  the  pretext  of  public  interest  try 
to  attain  selfish  ends,  some  going  so  far  as  to  consider  the  for- 
saking of  parents  as  a  sign  of  liberty  and  regarding  the  viola- 
tion of  the  laws  as  a  demonstration  of  equality.  I  will  cer- 
tainly do  my  best  to  change  all  this." 

In  the  second  Mandate  Yuan  Shih-kai  justifies  the 
re-establishment  of  the  Confucian  worship  in  a  singular 
way,  incidentally  showing  how  utterly  incomprehensible 
to  him  is  the  idea  of  representative  government,  since  he 
would  appear  to  have  imagined  that  by  dispatching 
circular  telegrams  to  the  provincial  capitals  and  receiv- 
ing affirmative  replies  from  his  creatures  all  that  is 
necessary  in  the  way  of  a  national  endorsement  of  high 
constitutional  measures  had  been  obtained. 

.  .  .  "China's  devotion  to  Confucius  began  with  the  reign  of 
the  Emperor  Hsiaowu,  of  the  Han  dynasty,  who  rejected  the 
works  of  the  hundred  authors,  making  the  six  Confucian  classics 
the  leading  books.  Confucius,  born  in  the  time  of  the  tyranny 
of  the  nobility,  in  his  works  declared  that  after  war  disturb- 
ances comes  peace,  and  with  peace  real  tranquillity  and  hap- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  65 

piness.  This,  therefore,  is  the  fountain  of  RepubHcanism. 
After  studying  the  history  of  China  and  consulting  the  opinions 
of  scholars,  I  find  that  Confucius  must  remain  the  teacher  for 
thousands  of  generations.  But  in  a  Republic  the  people  pos- 
sess sovereign  power.  Therefore  circular  telegrams  were  dis- 
patched to  all  the  provinces  to  collect  opinions,  and  many  affir- 
mative answers  have  already  been  received.  Therefore,  all  col- 
leges, schools,  and  public  bodies  are  ordered  to  revive  the  sac- 
rificial ceremony  of  Confucius,  which  shall  be  carefully  and 
minutely  ordained"  .  .  . 

With  the  formal  promulgation  of  the  Constitutional 
Compact  the  situation  had  become  bizarre  in  the  ex- 
treme. Although  even  the  child-mind  might  have 
known  that  powers  for  Constitution-making  were  vested 
solely  in  the  National  Assembly,  and  that  the  re-division 
of  authority  which  was  now  made  was  wholly  illegal, 
because  Yuan  Shih-kai  as  the  bailiff  of  the  Powers 
was  able  to  do  much  as  he  pleased;  and  at  a  moment 
when  Liberal  Europe  was  on  the  eve  of  plunging  into  the 
most  terrible  war  in  history  in  defence  of  right  against 
might,  reaction  and  Prussianism  of  the  most  repulsive 
type  were  passed  by  unnoticed  in  China.  In  a  few 
loosely  drafted  chapters  not  only  was  the  governance  of 
the  country  rearranged  to  suit  a  purely  dictational  rule, 
but  the  actual  Parliament  was  permanently  extinguished 
and  replaced  by  a  single  Legislative  Chamber  (Li  Fa 
Yuaii)  which  from  its  very  composition  could  be  nothing 
but  a  harmless  debating  Society  with  no  greater  signifi- 
cance than  a  dietine  of  one  of  the  minor  German  States. 
INIeanwhile,  as  there  was  no  intention  of  allowing  even 
this  chamber  to  assemble  until  the  last  possible  mo- 
ment, a  Senate  was  got  together  as  the  organ  of  public 
opinion,  ten  Senators  being  chosen  to  draft  yet  another 
Constitution  which  would  be  the  final  one.     Remark- 


66  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

able  steps  were  taken  a  little  later  in  the  year  (1914) 
to  secure  that  the  succession  to  the  dictatorship  should 
be  left  in  Yuan  Shih-kai's  own  hands.  An  elaborate 
ritual  was  contrived  and  officially  promulgated  under 
the  title  of  the  Presidential  Succession  Law  on  the  29th 
December  whereby  the  Chief  Executive  selected  three 
names  which  were  placed  in  a  gold  box  in  a  Stone 
House  in  the  grounds  of  the  Palace, — the  gold  box 
only  to  be  opened  when  death  or  incapacity  deprived 
the  nation  of  its  self-appointed  leader.  For  the  term 
of  the  presidency  was  openly  converted  into  one  of  ten 
years  and  made  subject  to  indefinite  renewal  by  this 
precious  instrument  which  was  the  work  of  the  puppet 
senate.  In  case  of  the  necessity  of  an  election  sud- 
denly arising,  an  Electoral  College  was  to  be  formed  by 
fifty  members  drawn  from  the  Legislative  Chamber  and 
fifty  from  the  Senate,  the  Presidential  candidates  con- 
sisting of  the  President  (if  he  so  desired)  and  the  three 
whose  names  were  in  the  gold  box  in  the  Stone  House  in 
the  Palace  grounds.  It  is  not  definitely  known  to  whom 
these  provisions  were  due,  but  it  is  known  that  at  least 
they  were  not  the  work  of  the  American  adviser. 

His  responsibility,  however,  was  very  great;  for  the 
keynote  of  all  this  scheme,  according  to  Dr.  Goodnow,^ 
was  "centralization  of  power,"  a  parrot-like  phrase 
which  has  deluded  better  men  than  ever  came  to  China 
and  which — save  as  a  method  necessary  during  a  state 
of  war — should  have  no  place  in  modern  politics.  But 
it  was  precisely  this  which  appealed  to  Yuan  Shih-kai. 
Although  as  President  he  was  ex  officio  Commander-in- 

1  It  is  significant  that  Dr.  Goodnow  carried  out  all  his  Constitutional 
studies  in  Germany,  specializing  in  that  department  known  as  Adminis- 
trative Law  which  has  no  place,  fortunately,  in  Anglo-Saxon  conceptions 
of  the  State. 


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REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  67 

Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  he  now  turned  this  office 
into  a  direct  and  special  organization  installed  within 
the  precincts  of  the  Imperial  City.  The  flags  of  this 
new  dictatorship  constantly  floated  over  his  palace, 
whilst  scores  of  officers  were  appointed  to  scores  of 
departments  which  were  directly  concerned  with  cen- 
tralizing the  control  of  every  armed  man  in  the  countiy 
in  the  master's  hands.  Meanwhile  in  order  to  placate 
provincial  commanders,  a  "Palace  of  Generals,"  was 
created  in  Peking  to  which  were  brought  all  men  it  was 
held  desirable  to  emasculate.  Here,  drawing  ample 
salaries,  they  could  sit  in  idleness  the  livelong  day,  dis- 
cussing the  battles  they  had  never  fought  and  intriguing 
against  one  another,  two  occupations  in  which  the  prod- 
uct of  the  older  school  of  men  in  China  excels.  Provin- 
cial levies  which  had  any  military  virtue,  were  gradually 
disbanded,  though  many  of  the  rascals  and  rapscallions, 
who  were  open  menaces  to  good  government  were  left 
with  arms  in  their  hands  so  as  to  be  an  argument  in 
favour  of  drastic  police-rule.  Thus  it  is  significant  of 
the  underlying  falseness  and  weakness  of  the  dictator's 
character  that  he  never  dared  to  touch  the  troops  of  the 
reprobate  General  Chang  Hsun,  who  had  made  trouble 
for  years,  and  who  had  nearly  embroiled  China  in  war 
with  Japan  during  the  so-called  Second  Revolution 
(July- August,  1913)  by  massacring  some  Japanese  ci- 
vilians in  the  streets  of  Nanking  when  the  city  was  re- 
captured. So  far  from  disbanding  his  men,  Chang 
Hsun  managed  constantly  to  increase  his  army  of  30,000 
men  on  the  plea  that  the  post  of  Inspector-General  of 
the  Yangtsze  Valley,  which  had  been  given  to  him  as  a 
reward  for  refusing  to  throw  in  his  lot  with  the  South- 
ern rebels,  demanded  larger  forces.     Yuan  Shih-kai, 


68  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

although  half-afraid  of  liim,  found  him  at  various  pe- 
riods useful  as  a  counterweight  to  other  generals  in  the 
provinces;  in  any  case  he  was  not  the  man  to  risk  any- 
thing by  attempting  to  crush  him.  As  he  was  planted 
with  his  men  astride  of  the  strategically  important 
Pukow  railway,  it  was  always  possible  to  order  him  at  a 
moment's  notice  into  the  Yangtsze  Valley  which  was 
thus  constantly  under  the  menace  of  fii'e  and  sword. 

Far  and  wide  Yuan  Shih-kai  now  stretched  his  nets. 
He  even  employed  Americans  throughout  the  United 
States  in  the  capacity  of  press-agents  in  order  to  keep 
American  pubhc  opinion  favourable  to  him,  hoping  to 
invoke  their  assistance  against  his  life-enemy — Japan — 
should  that  be  necessary.  The  precise  details  of  this 
propaganda  and  the  sums  spent  in  its  prosecution  are 
known  to  the  writer ;  if  he  refrains  from  publishing  them 
it  is  solely  for  reasons  of  policy.  England  it  was  not 
necessary  to  deal  with  in  this  way.  Chance  had  willed 
that  the  British  Representative  in  Peking  should  be  an 
old  friend  who  had  known  the  Dictator  intimately  since 
his  Korean  days ;  and  who  faithful  to  the  extraordinary 
English  love  of  hero-worship  believed  that  such  a  sur- 
prising character  could  do  little  wrong.  British  policy 
which  has  always  been  a  somewhat  variable  quantity  in 
China,  owing  to  the  spasmodic  attention  devoted  to  such 
a  distant  problem,  may  be  said  to  have  been  non-existent 
during  all  this  period — a  state  of  affairs  not  conducive 
to  international  happiness. 

Slowly  the  problem  developed  in  a  shiftless,  irresolute 
way.  Unable  to  see  that  China  had  vastly  changed,  and 
that  government  by  rascality  had  become  a  physical  and 
moral  impossibility,  the  Legations  in  Peking  adopted  an 
attitude  of  indifference  leaving  Yuan  Shih-kai  to  wreak 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  69 

his  will  on  the  people.  The  horde  of  foreign  advisers 
who  had  been  appointed  merely  as  a  piece  of  political 
window-dressing,  although  they  were  allowed  to  do  no 
work,  were  useful  in  running  backwards  and  forwards 
between  the  Legations  and  the  Presidential  headquart- 
ers and  in  making  each  Power  suppose  that  its  influence 
was  of  increasing  importance.  It  was  made  abund- 
antly clear  that  in  Yuan  Shih-kai's  estimation  the  Lega- 
tions played  in  international  politics  much  the  same  role 
that  provincial  capitals  did  in  domestic  politics :  so  long 
as  you  bound  both  to  benevolent  neutrality  the  main 
problem — the  consolidation  of  dictatorial  power — could 
be  pushed  on  with  as  you  wished.  Money,  however,  re- 
mained utterly  lacking  and  a  new  twenty-five  million 
sterling  loan  was  spoken  of  as  inevitable — the  accumu- 
lated deficit  in  1914  being  alone  estimated  at  thirty-eight 
milhon  pounds.  But  although  this  financial  dearth  was 
annoying,  Chinese  resources  were  sufficient  to  allow  the 
account  to  be  carried  on  from  day  to  day.  Some  prog- 
ress was  made  in  railways,  building  concessions  being 
liberally  granted  to  foreign  corporations,  this  policy 
having  received  a  great  impetus  from  the  manner  in 
which  Dr.  Sun  Yat  Sen  had  boomed  the  necessity  for 
better  communications  during  the  short  time  he  had 
ruled  at  a  National  Railway  Bureau  in  Shanghai,  an  of- 
fice from  which  he  had  been  relieved  in  1913  on  it  being 
discovered  that  he  was  secretly  indenting  for  quick-firing 
guns.  Certain  questions  proved  annoying  and  insol- 
uble, for  instance  the  Tibetan  question  concerning  which 
England  was  very  resolute,  as  well  as  the  perpetual 
risings  in  Inner  Mongolia,  a  region  so  close  to  Peking 
that  constant  concentrations  of  troops  were  necessary. 
But  on  the  whole  as  time  went  on  there  was  increasing 


70  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

indifference  both  among  the  Foreign  Powers  and 
Chinese  for  the  extraordinary  state  of  affairs  which  had 
been  allowed  to  grow  up. 

There  was  one  notable  exception,  however,  Japan. 
Never  relaxing  her  grip  on  a  compHcated  problem, 
watchful  and  active,  where  others  were  indifferent  and 
slothful,  Japan  bided  her  time.  Knowing  that  the  hour 
had  almost  arrived  when  it  would  be  possible  to  strike, 
Japan  was  vastly  active  behind  the  scenes  in  China  long 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war  gave  her  the 
longed  for  opportunity;  and  largely  because  of  her  the 
pear,  which  seemed  already  almost  ripe,  finally  withered 
on  the  tree. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   FACTOR   OF   JAPAN 

(from  the  outbreak  of  the  world-war,  1st  august,  1914, 
to  the  filing  of  the  twenty-one  demands, 

18th    JANUARY,    1915) 

The  thunderclap  of  the  European  war  shattered  the 
uneasy  cakn  in  China,  not  because  the  Chinese  knew 
anything  of  the  mighty  issues  which  were  to  be  fought 
out  with  such  desperation  and  valour,  but  because  the 
presence  of  the  German  colony  of  Kiaochow  on  Chinese 
soil  and  the  activity  of  German  cruisers  in  the  Yellow 
Sea  brought  the  war  to  China's  very  doors.  Vaguely 
conscious  that  this  might  spell  disaster  to  his  own  am- 
bitious plans.  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  actually  in  the  midst 
of  tentative  negotiations  with  the  German  Legation  re- 
garding the  retrocession  of  the  Kiaochow  territoiy  when 
the  news  reached  him  that  Japan,  after  some  rapid 
negotiations  with  her  British  Ally,  had  filed  an  ulti- 
matum on  Germany,  peremptorily  demanding  the  hand- 
ing-over of  all  those  interests  that  had  been  forcibly 
acquired  in  Shantung  province  in  the  great  leasing-year 
of  1898. 

At  once  Yuan  Shih-kai  realized  that  the  Nemesis 
which  had  dogged  his  footsteps  all  his  life  was  again 
close  behind  him.  In  the  Japanese  attack  on  Kiaochow 
he  foresaw  a  web  of  complications  which  even  his  unriv- 
alled diplomacy  might  be  unable  to  unravel ;  for  he  knew 
well  from  bitter  experience  that  wherever  the  Japanese 

71 


72  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

sets  his  foot  there  he  remains.  It  is  consequently  round 
this  single  factor  of  Japan  that  the  history  of  the  two 
succeeding  years  revolves.  From  being  indisputably 
the  central  figure  on  the  Chinese  canvas.  Yuan  Shih-kai 
suddenly  becomes  subordmate  to  the  terror  of  Japan- 
ese intervention  which  hangs  over  him  constantly  like  a 
black  cloud,  and  governs  every  move  he  made  from  the 
15th  August,  1914,  to  the  day  of  his  dramatic  death  on 
the  6th  June,  1916.  We  shall  attempt  to  write  down 
the  true  explanation  of  why  this  should  have  been  so. 

It  is  extremely  hard  to  discuss  the  question  of  Japan 
for  the  benefit  of  an  exclusively  Western  audience  in 
a  convincing  way  because  Japanese  policy  has  two  dis- 
tinct facets  which  seem  utterly  contradictory,  and  yet 
which  are  in  a  great  measure  understandable  if  the  ob- 
jects of  that  diplomacy  are  set  down.  Being  endowed 
with  an  extraordinary  capacity  for  taking  detached 
views,  the  Statesmen  of  Tokio  long  ago  discerned 
the  necessity  of  having  two  independent  policies — an 
Eastern  policy  for  Eastern  Asia  and  a  Western  policy 
for  Western  nations — because  East  and  West  are  essen- 
tially antithetical,  and  cannot  be  treated  (at  least  not 
yet)  in  precisely  the  same  manner.  Whilst  the  West- 
ern policy  is  frank  and  manly,  and  is  exclusively  in  the 
hands  of  brilliant  and  attractive  men  who  have  been 
largely  educated  in  the  schools  of  Europe  and  America 
and  who  are  fully  able  to  deal  with  all  matters  in  accord- 
ance with  the  customary  traditions  of  diplomacy,  the 
Eastern  policy  is  the  work  of  obscurantists  whose  imagi- 
nations are  held  by  the  vast  projects  which  the  Militarj'- 
Party  believes  are  capable  of  realization  in  China. 
There  is  thus  a  constant  contradiction  in  the  attitude  of 
Japan  which  men  have  sought  in  vain  to  reconcile.     It  is 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  73 

for  this  reason  that  the  outer  world  is  divided  into  two 
schools  of  thought,  one  believing  implicitly  in  Japan's 
bona  fides,  the  other  vulgarly  covering  her  with  abuse 
and  declaring  that  she  is  the  last  of  all  nations  in  her 
conceptions  of  fair  play  and  honourable  treatment. 
Both  views  are  far-fetched.  It  is  as  true  of  Japan  as  it 
is  of  every  other  Government  in  the  world  that  her  ac- 
tions are  dictated  neither  by  altruism  nor  by  perfidy, 
but  are  merely  the  result  of  the  faulty  working  of  a 
number  of  fallible  brains  and  as  regards  the  work  of  ad- 
ministration in  Japan  itself  the  position  is  equally 
extraordinary.  Here,  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  world, 
so  far  from  being  in  any  way  threatened,  the  principle  of 
Divine  Right,  which  is  being  denounced  and  dismem- 
bered in  Europe  as  a  crude  survival  from  almost  heathen 
days,  stands  untouched  and  still  exhibits  itself  in  all  its 
pristine  glory.  A  highly  aristocratic  Court,  possessing 
one  of  the  most  complicated  and  jealously  protected 
hierarchies  in  the  world,  and  presided  over  by  a  monarch 
claiming  direct  descent  from  the  sacred  Jimmu  Tenno 
of  twenty-five  hundred  years  ago,  decrees  to-day  pre- 
cisely as  before,  the  elaborate  ritual  governing  every 
move,  every  decision  and  every  agreement.  There  is 
something  so  engaging  in  this  political  curiosity,  some- 
thing so  far  removed  from  the  vast  world-movement 
now  rolling  fiercely  to  its  conclusion,  that  we  may  be 
pardoned  for  interpolating  certain  capital  considera- 
tions which  closely  affect  the  future  of  China  and  there- 
fore cannot  fail  to  be  of  public  interest. 

The  Japanese,  who  owe  their  whole  theocratic  con- 
ception to  the  Chinese,  just  as  they  owe  all  their  letters 
and  their  learning  to  them,  still  nominally  look  upon 
their  ruler  as  the  link  between  Heaven  and  Earth,  and 


74  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

the  central  fact  dominating  their  cosmogony.  Al- 
though the  vast  number  of  well-educated  men  who 
to-day  crowd  the  cities  of  Japan  are  fully  conscious  of 
the  bizarre  nature  of  this  belief  in  an  age  which  has 
turned  its  back  on  superstition,  nothing  has  yet  been 
done  to  modify  it  because — and  this  is  the  important 
point — the  structui-e  of  Japanese  society  is  such  that 
without  a  violent  upheaval  which  shall  hurl  the  military 
clan  system  irremediably  to  the  ground,  it  is  absolutely 
impossible  for  human  equality  to  be  admitted  and  the 
man-god  theory  to  be  destro3''ed.  So  long  as  these 
two  features  exist;  that  is  so  long  as  a  privileged  mili- 
tary caste  supports  and  attempts  to  make  all-powerful 
the  man-god  theory,  so  long  will  Japan  be  an  inter- 
national danger-spot  because  there  will  lack  those  demo- 
cratic restraints  which  this  war  has  shown  are  absolutely 
essential  to  secure  a  peaceful  understanding  among  the 
nations.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Japan  will  fail  to 
attain  the  position  the  art-genius  and  industry  of  her 
people  entitle  her  to  and  must  limp  behind  the  progress 
of  the  world  unless  a  very  radical  revision  of  the  consti- 
tution is  achieved.  The  disabilities  which  arise  from  an 
archaic  survival  are  so  great  that  they  will  affect  China 
as  adversely  as  Japan,  and  therefore  should  be  uni- 
versally understood. 

Japanese  history,  if  stripped  of  its  superficial  aspects, 
has  a  certain  remarkable  quality;  it  seems  steeped  in 
heroic  blood.  The  doctrine  of  force,  which  expresses 
itself  in  its  crudest  forms  in  Europe,  has  always  been 
in  Japan  a  system  of  heroic-action  so  fascinating  to 
humanity  at  large  that  until  recent  times  its  interna- 
tional significance  has  not  been  realized.  The  feudal 
organization  of  Japanese  society  which  arose  as  a  result 


Village  Mummeks.  Klabokate  Jb'EsrivALs  Occur  ix  China 
IN  Spring  and  Autumn  to  Celebrate  the  Fruitfulness 
OF  the  Earth,  Every  Temple  and  Every  Village  Hav- 
ing Its  Own  Celebration 


Toilers  of  the  Plain.     Country  Produce  Being  Hauled 

to  the  City 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  75 

of  the  armed  conquest  of  the  islands  fifteen  hundred 
years  ago,  precluded  centralizating  measures  being 
taken  because  the  Throne,  relying  on  the  virtues  of 
Divine  Ancestors  rather  than  on  any  well-articulated 
pohtical  theory,  was  weak  in  all  except  certain  quasi- 
sacerdotal  qualities,  and  forced  to  rely  on  great  chief- 
tains for  the  execution  of  its  mandates  as  well  as  for  its 
defence.  The  military  title  of  "barbarian-conquering 
general,"  which  was  first  conferred  on  a  great  clan  leader 
eight  centuries  ago,  was  a  natural  enough  development 
when  we  remember  that  the  autochthonous  races  were 
even  then  not  yet  pushed  out  of  the  main  island,  and 
were  still  battling  with  the  advancing  tide  of  Japanese 
civilization  which  was  itself  composed  of  several  rival 
streams  coming  from  the  Asiatic  mainland  and  from  the 
Malayan  archipelagoes.  This  armed  settlement  satur- 
ates Japanese  history  and  is  responsible  for  the  unend- 
ing local  wars  and  the  glorification  of  the  warrior.  The 
conception  of  triumphant  generalship  which  Hideyoshi 
attempted  unsuccessfully  to  carry  into  Korea  in  the 
Sixteenth  Century,  led  directly  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Seventeenth  Century  to  the  formal  establishment  of  the 
Shogunate,  that  military  dictatorship  being  the  result  of 
the  backwash  of  the  Korean  adventure,  and  the  greatest 
proof  of  the  disturbance  which  it  had  brought  in  Japan- 
ese society.  The  persistence  of  this  hereditary  mihtary 
dictatorship  for  more  than  two  and  a  half  centuries  is  a 
remarkable  illustration  of  the  fact  that  as  in  China  so  in 
Japan  the  theocratic  conception  was  unworkable  save  in 
primitive  times — civilization  demanding  organization 
rather  than  precepts  and  refusing  to  bow  its  head  to 
speechless  kings.  Although  the  Restoration  of  1868 
nominally  gave  back  to  the  Throne  all  it  had  been  forced 


76  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

to  leave  in  other  hands  since  1603,  that  transfer  of 
power  was  imaginary  rather  than  real,  the  new  military- 
organization  which  succeeded  the  Shogun's  government 
being  the  vital  portion  of  the  Restoration.  In  other 
words,  it  was  the  leaders  of  Japan's  conscript  armies 
who  inherited  the  real  power,  a  fact  made  amply  evi- 
dent by  the  crushing  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  by  these 
new  corps  whose  organization  allowed  them  to  over- 
throw the  proudest  and  most  valour ous  of  the  Samurai 
and  incidentally  to  proclaim  the  triumph  of  modern 
fire-arms. 

Now  it  is  important  to  note  that  as  early  as  1874 — 
that  is  six  years  after  the  Restoration  of  the  Emperor 
Meiji — these  facts  were  attracting  the  widest  notice  in 
Japanese  society,  the  agitation  for  a  Constitution  and  a 
popular  assembly  being  very  vigourously  pushed.  Led 
by  the  well-known  and  aristocratic  Itagaki,  Japanese 
Liberalism  had  joined  battle  with  out-and-out  Imperial- 
ism more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago ;  and  although 
the  question  of  recovering  Tariff  and  Judicial  autonomy 
and  revising  the  Foreign  Treaties  was  more  urgent  in 
those  days,  the  foreign  question  was  often  pushed  aside 
by  the  fierceness  of  the  constitutional  agitation. 

It  was  not,  however,  until  1889  that  a  Constitution 
was  finally  granted  to  the  Japanese — that  instrument 
being  a  gift  from  the  Crown,  and  nothing  more  than  a 
conditional  warrant  to  a  limited  number  of  men  to  be- 
come witnesses  of  the  processes  of  government  but  in  no 
sense  its  controllers.  The  very  first  Diet  summoned  in 
1890  was  sufficient  proof  of  that.  A  collision  at  once 
occurred  over  questions  of  finance  which  resulted  in  the 
resignation  of  the  Ministry.  And  ever  since  those  days, 
that  is  for  twenty-seven  consecutive  years,  successive 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  77 

Diets  in  Japan  have  been  fighting  a  forlorn  fight  for  the 
power  which  can  never  be  theirs  save  by  revolution,  it 
being  only  natural  that  Sociahsm  should  come  to  be 
looked  upon  by  the  governing  class  as  Nihilism,  whilst 
the  mob-threat  has  been  very  acute  ever  since  the  Tokio 
peace  riots  of  1905. 

Now  it  is  characteristic  of  the  ceremonial  respect 
which  all  Japanese  have  for  the  Tlirone  that  all  through 
this  long  contest  the  main  issue  should  have  been  pur- 
posely obscured.  The  traditional  f  eehngs  of  veneration 
which  a  loyal  and  obedient  people  feel  for  a  line  of 
monarchs,  whose  origin  is  lost  in  the  mists  of  antiquity, 
are  such  that  they  have  turned  what  is  in  effect  an  ever- 
growing struggle  against  the  archaic  principle  of  divine 
right  into  a  contest  with  clan-leaders  whom  they  assert 
are  acting  "unconstitutionally"  whenever  they  choose 
to  assert  the  undeniable  principles  of  the  Constitution. 
Thus  to-day  we  have  this  paradoxical  situation:  that 
although  Japanese  Liberalism  must  from  its  very  es- 
sence be  revolutionary,  i.e.,  destructive  before  it  can 
hope  to  be  constructive,  it  feigns  blindness,  hoping  that 
by  suasion  rather  than  bj'^  force  the  principle  of  parlia- 
mentary government  will  somehow  be  grafted  on  to  the 
body  politic  and  the  emperors,  being  left  outside  the 
controversy,  become  content  to  accept  a  greatly  mod- 
ified rule. 

This  hope  seems  a  vain  one  in  the  light  of  all  history. 
Militarism  and  the  clans  are  by  no  means  in  the  last 
ditch  in  Japan,  and  they  will  no  more  surrender  their 
power  than  would  the  Russian  bureaucracy.  The  only 
argument  which  is  convincing  in  such  a  case  is  the  last 
one  which  is  ever  used;  and  the  mere  mention  of  it  by 
so-called  socialists  is  sufficient  to  cause  summary  arrest 


78  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

in  Japan.  Sheltering  themselves  behind  the  Throne, 
and  nominally  deriving  their  latter-day  dictatorship 
from  the  Imperial  mandate,  the  military  chiefs  remain 
adamant,  nothing  having  yet  occurred  to  incline  them 
to  surrender  any  of  their  privileges.  By  a  process  of 
adaptation  to  present-day  conditions,  a  formula  has  now 
been  discovered  which  it  is  hoped  will  serve  many  a  long 
year.  By  securing  by  extra-legal  means  the  return  of  a 
"majority"  in  the  House  of  Representatives  the  fiction 
of  national  support  of  the  autocracy  has  been  re-invig- 
ourated,  and  the  doctrine  laid  down  that  what  is  good 
for  every  other  advanced  people  in  the  world  is  bad  for 
the  Japanese,  who  must  be  content  with  what  is  granted 
them  and  never  question  the  superior  intelligence  of  a 
privileged  caste.  In  the  opinion  of  the  writer,  it  is 
every  whit  as  important  for  the  peace  of  the  world  that 
the  people  of  Japan  should  govern  themselves  as  it  is 
for  the  people  of  Germany  to  do  so.  The  persistence  of 
the  type  of  military  government  which  we  see  to-day  in 
Japan  is  harmful  for  all  alike  because  it  is  as  antiquated 
as  Tsarism  and  a  perpetual  menace  to  a  disarmed  nation 
such  as  China.  So  long  as  that  government  remains,  so 
long  must  Japan  remain  an  international  suspect  and 
be  denied  equal  rights  in  the  council-chambers  of  the 
Liberal  Powers. 

If  the  situation  which  arose  on  the  15th  August,  1914, 
is  to  be  thoroughly  understood,  it  is  necessary  to  pick 
up  threads  of  Chino-Japanese  relations  from  a  good 
many  years  back.  First-hand  famiharity  with  the  ac- 
tors and  the  scenes  of  at  least  three  decades  is  essential 
to  give  the  picture  the  completeness,  the  brilliancy  of 
colouring,  and  withal  the  suggestiveness  inseparable 
from  all  true  works  of  art.     For  the  Chino-Japanese 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  79 

question  is  primarily  a  work  of  art  and  not  merely  a 
piece  of  jejmie  diplomacy  stretched  across  the  years. 
As  the  shuttle  of  Fate  has  been  cast  swiftly  backwards 
and  forwards,  the  threads  of  these  entwining  relations 
have  been  woven  into  patterns  involving  the  whole  Far 
East,  until  to-day  we  have  as  it  were  a  complete  Gobelin 
tapestry,  magnificent  with  meaning,  replete  with  action, 
and  full  of  scholastic  interest. 

Let  us  follow  some  of  the  tracery.  It  has  long  been 
the  habit  to  affirm  that  the  conflict  between  China  and 
Japan  had  its  origin  in  Korea,  when  Korea  was  a  vassal 
state  acknowledging  the  suzerainty  of  Peking;  and  that 
the  conflict  merited  ending  there,  since  of  the  two  pro- 
tagonists contending  for  empire  Japan  was  left  in  undis- 
puted mastery.  This  statement,  being  incomplete,  is 
dangerously  false.  Dating  from  that  vital  period  of 
thirty  years  ago,  when  Yuan  Shih-kai  first  went  to  Seoul 
as  a  general  officer  in  the  train  of  the  Chinese  Imperial 
Resident  (on  China  being  forced  to  take  action  in  pro- 
tection of  her  interests  owing  to  the  "opening"  of  Korea 
by  the  American  Treaty  of  1882)  three  contestants, 
equally  interested  in  the  balance  of  land-power  in  East- 
ern Asia  were  constantly  pitted  against  one  another 
with  Korea  as  their  common  battling-ground — Russia, 
China  and  Japan.  The  struggle,  which  ended  in  the 
eclipse  of  the  first  two,  merely  shifted  the  venue  from 
the  Korean  zone  to  the  Manchurian  zone;  and  from 
thence  gradually  extended  it  further  and  further  afield 
until  at  last  not  only  was  Inner  Mongolia  and  the  vast 
belt  of  country  fronting  the  Great  Wall  embraced  within 
its  scope,  but  the  entire  aspect  of  China  itself  was 
changed.  For  these  important  facts  have  to  be  noted. 
Until  the  Russian  war  of  1 904-05  had  demonstrated 


80  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

the  utter  valuelessness  of  Tsarism  as  an  interna- 
tional militaiy  factor,  Japan  had  been  aknost  willing 
to  resign  herself  to  a  subordinate  role  in  the  Far  East. 
Having  eaten  bitter  bread  as  the  result  of  her  premature 
attempt  in  1895  (after  the  Korean  war)  to  becon^e  a 
continental  power — an  attempt  which  had  resulted  in 
the  forced  retrocession  of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula — she 
had  been  placed  on  her  good  behaviour,  an  attitude 
which  was  admirably  reflected  in  1900  when  her  Peking 
Expeditionary  Force  proved  itself  so  well-behaved  and 
so  gallant  as  to  arouse  the  world's  admiration.  But  the 
war  with  Russia  and  the  collapse  of  the  Tsar's  Man- 
churian  adventure  not  only  drew  her  back  into  territory 
that  she  never  hoped  to  see  again,  but  placed  her  in 
possession  of  a  ready-made  railway  system  which  car- 
ried her  almost  up  to  the  Sungari  river  and  surrendered 
to  her  military  control  vast  gi'asslands  stretching  to  the 
Khingan  mountains.  This  Westernly  march  so  greatly 
enlarged  the  Japanese  political  horizon,  and  so  entirely 
changed  the  Japanese  viewpoint,  that  the  statesmen  of 
Tokio  in  their  excitement  threw  off  their  ancient  spec- 
tacles and  found  to  their  astonishment  that  their  eyes 
were  every  whit  as  good  as  European  eyes.  Now  see- 
ing the  v/orld  as  others  had  long  seen  it,  they  understood 
that  just  as  with  the  individuals  so  with  nations  the 
struggle  for  existence  can  most  easily  be  conducted  by 
adopting  that  war-principle  of  Clausewitz — the  restless 
offensive,  and  not  by  writing  meaningless  dispatches. 
Prior  to  the  Russian  war  they  had  written  to  Russia  a 
magnificent  series  of  documents  in  which  they  had 
pleaded  with  sincerity  for  an  equitable  settlement, — 
only  to  find  that  all  was  in  vain.     Forced  to  battle,  they 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  81 

had  found  in  combat  not  only  success  but  a  new  prin- 
ciple. 

The  discovery  necessitated  a  new  policy.  During  the 
eighties,  and  in  a  lesser  degree  in  the  nineties,  Japan  had 
apart  from  everything  else  been  content  to  act  in  a 
modest  and  retiring  way,  because  she  wished  at  all  costs 
to  avoid  testing  too  severely  her  immature  strength. 
But  owing  to  the  successive  collapses  of  her  rivals,  she 
now  found  herself  not  only  forced  to  attack  as  the 
safest  course  of  action,  but  driven  to  the  view  that  the 
Power  that  exerts  the  maximum  pressure  constantly 
and  unremittedly  is  inevitably  the  most  successful. 
This  conclusion  had  great  importance.  For  just  as 
the  first  article  of  faith  for  England  in  Asia  has  been 
the  doctrine  that  no  Power  can  be  permitted  to  seize 
strategic  harbours  which  menace  her  sea-communica- 
tions, so  did  it  now  become  equally  true  of  Japan 
that  her  dominant  policy  became  not  an  Eastern  Monroe 
doctrine,  as  shallow  men  have  supposed,  but  simply  the 
Doctrine  of  Maximum  Pressm-e.  To  press  with  all  her 
strength  on  China  was  henceforth  considered  vital  by 
every  Japanese ;  and  it  is  in  this  spirit  that  every  diplo- 
matic pattern  has  been  woven  since  the  die  was  cast  in 
1905.  Until  this  signal  fact  has  been  grasped  no  useful 
analysis  can  be  made  of  the  evolution  of  present  condi- 
tions. Standing  behind  this  policy,  and  constantly  re- 
inforcing it,  are  the  serried  ranks  of  the  new  democracy 
which  education  and  the  great  increase  in  material 
prosperity  have  been  so  rapidly  creating.  The  soaring 
ambition  which  springs  from  the  sea  lends  to  the  attacks 
developed  by  such  a  people  the  aspect  of  piracies;  and 
it  is  but  natural  in  such  circumstances  that  for  Chinese 


82  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Japan  should  not  only  have  the  aspect  of  a  sea-monster 
but  that  their  country  should  appear  as  hapless  Andro- 
meda bound  to  a  rock,  always  awaiting  a  Perseus  who 
never  comes.  .  .  . 

The  Revolution  of  1911  had  been  entirely  unexpected 
in  Japan.  Whilst  large  outbreaks  had  been  certainly 
counted  on  since  the  Chinese  Revolutionary  party  had 
for  years  used  Japan  as  an  asylum  and  a  base  of  opera- 
tions, never  had  it  been  anticipated  that  the  fall  of  an 
ancient  Dynasty  could  be  so  easily  encompassed.  Con- 
sequently, the  abdication  of  the  Manchus  as  the  result  of 
intrigues  rather  than  of  warfare  was  looked  upon  as 
little  short  of  a  catastrophe  because  it  hopelessly  compli- 
cated the  outlook,  broke  the  pattern  which  had  been  so 
carefully  woven  for  so  many  years,  and  interjected  harsh 
elements  which  could  not  be  assigned  an  orderly  place. 
Not  only  was  a  well-articulated  State-system  suddenly 
consigned  to  the  flames,  but  the  ruin  threatened  to  be  so 
general  that  the  balance  of  power  throughout  the  Far 
East  would  be  twisted  out  of  shape.  Japanese  states- 
men had  desired  a  weak  China,  a  China  which  would 
ultimately  turn  to  them  for  assistance  because  they  were 
a  kindred  race,  but  not  a  China  that  looked  to  the  French 
Revolution  for  its  inspiration.  To  a  people  as  slow  to 
adjust  themselves  to  violent  surprises  as  are  the  Japan- 
ese, there  was  an  air  of  desperation  about  the  whole 
business  which  greatly  alarmed  them,  and  made  them 
determined  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  to  throw 
every  ounce  of  their  weight  in  the  direction  which  would 
best  serve  them  by  bringing  matters  back  to  their  orig- 
inal starting-point.  For  this  reason  they  were  not  only 
prepared  in  theory  in  1911  to  lend  armed  assistance  to 
the  Manchus  but  would  have  speedily  done  so  had  not 


•t\\%.^^^^^-:rTKW 


A  r^lAxcHu  Wo.MAx  Grinding  Grain 


SiLK-KKKIJNG     DoXK     IX     THE     OPEN     UxDER     THE     WaLT,S     OF 

Peking 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  83 

England  strongly  dissented  from  such  a  course  of  action 
when  she  was  privately  sounded  about  the  matter. 
Even  to-day,  when  a  temporary  adjustment  of  Japan- 
ese policy  has  been  successfully  arranged,  it  is  of  the 
highest  importance  for  political  students  to  remember 
that  the  dynastic  influences  in  Tokio  have  never  de- 
parted from  the  view  that  the  legitimate  sovereignty  of 
China  remains  vested  in  the  Manchu  House  and  that 
everything  that  has  taken  place  since  1911  is  irregular 
and  unconstitutional. 

For  the  time  being,  however,  two  dissimilar  circum- 
stances demanded  caution:  first,  the  enthusiasm  which 
the  Japanese  democracy,  fed  by  a  highly  excited  press, 
exhibited  towards  the  Young  China  which  had  been  so 
largely  grounded  in  the  Tokio  schools  and  which  had 
carried  out  the  Revolution :  secondly — and  far  more  im- 
portant— the  deep,  abiding  and  ineradicable  animosity 
which  Japanese  of  all  classes  felt  for  the  man  who  had 
come  out  of  the  contest  head  and  shoulders  above  every- 
body else — Yuan  Shih-kai.  These  two  remarkable  fea- 
tures ended  by  completely  thrusting  into  the  back- 
ground during  the  period  1911-1914  every  other  element 
in  Japanese  statesmanship;  and  of  the  two  the  second 
must  be  counted  the  decisive  one.  Dating  back  to 
Korea,  when  Yuan  Shih-kai's  extraordinary  diplomatic 
talents  constantly  allowed  him  to  worst  his  Japanese 
rivals  and  to  make  Chinese  counsels  supreme  at  the 
Korean  Court  up  to  the  very  moment  when  the  first 
shots  of  the  war  of  1894  were  fired,  this  ancient  dislike, 
which  amounted  to  a  consuming  hatred,  had  become  a 
fixed  idea.  Restrained  by  the  world's  opinion  during 
the  period  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  world-war  as 
well  as  by  the  necessity  of  acting  financially  in  concert 


84  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

with  the  othcK^  Powers,  it  was  not  until  August,  1914, 
that  the  longed-for  opportunity  came  and  that  Japan 
prepared  to  act  in  a  most  remarkable  way. 

The  campaign  against  Kiaochow  was  unpopular  from 
the  outset  among  the  Japanese  public  because  it  was 
felt  that  they  were  not  legitimately  called  upon  to  inter- 
est themselves  in  such  a  remote  question  as  the  balance 
of  power  among  European  nations,  which  was  what 
British  warfare  against  Germany  seemed  to  them  to 
be.  Though  some  ill-will  was  felt  against  Germany  for 
the  part  played  by  her  in  the  intervention  of  1895,  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  just  as  the  Japanese  navy  is 
the  child  of  the  British  navy,  so  is  the  Japanese  army 
the  child  of  the  German  army — and  that  Japanese 
army  chiefs  largely  control  Japan.  These  men  were 
averse  from  "spoihng  their  army"  in  a  contest  which  did 
not  interest  them.  There  was  also  the  feeling  abroad 
that  England  by  calling  upon  her  Ally  to  carry  out  the 
essential  provisions  of  her  Alliance  had  shown  that  she 
had  the  better  part  of  a  bargain,  and  that  she  was  ex- 
ploiting an  old  advantage  in  a  way  which  could  not  fail 
to  react  adversely  on  Japan's  future  world's  relation- 
ships. Furthermore,  it  is  necessary  to  underline  the 
fact  that  official  Japan  was  displeased  by  the  tacit  sup- 
port an  uninterested  British  Foreign  Office  had  con- 
sistently given  to  the  Yuan  Shih-kai  regime.  That  the 
Chinese  experiment  was  looked  upon  in  England  more 
with  amusement  than  with  concern  irritated  the  Japan- 
ese— more  particularly  as  the  British  Foreign  Office 
was  issuing  in  the  form  of  White  Papers  documents 
covering  Yuan  Shih-kai's  public  declarations  as  if  they 
were  contributions  to  contemporary  history.  Thus  in 
the  preceding  year  (1913)  under  the  nomenclature  of 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  85 

"affairs  in  China"  the  text  of  a  dementi  regarding  the 
President  of  China's  Imperial  aspirations  had  been  pub- 
lished,— a  document  which  Japanese  had  classified  as  a 
studied  lie,  and  as  an  act  of  presumption  because  its 
wording  showed  that  its  author  intended  to  keep  his 
back  turned  on  Japan.     The  Dictator  had  declared: — 

.  .  .  "From  my  student  days,  I,  Yuan  Shih-kai,  have  ad- 
mired the  example  of  the  Emperors  Yao  and  Shun,  who  treated 
the  empire  as  a  public  trust,  and  considered  that  the  record  of 
a  dynasty  in  history  for  good  or  ill  is  inseparably  bound  up 
with  the  public  spirit  or  self-seeking  by  which  it  has  been  ani- 
mated. On  attaining  middle  age  I  grew  more  familiar  with  for- 
eign affairs,  was  struck  by  the  admirable  republican  system  in 
France  and  America,  and  felt  that  they  were  a  true  embodiment 
of  the  democratic  precepts  of  the  ancients.  When  last  year 
the  patriotic  crusade  started  in  Wuchang  its  echoes  went  forth 
into  all  the  provinces,  with  the  result  that  this  ancient  nation 
with  its  2,000  years  of  despotism  adopted  with  one  bound  the 
republican  system  of  government. 

It  was  my  good  fortune  to  see  this  glorious  day  at  my  life's 
late  eve ;  I  cherished  the  hope  that  I  might  dwell  in  the  seclusion 
of  my  own  home  and  participate  in  the  blessings  of  an  age  of 
peace. 

But  once  again  my  fellow-countrymen  honoured  me  with  the 
pressing  request  that  I  should  again  assume  a  heavy  burden, 
and  on  the  day  on  which  the  Republic  was  proclaimed  I  an- 
nounced it  the  whole  nation  that  never  again  should  a  mon- 
archy be  permitted  in  China.  At  my  inauguration  I  again 
took  this  solemn  oath  in  the  sight  of  heaven  above  and  earth 
beneath.  Yet  of  late  ignorant  persons  in  the  provinces  have 
fabricated  wild  rumours  to  delude  men's  minds,  and  have  ad- 
duced the  career  of  the  First  Napoleon  on  which  to  base  their 
erroneous  speculations.  It  is  best  not  to  inquire  as  to  their 
motives ;  in  some  cases  misconception  may  be  the  cause,  in, 
others  deliberate  malice. 

The  Republic  has  now  been  proclaimed  for  six  months ;  so 
far  there  is  no  prospect  of  recognition  from  the  Powers,  while 


86  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

order  is  far  from  being  restored  in  the  provinces.  Our  fate 
hangs  upon  a  hair ;  the  slightest  negligence  may  forfeit  all.  I, 
who  bear  this  arduous  responsibility,  feel  it  my  bounden  duty 
to  stand  at  the  helm  in  the  hope  of  successfully  breasting  the 
wild  waves. 

But  while  those  in  office  are  striving  with  all  their  might  to 
effect  a  satisfactory  solution,  spectators  seem  to  find  a  diffi- 
culty in  maintaining  a  generous  forbearance.  They  forget 
that  I,  who  have  received  this  charge  from  my  countrymen, 
cannot  possibly  look  dispassionately  on  when  the  fate  of  the 
nation  is  in  the  balance.  If  I  were  aware  that  the  task  was 
impossible  and  played  a  part  of  easy  acquiescence,  so  that  the 
future  of  the  Republic  might  become  irreparable,  others  might 
not  reproach  me,  but  my  own  conscience  would  never  leave  me 
alone. 

My  thoughts  are  manifest  in  the  sight  of  high  heaven.  But 
at  this  season  of  construction  and  dire  crisis  how  shall  these 
mutual  suspicions  find  a  place.''  Once  more  I  issue  this  an- 
nouncement ;  if  3'ou,  my  fellow  countrymen,  do  indeed  place  the 
safety  of  China  before  all  other  considerations,  it  behooves  you 
to  be  large-minded.  Beware  of  lightly  heeding  the  plausible 
voice  of  calumn}',  and  of  thus  furnisliing  a  medium  for  foster- 
ing anarchy.  If  evilly  disposed  persons,  who  are  bent  on  de- 
struction, seize  the  excuse  for  sowing  dissension  to  the  jeopardy 
of  the  situation,  I,  Yuan  Shih-kai,  shall  follow  the  behest  of 
my  fellow-countrymen  in  placing  such  men  beyond  the  pale  of 
humanity. 

A  vital  issue  is  involved.  It  is  my  duty  to  lay  before  you 
my  inmost  thought,  so  that  suspicion  may  be  dissipated.  Those 
who  know  have  the  right  to  impose  their  censure.  It  is  for  pub- 
lic opinion  to  take  due  notice." 

Moreover  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  also  shown  in  his  selec- 
tion and  use  of  foreign  Advisers,  that  he  was  determined 
to  proceed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  advertise  his  suspicion 
and  enmity  of  Japan.  After  the  Coup  d'etat  of  the  4th 
November,  1913,  and  the  scattering  of  Parliament,  it 
was  an  American  Adviser  who  was  set  to  work  on  the 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  87 

new  "Constitution";  and  although  a  Japanese,  Dr. 
Ariga,  who  was  in  receipt  of  a  princely  salary,  aided  and 
abetted  this  work,  his  endorsement  of  the  dictatorial 
rule  was  looked  upon  as  traitorous  by  the  bulk  of  his 
countrymen.  Similarly,  it  was  perfectly  well-known 
that  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  spending  large  sums  of  money 
in  Tokio  in  bribing  certain  organs  of  the  Japanese  Press 
and  in  attempting  to  win  adherents  among  Japanese 
members  of  Parliament.  Remarkable  stories  are  cur- 
rent which  compromise  very  highly -placed  Japanese  but 
which  the  writer  hesitates  to  set  down  in  black  and  white 
as  documentary  proof  is  not  available.  In  any  case,  be 
this  as  it  may,  it  was  felt  in  Tokio  that  the  time  had  ar- 
rived to  give  a  proper  definition  to  the  relations  between 
the  two  states, — the  more  so  as  Yuan  Shih-kai,  by  pub- 
licly proclaiming  a  small  war-zone  in  Shantung  within 
the  limits  of  which  the  Japanese  were  alone  permitted 
to  wage  war  against  the  Germans,  had  shown  himself 
indifferent  to  the  majesty  of  Japan.  The  Japanese 
having  captured  Kiaochow  by  assault  before  the  end  of 
1914  decided  to  accept  the  view  that  a  de  facto  Dictator- 
ship existed  in  China.  Therefore  on  the  18th  of  Janu- 
ary, 1915,  the  Japanese  Minister,  Dr.  Hioki,  person- 
ally served  on  Yuan  Shih-kai  the  now  famous  Twenty- 
one  Demands,  a  list  designed  to  satisfy  every  present 
and  future  need  of  Japanese  policy  and  to  reduce  China 
to  a  state  of  vassalage. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

Although  the  press  of  the  world  gave  a  certain  promi- 
nence at  the  time  to  the  astounding  demarche  with  which 
we  now  have  to  deal,  there  was  such  persistent  mystery 
about  the  matter  and  so  many  official  dementis  accom- 
panied every  publication  of  the  facts  that  even  to  this 
day  the  nature  of  the  assault  which  Japan  delivered  on 
China  is  not  adequately  reahzed,  nor  is  the  narrow  escape 
assigned  its  proper  place  in  estimates  of  the  future. 
Briefly,  had  there  not  been  publication  of  the  facts  and 
had  not  British  diplomacy  been  aroused  to  action  there 
is  little  doubt  that  Japan  would  have  forced  matters 
so  far  that  Chinese  independence  would  now  be  vir- 
tually a  thing  of  the  past.  Fortunately,  however, 
China  in  her  hour  of  need  found  many  who  were  willing 
to  succour  her;  with  the  result  that  although  she  lost 
something  in  these  negotiations,  Japan  nevertheless 
failed  in  a  very  signal  fashion  to  attain  her  main  objec- 
tive. The  Pyrrhic  victory  which  she  won  with  her 
eleventh  hour  ultimatum  will  indeed  in  the  end  cost  her 
more  than  would  have  a  complete  failure,  for  Chinese 
suspicion  and  hostihty  are  now  so  deep-seated  that 
nothing  will  ever  completely  eradicate  them.  It  is 
therefore  only  proper  that  an  accurate  record  should 
be  here  incorporated  of  a  chapter  of  history  which  has 
much  international  importance;  and  if  we  invite  close 
attention  to  the  mass  of  documents  that  follow  it  is 
because  we  hold  that  an  adequate  comprehension  of 

88 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  89 

them  is  essential  to  securing  the  future  peace  of  the 
Far  East.  Let  us  first  give  the  official  text  of  the  ori- 
ginal Demands : 

japan's  original  twenty-one  demands 

Translations  of  Documents  Handed  to  the  President,  Yuan- 
shih-kai,  by  Mr.  Hioki,  the  Japanese  Minister,  on  January  18th, 
1915. 

GROUP  I 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government  being 
desirous  of  maintaining  the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and 
further  strengthening  the  friendly  relations  and  good  neigh- 
bourhood existing  between  the  two  nations  agree  to  the  follow- 
ing articles : — 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  to  give  full 
assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese  Government 
may  hereafter  agree  with  the  German  Government  relating  to 
the  disposition  of  all  rights,  interests  and  concessions,  which 
Germany,  by  virtue  of  treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses  in  rela- 
tion to  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

Article  2.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  that  within  the 
Province  of  Shantung  and  along  its  coast  no  territory  or 
island  will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  a  third  Power  under  any  pre- 
text. 

Article  3.  The  Chinese  Government  consents  to  Japan's 
building  a  railway  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow  to  join  the  Kiao- 
chou-Tsinanfu  railway. 

Article  4?.  The  Chinese  Government  engages,  in  the  inter- 
est of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  her- 
self as  soon  as  possible  certain  important  cities  and  towns  in 
the  Province  of  Shantung  as  Commercial  Ports.  What  places 
shall  be  opened  are  to  be  jointly  decided  upon  in  a  separate 
agreement. 

GROUP  n 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government,  since 
the  Chinese  Government  has  always  acknowledged  the  special 


90  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

position  enjoyed  by  Japan  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern 
Inner  Mongoha,  agree  to  the  following  articles : — 

Article  1.  The  two  Contracting  Parties  mutually  agree  that 
the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  and  the  term 
of  lease  of  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  and  the  Antung- 
Mukden  Railway  shall  be  extended  to  the  period  of  99 
years. 

Article  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eas- 
tern Inner  Mongolia  shall  have  the  right  to  lease  or  own  land 
required  either  for  erecting  suitable  buildings  for  trade  and 
manufacture  or  for  farming. 

Article  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside  and 
travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  and 
to  engage  in  business  and  in  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatso- 
ever. 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  grant  to  Jap- 
anese subjects  the  right  of  opening  the  mines  in  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia.  As  regards  what  mines 
are  to  be  opened,  they  shall  be  decided  upon  jointly. 

Article  5.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  in  respect 
of  the  (two)  cases  mentioned  herein  below  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment's consent  shall  be  first  obtained  before  action  is 
taken : — 

(a)  Whenever  permission  is  granted  to  the  subject  of  a 
third  Power  to  build  a  railway  or  to  make  a  loan  with  a  third 
Power  for  the  purpose  of  building  a  railway  in  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia. 

(b)  Whenever  a  loan  is  to  be  made  with  a  third  Power 
pledging  the  local  taxes  of  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia  as  security. 

Article  6.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  if  the  Chi- 
nese Government  employs  political,  financial  or  military  advisers 
or  instructors  in  South  Manchuria  or  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia, 
the  Japanese  Government  shall  first  be  consulted. 

Article  7.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  the  control 
and  management  of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  shall  be 
handed  over  to  the  Japanese  Government  for  a  term  of  99  years 
dating  from  the  signing  of  this  Agreement. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  91 


GROUP  in 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government,  see- 
ing that  Japanese  financiers  and  the  Hanyehping  Co.  have 
ciose  relations  with  each  other  at  present  and  desiring  that  the 
common  interests  of  the  two  nations  shall  be  advanced,  agree  to 
the  following  articles : — 

Article  1.  The  two  Contracting  Parties  mutually  agree  that 
when  the  opportune  moment  arrives  the  Hanyehping  Company 
shall  be  made  a  joint  concern  of  the  two  nations  and  they  fur- 
ther agree  that  without  the  previous  consent  of  Japan,  China 
shall  not  by  her  own  act  dispose  of  the  rights  and  property  of 
whatsoever  nature  of  the  said  Company  nor  cause  the  said  Com- 
pany to  dispose  freely  of  the  same. 

Article  2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  all  mines  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  those  owned  by  the  Hanyehping  Company 
shall  not  be  permitted,  without  the  consent  of  the  said  Com- 
pany, to  be  worked  by  other  persons  outside  of  the  said  Com- 
pany ;  and  further  agrees  that  if  it  is  desired  to  carry  out  any 
undertaking  which,  it  is  apprehended,  may  directly  or  indi- 
rectly affect  the  interests  of  the  said  Company,  the  consent  of 
the  said  Company  shall  first  be  obtained. 

GKOUP  IV 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government  with 
the  object  of  effectively  preserving  the  territorial  integrity  of 
China  agree  to  the  following  special  articles : — 

The  Chinese  Government  engages  not  to  cede  or  lease  to  a 
third  Power  any  harbour  or  bay  or  island  along  the  coast  of 
China. 

GROUP  V 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Central  Government  shall  employ  in- 
fluential Japanese  advisers  in  political,  financial  and  military 
affairs. 

Article  2.  Japanese  hospitals,  churches  and  schools  in  the 
interior  of  China  shall  be  granted  the  right  of  owning  land. 

Article  3.  Inasmuch  as  the  Japanese  Government  and  the 
Chinese  Government  have  had  many  cases  of  dispute  between 


92  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Japanese  and  Chinese  police  to  settle  cases  which  caused  no 
little  misunderstanding,  it  is  for  this  reason  necessary  that  the 
police  departments  of  important  places  (in  China)  shall  be 
jointly  administered  by  Japanese  and  Chinese  or  that  the  police 
departments  of  these  places  shall  employ  numerous  Japanese, 
so  that  they  may  at  the  same  time  help  to  plan  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  Chinese  Police  Service. 

Article  4.  China  shall  purchase  from  Japan  a  fixed  amount 
of  munitions  of  war  (say  50^  or  more)  of  what  is  needed  by 
the  Chinese  Government  or  that  there  shall  be  established  in 
China  a  Sino- Japanese  jointly  worked  arsenal.  Japanese 
technical  experts  are  to  be  employed  and  Japanese  material  to 
be  purchased. 

Article  5.  China  agrees  to  grant  to  Japan  the  right  of  con- 
structing a  railway  connecting  Wuchang  with  Kiukiang  and 
Nanchang,  another  line  between  Nanchang  and  Hanchow,  and 
another  between  Nanchang  and  Chaochou. 

Article  6.  If  China  needs  foreign  capital  to  work  mines, 
build  railways  and  construct  harbour-works  (including  dock- 
yards) in  the  Provinces  of  Fukien,  Japan  shall  be  first  con- 
sulted. 

Article  7.  China  agrees  that  Japanese  subjects  shall  have 
the  right  of  missionary  propaganda  in  China. ^ 

The  five  groups  into  which  the  Japanese  divided  their 
demands  possess  a  remarkable  interest  not  because  of 
their  sequence,  or  the  style  of  their  phraseology,  but 
because  every  word  reveals  a  peculiar  and  very  illumi- 
nating chemistry  of  the  soul.  To  study  the  original 
Chinese  text  is  to  pass  as  it  were  into  the  secret  recesses 
of  the  Japanese  brain,  and  to  find  in  that  darkened 
chamber  a  whole  world  of  things  which  advertise  ambi- 
tions mixed  with  limitations,  hesitations  overwhelmed 
by  audacities,  greatnesses  succumbing  to  littlenesses,  and 
vanities  having  the  appearance  of  velleities.  Given  an 
intimate  knowledge  of  Far  Eastern  politics  and  Far 

1  Refers  to  preaching  Buddhism. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  93 

Eastern  languages,  only  a  few  minutes  are  required  to 
re-write  the  demands  in  the  sequence  in  which  they  were 
originally  conceived  as  well  as  to  trace  the  natural  his- 
tory of  their  genesis.  Unfortunately  a  great  deal  is  lost 
in  their  official  translation,  and  the  menace  revealed  in 
the  Chinese  original  partly  cloaked :  for  by  transferring 
Eastern  thoughts  into  Western  moulds,  things  that  are 
like  nails  in  the  hands  of  soft  sensitive  Oriental  beings 
are  made  to  a]3pear  to  the  steel-clad  West  as  cold- 
blooded, evolutionary  necessities  which  may  be  repellent 
but  which  are  never  cruel.  The  more  the  matter  is 
studied  the  more  convinced  must  the  political  student  be 
that  in  this  affair  of  the  18th  January  we  have  an  inter- 
national coup  destined  to  become  classic  in  the  new 
text-books  of  political  science.  All  the  way  through  the 
twenty-one  articles  it  is  easy  to  see  the  desire  for  action, 
the  love  of  accomplished  facts,  struggling  with  the 
necessity  to  observe  the  conventions  of  a  stereotyped 
diplomacy  and  often  overwhelming  those  conventions. 
As  the  thoughts  thicken  and  the  plot  develops,  the  effort 
to  mask  the  real  intention  lying  behind  every  word 
plainly  breaks  down,  and  a  growing  exultation  rings 
louder  and  louder  as  if  the  coveted  Chinese  prize  were 
already  firmly  grasped.  One  sees  as  it  were  the  Japan- 
ese nation,  released  from  bondage  imposed  by  the  Trea- 
ties which  have  been  binding  on  all  nations  since  1860, 
swarming  madly  through  the  breached  walls  of  ancient 
Cathay  and  disputing  hotly  the  spoils  of  age-old  do- 
mains. 

Group  I,  which  deals  with  the  fruits  of  victoiy  in 
Shantung,  has  little  to  detain  us  since  events  which  have 
just  unrolled  there  have  already  told  the  story  of  those 
demands.     In  Shantung  we  have  a  simple  and  easily- 


94  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

understood  repeated  performance  of  the  history  of  1905 
and  the  settlement  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 
Placed  at  the  very  head  of  the  list  of  demands,  though 
its  legitimate  position  should  be  after  Manchuria,  obvi- 
ously the  purpose  of  Group  I  is  conspicuously  to  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that  Japan  had  been  at  war  with 
Germany,  and  is  still  at  war  with  her.  This  flourish  of 
trumpets,  after  the  battle  is  over,  however,  scarcely 
serves  to  disguise  that  the  fate  of  Shantung,  following 
so  hard  on  the  heels  of  the  Russian  debacle  in  Manchuria, 
is  the  great  moral  wliich  Western  peoples  are  called 
upon  to  note.  Japan,  determined  as  she  has  repeatedly 
announced  to  preserve  the  peace  of  the  Orient  by  any 
means  she  deems  necessary,  has  found  the  one  and  only 
formula  that  is  satisfactory — ^that  of  methodically  an- 
nexing everything  worth  fighting  about. 

So  far  so  good.  The  insertion  of  a  special  preamble 
to  Group  II,  which  covers  not  only  South  ISIanchuria 
but  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  as  well,  is  an  ingenious 
piece  of  work  since  it  shows  that  the  hot  mood  of  con- 
quest suitable  for  Shantung  must  be  exchanged  for  a 
certain  judicial  detachment.  The  preamble  undoubt- 
edly betrays  the  guiding  hand  of  Viscount  Kato,  the 
then  astute  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  who  saturated 
in  the  great  series  of  international  undertakings  made 
by  Japan  since  the  first  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  of  1902, 
clearly  believes  that  the  stately  Elizabethan  manner 
which  still  characterizes  British  official  phrasing  is  an 
admirable  method  to  be  here  employed.  The  preamble 
is  quite  English;  it  is  so  English  that  one  is  almost  lulled 
into  believing  that  one's  previous  reasoning  has  been  at 
fault  and  that  Japan  is  only  demanding  what  she  is 
entitled  to.     Yet  study  Group  II  closely  and  subtleties 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  95 

gradually  emerge.  By  boldly  and  categorically  placing 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  on  precisely  the  same  footing 
as  Southern  Manchuria — though  they  have  nothing  in 
common — the  assumption  is  made  that  the  collapse  in 
1908  of  the  great  Anglo-American  scheme  to  run  a 
neutral  railway  up  the  flank  of  Southern  Manchuria  to 
Northern  Manchuria  (the  once  celebrated  Chinchow- 
Aigun  scheme),  coupled  with  general  agreement  with 
Russia  which  was  then  arrived  at,  now  impose  upon 
China  the  necessity  of  publicly  resigning  herself  to  a 
Japanese  overlordship  of  that  region.  In  other  words, 
the  preamble  of  Group  II  lays  down  that  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia  has  become  part  and  parcel  of  the  Manchu- 
rian  Question  because  Japan  has  found  a  parallel  for 
what  she  is  doing  in  the  acts  of  European  Powers. 

These  things,  however,  need  not  detain  us.  Not  that 
Manchuria  or  the  adjoining  Mongolian  plain  is  not  im- 
portant ;  not  that  the  threads  of  destiny  are  not  woven 
thickly  there.  For  it  is  certain  that  the  vast  region 
immediately  beyond  the  Great  Wall  of  China  is  the 
Flanders  of  the  Far  East — and  that  the  next  inevitable 
war  which  will  destroy  China  or  make  her  something  of 
a  nation  must  be  fought  on  that  soil  just  as  two  other 
wars  have  been  fought  there  during  the  past  twenty 
years.  But  this  does  not  belong  to  contemporary  poli- 
tics; it  is  possibly  an  affair  of  the  Chinese  army  of  1925 
or  1935.  Some  day  China  will  fight  for  Manchuria,  if 
it  is  impossible  to  recover  it  in  any  other  way, — nobody 
need  doubt  that.  For  Manchuria  is  absolutely  Chinese 
— people  must  remember.  No  matter  how  far  the 
town-dwelling  Japanese  may  invade  the  country  dur- 
ing the  next  two  or  three  decades,  no  matter  what  large 
alien  garrisons  may  be  planted  there,  the  Chinese  must 


96  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

and  will  remain  the  dominant  racial  element,  since  their 
population  which  abeady  nimibers  twenty-five  millions 
is  growing  at  the  rate  of  half  a  million  a  year,  and  in  a 
few  decades  will  equal  the  population  of  a  first-class 
European  Power. 

When  we  reach  Group  III  we  touch  matters  that  are 
not  only  immediately  vital  but  quite  new  in  their  type  of 
audacity  and  which  every  one  can  to-day  understand 
since  they  are  politico-industrial.  Group  III,  as  it 
stands  in  the  original  text,  is  simply  the  plan  for  the 
conquest  of  the  mineral  wealth  of  the  Yangtsze  Valley 
which  mainly  centres  round  Hankow  because  the  vast 
alluvial  plains  of  the  lower  reaches  of  this  greatest  of 
rivers  were  once  the  floor  of  the  Yellow  Sea,  the  upper 
provinces  of  Hupeh,  Hunan,  Kiangsi  being  the  region 
of  prehistoric  forests  clothing  the  coasts,  which  once 
looked  down  upon  the  slowly -receding  waste  of  waters, 
and  which  to-day  contain  all  the  coal  and  iron. 
Hitherto  every  one  has  always  believed  that  the  Yang- 
tsze Valley  was  par  excellence  the  British  sphere  in 
China ;  and  every  one  has  always  thought  that  that  belief 
was  enough.  It  is  true  that  political  students,  going 
carefully  over  all  published  documents,  have  ended  their 
search  by  declaring  that  the  matter  certainly  required 
further  elucidation.  To  be  precise,  this  so-called  Brit- 
ish sphere  is  not  an  enclave  at  all  in  the  proper  sense; 
indeed  it  can  only  seem  one  to  those  who  still  believe 
that  it  is  still  possible  to  pre-empt  provinces  by  minis- 
terial declarations.  The  Japanese  have  been  the  first  to 
dare  to  say  that  the  preconceived  general  belief  was 
stupid.  They  know,  of  course,  that  it  was  a  British 
force  which  invaded  the  Yangtsze  Valley  seventy-five 
years  ago,  and  forced  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  97 

Nanking  which  first  opened  China  to  the  world's  trade ; 
but  they  are  by  no  means  impressed  with  the  rights 
which  that  action  has  been  held  to  confer,  since  the 
mineral  resources  of  this  region  are  priceless  in  their 
eyes  and  must  somehow  be  won. 

The  study  of  twenty  years  of  history  proves  this 
assumption  to  be  correct.  Ever  since  1895,  Japan  has 
been  driving  wedges  into  the  Yangtsze  Valley  of  a 
peculiar  kind  to  form  the  foundations  for  her  sweeping 
claims  of  1915.  Thus  after  the  war  with  China  in 
1894-95,  she  opened  by  her  Treaty  of  Peace  four  ports 
in  the  Yangtsze  Valley  region,  Soochow,  Hangchow, 
Chungking  and  Shasi;  that  is,  at  the  two  extreme  ends 
of  the  valley  she  established  politico-commercial  points 
d'appin  from  which  to  direct  her  campaign.  Whilst  the 
proximity  of  Soochow  and  Hangchow  to  the  British 
stronghold  of  Shanghai  made  it  difficult  to  carry  out  any 
"penetration"  work  at  the  lower  end  of  the  river  save  in 
the  form  of  subsidized  steam-shipping,  the  case  was  dif- 
ferent in  Hunan  and  Hupeh  provinces.  There  she  was 
unendingly  busy,  and  in  1903  by  a  fresh  treaty  she  for- 
mally opened  to  trade  Changsha,  the  capital  of  the 
turbulent  Hunan  province.  Changsha  for  years  re- 
mained a  secret  centre  possessing  the  greatest  political 
importance  for  her,  and  sei-ving  as  a  focus  for  most 
varied  activities  involving  Hunan,  Hupeh,  and  Kiangsi, 
as  well  as  a  vast  hinterland.  The  great  Tayeh  iron- 
mines,  although  entirely  Chinese-owned,  were  already 
being  tapped  to  supply  iron-ore  for  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment Foundry  at  Wakamatsu  on  the  island  of 
Kiushiu.  The  rich  coal  mines  of  Pinghsiang,  being  con- 
veniently near,  supphed  the  great  Chinese  Government 
arsenal  of  Hanyang  with  fuel ;  and  since  Japan  had  very 


98  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

little  coal  or  iron  of  her  own,  she  decided  that  it  would 
be  best  to  embrace  as  soon  as  possible  the  whole  area 
of  interests  in  one  categorical  demand — that  is  to  claim 
a  dominant  share  in  the  Hanyang  arsenal,  the  Tayeh 
iron-mines  and  the  Ping-hsiang  collieries/  By  lending 
money  to  these  enterprises,  which  were  grouped  to- 
gether under  the  name  of  Hanyehping,  she  had  early 
estabhshed  a  claim  on  them  which  she  turned  at  the 
psychological  moment  into  an  international  question. 

We  can  pass  quickly  by  Group  IV  which  is  of  little 
importance,  except  to  say  that  in  taking  upon  herself, 
without  consultation  with  the  senior  ally,  the  duty  of 
asking  from  China  a  declaration  concerning  the  future 
non-leasing  of  harbours  and  islands,  Japan  has  at- 
tempted to  assume  a  protectorship  of  Chinese  territory 
which  does  not  belong  to  her  historically.  It  is  well 
also  to  note  that  although  Japan  wished  it  to  appear 
to  the  world  that  this  action  was  dictated  by  her  desire 
to  prevent  Germany  from  acquiring  a  fresh  foothold  in 
China  after  the  war,  in  reality  Group  IV  was  drafted 
as  a  general  warning  to  the  nations,  one  point  being 
that  she  believed  that  the  United  States  was  contem- 
plating the  reorganization  of  the  Foochow  Arsenal  in 
Fuhkien  province,  and  that  as  a  corollary  to  that  re- 
organization would  be  given  the  lease  of  an  adjoining 
harbour  such  as  Santuao. 

It  is  not,  however,  until  we  reach  Group  V  that  the 
real  purpose  of  the  Japanese  demands  becomes  un- 
alterably clear,  for  in  this  Group  we  have  seven  sketches 
of  things  designed  to  serve  as  the  coup  de  grace.  Not 
only  is  a  new  sphere — Fuhkien  province — indicated; 

1  The  reader  will  observe,  that  the  expression  "Hanyehping  enterprises" 
is  compounded  by  linking  together  characters  denoting  the  triple  industry. 


liuixs  OF  THE  Famous  Yuan  Ming  Yuan  1*ai,ace  Outside 
Peking,  Buii>t  for  the  Manchu  Sovereigns  by  the 
Jesi  IT  P'athers  and  Destroyed  by  the  Allies  in  1860 


Modern  JVeking:  a  Ktn  on  a  JJank 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  99 

not  only  is  the  mid-Yangtsze,  from  the  vicinity  of  Kiu- 
kiang,  to  serve  as  the  terminus  for  a  system  of  Japa- 
nese railways,  radiating  from  the  great  river  to  the 
coasts  of  South  China;  but  the  gleaming  knife  of  the 
Japanese  surgeon  is  to  aid  the  Japanese  teacher  in  the 
great  work  of  propaganda;  the  Japanese  monk  and  the 
Japanese  policeman  are  to  be  dispersed  like  skirmishers 
throughout  the  land;  Japanese  arsenals  are  to  supply 
all  the  necessary  arms,  or  failing  that  a  special  Japa- 
nese arsenal  is  to  be  established;  Japanese  advisers  are 
to  give  the  necessary  advice  in  finance,  in  politics,  in 
every  department — foreshadowing  a  complete  and  all 
embracing  political  control.     Never  was  a  more  sweep- 
ing   program    of    supervision    presented,    and    small 
wonder  if  Chinese  when  they  learnt  of  this  climax  ex- 
claimed that  the  fate  of  Korea  was  to  be  their  own. 
For  a  number  of  weeks  after  the  presentation  of  these 
demands  everything  remained  clothed  in  impenetrable 
mystery,    and    despite    every   effort    on    the    part    of 
diplomatists  reliable  details  of  what  was  occurring  could 
not  be  obtained.     Gradually,  however,  the  admission 
was  forced  that  the  secrecy  being  preserved  was  due  to 
the  Japanese  threat  that  pubhcity  would  be  met  with 
the  harshest  reprisals;  and  presently  the  veil  was  en- 
tirely lifted  by  newspaper  publication  and  foreign  Am- 
bassadors began  making  inquiries  in  Tokio.     The  nat- 
ure and  scope  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands  could  now 
be  no  longer  hidden;  and  in  response  to  the  growing 
indignation  which  began  to  be  voiced  by  the  press  and 
the  pressure  which  British  diplomacy  brought  to  bear, 
Japan  found  it  necessary  to  modif}^  some  of  the  most 
important  items.     She  had  held  twenty-four  meetings 
at  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office,  and  although  the  Chinese 


100  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

negotiators  had  been  forced  to  give  way  in  such  mat- 
ters as  extending  the  "leasing"  periods  of  railways  and 
territories  in  Manchuria  and  in  admitting  the  Japanese 
right  to  succeed  to  all  German  interests  and  rights  in 
Shantung  (Group  I  and  II),  in  the  essential  matters 
of  the  Hanyehping  concessions  (Group  III)  and  the 
noxious  demands  of  Group  V  China  had  stood  abso- 
lutely firm,  declining  even  to  discuss  some  of  the  items. 
Accordingly  Japanese  diplomacy  was  forced  to  re- 
state and  re-group  the  whole  corpus  of  the  demands. 
On  the  26th  April,  acting  under  direct  instructions  from 
Tokio,  the  Japanese  Minister  to  Peking  presented  a 
revised  list  for  renewed  consideration,  the  demands 
being  expanded  to  twenty-four  articles  (in  place  of  the 
original  twenty-one  largely  because  discussion  had 
shown  the  necessity  of  breaking  up  into  smaller  units 
some  of  the  original  articles).  Most  significant,  how- 
ever, is  the  fact  that  Group  V,  (which  in  its  original 
form  was  a  more  vicious  assault  on  Chinese  sovereignty 
than  the  Austrian  Ultimatum  to  Serbia  of  June,  1914) 
was  so  remodelled  as  to  convey  a  very  different 
meaning,  the  group  heading  disappearing  entirely  and 
an  innocent-looking  exchange  of  notes  being  asked  for. 
It  is  necessary  to  recall  that,  when  taxed  with  making 
Demands  which  were  entirely  in  conflict  with  the  spirit 
of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment through  its  ambassadors  abroad  had  categorically 
denied  that  they  had  ever  laid  any  such  Demands  on 
the  Chinese  Government.  It  was  claimed  that  there 
had  never  been  twenty-one  Demands,  as  the  Chinese 
alleged,  but  only  fourteen,  the  seven  items  of  Group  V 
being  desiderata  which  it  was  in  the  interests  of  China 
to  endorse  hut  which  Japan  had  no  intention  of  forcing 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  101 

upon  her.  The  writer,  being  acquainted  from  first  to 
last  with  everything  that  took  place  in  Peking  from 
the  18th  January  to  the  filing  of  the  Japanese  ultima- 
tum of  the  7th  May,  has  no  hesitation  in  stigmatising 
this  statement  as  false.  The  whole  aim  and  object  of 
these  negotiations  was  to  force  through  Group  V. 
Japan  would  have  gladly  postponed  si7ie  die  the  dis- 
cussion of  all  the  other  Groups  had  China  assented  to 
provisions  which  would  have  made  her  independence 
a  thing  of  the  past.  Every  Chinese  knew  that,  in  the 
main.  Group  V  was  simply  a  repetition  of  the  measures 
undertaken  in  Korea  after  the  Russo-Japanese  war  of 
1905  as  a  forerunner  to  annexation;  and  although  ob- 
viously in  the  case  of  China  no  such  rapid  surgery  could 
be  practised,  the  endorsement  of  these  measures  would 
have  meant  a  virtual  Japanese  Protectorate.  Even  a 
cursory  study  of  the  text  that  follows  will  confirm  in 
every  particular  these  capital  contentions: 

japan's  kevised  demands 

Japan's  Revised  Demands  on  China,  twenty-four  in  all,  pre- 
sented April  26,  1915. 

Note  on  original  text: 

[The  revised  list  of  articles  is  a  Chinese  translation  of  the 
Japanese  text.  It  is  hereby  declared  that  when  a  final  de- 
cision is  reached,  there  shall  be  a  revision  of  the  wording  of  the 
text.] 

GROUP  I 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government,  being 
desirous  of  maintaining  the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and 
further  strengthening  the  friendly  relations  and  good  neigh- 
bourhood existing  between  the  two  nations,  agree  to  the  follow- 
ing articles : — 

Article   1.     The  Chinese  Government  engages   to  give  full 


102  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese  Government  may 
hereafter  agree  with  the  German  Government,  relating  to  the 
disposition  of  all  rights,  interests  and  concessions,  which  Ger- 
many, by  virtue  of  treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses  in  relation 
to  the  Province  of  Shangtung. 

Article  2.     (Changed  into  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  within  the  Province  of 
Shantung  and  along  its  coast  no  territory  or  island  will  be 
ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power  under  any  pretext. 

Article  3.  The  Chinese  Government  consents  that  as  regards 
the  railway  to  be  built  by  China  herself  from  Chefoo  or  Lung- 
kow  to  connect  with  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Railway,  if  Ger- 
many is  willing  to  abandon  the  privilege  of  financing  the  Chefoo- 
Weihsien  line.  China  will  approach  Japanese  capitalists  to 
negotiate  for  a  loan. 

Article  4t.  The  Chinese  Government  engages,  in  the  interest 
of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  China 
herself  as  soon  as  possible  certain  suitable  places  in  the  Prov- 
ince of  Shantung  as  Commercial  Ports. 

(Supplementary  Exchange  of  Notes) 

The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be  chosen  and 
the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted,  by  the  Chinese  Government, 
but  the  Japanese  Minister  must  be  consulted  before  making  a 
decision. 

GROUP  II 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government,  with 
a  view  to  developing  their  economic  relations  in  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  agree  to  the  following 
articles : — 

Article  1.  The  two  contracting  Powers  mutually  agree  that 
the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  and  the  terms  of 
the  South  Manchuria  Railway  and  the  Antung-Mukden  Rail- 
way' shall  be  extended  to  99  years. 

(Supplementary  Exchange  of  Notes) 

The  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  shall  expire  in 
the  86th  year  of  the  Republic  or  199T.     The  date  for  restoring 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  103 

the  South  Manchurian  Railway  to  China  shall  fall  due  in  the 
91st  year  of  the  Republic  or  2002.  Article  12  in  the  original 
South  Manchurian  Railway  Agreement  stating  that  it  may  be 
redeemed  by  China  after  36  years  after  the  traffic  is  opened  is 
hereby  cancelled.  The  term  of  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway 
shall  expire  in  the  96th  year  of  the  Republic  or  2007. 

Article  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  may  lease 
or  purchase  the  necessary  land  for  erecting  suitable  buildings 
for  trade  and  manufacture  or  for  prosecuting  agricultural 
enterprises. 

Article  S.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside  and 
travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in  business  and  manu- 
facture of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Article  2^.  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to  in  the  pre- 
ceding two  articles,  besides  being  required  to  register  with  the 
local  authorities  pass-ports  which  they  must  procure  under  the 
existing  regulations,  shall  also  submit  to  police  laws  and  ordi- 
nances and  tax  regulations,  which  are  approved  by  the  Jap- 
anese consul.  Civil  and  criminal  cases  in  which  the  defendants 
are  Japanese  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  the  Japanese 
consul ;  those  in  which  the  defendants  are  Chinese  shall  be  tried 
and  adjudicated  by  Chinese  Authorities.  In  either  case  an  offi- 
cer can  be  deputed  to  the  court  to  attend  the  proceedings.  But 
mixed  civil  cases  between  Chinese  and  Japanese  relating  to  land 
shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  delegates  of  both  nations  con- 
jointly in  accordance  with  Chinese  law  and  local  usage.  When 
the  judicial  system  in  the  said  region  is  completely  reformed, 
all  civil  and  criminal  cases  concerning  Japanese  subjects  shall 
be  tried  entirely  by  Chinese  law  courts. 

Article  4.      (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  Japanese  subjects 
shall  be  permitted  forthwith  to  investigate,  select,  and  then 
prospect  for  and  open  mines  at  the  following  places  in  South 
Manchuria,  apart  from  those  mining  areas  in  which  mines 
are  being  prospected  for  or  worked;  until  the  Mining  Ordi- 
nance is  definitely  settled  methods  at  present  in  force  shall 
be  followed. 


104  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Province  of  Feng-Tien 
Locality  District  Mineral 

Niu  Hsin  T'ai  Pen-hsi Coal 

Tien  Shih  Fu  Kou "        " 

Sha  Sung  Kang Hai-lung    " 

T'ieh  Ch'ang Tung-hua " 

Nuan  Ti  Tang Chin   " 

An  Shan  Chan  region.  .From  Liao-yang  to 

Pen-hsi  . Iron 

Province  of  Kirin 

(Southern  portion) 

Sha  Sung  Kang  ......  .Ho-lung  Coal  and  Iron 

Kang  Yao Chi-lin  (Kirin)    .  .,. Coal 

Chia  P'i  Kou Hua-tien   .......  .Gold 

Article  5.      (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 
The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  China  will  hereafter 
provide  funds  for  building  railways  in  South  Manchuria ;  if 
foreign  capital  is  required,  the  Chinese  Government  agrees  to 
negotiate  for  the  loan  with  Japanese  capitalists  first. 
Article  5^.      (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 
The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  hereafter,  when  a  for- 
eign loan  is  to  be  made  on  the  security  of  the  taxes  of  South 
Manchuria  (not  including  customs  and  salt  revenue  on  the  se- 
curity of  which  loans  have  already  been  made  by  the  Central 
Government),  it  will  negotiate  for  the  loan  with  Japanese  cap- 
italists first. 

Article  6.      (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 
The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  hereafter  if  foreign 
advisers  or  instructors  on  political,  financial,  military  or  police 
matters,  are  to  be  employed  in  South  Manchuria,  Japanese  will 
be  employed  first. 

Article  7.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  speedily  to  make 
a  fundamental  revision  of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  Loan 
Agreement,  taking  as  a  standard  the  provisions  in  railroad  loan 
agreements  made  heretofore  between  China  and  foreign  finan- 
ciers.    If,  in  future,  more  advantageous  terms  than  those  in 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  105 

existing  railway  loan  agreements  are  granted  to  foreign  finan- 
ciers, in  connection  with  railway  loans,  the  above  agreement 
shall  again  be  revised  in  accordance  with  Japan's  wishes. 

All  existing  treaties  between  China  and  Japan  relating  to 
Manchuria  shall,  except  where  otherwise  provided  for  by  this 
Convention,  remain  in  force. 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  hereafter  when  a 
foreign  loan  is  to  be  made  on  the  security  of  the  taxes  of  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia,  China  must  negotiate  with  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment first. 

2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  China  will  herself 
provide  funds  for  building  the  railways  in  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia ;  if  foreign  capital  is  required,  she  must  negotiate  with 
the  Japanese  Government  first. 

3.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees,  in  the  interest  of  trade 
and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  China  herself, 
as  soon  as  possible,  certain  suitable  places  in  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia  as  Commercial  Ports.  The  places  which  ought  to  be 
opened  are  to  be  chosen,  and  the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted, 
by  the  Chinese  Government,  but  the  Japanese  Minister  must  be 
consulted  before  making  a  decision. 

4.  In  the  event  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  desiring  jointly  to 
undertake  agricultural  enterprises  and  industries  incidental 
thereto,  the  Chinese  Government  shall  give  its  permission. 

GROUP  m 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  Hanyehping  Company 
being  very  intimate,  if  those  interested  in  the  said  Company 
come  to  an  agreement  with  the  Japanese  capitalists  for  co-op- 
eration, the  Chinese  Government  shall  forthwith  give  its  con- 
sent thereto.  The  Chinese  Government  further  agrees  that, 
without  the  consent  of  the  Japanese  capitalists,  China  will  not 
convert  the  Company  into  a  state  enterprise,  nor  confiscate  it, 
nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign  capital  other  than 
Japanese. 

GROUP  IV 

China  to  give  a  pronouncement  by  herself  in  accordance  with 
the  following  principle : — 


106  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

No  bay,  harbour,  or  Island  along  the  coast  of  China  may  be 
ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power. 

Notes  to  be  Exchanged 
A 

As  regards  the  right  of  financing  a  railway  from  Wuchang 
to  connect  with  the  Kiu-kiang-Nanchang  line,  the  Nanchang- 
Hangchow  railway,  and  the  Nanchang-Chaochow  railway,  if  it 
is  clearly  ascertained  that  other  Powers  have  no  objection, 
China  shall  grant  the  said  right  to  Japan. 

B 

As  regards  the  rights  of  financing  a  railway  from  Wuchang 
to  connect  with  the  Kiu-kiang-Nanchang  railway,  a  railway 
from  Nanchang  to  Hangchow  and  another  from  Nanchang  to 
Chaochow,  the  Chinese  Government  shall  not  grant  the  said 
right  to  any  foreign  Power  before  Japan  comes  to  an  under- 
standing with  the  other  Power  which  is  heretofore  interested 
therein. 

NOTES    TO    BE    EXCHANGED 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  no  nation  whatever  is 
to  be  permitted  to  construct,  on  the  coast  of  Fukien  Province, 
a  dockyard,  a  coaling  station  for  military  use,  or  a  naval  base ; 
not  to  be  authorized  to  set  up  any  other  military  establish- 
ment. The  Chinese  Government  further  agrees  not  to  use  for- 
eign capital  for  setting  up  the  above  mentioned  construction 
or  establishment. 

Mr.  Lu,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  stated  as  follows : — 

1.  The  Chinese  Government,  shall,  whenever,  in  future,  it 
considers  this  step  necessary,  engage  numerous  Japanese  ad- 
visers. 

2.  Whenever,  in  future,  Japanese  subjects  desire  to  lease  or 
purchase  land  in  the  interior  of  China  for  establishing  schools 
or  hospitals,  the  Chinese  Government  shall  forthwith  give  its 
consent  thereto. 

3.  When  a  suitable  opportunity  arises  in  future,  the  Chinese 
Government  will  send  military  ofiicers  to  Japan  to  negotiate 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  107 

with  Japanese  military  authorities  the  matter  of  purchasing 
arms  or  that  of  establishing  a  joint  arsenal. 

Mr.  Hioki,  the  Japanese  Minister,  stated  as  follows : — 
As  relates  to  the  question  of  the  right  of  missionary  prop- 
aganda the  same  shall  be  taken  up  again  for  negotiation  in 
future. 

An  ominous  silence  followed  the  delivery  of  this  docu- 
ment. The  Chinese  Foreign  Office  had  already  ex- 
hausted itself  in  a  discussion  which  had  lasted  three 
months,  and  pursuant  to  instructions  from  the  Presi- 
dential Palace  prepared  an  exhaustive  Memorandum 
on  the  subject.  It  was  understood  by  now  that  all  the 
Foreign  Offices  in  the  world  were  interesting  them- 
selves very  particularly  in  the  matter ;  and  that  all  were 
agreed  that  the  situation  which  had  so  strangely  de- 
veloped was  very  serious.  On  the  1st  May,  proceeding 
by  appointment  to  the  Waichiaopu  (Foreign  Office) 
the  Japanese  Minister  had  read  to  him  the  following 
Memorandum  which  it  is  very  necessary  to  grasp  as  it 
shows  how  solicitous  China  had  become  of  terminating 
the  business  before  there  was  an  open  international 
break.  It  will  also  be  seen  that  this  Memorandum 
was  obviously  composed  for  purpose  of  public  record, 
the  fifth  group  being  dealt  with  in  such  a  way  as  to  fix 
upon  Japan  the  guilt  of  having  concealed  from  her 
British  Ally  matters  which  conflicted  vitally  with  the 
aims  and  objects  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance 
Treaty. 

MEMORANDUM 

Read  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  Mr.  Hioki,  the 
Japanese  Minister,  at  a  Conference  held  at  Wai  Chiao  Pu, 
May  1, 1915. 

The  list  of  demands  which  the  Japanese  Government  first 
presented  to  the  Chinese  Government  consists  of  five  groups,  the 


108  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

first  relating  to  Shantung,  the  second  relating  to  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  the  third  relating  to  Han- 
yehping  Company,  the  fourth  asking  for  non-alienation  of  the 
coast  of  the  country,  and  the  fifth  relating  to  the  questions  of 
national  advisers,  national  police,  national  arms,  missionary 
propaganda,  Yangtsze  Valley  railways,  and  Fukien  Province. 
Out  of  profound  regard  for  the  intentions  entertained  by  Japan, 
the  Chinese  Government  took  these  momentous  demands  into 
grave  and  careful  consideration  and  decided  to  negotiate  with 
the  Japanese  Government  frankly  and  sincerely  what  were 
possible  to  negotiate.  This  is  a  manifestation  to  Japan  of  the 
most  profound  regard  which  the  Chinese  Government  enter- 
tains for  the  relations  between  the  two  nations. 

Ever  since  the  opening  of  the  negotiations  China  has  been 
doing  her  best  to  hasten  their  progress  holding  as  many  as 
three  conferences  a  week.  As  regards  the  articles  in  the  sec- 
ond group,  the  Chinese  Government  being  disposed  to  allow  the 
Japanese  Government  to  develop  the  economic  relations  of  the 
two  countries  in  South  Manchuria,  realizing  that  the  Japanese 
Government  attaches  importance  to  its  interests  in  that  region, 
and  wishing  to  meet  the  hope  of  Japan,  made  a  painful  effort, 
without  hesitation,  to  agree  to  the  extension  of  the  25-year 
lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny,  the  36-year  period  of  the 
South  Manchurian  Railway  and  the  IS-year  period  of  the  An- 
tung-Mukden  Railway,  all  to  99  years ;  and  to  abandon  its  own 
cherished  hopes  to  regain  control  of  these  places  and  prop- 
erties at  the  expiration  of  their  respective  original  terms  of 
lease.  It  cannot  but  be  admitted  that  this  is  a  most  genuine 
proof  of  China's  friendship  for  Japan. 

As  to  the  right  of  opening  mines  in  South  Manchuria,  the 
Chinese  Government  has  already  agreed  to  permit  Japanese 
to  work  mines  within  the  mining  areas  designated  by  Japan. 
China  has  further  agreed  to  give  Japan  a  right  of  preference 
in  the  event  of  borrowing  foreign  capital  for  building  railways 
or  of  making  a  loan  on  the  security  of  the  local  taxes  in  South 
Manchuria.  The  question  of  revising  the  arrangement  for  the 
Kirin-Changchun  Railway  has  been  settled  in  accordance  with 
the  proposal  made  by  Japan.     The  Chinese  Government  has 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  109 

further  agreed  to  employ  Japanese  first  in  the  event  of  em- 
ploying foreign  advisers  on  political,  military,  financial  and 
police  matters. 

Furthermore,  the  provision  about  the  repurchase  period  in 
the  South  Manchurian  Railway  was  not  mentioned  in  Japan's 
original  proposal.  Subsequently,  the  Japanese  Government  al- 
leging that  its  meaning  was  not  clear,  asked  China  to  cancel 
the  provision  altogether.  Again,  Japan  at  first  demanded 
the  right  of  Japanese  to  carry  on  farming  in  South  Man- 
churia, but  subsequently  she  considered  the  word  "farming" 
was  not  broad  enough  and  asked  to  replace  it  with  the 
phrase  "agricultural  enterprises."  To  these  requests  the 
Chinese  Government,  though  well  aware  that  the  proposed 
changes  could  only  benefit  Japan,  still  acceded  without  delay. 
This,  too,  is  a  proof  of  China's  frankness  and  sincerity 
towards  Japan. 

As  regards  matters  relating  to  Shangtung  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment has  agreed  to  a  majority  of  the  demands. 

The  question  of  inland  residence  in  South  Manchuria  is,  in 
the  opinion  of  the  Chinese  Government,  incompatible  with  the 
treaties  China  had  entered  into  with  Japan  and  other  Powers, 
still  the  Chinese  Government  did  its  best  to  consider  how  it  was 
possible  to  avoid  that  incompatibility.  At  first,  China  sug- 
gested that  the  Chinese  Authorities  should  have  full  rights  of 
jurisdiction  over  Japanese  settlers.  Japan  declined  to  agree 
to  it.  Thereupon  China  reconsidered  the  question  and  revised 
her  counter-proposal  five  or  six  times,  each  time  making  some 
definite  concession,  and  went  so  far  to  agree  that  all  civil  and 
criminal  cases  between  Chinese  and  Japanese  should  be  arranged 
according  to  existing  treaties.  Only  cases  relating  to  land  or 
lease  contracts  were  reserved  to  be  adjudicated  by  Chinese 
Courts,  as  a  mark  of  China's  sovereignty  over  the  region.  This 
is  another  proof  of  China's  readiness  to  concede  as  much  as 
possible. 

Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  is  not  an  enlightened  region  as  yet 
and  the  conditions  existing  there  are  entirely  different  from 
those  prevailing  in  South  Manchuria.  The  two  places,  there- 
fore, cannot  be  considered  in  the  same  light.     Accordingly, 


110  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

China  agreed  to  open  commercial  marts  first,  in  the  interests  of 
foreign  trade. 

The  Hanjehping  Company  mentioned  in  the  third  group  is 
entirely  a  private  company,  and  the  Chinese  Government  is  pre- 
cluded from  interfering  with  it  and  negotiating  with  another 
government  to  make  any  disposal  of  the  same  as  the  Govern- 
ment likes,  but  having  regard  for  the  interests  of  the  Japanese 
capitalists,  the  Chinese  Government  agreed  that  whenever,  in 
future,  the  said  company  and  the  Japanese  capitalists  should 
arrive  at  a  satisfactory  arrangement  for  co-operation,  China 
will  give  her  assent  thereto.  Thus  the  interests  of  the  Jap- 
anese capitalists  are  amply  safeguarded. 

Although  the  demand  in  the  fourth  group  asking  for  a  dec- 
laration not  to  alienate  China's  coast  is  an  infringement  of  her 
sovereign  rights,  yet  the  Chinese  Government  offered  to  make  a 
voluntary  pronouncement  so  far  as  it  comports  with  China's 
sovereign  rights.  Thus,  it  is  seen  that  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  Japan,  gave  a  most  serious 
consideration  even  to  those  demands,  which  gravely  aifect  the 
sovereignty  and  territorial  rights  of  China  as  well  as  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  opportunity  and  the  treaties  with  foreign  Powers. 
All  this  was  a  painful  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment to  meet  the  situation — a  fact  of  which  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment must  be  aware. 

As  regards  the  demands  in  the  fifth  group,  they  all  infringe 
China's  sovereignty,  the  treaty  rights  of  other  Powers  or  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunity.  Although  Japan  did  not  indi- 
cate any  difference  between  this  group  and  the  preceding  four 
in  the  list  which  she  presented  to  China  in  respect  to  their  char- 
acter, the  Chinese  Government,  in  view  of  their  palpably  objec- 
tionable features,  persuaded  itself  that  these  could  not  have 
been  intended  by  Japan  as  anything  other  than  Japan's  mere 
advice  to  China.  Accordingly  China  has  declared  from  the 
very  beginning  that  while  she  entertains  the  most  profound  re- 
gard for  Japan's  wishes,  she  was  unable  to  admit  that  any  of 
these  matters  could  be  made  the  subject  of  an  understanding 
with  Japan.  Much  as  she  desired  to  pay  regard  to  Japan's 
wishes,  China  cannot  but  respect  her  own  sovereign  rights  and 


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REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  111 

the  existing  treaties  with  other  Powers.  In  order  to  be  rid  of 
the  seed  for  future  misunderstanding  and  to  strengthen  the 
basis  of  friendship,  China  was  constrained  to  iterate  the  rea- 
sons for  refusing  to  negotiate  on  any  of  the  articles  in  the 
fifth  group,  jet  in  view  of  Japan's  wishes  China  has  expressed 
her  readiness  to  state  that  no  foreign  money  was  borrowed  to 
construct  harbour  work  in  Fukien  Province,  Thus  it  is  clear 
that  China  went  so  far  as  to  see  a  solution  for  Japan  of  a  ques- 
tion that  really  did  not  admit  of  negotiation.  Was  there, 
then,  evasion,  on  the  part  of  China? 

Now,  since  the  Japanese  Government  has  presented  a  revised 
list  of  demands  and  declared  at  the  same  time,  that  it  will 
restore  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment reconsiders  the  whole  question  and  herewith  submits  a 
new  reply  to  the  friendly  Japanese  Government. 

In  this  reply  the  unsettled  articles  in  the  first  group  are 
stated  again  for  discussion. 

As  regards  the  second  group,  those  articles  which  have  al- 
ready been  initialled  are  omitted.  In  connection  with  the  ques- 
tion of  inland  residence  the  police  regulation  clause  has  been 
revised  in  a  more  restrictive  sense.  As  for  the  trial  of  cases 
relating  to  land  and  lease  contracts  the  Chinese  Government 
now  permits  the  Japanese  Consul  to  send  an  officer  to  attend  the 
proceedings. 

Of  the  four  demands  in  connection  with  that  part  of  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia  which  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  South  Man- 
churia and  the  Jehol  intendency,  China  agrees  to  three. 

China,  also,  agrees  to  the  article  relating  to  the  Hanyehping 
Company  as  revised  by  Japan. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  Japanese  Government  will  appre- 
ciate the  conciliatory  spirit  of  the  Chinese  Government  in 
making  this  final  concession  and  forthwith  give  her  assent 
thereto. 

There  is  one  more  point.  At  the  beginning  of  the  present 
negotiations  it  was  mutually  agreed  to  observe  secrecy  but 
unfortunately  a  few  days  after  the  presentation  of  the  de- 
mands by  Japan  an  Osaka  newspaper  published  an  "Extra" 
giving  the  text  of  the  demands.     The  foreign  and  the  Chinese 


112  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

press  has  since  been  paying  considerable  attention  to  this  ques- 
tion and  frequently  publishing  pro-Chinese  or  pro-Japanese 
comments  in  order  to  call  forth  the  World's  conjecture — a  mat- 
ter which  the  Chinese  Government  deeply  regrets. 

The  Chinese  Government  has  never  carried  on  any  news- 
paper campaign  and  the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
has  repeatedly  declared  this  to  the  Japanese  Minister. 

In  conclusion,  the  Chinese  Government  wishes  to  express  its 
hope  that  the  negotiations  now  pending  between  the  two  coun- 
tries will  soon  come  to  an  end  and  whatever  misgivings  foreign 
countries  entertain  toward  the  present  situation  may  be  quickly 
dispelled. 

The  Peking  Government,  although  fully  aware 
of  the  perils  now  confronting  it,  had  dared  to 
draft  a  complete  reply  to  the  revised  Demands  and 
had  reduced  Japanese  redundancy  to  effective  limits. 
Not  only  were  various  articles  made  more  compact, 
but  the  phraseology  employed  conveyed  unmistakably, 
if  in  a  somewhat  subtle  way,  that  China  was  not  a 
subordinate  State  treating  with  a  suzerain.  Moreover, 
after  dealing  succinctly  and  seriously  with  Groups  I, 
II  and  III,  the  Chinese  reply  terminates  abruptly, 
the  other  points  in  the  Japanese  List  being  left  entirely 
unanswered.  It  is  important  to  seize  these  points  in 
the  text  that  follows. 

china's  reply  to  revised  demands 

China's  Reply  of  May  1,  1915,  to  the  Japanese  Revised  De- 
mands of  April  26,  1915. 

GROUP  I 

The  Chinese  Government  and  the  Japanese  Government,  being 
desirous  of  maintaining  the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and 
further  strengthening  the  friendly  relations  and  good  neigh- 
bourhood existing  between  the  two  nations,  agree  to  the  follow- 
ing articles: — 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  113 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  they  will 
give  full  assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese  and 
German  Governments  may  hereafter  mutually  agree,  relating 
to  the  disposition  of  all  interests,  which  Germany,  by  virtue 
of  treaties  or  recorded  cases,  possesses  in  relation  to  the  Prov- 
ince of  Shantung. 

The  Japanese  Government  declares  that  when  the  Chinese 
Government  give  their  assent  to  the  disposition  of  interests 
above  referred  to,  Japan  will  restore  the  leased  territory  of 
Kiaochow  to  China;  and  further  recognize  the  right  of  the 
Chinese  Government  to  participate  in  the  negotiations  referred 
to  above  between  Japan  and  Germany. 

Article  2.  The  Japanese  Government  consents  to  be  respon- 
sible for  the  indemnification  of  all  losses  occasioned  by  Japan's 
military  operation  around  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow. 
The  customs,  telegraphs  and  post  offices  within  the  leased  ter- 
ritory of  Kiaochow  shall,  prior  to  the  restoration  of  the  said 
leased  territory  to  China,  be  administered  as  heretofore  for  the 
time  being.  The  railways  and  telegraph  lines  erected  by  Japan 
for  military  purposes  are  to  be  removed  forthwith.  The  Jap- 
anese troops  now  stationed  outside  the  original  leased  terri- 
tory of  Kiaochow  are  now  to  be  withdrawn  first,  those  within 
the  original  leased  territory  are  to  be  withdrawn  on  the  res- 
toration of  the  said  leased  territory  to  China. 

Article  3.      (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  within  the  Province 
of  Shantung  and  along  its  coast  no  territory  or  island  will  be 
ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power  under  any  pretext. 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  consent  that  as  regards 
the  railway  to  be  built  by  China  herself  from  Chefoo  or  Lung- 
l<ow  to  connect  with  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  railway,  if  Ger- 
many is  willing  to  abandon  the  privilege  of  financing  the  Chefoo- 
Weihsien  line,  China  will  approach  Japanese  capitalists  for  a 
loan. 

Article  5.  The  Chinese  Government  engage,  in  the  interest 
of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  herself 
as  soon  as  possible  certain  suitable  places  in  the  Province  of 
Shantung  as  Commercial  Ports. 


114  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

(Supplementary  Exchange  of  Notes) 

The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be  chosen,  and 
the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted  by  the  Chinese  Government, 
but  the  Japanese  Minister  must  be  consulted  before  making  a 
decision. 

Article  G.  If  the  Japanese  and  German  Governments  are 
not  able  to  come  to  a  definite  agreement  in  future  in  their  ne- 
gotiations respecting  transfer,  etc.,  this  provisional  agreement 
contained  in  the  foregoing  articles  shall  be  void. 

GROUP  II  ^ 

The  Chinese  Government  and  the  Japanese  Government,  with 
a  view  to  developing  their  economic  relations  in  South  Man- 
churia, agree  to  the  following  articles : — 

Article  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  may,  by 
arrangement  with  the  owners,  lease  land  required  for  erecting 
suitable  buildings  for  trade  and  manufacture  or  agricultural 
enterprises. 

Article  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside  and 
travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in  business  and  man- 
ufacture of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Article  3^  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to  in  the  preced- 
ing two  articles,  besides  being  required  to  register  with  the  local 
authorities  pass-ports  which  they  must  procure  under  the  ex- 
isting regulations,  shall  also  observe  police  rules  and  regulations 
and  pay  taxes  in  the  same  manner  as  Chinese.  Civil  and  crim- 
inal cases  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  the  authorities  of 
the  defendant  nationality  and  an  officer  can  be  deputed  to  at- 
tend the  proceedings.  But  all  cases  purely  between  Japanese 
subjects  and  mixed  cases  between  Japanese  or  Chinese,  relat- 
ing to  land  or  disputes  arising  from  lease  contracts,  shall  be 
tried  and  adjudicated  by  Chinese  Authorities  and  the  Japanese 
Consul  may  also  depute  an  officer  to  attend  the  proceedings. 
When  the  judicial  system  in  the  said  Province  is  completely 
reformed,  all  the  civil  and  criminal  cases  concerning  Japanese 
subjects  shall  be  tried  entirely  by  Chinese  law  courts. 

1  Six  articles  found  in  Japan's  Revised  Demands  are  omitted  here  as  they 
had  already  been  initiated  by  the  Chinese  Foreign  Minister  and  the 
Japanese  minister. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  115 

EELATING  TO  EASTERN  INNER  MONGOLIA 

(To  be  Exchanged  by  Notes) 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that  China  will  not  in 
future  pledge  the  taxes,  other  than  customs  and  salt  revenue 
of  that  part  of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  South  Manchuria  and  Jehol  Intendency,  as  security  for 
raising  a  foreign  loan. 

2.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that  China  will  herself 
provide  funds  for  building  the  railways  in  the  part  of  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia  under  the  jurisdiction  of  South  Manchuria  and 
the  Jehol  Intendency ;  if  foreign  capital  is  required,  China  will 
negotiate  with  Japanese  capitalists  first,  provided  this  does  not 
conflict  with  agreements  already  concluded  with  other  Powers. 

The  Chinese  Government  agree,  in  the  interest  of  trade  and 
for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  China  herself  cer- 
tain suitable  places  in  that  part  of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  South  Manchurian  and  the  Jehol 
Intendency,  as  Commercial  Marts. 

The  regulations  for  the  said  Commercial  Marts  will  be  made 
in  accordance  with  those  of  other  Commercial  Marts  opened 
by  China  herself. 

GROUP  ni 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  Hanyehping  Company 
being  very  intimate,  if  the  said  Company  comes  to  an  agree- 
ment with  the  Japanese  capitalists  for  co-operation,  the  Chi- 
nese Government  shall  forthwith  give  their  consent  thereto. 
The  Chinese  Government  further  declare  that  China  will  not 
convert  the  company  into  a  state  enterprise,  not  confiscate  it, 
nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign  capital  other  than 
Japanese. 

Letter  to  be  addressed  by  the  Japanese  Minister  to  the  Chi- 
nese Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Excellency:  I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  a  report  has 
reached  me  that  the  Chinese  Government  have  given  permission 
to  foreign  nations  to  construct,  on  the  coast  of  Fukien  Province, 
dock-yards,  coaling  stations  for  military  use,  naval  bases  and 
other  establishments  for  military  purposes;  and  further,  that 


116  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

the  Chinese  Government  are  borrowing  foreign  capital  for 
putting  up  the  above-mentioned  constructions  or  establishments. 
I  shall  be  much  obliged  if  the  Chinese  Government  will  inform 
me  whether  or  not  these  reports  are  well  founded  in  fact. 

Reply  to  be  addressed  by  the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  the  Japanese  Minister. 

Excellency:     I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 

of  your  Excellency's  Note  of In  reply  I  beg  to  state 

that  the  Chinese  Government  have  not  given  permission  to  for- 
eign Powers  to  construct,  on  the  coast  of  Fukien  Province, 
dock-yards,  coaling  stations  for  military  use,  naval  bases  or 
other  establishments  for  military  purposes ;  nor  do  they  con- 
template to  borrow  foreign  capital  for  putting  up  such  con- 
structions or  establishments. 

Within  forty-eight  hours  of  this  passage-at-arms  of 
the  1st  May  it  was  understood  in  Peking  that  Japan 
was  meditating  a  serious  step.  That  vague  feeling 
of  um-est  which  so  speedily  comes  in  capitals  when 
national  affairs  reach  a  crisis  was  very  evident,  and 
the  word  "ultimatum"  began  to  be  whispered.  It  was 
felt  that  whilst  China  had  held  to  her  rights  to  the  ut- 
most and  had  received  valuable  indirect  support  from 
both  England  and  the  United  States,  the  world-situation 
was  such  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  prevent  Japan 
from  proceeding  to  extremities.  Accordingly  there 
was  little  real  surprise  when  on  the  7th  May  Japan 
filed  an  ultimatum  demanding  a  satisfactory  reply 
within  48  hours  to  her  Revised  Demands — failing  which 
those  steps  deemed  necessary  would  be  taken.  A 
perusal  of  the  text  of  the  Ultimatum  will  show  an  inter- 
esting change  in  the  language  employed.  Coaxing 
having  failed,  and  Japan  being  now  convinced  that  so 
long  as  she  did  not  seek  to  anneal  the  rights  of  other  For- 
eign Powers  in  China  open  opposition  could  not  be  of- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  117 

fered  to  her,  states  her  case  very  defiantly.  One  signifi- 
cant point,  however,  must  be  carefully  noted — that  she 
agrees  "to  detach  Group  V  from  the  present  negotia- 
tions and  to  discuss  it  separately  in  the  future."  It  is 
this  fact  which  remains  the  sword  of  Damocles  hanging 
over  China's  head;  and  until  this  sword  has  been  flung 
back  into  the  waters  of  the  Yellow  Sea  the  Far  East- 
ern situation  will  remain  perilous. 

japan's  ultematum  to  china 

Japan's  Ultimatum  delivered  by  the  Japanese  Minister  to 
the  Chinese  Government,  on  May  7th,  1915. 

The  reason  why  the  Imperial  Government  opened  the  present 
negotiations  with  the  Chinese  Government  is  first  to  endeavour 
to  dispose  of  the  complications  arising  out  of  the  war  between 
Japan  and  China,  and  secondly  to  attempt  to  solve  those  va- 
rious questions  which  are  detrimental  to  the  intimate  relations 
of  China  and  Japan  with  a  view  to  solidifying  the  foundation 
of  cordial  friendship  subsisting  between  the  two  countries  to 
the  end  that  the  peace  of  the  Far  East  may  be  effectually  and 
permanently  preserved.  With  this  object  in  view,  definite  pro- 
posals were  presented  to  the  Chinese  Government  in  January  of 
this  year,  and  up  to  today  as  many  as  twenty-five  conferences 
have  been  held  with  the  Chinese  Government  in  perfect  sin- 
cerity and  frankness. 

In  the  course  of  the  negotiation  the  Imperial  Government  have 
consistently  explained  the  aims  and  objects  of  the  proposals 
in  a  concihatory  spirit,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  proposals 
of  the  Chinese  Government,  whether  important  or  unimportant, 
have  been  attended  to  without  any  reserve. 

It  may  be  stated  with  confidence  that  no  effort  has  been 
spared  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  and  amicable  settlement  of 
those  questions. 

The  discussion  of  the  entire  corpus  of  the  proposals  was 
practically  at  an  end  at  the  twenty-fourth  conference ;  that  is 
on  the  17th  of  the  last  month.  The  Imperial  Government,  tak- 
ing a  broad  view  of  the  negotiation  and  in  consideration  of  the 


118  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

points  raised  by  the  Chinese  Government,  modified  the  original 
proposals  with  considerable  concessions  and  presented  to  the 
Chinese  Government  on  the  26th  of  the  same  month  the  revised 
proposals  for  agreement,  and  at  the  same  time  it  was  offered 
that,  on  the  acceptance  of  the  revised  proposals,  the  Imperial 
Government  would,  at  a  suitable  opportunity,  restore,  with 
fair  and  proper  conditions,  to  the  Chinese  Government  the 
Kiaochow  territory,  in  the  acquisition  of  which  the  Imperial 
Government  had  made  a  great  sacrifice. 

On  the  1st  of  May,  the  Chinese  Government  delivered  the  reply 
to  the  revised  proposals  of  the  Japanese  Government,  which  is 
contrary  to  the  expectations  of  the  Imperial  Government,  The 
Chinese  Government  not  only  did  not  give  a  careful  considera- 
tion to  the  revised  proposals  but  even  with  regard  to  the  offer 
of  the  Japanese  Government  to  restore  Kiaochow  to  the  Chi- 
nese Government  the  latter  did  not  manifest  the  least  apprecia- 
tion for  Japan's  good  will  and  difficulties. 

From  the  commercial  and  military  point  of  view  Kiaochow 
is  an  important  place,  in  the  acquisition  of  which  the  Japanese 
Empire  sacrificed  much  blood  and  money,  and,  after  the  acquisi- 
tion the  Empire  incurs  no  obligation  to  restore  it  to  China. 
But  with  the  object  of  increasing  the  future  friendly  relations 
of  the  two  countries,  they  went  to  the  extent  of  proposing  its 
restoration,  yet  to  her  great  regret,  the  Chinese  Government  did 
not  take  into  consideration  the  good  intention  of  Japan  and 
manifest  appreciation  of  her  difficulties.  Furthermore,  the 
Chinese  Government  not  only  ignored  the  friendly  feelings  of 
the  Imperial  Government  in  offering  the  restoration  of  Kiao- 
chow Bay,  but  also  in  replying  to  the  revised  proposals  they 
even  demanded  its  unconditional  restoration ;  and  again  China 
demanded  that  Japan  should  bear  the  responsibility  of  paying 
indemnity  for  all  the  unavoidable  losses  and  damages  resulting 
from  Japan's  military  operations  at  Kiaochow;  and  still  fur- 
ther in  connection  with  the  territory  of  Kiaochow  China  ad- 
vanced other  demands  and  declared  that  she  has  the  right  of 
participation  at  the  future  peace  conference  to  be  held  between 
Japan  and  Germany.  Although  China  is  fully  aware  that  the 
unconditional  restoration  of  Kiaochow  and  Japan's  responsi- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  119 

bility  of  indemnification  for  the  unavoidable  losses  and  damages 
can  never  be  tolerated  by  Japan  yet  she  purposely  advanced 
these  demands  and  declared  that  this  reply  was  final  and  de- 
cisive. 

Since  Japan  could  not  tolerate  such  demands  the  settlement 
of  the  other  questions,  however  compromising  it  may  be,  would 
not  be  to  her  interest.  The  consequence  is  that  the  present 
reply  of  the  Chinese  Government  is,  on  the  whole,  vague  and 
meaningless. 

Furthermore,  in  the  reply  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  the 
other  proposals  in  the  revised  list  of  the  Imperial  Government, 
such  as  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  where 
Japan  particularly  has  geographical,  commercial,  industrial 
and  strategic  relations,  as  recognized  by  all  the  nations,  and 
made  more  remarkable  in  consequence  of  the  two  wars  in  which 
Japan  was  engaged  the  Chinese  Government  overlooks  these 
facts  and  does  not  respect  Japan's  position  in  that  place.  The 
Chinese  Government  even  freely  altered  those  articles  which  the 
Imperial  Government,  in  a  compromising  spirit,  have  formu- 
lated in  accordance  with  the  statement  of  the  Chinese  Repre- 
sentatives thereby  making  the  statements  of  the  Representatives 
an  empty  talk ;  and  on  seeing  them  conceding  with  the  one  hand 
and  withholding  with  the  other  it  is  very  difficult  to  attribute 
faithfulness  and  sincerity  to  the  Chinese  authorities. 

As  regards  the  articles  relating  to  the  employment  of  ad- 
visers, the  establisliment  of  schools,  and  hospitals,  the  supply 
of  arms  and  ammunition  and  the  establishment  of  arsenals  and 
railway  concessions  in  South  China  in  the  revised  proposals 
they  were  either  proposed  with  the  proviso  that  the  consent  of 
the  Power  concerned  must  be  obtained,  or  they  are  merely  to 
be  recorded  in  the  minutes  in  accordance  Avith  the  statements  of 
the  Chinese  delegates,  and  thus  they  are  not  in  the  least  in  con- 
flict either  with  Chinese  sovereignty  or  her  treaties  with  the  For- 
eign Powers,  yet  the  Chinese  Government  in  their  reply  to  the 
proposals,  alleging  that  these  proposals  are  incompatible  with 
their  sovereign  rights  and  treaties  with  Foreign  Powers,  defeat 
the  expectations  of  the  Imperial  Government.  However  in 
spite  of  such  attitude  of  the  Chinese  Government,  the  Imperial 


120  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Government,  though  regretting  to  see  that  there  is  no  room  for 
further  negotiations,  yet  warmly  attached  to  the  preservation 
of  the  peace  of  the  Far  East,  is  still  hoping  for  a  satisfactory 
settlement  in  order  to  avoid  the  disturbance  of  the  relations. 

So  in  spite  of  the  circumstances  which  admitted  no  patience, 
they  have  reconsidered  the  feelings  of  the  Government  of  their 
neighbouring  country  and,  with  the  exception  of  the  article 
relating  to  Fukien  which  is  to  be  the  subject  of  an  exchange  of 
notes  as  has  already  been  agreed  upon  by  the  Representatives 
of  both  nations,  will  undertake  to  detach  the  Group  V  from  the 
present  negotiation  and  discuss  it  separately  in  the  future. 
Therefore  the  Chinese  Government  should  appreciate  the 
friendly  feelings  of  the  Imperial  Government  by  immediately 
accepting  without  any  alteration  all  the  articles  of  Group  I, 
II,  III,  and  IV  and  the  exchange  of  notes  in  connection  with 
Fukien  province  in  Group  V  as  contained  in  the  revised  pro- 
posals presented  on  the  26th  of  April. 

The  Imperial  Government  hereby  again  offer  their  advice 
and  hope  that  the  Chinese  Government,  upon  this  advice,  will 
give  a  satisfactory  reply  by  6  o'clock  p.  m.  on  the  9th  day  of 
May.  It  is  hereby  declared  that  if  no  satisfactory  reply  is 
received  before  or  at  the  specified  time,  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment will  take  steps  they  may  deem  necessary. 

EXPLANATORY  NOTE 

Accompanying  Ultimatum  delivered  to  the  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  by  the  Japanese  Minister,  May  7th,  1915. 

1.  With  the  exception  of  the  question  of  Fukien  to  be  ar- 
ranged by  an  exchange  of  notes,  the  five  articles  postponed  for 
later  negotiation  refer  to  (a)  the  employment  of  advisers,  (b) 
the  establishment  of  schools  and  hospitals,  (c)  the  railway  con- 
cessions in  South  China,  (d)  the  supply  of  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion and  the  establishment  of  arsenals  and  (e)  right  of  Mis- 
sionary propaganda. 

2.  The  acceptance  by  the  Chinese  Government  of  the  article 
relating  to  Fukien  may  be  either  in  the  form  as  proposed  by 
the  Japanese  Minister  on  the  26th  of  April  or  in  that  contained 
in  the  Reply  of  the  Chinese  Government  of  May  1st.     Although 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  121 

the  Ultimatum  calls  for  the  immediate  acceptance  by  China  of 
the  modified  proposals  presented  on  April  2Gth,  without  altera- 
tion but  it  should  be  noted  that  it  merely  states  the  principle  and 
does  not  apply  to  this  article  and  articles  4  and  5  of  this  note. 

3.  If  the  Chinese  Government  accept  all  the  articles  as  de- 
manded in  the  Ultimatum  the  offer  of  the  Japanese  Government 
to  restore  Kiaochow  to  China,  made  on  the  26th  of  April,  will 
still  hold  good. 

4.  Article  2  of  Group  II  relating  to  the  lease  or  purchase  of 
land,  the  terms  "lease"  and  "purchase"  may  be  replaced  by  the 
terms  "temporary  lease"  and  "perpetual  lease"  or  "lease  on 
consultation,"  which  means  a  long-term  lease  with  its  uncon- 
ditional renewal. 

Article  4  of  Group  II  relating  to  the  approval  of  police  laws 
and  Ordinances  and  local  taxes  by  the  Japanese  Council  may 
form  the  subject  of  a  secret  agreement. 

5.  The  phrase  "to  consult  with  the  Japanese  Government" 
in  connection  with  questions  of  pledging  the  local  taxes  for 
raising  loans  and  the  loans  for  the  construction  of  railways,  in 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  which  is  similar  to  the  agreement  in 
Manchuria  relating  to  the  matters  of  the  same  kind,  may  be  re- 
placed by  the  phrase  "to  consult  with  the  Japanese  capitalists." 

The  article  relating  to  the  opening  of  trade  marts  in  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia  in  respect  to  location  and  regulations,  may, 
following  their  precedent  set  in  Shantung,  be  the  subject  of  an 
exchange  of  notes. 

6.  From  the  phrase  "those  interested  in  the  Company"  in 
Group  III  of  the  revised  list  of  demands,  the  words  "those  in- 
terested in"  may  be  deleted. 

7.  The  Japanese  version  of  the  Formal  Agreement  and  its 
annexes  shall  be  the  official  text  or  both  the  Chinese  and  Jap- 
anese shall  be  the  official  texts. 

Whilst  it  would  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  open 
panic  followed  the  filing  of  this  document,  there  was 
certainly  very  acute  alarm, — so  much  so  that  it  is  to- 
day known  in  Peking  that  the  Japanese  Legation  cabled 
urgently  to  Tokio  that  even  better  terms  could  be  ob- 


122  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

tained  if  the  matter  was  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  men 
on  the  spot.  But  the  Japanese  Government  had  by 
now  passed  through  a  sufficiently  anxious  time  itself, 
being  in  possession  of  certain  unmistakable  warnings 
regarding  what  was  likely  to  happen  after  a  world-peace 
had  come, — if  matters  were  pressed  too  far.  Conse- 
quently nothing  more  was  done,  and  on  the  following 
day  China  signified  her  acceptance  of  the  Ultimatum  in 
the  following  terms. 

Reply  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  the  Ultimatum  of  the 
Japanese  Government,  delivered  to  the  Japanese  Minister  hy 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  on  the  8th  of  May,  1915. 

On  the  7th  of  this  month,  at  three  o'clock  p.  m.  the  Chinese 
Government  received  an  Ultimatum  from  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment together  with  an  Explanatory  Note  of  seven  articles. 
The  Ultimatum  concluded  with  the  hope  that  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment by  six  o'clock  p.  m.  on  the  9th  of  May  will  give  a 
satisfactory  reply,  and  it  is  hereby  declared  that  if  no  satis- 
factory reply  is  received  before  or  at  the  specified  time,  the 
Japanese  Government  will  take  steps  she  may  deem  necessary. 

The  Chinese  Government  with  a  view  to  preserving  the  peace 
of  the  Far  East  hereby  accepts,  with  the  exception  of  those 
five  articles  of  Group  V  postponed  for  later  negotiation,  all  the 
articles  of  Group  I,  II,  III,  and  IV  and  the  exchange  of  notes 
in  connection  with  Fukien  Province  in  Group  V  as  contained 
in  the  revised  proposals  presented  on  the  26th  of  April,  and  in 
accordance  with  the  Explanatory  Note  of  seven  articles  accom- 
panying the  Ultimatum  of  the  Japanese  Government  with  the 
hope  that  thereby  all  the  outstanding  questions  are  settled,  so 
that  the  cordial  relationship  between  the  two  countries  may  be 
further  consolidated.  The  Japanese  Minister  is  hereby  re- 
quested to  appoint  a  day  to  call  at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  make  the  literary  improvement  of  the  text  and  sign 
the  Agreement  as  soon  as  possible. 

Thus  ended  one  of  the  most  extraoramary  diplomatic 
negotiations  ever  undertaken  in  Peking. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   ORIGIN   OF   THE   TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

The  key  to  this  remarkable  business  was  supplied  by  a 
cover  sent  anonymously  to  the  writer  during  the  course 
of  these  negotiations  with  no  indication  as  to  its  origin. 
The  documents  which  this  envelope  contained  are  so 
interesting  that  they  merit  attention  at  the  hands  of 
all  students  of  history,  explaining  as  they  do  the  psy- 
chology of  the  Demands  as  well  as  throwing  much  light 
on  the  manner  in  which  the  world-war  has  been  viewed 
in  Japan. 

The  first  document  is  purely  introductory,  but  is 
none  the  less  interesting.  It  is  a  fragment,  or  rather  a 
precis  of  the  momentous  conversation  which  took  place 
between  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  the  Japanese  Minister 
when  the  latter  personally  served  the  Demands  on  the 
Chief  Executive  and  took  the  opportunity  to  use  lan- 
guage unprecedented  even  in  the  diplomatic  history  of 
Peking. 

The  precis  begins  in  a  curious  way.  After  saying 
that  "the  Japanese  Minister  tried  to  influence  Presi- 
dent Yuan  Shih-kai  with  the  following  words,"  several 
long  lines  of  asterisks  suggest  that  after  reflection  the 
unknown  chronicler  had  decided,  for  political  reasons 
of  the  highest  importance,  to  allow  others  to  guess  how 
the  "conversation"  opened.  From  the  context  it  seems 
absolutely  clear  that  the  excised  words  have  to  deal  with 
the  possibility  of  the  re-establishment  of  the  Empire  in 
China — a  very  important  conclusion  in  view  of  what 

123 


124  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

followed  later  in  the  year.  Indeed  there  is  no  reason 
to  doubt  that  the  Japanese  Envoy  actually  told  Yuan 
Shili-kai  that  as  he  was  already  virtually  Emperor  it 
lay  within  his  power  to  settle  the  whole  business  and  to 
secure  his  position  at  one  blow.  In  any  case  the  precis 
begins  with  these  illuminating  sentences : 

.  .  .  Furthermore,  the  Chinese  revolutionists  are  in  close 
touch  and  have  intimate  relations  with  numerous  irresponsible 
Japanese,  some  of  whom  have  great  influence  and  whose  policy 
is  for  strong  measures.  Our  Government  has  not  been  in- 
fluenced by  this  policy,  but  if  your  Government  does  not  quickly 
agree  to  these  stipulations,  it  will  be  impossible  to  prevent  some 
of  our  irresponsible  people  from  inciting  the  Chinese  revolu- 
tionists to  create  trouble  in  China. 

The  majority  of  the  Japanese  people  are  also  opposed  to 
President  Yuan  and  Yuan's  Government.  They  all  declare 
that  the  President  entertains  anti-Japanese  feeling  and  adopts 
the  policy  of  "befriending  the  Far"  (Europe  and  America)  and 
"antagonizing  the  Near"  (Japan).  Japanese  public  opinion 
is  therefore  exceedingly  hostile. 

Our  Government  has  all  along  from  first  to  last  exerted  its 
best  eff'orts  to  help  the  Chinese  Government,  and  if  the  Chinese 
Government  will  speedily  agree  to  these  stipulations  it  will  have 
thus  manifested  its  friendship  for  Japan. 

The  Japanese  people  will  then  be  able  to  say  that  the  Presi- 
dent never  entertained  anti-Japanese  feelings,  or  adopted  the 
policy  of  "befriending  the  Far  and  antagonizing  the  Near." 
Will  not  this  then  be  indeed  a  bona  fide  proof  of  our  friendly  re- 
lations ? 

The  Japanese  Government  also  will  then  be  inclined  to  ren- 
der assistance  to  President  Yuan's  Government  whenever  it  is 
necessary.  .  .  . 

We  are  admittedly  living  in  a  remarkable  age  which 
is  making  waste  paper  of  our  dearest  principles.  But 
in  all  the  welter  which  the  world  war  has  made  it  would 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  125 

be  difficult  to  find  anything  more  extraordinary  than 
these  few  paragraphs.  Japan,  through  her  official  rep- 
resentative, boldly  tears  down  the  veil  hiding  her  ambi- 
tions, and  using  the  undoubted  menace  which  Chinese 
revolutionary  activities  then  held  for  the  Peking  Gov- 
ernment, declares  in  so  many  words  that  unless  Presi- 
dent Yuan  Shih-kai  bows  his  head  to  the  dictation  of 
Tokio,  the  duel  which  began  in  Seoul  twenty-five  years 
ago  would  be  openly  resumed. 

Immediately  following  the  "conversation"  is  the  prin- 
cipal document  in  the  dossier.  This  is  nothing  less  than 
an  exhaustive  Memorandum,  divided  into  two  sections, 
containing  the  policy  advocated  by  the  Japanese  secret 
society,  called  the  Black  Dragon  Society,  which  is  said  to 
have  assumed  that  name  on  account  of  the  members 
(military  officers)  having  studied  the  situation  in  the 
Heilungchiang  (or  "Black  Dragon")  province  of  Man- 
churia. The  memorandum  is  the  most  remarkable 
document  dealing  with  the  Far  East  which  has  come  to 
light  since  the  famous  Cassini  Convention  was  pub- 
lished in  1896.  Written  presumably  late  in  the 
autumn  of  1914  and  immediately  presented  to  the 
Japanese  Government,  it  may  undoubtedly  be  called 
the  fulminate  which  exploded  the  Japanese  mine  of  the 
18th  January,  1915.  It  shows  such  sound  knowledge 
of  world-conditions,  and  is  so  scientific  in  its  detach- 
ment that  little  doubt  can  exist  that  distinguished  Japa- 
nese took  part  in  its  drafting.  It  can  therefore  be 
looked  upon  as  a  genuine  expression  of  the  highly  edu- 
cated Japanese  mind,  and  as  such  cannot  fail  to  arouse 
serious  misgivings.  The  first  part  is  a  general  review 
of  the  European  War  and  the  Chinese  Question:  the 
second  is  concerned  with  the  Defensive  Alliance  between 


126  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

China  and  Japan  which  is  looked  upon  as  the  one  goal 
of  all  Japanese  Diplomacy. 

PART  I.       THE  EUEOPEAN  WAR  AND  THE  CHINESE  QUESTION 

The  present  gigantic  struggle  in  Europe  has  no  parallel  in 
history.  Not  only  will  the  equilibrium  of  Europe  be  affected 
and  its  effect  felt  all  over  the  globe,  but  its  results  will  create  a 
New  Era  in  the  political  and  social  world.  Therefore,  whether 
or  not  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  can  settle  the  Far 
Eastern  Question  and  bring  to  realization  our  great  Imperial 
policy  depends  on  our  being  able  to  skilfully  avail  ourselves  of 
the  world's  general  trend  of  affairs  so  as  to  extend  our  influence 
and  to  decide  upon  a  course  of  action  towards  China  which  shall 
be  practical  in  execution.  If  our  authorities  and  people  view 
the  present  European  War  with  indifference  and  without  deep 
concern,  merely  devoting  their  attention  to  the  attack  on  Kiao- 
chow,  neglecting  the  larger  issues  of  the  war,  they  will  have 
brought  to  nought  our  great  Imperial  policy,  and  committed  a 
blunder  greater  than  which  it  can  not  be  conceived.  We  are 
constrained  to  submit  this  statement  of  policy  for  the  consid- 
eration of  our  authorities,  not  because  we  are  fond  of  argu- 
ment but  because  we  are  deeply  anxious  for  our  national  wel- 
fare. 

No  one  at  present  can  foretell  the  outcome  of  the  European 
War.  If  the  Allies  meet  with  reverses  and  victory  shall  crown 
the  arms  of  the  Germans  and  Austrians,  German  militarism  will 
undoubtedly  dominate  the  European  Continent  and  extend  south- 
ward and  eastward  to  other  parts  of  the  world.  Should  such  a 
state  of  affairs  happen  to  take  place  the  consequences  resulting 
therefrom  will  be  indeed  great  and  extensive.  On  this  account 
we  must  devote  our  most  serious  attention  to  the  subject.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  and  Austrians  should  be  crushed 
by  the  Allies,  Germany  will  be  deprived  of  her  present  status 
as  a  Federated  State  under  a  Kaiser.  The  Federation  will  be 
disintegrated  into  separate  states,  and  Prussia  will  have  to  be 
content  with  the  status  of  a  second-rate  Power.  Austria  and 
Hungary,  on  account  of  this  defeat,  will  consequently  be  di- 
vided.    What  their  final  fate  shall  be,  no  one  would  now  venture 


Peasants  Raising  Water   i?y   the  Oldest  Method  in   the 

World 


Transporting  Grain  «v  Donkey  in  the  Roadless  CouinTky 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  127 

to  predict.  In  the  meantime  Russia  will  annex  Galicia  and  the 
Austrian  Poland:  France  will  repossess  Alsace  and  Lorraine: 
Great  Britain  will  occupy  the  German  Colonies  in  Africa  and 
the  South  Pacific;  Servia  and  Montenegro  will  take  Bosnia, 
Herzegovina  and  a  certain  portion  of  Austrian  Territory ;  thus 
making  such  great  changes  in  the  map  of  Europe  that  even  the 
Napoleonic  War  in  1815  could  not  find  a  parallel. 

When  these  events  take  place,  not  only  will  Europe  expe- 
rience great  changes,  but  we  should  not  ignore  the  fact  that 
they  will  occur  also  in  China  and  in  the  South  Pacific.  After 
Russia  has  replaced  Germany  in  the  territories  lost  by  Ger- 
many and  Austria,  she  will  hold  a  controlling  influence  in  Eu- 
rope, and,  for  a  long  time  to  come,  will  have  nothing  to  fear 
from  her  western  frontier.  Immediately  after  the  war  she  will 
make  an  effort  to  carry  out  her  policy  of  expansion  in  the  East 
and  will  not  relax  that  effort  until  she  has  acquired  a  controlling 
influence  in  China.  At  the  same  time  Great  Britain  will 
strengthen  her  position  in  the  Yangtsze  Valley  and  prohibit  any 
other  country  from  getting  a  footing  there.  France  will  do 
likewise  in  Yunnan  province  using  it  as  her  base  of  operations 
for  further  encroachments  upon  China  and  never  hesitate  to 
extend  her  advantages.  We  must  therefore  seriously  study  the 
situation  remembering  always  that  the  combined  action  of 
Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  France  will  not  only  affect  Europe 
but  that  we  can  even  foresee  that  it  will  also  affect  China. 

Whether  this  combined  action  on  the  part  of  England,  France 
and  Russia  is  to  terminate  at  the  end  of  the  war  or  to  con- 
tinue to  operate,  we  can  not  now  predict.  But  after  peace  in 
Europe  is  restored,  these  Powers  will  certainly  turn  their  atten- 
tion to  the  expansion  of  their  several  spheres  of  interest  in 
China,  and,  in  the  adjustment,  their  interests  will  most  likely 
conflict  with  one  another.  If  their  interests  do  not  conflict, 
they  will  work  jointly  to  solve  the  Chinese  Question.  On  this 
point  we  have  not  the  least  doubt.  If  England,  France  and 
Russia  are  actually  to  combine  for  the  coercion  of  China,  what 
course  is  to  be  adopted  by  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government 
to  meet  the  situation?  What  proper  means  shall  we  employ  to 
maintain  our  Influence  and  extend  our  interests  within  this  ring 


128  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

of  rivalry  and  competition?  It  is  necessary  that  we  bear  in 
mind  the  final  results  of  the  European  War  and  forestall  the 
trend  of  events  succeeding  it  so  as  to  be  able  to  decide  upon  a 
policy  towards  China  and  determine  the  action  to  be  ulti- 
mately taken.  If  we  remain  passive,  the  Imperial  Japanese 
Government's  policy  towards  China  will  lose  that  subjective  in- 
fluence and  our  diplomacy  will  be  checked  forever  by  the  com- 
bined force  of  the  other  Powers.  The  peace  of  the  Far  East 
will  be  thus  endangered  and  even  the  existence  of  the  Japanese 
Empire  as  a  nation  will  no  doubt  be  imperilled.  It  is  therefore 
our  first  important  duty  at  this  moment  to  enquire  of  our  Gov- 
ernment what  course  is  to  be  adopted  to  face  that  general  sit- 
uation after  the  war?  What  preparations  are  being  made  to 
meet  the  combined  pressure  of  the  Allies  upon  China?  What 
policy  has  been  followed  to  solve  the  Chinese  Question?  When 
the  European  War  is  terminated  and  peace  restored  we  are  not 
concerned  so  much  with  the  question  whether  it  be  the  Dual 
Monarchies  or  the  Triple  Entente  which  emerge  victorious  but 
whether,  in  anticipation  of  the  future  expansion  of  European 
influence  in  the  Continents  of  Europe  and  Asia,  the  Imperial 
Japanese  Government  should  or  should  not  hesitate  to  employ 
force  to  check  the  movement  before  tliis  occurrence.  Now  is 
the  most  opportune  moment  for  Japan  to  quickly  solve  the  Chi- 
nese Question.  Such  an  opportunity  will  not  occur  for  hun- 
dreds of  years  to  come.  Not  only  is  it  Japan's  divine  duty  to 
act  now,  but  present  conditions  in  China  favour  the  execution 
of  such  a  plan.  We  should  by  all  means  decide  and  act  at  once. 
If  our  authorities  do  not  avail  themselves  of  this  rare  oppor- 
tunity, great  difficulty  will  surely  be  encountered  in  future  in 
the  settlement  of  this  Chinese  Question.  Japan  will  be  isolated 
from  the  European  Powers  after  the  war,  and  will  be  regarded 
by  them  with  envy  and  jealousy  just  as  Germany  is  now  re- 
garded. Is  it  not  then  a  vital  necessity  for  Japan  to  solve  at 
this  very  moment  the  Chinese  Question? 

No  one — not  even  those  who  care  nothing  for  politics 
— can  deny  that  there  is  in  this  document  an  astound- 
ing disclosure  of  the  mental  attitude  of  the  Japanese 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  129 

not  only  towards  their  enemies  but  towards  their  friends 
as  well.  They  trust  nobody,  befriend  nobody,  envy 
nobody ;  they  content  themselves  with  believing  that  the 
whole  world  may  in  the  not  distant  future  turn  against 
them.  The  burden  of  their  argument  swings  just  as 
much  against  their  British  ally  as  against  Germany  and 
Austria ;  and  the  one  and  only  matter  which  preoccupies 
Japanese  who  make  it  their  business  to  think  about  such 
things  is  to  secure  that  Japan  shall  forestall  Europe 
in  seizing  control  of  China.  It  is  admitted  in  so  many 
words  that  it  is  too  early  to  know  who  is  to  triumph  in 
the  gigantic  European  struggle ;  it  is  also  admitted  that 
Germany  will  forever  be  the  enemy.  At  the  same  time 
it  is  expected,  should  the  issue  of  the  struggle  be  clear- 
cut  and  decisive  in  favour  of  the  Allies,  that  a  new  three- 
Power  combination  formed  by  England,  France  and 
Russia  may  be  made  to  operate  against  Japan.  Al- 
though the  alliance  with  England,  twice  renewed  since 
1902,  should  occupy  as  important  a  place  in  the  Far 
East  as  the  Entente  between  England  and  France  oc- 
cupies in  Europe,  not  one  Japanese  in  a  hundred  knows 
or  cares  anything  about  such  an  arrangement ;  and  even 
if  he  has  knowledge  of  it,  he  coolly  assigns  to  his  coun- 
try's major  international  commitment  a  minimum  and 
constantly  diminishing  importance.  In  his  view  the 
British  Alliance  is  nothing  but  a  piece  of  paper  which 
may  be  consumed  in  the  great  bonfire  now  shedding 
such  a  lurid  light  over  the  world.  What  is  germane  to 
the  matter  is  his  own  plan,  his  own  method  of  taking 
up  arms  in  a  sea  of  troubles.  The  second  part  of  the 
Black  Dragon  Society's  Memorandum,  pursuing  the 
argument  logically  and  inexorably  and  disclosing  traces 
of  real  pohtical  genius,  makes  this  unalterably  clear. 


130  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Having  established  clearly  the  attitude  of  Japan  to- 
wards the  world — and  more  particularly  towards  the 
rival  political  combinations  now  locked  together  in  a 
terrible  death-struggle,  this  second  part  of  the  Memo- 
randum is  concerned  solely  with  China  and  can  be 
broken  into  two  convenient  sections.  The  first  section  is 
constructive — the  plan  for  the  reconstruction  of  China 
is  outlined  in  terms  suited  to  the  Japanese  genius.  This 
part  begins  with  an  illuminating  piece  of  rhetoric. 

PAKT  n.       THE  CHINESE  QUESTION  AND  THE  DEFENSIVE  ALI.IANCE 

It  is  a  very  important  matter  of  policy  whether  the  Jap- 
anese Government,  in  obedience  to  its  divine  mission,  shall  solve 
the  Chinese  Question  in  a  heroic  manner  by  making  China  vol- 
untarily rely  upon  Japan.  To  force  China  to  such  a  position 
there  is  nothing  else  for  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  to 
do  but  to  take  advantage  of  the  present  opportunity  to  seize 
the  reigns  of  political  and  financial  power  and  to  enter  by  all 
means  into  a  defensive  alliance  with  her  under  secret  terms  as 
enumerated  below: 

The  Secret  Terms  of  the  Defensive  Alliance 

The  Imperial  Japanese  Government,  with  due  respect  for  the 
Sovereignty  and  Integrity  of  China  and  with  the  object  and 
hope  of  maintaining  the  peace  of  the  Far  East,  undertakes  to 
share  the  responsibility  of  co-operating  with  China  to  guard 
her  against  internal  trouble  and  foreign  invasion  and  China 
shall  accord  to  Japan  special  facilities  in  the  matter  of  China's 
National  Defence,  or  the  protection  of  Japan's  special  rights 
and  privileges  and  for  these  objects  the  following  treaty  of 
Alliance  is  to  be  entered  into  between  the  two  contracting 
parties : 

1.  When  there  is  internal  trouble  in  China  or  when  she  Is  at 
war  with  another  nation  or  nations,  Japan  shall  send  her  army 
to  render  assistance,  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  guarding 
Chinese  territory  and  to  maintain  peace  and  order  in  China. 

2.  China  agrees  to  recognize  Japan's  privileged  position  in 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  131 

South  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mongolia  and  to  cede  the  sovereign 
rights  of  these  regions  to  Japan  to  enable  her  to  carry  out  a 
scheme  of  local  defence  on  a  permanent  basis. 

3.  After  the  Japanese  occupation  of  Kiaochow,  Japan  shall 
acquire  all  the  rights  and  privileges  hitherto  enjoyed  by  the 
Germans  in  regard  to  railways,  mines  and  all  other  interests, 
and  after  peace  and  order  is  restored  in  Tsingtao,  the  place 
shall  be  handed  back  to  China  to  be  opened  as  an  International 
fTreaty  port. 

4.  For  the  maritime  defence  of  China  and  Japan,  China  shall 
lease  strategic  harbours  along  the  coast  of  the  Fukien  province 
to  Japan  to  be  converted  into  naval  bases  and  grant  to  Japan 
in  the  said  province  all  railway  and  mining  rights. 

5.  For  the  reorganization  of  the  Chinese  army  China  shall 
entrust  the  training  and  drilling  of  the  army  to  Japan. 

6.  For  the  unification  of  China's  firearms  and  munitions  of 
war,  China  shall  adopt  firearms  of  Japanese  pattern,  and  at 
the  same  time  establish  arsenals  (with  the  help  of  Japan)  in 
different  strategic  points. 

7.  With  the  object  of  creating  and  maintaining  a  Chinese 
Navy,  China  shall  entrust  the  training  of  her  navy  to  Japan. 

8.  With  the  object  of  reorganizing  her  finances  and  improv- 
ing the  methods  of  taxation,  China  shall  entrust  the  work  to 
Japan,  and  the  latter  shall  elect  competent  financial  experts 
who  shall  act  as  first-class  advisers  to  the  Chinese  Government. 

9.  China  shall  engage  Japanese  educational  experts  as  edu- 
cational advisers  and  extensively  establish  schools  in  different 
parts  of  the  country  to  teach  Japanese  so  as  to  raise  the  edu- 
cational standard  of  the  country. 

10.  China  shall  first  consult  with  and  obtain  the  consent  of 
Japan  before  she  can  enter  into  an  agreement  with  another 
Power  for  making  loans,  the  leasing  of  territory,  or  the  ces- 
sion of  the  same. 

From  the  date  of  the  signing  of  this  Defensive  Alliance, 
'Japan  and  China  shall  work  together  hand-in-hand.  Japan 
will  assume  the  responsibility  of  safeguarding  Chinese  terri- 
tory and  maintaining  the  peace  and  order  in  China.  This  will 
relieve  China  of  all  future  anxieties  and  enable  her  to  proceed 


132  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

energetically  with  her  reforms,  and,  with  a  sense  of  territorial 
security,  she  may  wait  for  her  national  development  and  regen- 
eration. Even  after  the  present  European  War  is  over  and 
peace  is  restored  China  will  absolutely  have  nothing  to  fear  in 
the  future  of  having  pressure  brought  against  her  by  the  for- 
eign powers.  It  is  only  thus  that  permanent  peace  can  be  se- 
cured in  the  Far  East. 

But  before  concluding  this  Defensive  Alliance,  two  points 
must  first  be  ascertained  and  settled.  (1)  Its  bearing  on  the 
Chinese  Government.  (2)  Its  bearing  on  those  Powers  having 
intimate  relations  with  and  great  interests  in  China. 

In  considering  its  effect  on  the  Chinese  Government,  Japan 
must  try  to  foresee  whether  the  position  of  China's  present 
ruler  Yuan  Shih-kai  shall  be  permanent  or  not;  whether  the 
present  Government's  policy  will  enjoy  the  confidence  of  a  large 
section  of  the  Chinese  people ;  whether  Yuan  Shi-kai  will  readily 
agree  to  the  Japanese  Government's  proposal  to  enter  into  a 
treaty  of  alliance  with  us.  These  are  points  to  which  we  are 
bound  to  give  a  thorough  consideration.  Judging  by  the  atti- 
tude hitherto  adopted  by  Yuan  Shi-kai  we  know  he  has  always 
resorted  to  the  policy  of  expediency  in  his  diplomatic  dealings, 
and  although  he  may  now  outwardly  show  friendliness  towards 
us,  he  will  in  fact  rely  upon  the  influence  of  the  different 
Powers  as  the  easiest  check  against  us  and  refuse  to  accede  to 
our  demands.  Take  for  a  single  instance,  his  conduct  towards 
us  since  the  Imperial  Government  declared  war  against  Ger- 
many and  his  action  will  then  be  clear  to  all.  Whether  we  can 
rely  upon  the  ordinary  friendly  methods  of  diplomacy  to  gain 
our  object  or  not  it  does  not  require  much  wisdom  to  decide. 
After  the  gigantic  struggle  in  Europe  is  over,  leaving  aside 
America  which  will  not  press  for  advantage,  China  will  not  be 
able  to  obtain  any  loans  from  the  other  Powers.  With  a  de- 
pleted treasury,  without  means  to  pay  the  officials  and  the 
army,  with  local  bandits  inciting  the  poverty-stricken  populace 
to  trouble,  with  the  revolutionists  waiting  for  opportunities  to 
rise,  should  an  insurrection  actually  occur  while  no  outside 
assistance  can  be  rendered  to  quell  it  we  are  certain  it  will  be 
impossible  for  Yuan  Shi-kai,  single-handed,  to  restore  order 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  133 

and  consolidate  the  country.  The  result  will  be  that  the  na- 
tion will  be  cut  up  into  many  parts  beyond  all  hope  of  remedy. 
That  this  state  of  affairs  will  come  is  not  difficult  to  foresee. 
When  this  occurs,  shall  we  uphold  Yuan's  Government  and 
assist  him  to  suppress  the  internal  insurrection  with  the  certain 
assurance  that  we  could  influence  him  to  agree  to  our  demands, 
or  shall  we  help  the  revolutionists  to  achieve  a  success  and  real- 
ize our  object  through  them?  This  question  must  be  definitely 
decided  upon  this  very  moment  so  that  we  may  put  it  into  prac- 
tical execution.  If  we  do  not  look  into  the  future  fate  of  China 
but  go  blindly  to  uphold  Yuan's  Government,  to  enter  into  a 
Defensive  Alliance  with  China,  hoping  thus  to  secure  a  complete 
realization  of  our  object  by  assisting  him  to  suppress  the  rev- 
olutionists, it  is  obviously  a  wrong  policy.  Why?  Because 
the  majority  of  the  Chinese  people  have  lost  all  faith  in  the 
tottering  Yuan  Shi-kai  who  is  discredited  and  attacked  by  the 
whole  nation  for  having  sold  his  country.  If  Japan  gives  Yuan 
the  support,  his  Government,  though  in  a  very  precarious  state, 
may  possibly  avoid  destruction.  Yuan  Shi-kai  belongs  to  that 
school  of  politicians  who  are  fond  of  employing  craftiness  and 
cunning.  He  may  be  friendly  to  us  for  a  time,  but  he  will 
certainly  abandon  us  and  again  befriend  the  other  Powers  when 
the  European  war  is  at  an  end.  Judging  by  his  past  we  have 
no  doubt  as  to  what  he  will  do  in  the  future.  For  Japan  to 
ignore  the  general  sentiment  of  the  Chinese  people  and  support 
Yuan  Shi-kai  with  the  hope  that  we  can  settle  with  him  the  Chi- 
nese Question  is  a  blunder  indeed.  Therefore  in  order  to  secure 
the  permanent  peace  of  the  Far  East,  instead  of  supporting  a 
Chinese  Government  which  can  neither  be  long  continued  in 
power  nor  assist  in  the  attainment  of  our  object,  we  should 
rather  support  the  400,000,000  Chinese  people  to  renovate  their 
corrupt  Government,  to  change  its  present  form,  to  maintain 
peace  and  order  in  the  land  and  to  usher  into  China  a  new  era 
of  prosperity  so  that  China  and  Japan  may  in  fact  as  well  as 
in  name  be  brought  into  the  most  intimate  and  vital  relations 
with  each  other.  China's  era  of  prosperity  is  based  on  the 
China-Japanese  Alliance  and  this  Alliance  is  the  foundational 
power  for  the  repelling  of  the  foreign  aggression  that  is  to  be 


134  .THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

directed  against  the  Far  East  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Euro- 
pean war.  This  Alliance  is  also  the  foundation-stone  of  the 
peace  of  the  world.  Japan  therefore  should  take  this  as  the 
last  warning  and  immediately  solve  this  question.  Since  the 
Imperial  Japanese  Government  has  considered  it  imperative  to 
support  the  Chinese  people,  we  should  induce  the  Chinese  rev- 
olutionists, the  Imperialists  and  other  Chinese  malcontents  to 
create  trouble  all  over  China.  The  whole  country  will  be 
thrown  into  disorder  and  Yuan's  Government  will  consequently 
be  overthrown.  We  shall  then  select  a  man  from  amongst  the 
most  influential  and  most  noted  of  the  400,000,000  of  Chinese 
and  help  him  to  organize  a  new  form  of  Government  and  to  con- 
solidate the  whole  country.  In  the  meantime  our  army  must 
assist  in  the  restoration  of  peace  and  order  in  the  country,  and 
in  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  properties  of  the  people,  so 
that  they  may  gladly  tender  their  allegiance  to  the  new  Gov- 
ernment which  will  then  naturally  confide  in  and  rely  upon 
Japan.  It  is  after  the  accomplishment  of  only  these  things 
that  we  shall  without  difficulty  gain  our  object  by  the  conclu- 
sion of  a  Defensive  Alliance  with  China. 

For  us  to  incite  the  Chinese  revolutionists  and  malcontents 
to  rise  in  China  we  consider  the  present  to  be  the  most  oppor- 
tune moment.  The  reason  why  these  men  can  not  now  carry 
on  an  active  campaign  is  because  they  are  insufficiently  provided 
with  funds.  If  the  Imperial  Government  can  take  advantage 
of  this  fact  to  make  them  a  loan  and  instruct  them  to  rise 
simultaneously,  great  commotion  and  disorder  will  surely  pre- 
vail all  over  China.  ,We  can  intervene  and  easily  adjust  mat- 
ters. 

The  progress  of  the  European  War  warns  Japan  with  greater 
urgency  of  the  imperative  necessity  of  solving  this  most  vital  of 
questions.  The  Imperial  Government  can  not  be  considered  as 
embarking  on  a  rash  project.  This  opportunity  will  not  re- 
peat itself  for  our  benefit.  We  must  avail  ourselves  of  this 
chance  and  under  no  circumstances  hesitate.  Why  should  we 
wait  for  the  spontaneous  uprising  of  the  revolutionists  and  mal- 
contents? Why  should  we  not  think  out  and  lay  down  a  plan 
beforehand?     When  we  examine  into  the  form  of  Government 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  135 

in  China,  we  must  ask  whether  the  existing  Repubhc  is  well 
suited  to  the  national  temperament  and  well  adapted  to  the 
thoughts  and  aspirations  of  the  Chinese  people.  From  the  time 
the  Republic  of  China  was  established  up  to  the  present  mo- 
ment, if  what  it  has  passed  through  is  to  be  compared  to  what 
it  ought  to  be  in  the  matter  of  administration  and  unification, 
we  find  disappointment  everywhere.  Even  the  revolutionists 
themselves,  the  very  ones  who  first  advocated  the  Republican 
form  of  government,  acknowledge  that  they  have  made  a  mis- 
take. The  retention  of  the  Republican  form  of  Government  in 
China  will  be  a  great  future  obstacle  in  the  way  of  a  Chino-Jap- 
anese  Alliance.  And  why  must  it  be  so?  Because,  in  a  Repub- 
lic the  fundamental  principles  of  government  as  well  as  the 
social  and  moral  aims  of  the  people  are  distinctly  different  from 
that  of  a  Constitutional  Monarchy.  Their  laws  and  adminis- 
tration also  conflict.  If  Japan  act  as  a  guide  to  China  and 
China  models  herself  after  Japan,  it  will  only  then  be  possible 
for  the  two  nations  to  solve  by  mutual  effort  the  Far  East 
Question  without  differences  and  disagreements.  Therefore  to 
start  from  the  foundation  for  the  purpose  of  reconstructing 
the  Chinese  Government,  of  establishing  a  Chino-Japanese  Al- 
liance, of  maintaining  the  permanent  peace  of  the  Far  East 
and  of  realizing  the  consummation  of  Japan's  Imperial  policy, 
we  must  take  advantage  of  the  present  opportunity  to  alter 
China's  Republican  form  of  Government  into  a  Constitutional 
Monarchy  which  shall  necessarily  be  identical,  in  all  its  details, 
to  the  Constitutional  Monarchy  of  Japan,  and  to  no  other. 
This  is  really  the  key  and  first  principle  to  be  firmly  held  for 
the  actual  reconstruction  of  the  form  of  Government  in  China. 
If  China  changes  her  Republican  form  of  Government  to  that  of 
a  Constitutional  Monarchy,  shall  we,  in  the  selection  of  a  new 
ruler,  restore  the  Emperor  Hsuan  T'ung  to  his  throne  or  choose 
the  most  capable  man  from  the  Monarchists  or  select  the  most 
worthy  member  from  among  the  revolutionists?  We  think, 
however,  that  it  is  advisable  at  present  to  leave  this  question  to 
the  exigency  of  the  future  when  the  matter  is  brought  up  for 
decision.  But  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  to  ac- 
tually put  into  execution  this  policy  of  a  Chino-Japanese  Al- 


136  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

liance  and  the  transformation  of  the  Republic  of  China  into 
a  Constitutional  Monarchy,  is,  in  reality,  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple to  be  adopted  for  the  reconstruction  of  China. 

We  shall  now  consider  the  bearing  of  this  Defensive  Alliance 
on  the  other  Powers.  Needless  to  say,  Japan  and  China  will  in 
no  way  impair  the  rights  and  interests  already  acquired  by  the 
Powers.  At  this  moment  it  is  of  paramount  importance  for 
Japan  to  come  to  a  special  understanding  with  Russia  to  define 
our  respective  spheres  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  so  that  the 
two  countries  may  co-operate  with  each  other  in  the  future. 
This  means  that  Japan  after  the  acquisition  of  sovereign  rights 
in  South  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mongolia  will  work  together 
with  Russia  after  her  acquisition  of  sovereign  rights  in  North 
Manchuria  and  Outer  Mongolia  to  maintain  the  status  quo, 
and  endeavour  by  every  effort  to  protect  the  peace  of  the  Far 
East.  Russia,  since  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War,  has 
not  only  laid  aside  all  ill-feelings  against  Japan,  but  has  adopted 
the  same  attitude  as  her  Allies  and  shown  warm  friendship  for 
us.  No  matter  how  we  regard  the  Manchurian  and  Mongolian 
Questions  in  the  future  she  is  anxious  that  we  find  some  way  of 
settlement.  Therefore  we  need  not  doubt  but  that  Russia,  in 
her  attitude  towards  this  Chinese  Question,  will  be  able  to  come 
to  an  understanding  with  us  for  mutual  co-operation. 

The  British  sphere  of  influence  and  interest  in  China  is 
centred  in  Tibet  and  the  Yangtsze  Valley.  Therefore  if  Japan 
can  come  to  some  satisfactory  arrangement  with  China  in  re- 
gard to  Tibet  and  also  give  certain  privileges  to  Great  Britain 
in  the  Yangtsze  Valley,  with  an  assurance  to  protect  those  priv- 
ileges, no  matter  how  powerful  Great  Britain  might  be,  she  will 
surely  not  oppose  Japan's  policy  in  regard  to  this  Chinese 
Question.  While  this  present  European  War  is  going  on 
Great  Britain  has  never  asked  Japan  to  render  her  assistance. 
That  her  strength  will  certainly  not  enable  her  to  oppose  us  in 
the  future  need  not  be  doubted  in  the  least. 

Since  Great  Britain  and  Russia  will  not  oppose  Japan's  pol- 
icy towards  China,  it  can  readily  be  seen  what  attitude  France 
will  adopt  in  regard  to  the  subject.  What  Japan  must  now 
somewhat  reckon  with  is  America.     But  America  in  her  attitude 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  137 

towards  us  regarding  our  policy  towards  China  has  already 
declared  the  principle  of  maintaining  China's  territorial  integ- 
rity and  equal  opportunity  and  will  be  satisfied,  if  we  do  not 
impair  America's  already  acquired  rights  and  privileges.  We 
think  America  will  also  have  no  cause  for  complaint.  Never- 
theless America  has  in  the  East  a  naval  force  which  can  be 
fairly  relied  upon,  though  not  sufficiently  strong  to  be  feared. 
Therefore  in  Japan's  attitude  towards  America  there  is  noth- 
ing really  for  us  to  be  afraid  of. 

Since  China's  condition  is  such  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
Powers'  relation  towards  China  is  such  on  the  other  hand, 
Japan  should  avail  herself  in  the  meantime  of  the  European 
War  to  definitely  decide  upon  a  policy  towards  China,  the  most 
important  move  being  the  transformation  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  be  followed  up  by  preparing  for  the  conclusion  of 
the  Defensive  Alliance.  The  precipitate  action  on  the  part  of 
our  present  Cabinet  in  acceding  to  the  request  of  Great  Britain 
to  declare  war  against  Germany  without  having  definitely  set- 
tled our  policy  towards  China  has  no  real  connection  with  our 
future  negotiations  with  China  or  affect  the  political  condition 
in  the  Far  East.  Consequently  all  intelligent  Japanese,  of 
every  walk  of  life  throughout  the  land,  are  very  deeply  con- 
cerned about  the  matter. 

Our  Imperial  Government  should  now  definitely  change  our 
dependent  foreign  policy  which  is  being  directed  by  others  into 
an  independent  foreign  policy  which  shall  direct  others,  pro- 
claiming the  same  with  solemn  sincerity  to  the  world  and  carry- 
ing it  out  with  determination.  If  we  do  so,  even  the  gods  and 
spirits  will  give  way.  These  are  important  points  in  our  policy 
towards  China  and  the  result  depends  on  how  we  carry  them 
out.  Can  our  authorities  firmly  make  up  their  mind  to  solve 
this  Chinese  Question  by  the  actual  carrying  out  of  this  funda- 
mental principle?  If  they  show  irresolution  while  we  have  this 
heaven-conferred  chance  and  merely  depend  on  the  good  will  of 
the  other  Powers,  we  shall  eventually  have  greater  pressure  to 
be  brought  against  the  Far  East  after  the  European  War  is 
over,  when  the  present  equilibrium  will  be  destroyed.  That  day 
will  then  be  too  late  for  us  to  repent  of  our  folly.     We  are 


138  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

therefore  impelled  by  force  of  circumstances  to  urge  our  au- 
thorities to  a  quicker  sense  of  the  situation  and  to  come  to  a 
determination. 

The  first  point  which  leaps  out  of  this  extraordinarily- 
frank  disquisition  is  that  the  origin  of  the  Twenty-one 
Demands  is  at  last  disclosed.  A  perusal  of  the  ten 
articles  forming  the  basis  of  the  Defensive  alliance  pro- 
posed by  the  Black  Dragon  Society,  allows  us  to  under- 
stand everything  that  occurred  in  Peking  in  the  spring 
of  1915.  As  far  back  as  November,  1914,  it  was  gen- 
erally rumoured  in  Peking  that  Japan  had  a  surprise 
of  an  extraordinary  nature  in  her  diplomatic  archives, 
and  that  it  would  be  merely  a  matter  of  weeks  before 
it  was  sprung.  Comparing  this  elaborate  memoran- 
dum of  the  Black  Dragon  Society  with  the  original 
text  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands  it  is  plain  that  the 
proposed  plan,  having  been  handed  to  Viscount  Kato, 
had  to  be  passed  through  the  diplomatic  filters  again 
and  again  until  all  gritty  matter  had  been  removed,  and 
an  appearance  of  innocuousness  given  to  it.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  the  defensive  alliance  finally  emerges 
as  five  compact  little  "groups"  of  demands,  with  the 
vital  tilings  directly  affecting  Chinese  sovereignty 
labelled  desiderata,  so  that  Japanese  ambassadors  abroad 
could  leave  very  warm  assurances  at  every  Foreign 
Office  that  there  was  nothing  in  what  Japan  desired 
which  in  any  way  conflicted  with  the  Treaty  rights  of 
the  Powers  in  China.  The  air  of  mystery  which  sur- 
rounded the  whole  business  from  the  18th  January  to 
the  7th  May — the  day  of  the  ultimatum — was  due  to 
the  fact  that  Japan  attempted  to  translate  the  conspir- 
acy into  terms  of  ordinary  intercourse,  only  to  find  that 
in  spite  of  the  "filtering"  the  atmosphere  of  plotting 


The  Peerless  Lake  of  the  Summer  Palacj:  Near  Peking 


AxoTHER    View    of    the    Peerless    Lake    of    the    Summer 
Palace  iVear  Peking 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  139 

could  not  be  shaken  off  or  the  political  threat  adequately 
hidden.  There  is  an  arresting  piece  of  psychology  in 
this. 

The  conviction  expressed  in  the  first  portion  of  the 
Memorandum  that  bankruptcy  was  the  rock  on  which 
the  Peking  administration  must  sooner  or  later  split, 
and  that  the  moment  which  Japan  must  seize  is  the  out- 
break of  insurrections,  is  also  highly  instructive  in  view 
of  what  happened  later.  Still  more  subtle  is  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  ultimate  solution  is  left  open:  it  is 
consistently  admitted  throughout  the  mass  of  reasoning 
that  there  is  no  means  of  knowing  whether  suasion  or 
force  will  ultimately  be  necessary.  Force,  however,  al- 
ways beckons  to  Japan  because  that  is  the  simplest 
formula.  And  since  Japan  is  the  self-appointed  de- 
fender of  the  dumb  four  hundred  millions,  her  influence 
will  be  thrown  on  the  side  of  the  populace  in  order  "to 
usher  into  China  a  new  era  of  prosperity"  so  that  China 
and  Japan  may  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name  be  brought 
into  the  most  intimate  and  vital  relations  with  each 
other. 

The  object  of  the  subsidized  insurrections  is  also 
clearly  stated:  it  is  to  alter  China's  republican  form  of 
government  into  a  Constitutional  Monarchy  which  shall 
necessarily  be  identical  in  all  its  details  to  the  Constitu- 
tional Monarchy  of  Japan  and  to  no  other.  Who  the 
new  Emperor  is  to  be  is  a  point  left  in  suspense,  although 
we  may  here  again  recall  that  in  1912  in  the  midst  of  the 
revolution  Japan  privately  sounded  England  regarding 
the  advisability  of  lending  the  Manchus  armed  assist- 
ance, a  proposal  which  was  immediately  vetoed.  But 
there  are  other  things :  nothing  is  forgotten  in  the  Memo- 
randum.    Russia  is  to  be  specially  placated,  England 


140  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

to  be  specially  negotiated  with,  thus  incidentally  ex- 
plaining Japan's  recent  attitude  regarding  the 
Yangtsze  Railways.  Japan,  released  from  her  de- 
pendent foreign  policy,  that  is  from  a  policy  which  is 
bound  by  conventions  and  treaties  which  others  respect, 
can  then  carry  out  her  own  plans  without  fear  of  mo- 
lestation. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  two  last  documents  of  the 
dossier — the  method  of  subsidizing  and  arranging  in- 
surrections in  China  when  and  wherever  necessary. 

The  first  document  is  a  detailed  agreement  between 
th  Revolutionary  Party  and  various  Japanese  mer- 
chants. Trained  leaders  are  to  be  used  in  the  pro- 
vinces South  of  the  Yellow  River,  and  the  matter  of 
result  is  so  systematized  that  the  agi'cement  specifies 
the  amount  of  compensation  to  be  paid  for  every 
Japanese  killed  on  active  service;  it  declares  that  the 
Japanese  will  deliver  arms  and  ammunition  in  the  dis- 
tricts of  Jihchow  in  Shantung  and  Haichow  in  Kiangsu ; 
and  it  ends  by  stating  that  the  first  instalment  of  cash, 
Yen  400,000,  had  been  paid  over  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  the  agreement.  The  second  document  is  an 
additional  loan  agreement  between  the  interested  par- 
ties creating  a  special  "trading"  corporation,  perhaps 
satirically  named  "The  Europe  and  Asia  Trading  Com- 
pany," which  in  a  consideration  of  a  loan  of  half  a  mil- 
lion yen  gives  Japanese  prior  rights  over  all  the  mines 
of  China. 

ALLEGED    SECRET    AGREEMENT    MADE    BETWEEN    SUN    WEN     (sUN 
YAT  sen)  and  the  JAPANESE 

In  order  to  preserve  the  peace  in  the  Far  East,  it  is  neces- 
sary for  China  and  Japan  to  enter  into  an  offensive  and  defen- 
sive alliance  whereby  in  case  of  war  with  any  other  nation  or 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  141 

nations  Japan  shall  supply  the  military  force  while  China  shall 
be  responsible  for  the  finances.  It  is  impossible  for  the  pres- 
ent Chinese  Government  to  work  hand  in  hand  with  the  Jap- 
anese Government  nor  does  the  Japanese  Government  desire  to 
co-operate  with  the  former.  Consequently  Japanese  politicians 
and  merchants  who  have  the  peace  of  the  Far  East  at  heart 
are  anxious  to  assist  China  in  her  reconstruction.  For  this 
object  the  following  Agreement  is  entered  into  by  the  two 
parties : 

1.  Before  an  uprising  is  started,  Terao,  Okura,  Tseji  Karoku 
and  their  associates  shall  provide  the  necessary  funds,  weapons 
and  military  force,  but  the  funds  so  provided  must  not  exceed 
1,500,000  yen  and  rifles  not  to  exceed  100,000  pieces. 

2.  Before  the  uprising  takes  place  the  loan  shall  be  tem- 
porarily secured  by  10,000,000  yen  worth  of  bonds  to  be  is- 
sued by  Sun  Wen  (Sun  Yat  Sen).  It  shall  however  be  secured 
afterwards  by  all  the  movable  properties  of  the  occupied  terri- 
tory.     (See  Article  14  of  this  Agreement.) 

'3.  The  funds  from  the  present  loan  and  military  force  to  be 
provided  are  for  operations  in  the  provinces  South  of  the  Yellow 
River  viz:  Yunnan,  Kweichow,  Hunan,  Hupeh,  Szechuan, 
Kiangsi,  Anhuei,  Kiangsu,  Chekiang,  Fukien,  Kwangsi  and 
Kwangtung.  If  it  is  intended  to  invade  the  Northern  provinces 
North  of  the  Yellow  River,  Tseji  Karoku  and  his  associates 
shall  participate  with  the  revolutionists  in  all  deliberations  con- 
nected with  such  operations. 

4.  The  Japanese  volunteer  force  shall  be  allowed  from  the 
date  of  their  enrolment  active  service  pay  in  accordance  with 
the  regulations  of  the  Japanese  army.  After  the  occupation  of 
a  place,  the  two  parties  will  settle  the  mode  of  rewarding  the 
meritorious  and  compensating  the  family  of  the  killed,  adopt- 
ing the  most  generous  practice  in  vogue  in  China  and  Japan. 
In  the  case  of  the  killed,  compensation  for  each  soldier  shall, 
at  the  least,  be  more  than  1,000  yen. 

5.  Wherever  the  revolutionary  army  might  be  located  the 
Japanese  military  officers  accompanying  these  expeditions  shall 
have  the  right  to  advise  a  continuation  or  cessation  of  opera- 
tions. 


142  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

6.  After  the  revolutionary  army  has  occupied  a  re- 
gion and  strengthened  its  defences,  all  industrial  un- 
dertakings and  railway  construction  and  the  like, 
not  mentioned  in  the  Treaties  with  other  foreign  Powers, 
shall  be  worked  with  joint  capital  together  with  the  Japan- 
ese. 

7.  On  the  establishment  of  a  new  Government  in  China,  all 
Japan's  demands  on  China  shall  be  recognized  by  the  new  Gov- 
ernment as  settled  and  binding. 

8.  All  Japanese  Military  Officers  holding  the  rank  of  Captain 
or  higher  ranks  engaged  by  the  Chinese  revolutionary  army 
shall  have  the  privilege  of  being  continued  in  their  employment 
with  a  limit  as  to  date  and  shall  have  the  right  to  ask  to  be 
thus  employed. 

9.  The  loan  shall  be  paid  over  in  three  instalments.  The 
first   instalment   will   be   400,000   yen,   the   second   instalment 

yen  and  the  third  instalment yen.     After  the 

first  instalment  is  paid  over,  Okura  who  advances  the  loan  shall 
have  the  right  to  appoint  men  to  supervise  the  expenditure  of 
the  money. 

10.  The  Japanese  shall  undertake  to  deliver  all  arms  and 
ammunition  in  the  Districts  of  Jih  Chao  and  Haichow  (in  Shan- 
tung and  Kiangsu,  South  of  Kiaochow). 

11.  The  payment  of  the  first  instalment  of  the  loan  shall  be 
made  not  later  than  three  days  after  the  signing  of  this 
Agreement. 

12.  All  the  employed  Japanese  Military  officers  and  Japan- 
ese volunteers  are  in  duty  bound  to  obey  the  orders  of  the 
Commander  of  the  revolutionary  army. 

13.  The  Commander  of  the  revolutionary  army  shall  have 
the  right  to  send  back  to  Japan  those  Japanese  military  officers 
and  Japanese  volunteers  who  disobey  his  orders  and  their  pass- 
age money  shall  not  be  paid  if  such  decision  meets  with  the 
approval  of  three  or  more  of  the  Japanese  who  accompany  the 
revolutionary  force. 

14.  All  the  commissariat  departments  in  the  occupied  terri- 
tory must  employ  Japanese  experts  to  co-operate  in  their  man- 
agement. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  143 

15.  Tills  Agreement  takes  effect  immediately  it  is  signed  by 
the  two  parties. 

The  foregoing  fifteen  articles  have  been  discussed  several 
times  between  the  two  parties  and  signed  by  them  in  February. 
The  first  instalment  of  400,000  yen  has  been  paid  according  to 
the  terms  of  this  Agreement. 

LOAN  AGREEMENT  MADE  BETWEEN  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  PARTY 
REPRESENTED  BY  CHANG  YAO  CHING  AND  HIS  ASSOCIATES  OF 
THE  FIRST  PART  AND  KAWASAKI  KULANOSKE  OF  THE  SECOND 
PART 

1.  The  Europe  and  Asia  Trading  Company  undertakes  to 
raise  a  loan  of  500,000  yen.  After  the  Agreement  is  signed 
and  sealed  by  the  contracting  parties  the  Japanese  Central 
Bank  shall  hand  over  3/10  of  the  loan  as  the  first  instalment. 
When  Chang  Yao  Ching  and  his  associates  arrive  at  their 
proper  destination  the  sum  of  150,000  yen  shall  be  paid  over 
as  the  second  instalment.  When  final  arrangements  are  made 
the  third  and  last  instalment  of  200,000  yen  shall  be  paid. 

2.  When  money  is  to  be  paid  out,  the  Europe  and  Asia  Trad- 
ing Company  shall  appoint  supervisers.  Responsible  individu- 
als of  the  contracting  parties  shall  jointly  affix  their  seals  (to 
the  checks)  before  money  is  drawn  for  expenditure. 

3.  The  Europe  and  Asia  Trading  Company  shall  secure  a 
volunteer  force  of  150  men,  only  retired  officers  of  the  Japanese 
army  to  be  eligible. 

4).  On  leaving  Japan  the  travelling  expenses  and  personal 
effects  of  the  volunteers  shall  be  borne  by  themselves.  After 
reaching  China,  Chang  Yao  Ching  and  his  associates  shall  give 
the  volunteers  the  pay  of  officers  of  the  subordinate  grade  ac- 
cording to  the  established  regulations  of  the  Japanese  army. 

5.  If  a  volunteer  is  wounded  while  on  duty  Chang  Yao  Ching 
and  his  associates  shall  pay  him  a  provisional  compensation  of 
not  exceeding  1,000  yen.  When  wounded  seriously  a  pro- 
visional compensation  of  5,000  yen  shall  be  paid  as  well  as  a 
life  pension  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  the  Japanese  army. 
If  a  volunteer  meets  with  an  accident,  thus  losing  his  life,  an 
indemnity  of  50,000  yen  shall  be  paid  to  his  family. 


144  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

6.  If  a  volunteer  is  not  qualified  for  duty  Chang'  Yao-ching 
and  his  associates  shall  have  the  power  to  dismiss  him.  All  vol- 
unteers are  subject  to  the  orders  of  Chang  Yao-ching  and  liis 
associates  and  to  their  command  in  the  battlefields. 

7.  When  volunteers  are  required  to  attack  a  certain  se- 
lected place  it  shall  be  their  duty  to  do  so.  But  the  necessary 
expenses  for  the  undertaking  shall  be  determined  beforehand 
by  both  parties  after  investigating  into  existing  conditions. 

8.  The  volunteer  force  shall  be  organized  after  the  model  of 
the  Japanese  army.  Two  Japanese  officers  recommended  by 
the  Europe  and  Asia  Trading  Company    shall  be  employed. 

9.  The  Europe  and  Asia  Trading  Company  shall  have  the 
power  to  dispose  of  the  public  properties  in  the  places  occupied 
by  the  volunteer  force. 

10.  The  Europe  and  Asia  Trading  Company  shall  have  the 
first  preference  for  working  the  mines  in  places  occupied  and 
protected  by  the  volunteer  force. 

And  here  ends  this  extraordinary  collection  of  papers. 
Is  fiction  mixed  with  fact — are  these  only  "trial"  drafts, 
or  are  they  real  documents  signed,  sealed,  and  deliv- 
ered? The  point  seems  unimportant.  The  thing  of 
importance  is  the  undoubted  fact  that  assembled  and 
treated  in  the  way  we  have  treated  them  they  present  a 
complete  and  arresting  picture  of  the  aims  and  ambi- 
tions of  the  ordinary  Japanese;  of  their  desire  to  push 
home  the  attack  to  the  last  gasp  and  so  to  secure  the 
inf  eodation  of  China. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE    MONARCHIST   PLOT 

THE    PAMPHLET    OF    YANG    TU 

A  SHIVER  of  impotent  rage  passed  over  the  country 
when  the  nature  and  acceptance  of  the  Japanese  Ulti- 
matum became  generally  known.  The  Chinese,  always 
an  emotional  people  responding  with  quasi-feminine 
volubility  to  oppressive  acts,  cried  aloud  at  the  igno- 
miny of  the  diplomacy  which  had  so  cruelly  crucified 
them.  One  and  all  declared  that  the  day  of  shame 
which  had  been  so  harshly  imposed  upon  them  would 
never  be  forgotten  and  that  Japan  would  indeed  pay 
bitterly  for  her  policy  of  extortion. 

Two  movements  were  started  at  once:  one  to  raise  a 
National  Salvation  Fund  to  be  applied  towards 
strengthening  the  nation  in  any  way  the  government 
might  decide ;  the  other,  to  boycott  all  Japanese  articles 
of  commerce.  Both  soon  attained  formidable  propor- 
tions. The  nation  became  deeply  and  fervently  inter- 
ested in  the  double-idea;  and  had  Yuan  Shih-kai  pos- 
sessed true  political  vision  there  is  little  doubt  that  by 
responding  to  this  national  call  he  might  have  ultimately 
been  borne  to  the  highest  pinnacles  of  his  ambitions 
without  effort  on  his  part.  His  oldest  enemies  now 
openly  declared  that  henceforth  he  had  only  to  work 
honourably  and  whole-heartedly  in  the  nation's  inter- 
est to  find  them  supporting  him,  and  to  have  every  black 
mark  set  against  his  name  wiped  out. 

145 


146  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

In  these  circumstances  what  did  he  do?  His  actions 
form  one  of  the  most  incredible  and,  let  it  be  said,  con- 
temptible chapters  of  contemporary  history. 

In  dealing  with  the  origins  of  the  Twenty-one  De- 
mands we  have  already  discussed  the  hints  the  Japan 
Representative  had  officially  made  when  presenting  his 
now  famous  Memorandum.  Briefly  Yuan  Shih-kai 
had  been  told  in  so  many  words  that  since  he  was  al- 
ready autocrat  of  all  the  Chinese,  he  had  only  to  endorse 
the  principle  of  Japanese  guidance  in  his  administra- 
tion to  find  that  his  Throne  would  be  as  good  as  publicly 
and  solidly  established.  Being  saturated  with  the  dole- 
ful diplomacy  of  Korea,  and  seeing  in  these  proposals  a 
mere  trap,  Yuan  Shih-kai,  as  we  have  shown,  had  drawn 
back  in  apparent  alarm.  Nevertheless  the  words 
spoken  had  sunk  in  deep,  for  the  simple  and  excellent 
reason  that  ever  since  the  coup  d'etat  of  the  4th  Novem- 
ber, 1913,  the  necessity  of  "consolidating"  his  position 
by  something  more  permanent  than  a  display  of  armed 
force  had  been  a  daily  subject  of  conversation  in  the 
bosom  of  his  family.  The  problem,  as  this  misguided 
man  saw  it,  was  simply  by  means  of  an  um'ivalled  dis- 
play of  cunning  to  profit  by  the  Japanese  suggestion, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  leave  the  Japanese  in  the  lurch. 

His  eldest  son,  an  individual  of  whom  it  has  been 
said  that  he  had  absorbed  every  theory  his  foreign 
teachers  had  taught  him  without  being  capable  of  ap- 
plying a  single  one,  was  the  leader  in  this  family  in- 
trigue. The  unliappy  victim  of  a  brutal  attempt  to 
kill  him  during  the  Revolution,  this  eldest  son  had  been 
for  years  semi-paralyzed:  but  brooding  over  his  dis- 
aster had  only  fortified  in  him  the  resolve  to  succeed  his 
father  as  legitimate  Heir.     Having  saturated  himself 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  147 

in  Napoleonic  literature,  and  being  fully  aware  of  how 
far  a  bold  leader  can  go  in  times  of  emergency,  he  daily 
preached  to  his  father  the  necessity  of  plucking  the  pear 
as  soon  as  it  was  ripe.  The  older  man,  being  more 
skilled  and  more  cautious  in  statecraft  than  this  youth- 
ful visionary,  purposely  rejected  the  idea  so  long  as  its 
execution  seemed  to  him  premature.  But  at  last  the 
point  was  reached  when  he  was  j)ersuaded  to  give  the 
monarchy  advocates  the  free  hand  they  solicited,  being 
largely  helped  to  this  decision  by  the  argument  that  al- 
most anything  in  China  could  be  accomplished  under 
cover  of  the  war, — so  long  as  vested  foreign  interests 
were  not  jeopardized. 

In  accordance  with  this  decision,  very  shortly  after  the 
18th  January,  the  dictator's  lieutenants  had  begun  to 
sound  the  leaders  of  public  opinion  regarding  the  feas- 
ibihty  of  substituting  for  the  nominal  Republic  a  Con- 
stitutional Monarchy.  Thus,  in  a  highly  characteristic 
way,  all  through  the  tortuous  course  of  the  Japanese 
negotiations,  to  which  he  was  supposed  to  be  devoting 
his  sole  attention  in  order  to  save  his  menaced  father- 
land. Yuan  Shih-kai  was  assisting  his  henchmen  to  in- 
doctrinate Peking  officialdom  with  the  idea  that  the 
salvation  of  the  State  depended  more  on  restoring  on 
a  modified  basis  the  old  empire  than  in  beating  off  the 
Japanese  assault.  It  was  his  belief  that  if  some  scholar 
of  national  repute  could  be  found,  who  would  openly 
champion  these  ideas  and  urge  them  with  such  per- 
suasiveness and  authority  that  they  became  accepted  as 
a  Categorical  Imperative,  the  game  would  be  as  good 
as  won,  the  Foreign  Powers  being  too  deeply  com- 
mitted abroad  to  pay  much  attention  to  the  Far 
East.     The  one  man  who  could  have  produced  that 


148  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

result  in  the  way  Yuan  Shih-kai  desired  to  see  it,  the 
brilliant  reformer  Liang  Chi-chao,  famous  ever  since 
1898,  however,  obstinately  refused  to  lend  himself  to 
such  work ;  and,  sooner  than  be  involved  in  any  way  in 
the  plot,  threw  up  his  post  of  Minister  of  Justice  and 
retired  to  the  neighbouring  city  of  Tientsin  from  which 
centre  he  was  destined  to  play  a  notable  part. 

This  hitch  occasioned  a  delay  in  the  pubhc  propa- 
ganda, though  not  for  long.  Forced  to  turn  to  a  man 
of  secondary  ability.  Yuan  Shih-kai  now  invoked  the 
services  of  a  scholar  who  had  been  known  to  be  his  secret 
agent  in  the  Old  Imperial  Senate  under  the  Manchus — a 
certain  Yang  Tu — whose  constant  appeals  in  that  cham- 
ber had  indeed  been  the  means  of  forcing  the  Manchus 
to  summon  Yuan  Shih-kai  back  to  office  to  their  res- 
cue on  the  outbreak  of  the  Wuchang  rebellion  in  1911. 
After  very  little  discussion  everything  was  arranged. 
In  the  person  of  this  ex-Senator,  whose  whole  appear- 
ance was  curiously  Machiavellian  and  decadent,  the  neo- 
imperialists  at  last  found  their  champion. 

Events  now  moved  quickly  enough.  In  the  Eastern 
way,  very  few  weeks  after  the  Japanese  Ultimatum,  a 
society  was  founded  called  the  Society  for  the  Preserva- 
tion of  Peace  (Chou  An  Hui)  and  hundreds  of  affilia- 
tions opened  in  the  provinces.  Money  was  spent  like 
water  to  secure  adherents,  and  when  the  time  was  deemed 
ripe  the  now  famous  pamphlet  of  Yang  Tu  was  pub- 
lished broadcast,  being  in  everybody's  hands  during  the 
idle  summer  month  of  August.  This  document  is  so 
remarkable  as  an  illustration  of  the  working  of  that 
type  of  Chinese  mind  which  has  assimilated  some  por- 
tion of  the  facts  of  the  modern  world  and  yet  remains 
thoroughly  reactionary  and  illogical,  that  special  at- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  149 

tention  must  be  directed  to  it.  Couched  in  the  form  of 
an  argument  between  two  individuals — one  the  in- 
quirer, the  other  the  expounder — it  has  something 
of  the  old  Testament  about  it  both  in  its  blind  faith  and 
in  its  insistence  on  a  few  simple  essentials.  It  embodies 
everything  essential  to  an  understanding  of  the  old 
mentality  of  China  which  has  not  yet  been  completely 
destroyed.  From  a  literary  standpoint  it  has  also  much 
that  is  valuable  because  it  is  so  naive ;  and  although  it  is 
concerned  with  such  a  distant  region  of  the  world  as 
China  its  treatment  of  modern  political  ideas  is  so  bi- 
zarre and  yet  so  acute  that  it  will  repay  study. 

It  was  not,  however,  for  some  time,  that  the  signfi- 
cance  of  this  pamphlet  was  generally  understood.  It 
was  such  an  amazing  departure  from  old  precedents 
for  the  Peking  Government  to  lend  itself  to  public  prop- 
aganda as  a  revolutionary  weapon  that  the  mind  of  the 
people  refused  to  credit  the  fatal  turn  things  were  tak- 
ing. But  presently  when  it  became  known  that  the  "So- 
ciety for  the  Preservation  of  Peace"  was  actually  housed 
in  the  Imperial  City  and  in  daily  relations  with  the  Pres- 
ident's Palace;  and  that  furthermore  the  Procurator- 
General  of  Peking,  in  response  to  innumerable 
memorials  of  denunciation,  having  attempted  to  pro- 
ceed against  the  author  and  publishers  of  the  pamphlet, 
as  well  as  against  the  Society,  had  been  forced  to  leave 
the  capital  under  threats  against  his  life,  the  document 
was  accepted  at  its  face-value.  Almost  with  a  gasp  of 
incredulity  China  at  last  realized  that  Yuan  Shih-kai  had 
been  seduced  to  the  point  of  openly  attempting  to  make 
himself  Emperor.  From  those  August  days  of  1915 
until  the  6th  June  of  the  succeeding  year,  when  Fate  had 
her  own  grim  revenge,  Peking  was  given  up  to  one  of 


150  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

the  most  amazing  episodes  that  has  ever  been  clironicled 
in  the  dramatic  history  of  the  capital.  It  was  as  if  the 
old  city  walls,  which  had  looked  down  on  so  much  real 
drama,  had  determined  to  lend  themselves  to  the  staging 
of  an  unreal  comedy.  For  from  first  to  last  the  mon- 
archy movement  had  something  unreal  about  it,  and 
might  have  been  the  scenario  of  some  vast  picture-play. 
It  was  acting  pure  and  simple — acting  done  in  the  hope 
that  the  people  might  find  it  so  admirable  that  they 
would  acclaim  it  as  real,  and  call  the  Dictator  their  King. 
But  it  is  time  to  turn  to  the  arguments  of  Yang  Tu  and 
allow  a  Chinese  to  picture  the  state  of  his  country : 

A    DEFENCE    OF    THE    MONARCHICAL    MOVEMENT 
PART  I 

Mr.  Kg  (or  'the  stranger')  :  Since  the  establishment  of  the 
Republic  four  years  have  passed,  and  upon  the  President  de- 
pends the  preservation  of  order  at  home  and  the  maintenance 
of  prestige  abroad.  I  suppose  that  after  improving  her  in- 
ternal administration  for  ten  or  twenty  years,  China  will  be- 
come a  rich  and  prosperous  country,  and  will  be  able  to  stand 
in  the  front  rank  with  western  nations. 

Mr.  Hu :  No  !  No !  If  China  does  not  make  any  change  in 
the  form  of  government  there  is  no  hope  for  her  becoming 
strong  and  rich;  there  is  even  no  hope  for  her  having  a  con- 
stitutional government.     I  say  that  China  is  doomed  to  perish. 

Mr.  Ko:     Why  so? 

Mr.  Hu:  The  republican  form  of  government  is  responsi- 
ble. The  Chinese  people  are  fond  of  good  names,  but  they  do 
not  care  much  about  the  real  welfare  of  the  nation.  No  plan 
to  save  the  country  is  possible.  The  formation  of  the  Repub- 
lic as  a  result  of  the  first  revolution  has  prevented  that. 

Mr.  Ko :  Why  is  it  that  there  is  no  hope  of  China's  becom- 
ing strong? 

Mr.  Hu :  The  people  of  a  republic  are  accustomed  to  listen 
to  the  talk  of  equality  and  freedom  which  must  affect  the  politi- 


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REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  151 

cal  and  more  especially  the  military  administration.  In  normal 
circumstances  both  the  military  and  student  classes  are  required 
to  lay  great  emphasis  upon  unquestioned  obedience  and  respect 
for  those  who  hold  high  titles.  The  German  and  Japanese 
troops  observe  strict  discipline  and  obey  the  orders  of  their 
chiefs.  That  is  why  they  are  regarded  as  the  best  soldiers  in 
the  world.  France  and  America  are  in  a  different  position. 
They  are  rich  but  not  strong.  The  sole  difference  is  that  Ger- 
many and  Japan  are  ruled  by  monarchs  while  France  and 
America  are  republics.  Our  conclusion  therefore  is  that  no 
republic  can  be  strong. 

But  since  the  French  and  American  peoples  possess  general 
education,  they  are  in  a  position  to  assume  responsibility  for 
the  good  government  of  their  nations  which  they  keep  in  good 
order.  On  that  account,  although  these  republics  are  not 
strong  in  dealing  with  the  Powers,  they  can  maintain  peace  at 
home.  China,  however,  is  unlike  these  countries,  for  her  stand- 
ard of  popular  education  is  very  low.  Most  of  the  Chinese 
soldiers  declare  as  a  commonplace ;  "We  eat  the  imperial  food 
and  we  must  therefore  serve  the  imperial  master."  But  now 
the  Imperial  family  is  gone,  and  for  it  has  been  substituted  an 
impersonal  republic,  of  which  they  know  nothing  whatsoever. 
These  soldiers  are  now  law-abiding  because  they  have  awe- 
inspiring  and  respectful  feelings  for  the  man  at  the  head  of  the 
state.  But  as  the  talk  of  equality  and  freedom  has  gradually 
influenced  them,  it  has  become  a  more  difficult  task  to  control 
them.  As  an  example  of  this  corrupt  spirit,  the  commanders 
of  the  Southern  troops  formerly  had  to  obey  their  subordinate 
officers  and  the  subordinate  officers  had  to  obey  their  soldiers. 
Whenever  there  was  an  important  question  to  be  discussed,  the 
soldiers  demanded  a  voice  and  a  share  in  the  solution.  These 
soldiers  were  called  the  republican  army.  Although  the  North- 
ern troops  have  not  yet  become  so  degenerate,  still  they  never 
hesitate  to  disobey  the  order  of  their  superiors  whenever  they 
are  ordered  to  proceed  to  distant  localities.  Now  we  have 
come  to  the  point  when  we  are  deeply  satisfied  if  the  army  of 
the  Republic  does  not  openly  mutiny!  We  cannot  expect  any 
more  from  them  save  to  hope  that  they  will  not  mutiny  and 


152  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

that  they  will  be  able  to  suppress  internal  disturbances.  In 
the  circumstances  there  is  no  use  talking  about  resistance  of  a 
foreign  invasion  by  these  soldiers.  As  China,  a  republic,  is 
situated  between  two  countries,  Japan  and  Russia,  both  of 
which  have  monarchical  governments,  how  can  we  resist  their 
aggression  once  diplomatic  conversations  begin?  From  this 
it  is  quite  evident  that  there  is  nothing  which  can  save  China 
from  destruction.  Therefore  I  say  there  is  no  hope  of  China 
becoming  strong. 

Mr.  Ko :  But  why  is  it  that  there  is  no  hope  of  China  ever 
becoming  rich? 

Mr.  Hu:  People  may  not  believe  that  while  France  and 
America  are  rich  China  must  remain  poor.  Nevertheless,  the 
reason  why  France  and  America  are  rich  is  that  they  were 
allowed  to  work  out  their  own  salvation  without  foreign  inter- 
vention for  many  years,  and  that  at  the  same  time  they  were 
free  from  internal  disturbances.  If  any  nation  wishes  to  be- 
come rich,  it  must  depend  upon  industries  for  its  wealth.  Now, 
what  industries  most  fear  is  disorder  and  civil  war.  During 
the  last  two  years  order  has  been  restored  and  many  things 
have  returned  their  former  State,  but  our  industrial  condi- 
tion is  the  same  as  under  the  Manchu  Dynasty.  Merchants  who 
lost  their  capital  during  the  troublous  times  and  who  are  now 
poor  have  no  way  of  retrieving  their  losses,  while  those  who  are 
rich  are  unwilling  to  invest  their  money  in  industrial  under- 
takings, fearing  that  another  civil  war  may  break  out  at  any 
moment,  since  they  take  the  recent  abortive  second  revolution 
as  their  warning.  In  future,  we  shall  have  disquietude  every 
few  years  ;  that  is  whenever  the  president  is  changed.  Then  our 
industrial  and  commercial  condition  will  be  in  a  still  worse  con- 
dition. If  our  industries  are  not  developed,  how  can  we  expect 
to  be  strong?  Take  Mexico  as  a  warning.  There  is  very  little 
difference  between  that  country  and  China,  which  certainly  can- 
not be  compared  with  France  and  America.  Therefore  I  say 
there  is  no  hope  for  China  ever  becoming  rich. 

Mr.  Ko :  Why  is  it  that  you  say  there  is  no  hope  for  China 
having  a  Constitutional  Government? 

Mr.  Hu :     A  true  republic  must  be  conducted  by  many  people 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  153 

possessing  general  education,  political  experience  and  a  certain 
political  morality.  Its  president  is  invested  with  power  by  the 
people  to  manage  the  general  affairs  of  the  state.  Should  the 
people  desire  to  elect  Mr.  A  their  president  today  and  Mr.  B 
tomorrow,  it  does  not  make  much  difference;  for  the  policy  of 
the  country  may  be  changed  together  with  the  change  of  the 
president  without  there  being  any  danger  of  disorder  of  chaos 
following  such  change.  We  have  a  very  different  problem  to 
solve  in  China.  The  majority  of  our  people  do  not  know  what 
the  republic  is,  nor  do  they  know  anything  about  a  Constitu- 
tion nor  have  they  any  true  sense  of  equality  and  freedom. 
Having  overthrown  the  Empire  and  established  in  its  place  a 
republic  they  believe  that  from  now  on  they  are  subservient  to 
no  one,  and  they  think  they  can  do  as  they  please.  Ambitious 
men  hold  that  any  person  may  be  president  and  if  they  cannot 
get  the  presidency  by  fair  means  of  election  they  are  prepared 
to  fight  for  it  with  the  assistance  of  troops  and  robbers.  The 
second  revolution  is  an  illustration  of  this  point.  From  the 
moment  that  the  Emperor  was  deposed,  the  centralization  of 
power  in  the  government  was  destroyed ;  and  no  matter  who  may 
be  at  the  head  of  the  country,  he  cannot  restore  peace  except 
by  the  re-establishment  of  the  monarchy.  So  at  the  time  when 
the  republic  was  formed,  those  who  had  previously  advocated 
Constitutional  Government  turned  into  monarchists.  Although 
we  have  a  Provisional  Constitution  now  and  we  have  all  kinds  of 
legislative  organs,  which  give  to  the  country  an  appearance  of 
a  constitutional  government,  China  has  a  constitutional  gov- 
ernment in  name  only  and  is  a  monarchy  in  spirit.  Had  the 
government  refrained  from  exercising  monarchical  power  dur- 
ing the  last  four  years,  the  people  could  not  have  enjoyed  one 
day  of  peace.  In  short,  China's  republic  must  be  governed  by  a 
monarchy  through  a  constitutional  government.  If  the  con- 
stitutional government  cannot  govern  the  republic,  the  latter 
cannot  remain.  The  question  of  constitutional  government  is 
therefore  very  important,  but  it  will  take  ten  or  twenty  years 
before  it  can  be  solved. 

Look  at  the  people  of  China  today !     They  know  that  some- 
thing terrible  is  going  to  come  sooner  or  later.     They  dare  not 


154  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

think  of  the  future.  The  corrupt  official  lines  his  pocket  with 
unrighteous  money,  preparing  to  flee  to  foreign  countries  or  at 
least  to  the  Foreign  Settlements  for  safety.  The  cautious  work 
quietly  and  do  not  desire  to  earn  merit  but  merely  try  to  avoid 
giving  offence.  The  scholars  and  politicians  are  grandilo- 
quent and  discourse  upon  their  subjects  in  a  sublime  vein,  but 
they  are  no  better  than  the  corrupt  officials.  As  for  our  Presi- 
dent, he  can  remain  at  the  head  of  the  State  for  a  few  years. 
At  most  he  may  hold  office  for  several  terms, — or  perhaps  for 
his  whole  life.  Then  questions  must  arise  as  to  who  shall  suc- 
ceed him ;  how  to  elect  his  successor ;  how  many  rivals  will  there 
be ;  whether  their  policies  will  be  different  from  his,  etc.,  etc. 
He  personally  has  no  idea  regarding  the  solution  of  these  ques- 
tions. Even  if  the  president  is  a  sagacious  and  capable  man, 
he  will  not  be  able  to  make  a  policy  for  the  country  or  fix  a 
Constitution  which  will  last  for  a  hundred  years.  Because  of 
this  he  is  driven  merely  to  adopt  a  policy  so  as  to  maintain 
peace  in  his  own  country  and  to  keep  the  nation  intact  so  long 
as  he  may  live.  In  the  circumstances  such  a  president  can  be 
considered  the  best  executive  head  we  can  have.  Those  who  are 
worshippers  of  the  constitutional  government  cannot  do  more 
than  he  does.  Here  we  find  the  reason  for  the  silence  of  the 
former  advocates  of  a  constitutional  administration.  They 
have  realized  that  by  the  formation  of  the  republic  the  funda- 
mental problem  of  the  country  has  been  left  unsolved.  In  this 
wise  it  happens  that  the  situation  is  something  like  this. 
Whilst  the  country  is  governed  by  an  able  president,  the  people 
enjoy  peace  and  prosperity.  But  once  an  incapable  man  as- 
sumes the  presidency,  chaos  will  become  the  order  of  the  day,  a 
state  of  affairs  which  will  finally  lead  to  the  overthrow  of  the 
president  himself  and  the  destruction  of  the  country.  In  such 
circumstances,  how  can  you  devise  a  general  policy  for  the 
country  which  will  last  for  a  hundred  years  ?  I  say  that  there 
is  no  hope  for  China  establishing  a  truly  constitutional  govern- 
ment. 

Mr.  Ko :  In  your  opinion  there  is  no  hope  for  China  becom- 
ing strong  and  rich  or  for  her  acquiring  a  constitutional  gov- 
ernment.    She   has   no    choice    save   ultimately   to   disappear. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  155 

And  yet  is  there  no  plan  possible  whereby  she  may  be  saved? 

Mr.  Hu:  If  China  wishes  to  save  herself  from  ultimate  dis- 
appearance from  the  face  of  the  earth,  first  of  all  she  must  get 
rid  of  the  republic.  Should  she  desire  wealth  and  strength,  she 
must  adopt  a  constitutional  government.  Should  she  want 
constitutional  government  she  must  first  establish  a  monarchy. 

Mr.  Ko:  How  is  it  that  should  China  desire  wealth  and 
strength  she  must  first  adopt  the  constitutional  form  of  gov- 
ernment ? 

Mr.  Hu:  Wealth  and  strength  is  the  object  of  the  coun- 
try, and  a  constitutional  government  is  the  means  to  realizing 
this  object.  In  the  past  able  rulers  could  accomplish  their 
purpose  without  a  constitutional  government.  We  refer  to 
Emperor  Wu  of  the  Han  Dynasty  and  Emperor  Tai  Chung  of 
the  Tang  Dynasty.  However,  when  these  able  rulers  died  their 
system  of  administration  died  with  them.  This  contention 
can  be  supported  by  numerous  historical  instances;  but  suf- 
fice to  say  that  in  China  as  well  as  in  Europe,  the  lack  of  a  con- 
stitutional government  has  been  the  cause  of  the  weakness  of 
most  of  the  nations  in  ancient  times.  Japan  was  never  known  as 
a  strong  nation  until  she  adopted  a  constitutional  government. 
The  reason  is  this:  when  there  is  no  constitutional  govern- 
ment, the  country  cannot  continue  to  carry  out  a  definite 
policy. 

Within  comparatively  recent  times  there  was  born  in  Eu- 
rope the  constitutional  form  of  government.  European  na- 
tions adopted  it,  and  they  became  strong.  The  most  danger- 
ous fate  that  can  confront  a  nation  is  that  after  the  death  of 
an  able  ruler  the  system  of  administration  he  has  established 
disappears  with  him;  but  this  the  constitutional  form  of  gov- 
ernment is  able  to  avert.  Take  for  instance  William  I  of 
Germany  who  is  dead  but  whose  country  continues  to  this  day 
strong  and  prosperous.  It  is  because  of  constitutional  gov- 
ernment. The  same  is  true  of  Japan,  which  has  adopted  con- 
stitutional government  and  which  is  becoming  stronger  and 
stronger  every  day.  The  change  of  her  executive  cannot  af- 
fect her  progress  in  respect  of  her  strength.  From  this  it  is 
quite  clear  that  constitutional  government  is  a  useful  instru- 


156  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

ment  for  building  up  a  country.  It  is  a  government  with  a  set 
of  fixed  laws  which  guard  the  actions  of  both  the  people  and  the 
president  none  of  whom  can  overstep  the  boundary  as  specified  in 
the  laws.  No  ruler,  whether  be  he  a  good  man  or  a  bad  man, 
can  change  one  iota  of  the  laws.  The  people  reap  the  benefit 
of  this  in  consequence.  It  is  easy  to  make  a  country  strong 
and  rich  but  it  is  difficult  to  establish  a  constitutional  govern- 
ment. When  a  constitutional  government  has  been  established, 
everything  will  take  care  of  itself,  prosperity  following  nat- 
urally enough.  The  adoption  of  a  constitutional  government 
at  the  present  moment  can  be  compared  to  the  problem  of  a  de- 
railed train.  It  is  hard  to  put  the  train  back  on  the  track, 
but  once  on  the  track  it  is  very  easy  to  move  the  train.  What 
we  should  worry  about  is  not  how  to  make  the  country  rich  and 
prosperous,  but  how  to  form  a  genuine  constitutional  govern- 
ment. Therefore  I  say  that  if  China  desires  to  be  strong  and 
prosperous,  she  should  first  of  all  adopt  the  constitutional 
form  of  government. 

Mr.  Ko:  I  do  not  understand  why  it  is  that  a  monarchy 
should  be  established  before  the  constitutional  form  of  gov- 
ernment can  be  formed  ? 

Mr.  Hu;  Because  if  the  present  system  continues  there 
will  be  intermittent  trouble.  At  every  change  of  the  president 
there  will  be  riot  and  civil  war.  In  order  to  avert  the  possi- 
bility of  such  aweful  times  place  the  president  in  a  position 
which  is  permanent.  It  follows  that  the  best  thing  is  to  make 
him  Emperor.  When  that  bone  of  contention  is  removed,  the 
people  will  settle  down  to  business  and  feel  peace  in  their  hearts, 
and  devote  their  whole  energy  and  time  to  the  pursuit  of  their 
vocations.  It  is  logical  to  assume  that  after  the  adoption  of 
the  monarchy  they  will  concentrate  their  attention  on  securing 
a  constitutional  government  which  they  know  is  the  only  salva- 
tion for  their  country.  As  for  the  Emperor,  knowing  that  he 
derives  his  position  from  the  change  from  a  republic,  and  filled 
with  the  desire  of  pacifying  the  people,  he  cannot  help  sanction- 
ing the  formation  of  the  constitutional  form  of  government, 
which  in  addition,  will  insure  to  his  offspring  the  continuation 
of  the  Throne.     Should  he  adopt  any  other  course,  he  will  be 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  157 

exposed  to  great  personal  danger.  If  he  is  broadminded,  he 
will  further  recognize  the  fact  that  if  no  constitutional  form 
of  government  is  introduced,  his  policy  will  perish  after  his 
death.  Therefore  I  say  that  before  the  adoption  of  the  con- 
stitutional form  of  government,  a  monarchy  should  be  estab- 
lished. William  I  of  Germany  and  the  Emperor  Meiji  of 
Japan  both  tried  the  constitutional  form  of  government  and 
found  it  a  success. 

Mr.  Ko :     Please  summarize  your  discussion. 

Mr.  Hu:  In  short,  the  country  cannot  be  saved  except 
through  the  establishment  of  a  constitutional  form  of  govern- 
ment. No  constitutional  government  can  be  formed  except 
through  the  establishment  of  a  monarchy.  The  constitutional 
form  of  government  has  a  set  of  fixed  laws,  and  the  monarchy 
has  a  definite  head  who  cannot  be  changed,  in  which  matters  lies 
the  source  of  national  strength  and  wealth. 

Mr.  Ko:  What  you  have  said  in  regard  to  the  adoption  of 
the  constitutional  monarchy  as  a  means  of  saving  the  country 
from  dismemberment  is  quite  true,  but  I  would  like  to  have 
your  opinion  on  the  relative  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
a  republic  and  a  monarchy,  assuming  that  China  adopts  the 
scheme  of  a  monarchy. 

Mr.  Hu:  I  am  only  too  glad  to  give  you  my  humble  opin- 
ion on  this  momentous  question. 

Mr.  Ko :  You  have  said  that  China  would  be  devastated  by 
contending  armies  of  rival  leaders  trying  to  capture  the  presi- 
dency.    At  what  precise  moment  will  that  occur? 

Mr.  Hu:  The  four  hundred  million  people  of  China  now 
rely  upon  the  President  alone  for  the  protection  of  their  lives 
and  property.  Upon  him  likewise  falls  the  burden  of  preserv- 
ing both  peace  and  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Far  East. 
There  is  no  time  in  the  history  of  China  that  the  Head  of  the 
State  has  had  to  assume  such  a  heavy  responsibility  for  the 
protection  of  life  and  property  and  for  the  preservation  of 
peace  in  Asia;  and  at  no  time  in  our  history  has  the  country 
been  in  greater  danger  than  at  the  present  moment.  China 
can  enjoy  peace  so  long  as  His  Excellency  Yuan  Shih-kai  re- 
mains the  President,  and  no  longer.     Should  anything  befall 


158  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

the  President,  every  business  activity  will  at  once  be  suspended, 
shops  will  be  closed,  disquietude  will  prevail,  people  will  become 
panic-stricken,  the  troops  uncontrollable,  and  foreign  warship 
will  enter  our  harbours.  European  and  American  newspapers 
will  be  full  of  special  dispatches  about  the  complicated  events 
in  China,  and  martial  law  will  be  declared  in  every  part  of  the 
country.  All  this  will  be  due  to  the  uncertainty  regarding  the 
succession  to  the  presidency. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  first  section  of  this  long  and 
extraordinary  pamphlet  how  the  author  develops  his 
argument.  One  of  his  major  premises  is  the  inherent 
unruliness  of  Republican  soldiery, — the  armies  of  re- 
pubhcs  not  to  be  compared  with  the  armed  forces  of 
monarchies, — and  consequently  constituting  a  perpetual 
menace  to  good  government.  Passing  on  from  this,  he 
lays  down  the  proposition  that  China  cannot  hope  to 
become  rich  so  long  as  the  fear  of  civil  war  is  ever- 
present  ;  and  that  without  a  proper  universal  education 
a  republic  is  an  impossibility.  The  exercise  of  mo- 
narchical power  in  such  circumstances  can  only  be  called 
an  inevitable  development, — the  one  goal  to  be  aimed 
at  being  the  substitution  of  Constitutional  Government 
for  the  dictatorial  rule.  The  author  deals  at  great 
length  with  the  background  to  this  idea,  playing  on 
popular  fears  to  reinforce  his  casuistry.  For  although 
constitutional  government  is  insisted  upon  as  the  sole 
solution,  he  speedily  shows  that  this  constitutionalism 
will  depend  more  on  the  benevolence  of  the  dictator  than 
on  the  action  of  the  people.  And  should  his  advice  be 
not  heeded,  when  Fortune  wills  that  Yuan  Shih-kai's 
rule  shall  end,  chaos  will  ensue  owing  to  the  "uncer- 
tainty" regarding  the  succession. 

Here  the  discussion  reaches  its  climax — for  the  de- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  159 

mand  that  salvation  be  sought  by  enthroning  Yuan 
Shih-kai  now  becomes  clear  and  unmistakable.  Let  the 
author  speak  for  himself. 

Mr.  Ko :  But  it  is  provided  in  the  Constitutional  Compact 
that  a  president  must  be  selected  from  among  the  three  candi- 
dates whose  names  are  now  kept  in  a  golden  box  locked  in  a 
stone  room.  Do  you  think  this  provision  is  not  sufficient  to 
avert  the  terrible  times  which  you  have  just  described? 

Mr.  Hu:  The  provision  you  have  mentioned  is  useless. 
Can  you  find  any  person  who  is  able  to  be  at  the  head  of  the 
state  besides  His  Excellency  Yuan  Shih-kai?  The  man  who  can 
succeed  President  Yuan  must  enjoy  the  implicit  confidence  of 
the  people  and  must  have  extended  his  influence  all  over  the 
country  and  be  known  both  at  home  and  abroad.  He  must  be 
able  to  maintain  order,  and  then  no  matter  what  the  consti- 
tution provides,  he  will  be  unanimously  elected  President.  He 
must  also  be  able  to  assure  himself  that  the  two  other  candi- 
dates for  the  presidency  have  no  hope  for  success  in  the  presi- 
dential campaign.  The  provision  in  the  constitution,  as  well 
as  the  golden  casket  in  which  the  names  of  the  three  candidates 
are  kept  which  you  have  mentioned,  are  nothing  but  nominal 
measures.  Moreover  there  is  no  man  in  China  who  answers  the 
description  of  a  suitable  successor  which  I  have  just  given. 
Here  arises  a  difficult  problem;  and  what  has  been  specified  in 
the  Constitutional  Compact  is  a  vain  attempt  to  solve  it.  It  is 
pertinent  to  ask  why  the  law-makers  should  not  have  made  the 
law  in  such  a  way  that  the  people  could  exercise  their  free 
choice  in  the  matter  of  the  presidential  successor?  The  an- 
swer is  that  there  is  reason  to  fear  that  a  bad  man  may  be 
elected  president  by  manipulations  carried  out  with  a  masterly 
hand,  thereby  jeopardizing  the  national  welfare.  This  fear 
has  influenced  the  constitution-makers  to  settle  upon  three 
candidates  from  among  whom  the  president  must  be  elected. 
Then  it  may  be  asked  why  not  fix  upon  one  man  instead  of  upon 
three  since  you  have  already  deprived  the  people  of  part  of 
their  freedom?  The  answer  is  that:  there  is  not  a  single 
man  whose  qualifications  are  high  enough  to  be  the  successor. 


160  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

As  it  is,  three  candidates  of  equal  qualifications  are  put  for- 
ward for  the  people  to  their  selection.  No  matter  how  one 
may  argue  this  important  question  from  the  legal  point  of 
view,  there  is  the  fact  that  the  law  makers  fixed  upon  three 
candidates  for  the  presidency,  believing  that  we  do  not  possess 
a  suitable  presidential  successor.  The  vital  question  of  the 
day  setting  aside  all  paper  talk,  is  whether  or  not  China  has  a 
suitable  man  to  succeed  President  Yuan  Shih-kai.  Whether  or 
not  the  constitutional  compact  can  be  actually  carried  out  in 
future  I  do  not  know ;  but  I  do  know  that  that  instrument  will 
eventually  become  ineffective. 

Mr.  Ko:  I  desire  a  true  picture  of  the  chaos  which  you 
have  hinted  will  ensue  in  this  country.  Can  you  tell  me  any- 
thing along  that  line? 

Mr.  Hu:  In  a  time  of  confusion,  the  soldiers  play  the 
most  important  part,  virtuous  and  experienced  and  learned 
statesmen  being  unable  to  cope  with  the  situation.  The  only 
qualification  which  a  leader  at  such  a  time  needs  to  possess  is 
the  control  of  the  military,  and  the  ability  to  suppress  Parlia- 
ment. Should  such  a  person  be  made  the  president,  he  can- 
not long  hold  his  enviable  post  in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  can- 
not possess  siifficient  influence  to  control  the  troops  of  the 
whole  country.  The  generals  of  equal  rank  and  standing  will 
not  obey  each  other,  while  the  soldiers  and  politicians,  seeing  a 
chance  in  these  differences  for  their  advancement,  will  stir  up 
their  feelings  and  incite  one  another  to  fight.  They  will  fight 
hard  among  themselves.  The  rebels,  who  are  now  exiles  in  for- 
eign lands,  taking  advantage  of  the  chaos  in  China,  will  re- 
turn in  very  little  time  to  perpetrate  the  worst  crimes  known 
in  human  history.  The  royalists  who  are  in  retirement  will 
likewise  come  out  to  fish  in  muddy  waters.  Persons  who  have 
the  qualifications  of  leaders  will  be  used  as  tools  to  fight  for  the 
self-aggrandizement  of  those  who  use  them.  I  do  not  wish  to 
mention  names,  but  I  can  safely  predict  that  more  than  ten  dif- 
ferent parties  will  arise  at  the  psychological  moment.  Men 
who  will  never  be  satisfied  until  they  become  president,  and 
those  who  know  they  cannot  get  the  presidency  but  who  are  un- 
willing to  serve  others,  wiR  come  out  one  after  another.     Con- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  161 

fusion  and  disturbance  will  follow  with  great  rapidity.  Then 
foreign  countries  which  have  entertained  wild  ambitions,  avail- 
ing themselves  of  the  distressful  situation  in  China,  will  stir 
up  ill-feelings  among  these  parties  and  so  increase  the  dis- 
turbances. When  the  proper  time  comes,  various  countries, 
unwilling  to  let  a  single  country  enjoy  the  privilege  of  con- 
trolling China,  will  resort  to  armed  intervention.  In  conse- 
quence the  eastern  problem  will  end  in  a  rupture  of  the  inter- 
national peace.  Whether  China  will  be  turned  at  that  time 
into  a  battleground  for  the  Chinese  people  or  for  the  foreign 
Powers  I  cannot  tell  you.  It  is  too  dreadful  to  think  of  the 
future  which  is  enshrouded  in  a  veil  of  mystery.  However,  I 
can  tell  you  that  the  result  of  this  awful  turmoil  will  be  either 
the  slicing  of  China  like  a  melon  or  the  suppression  of  in- 
ternal trouble  with  foreign  assistance  which  will  lead  to  dis- 
memberment. As  to  the  second  result  some  explanation  is 
necessary.  After  foreign  countries  have  helped  us  to  suppress 
internal  disturbances,  they  will  select  a  man  of  the  type  of  Li 
Wang  of  Korea,  who  betrayed  his  country  to  Japan,  and  make 
him  Emperor  of  China.  Whether  this  man  will  be  the  deposed 
emperor  or  a  member  of  the  Imperial  family  or  the  leader  of 
the  rebel  party,  remains  to  be  seen.  In  any  event  he  will  be  a 
figurehead  in  whose  hand  will  not  be  vested  political,  financial 
and  military  power,  which  will  be  controlled  by  foreigners.  All 
the  valuable  mines,  various  kinds  of  industries  and  our  abun- 
dant natural  resources  will  likewise  be  developed  by  others. 
China  will  thus  disappear  as  a  nation. 

In  selecting  a  man  of  the  Li  Wang  type,  the  aforesaid  for- 
eign countries  will  desire  merely  to  facilitate  the  acquisition  of 
China's  territory.  But  there  can  be  easily  found  such  a  man 
who  bears  remarkable  resemblance  to  Li  Wang,  and  who  will  be 
willing  to  make  a  treaty  with  the  foreigners  whereby  he  un- 
patriotically  sells  his  country  in  exchange  for  a  throne  which 
he  can  never  obtain  or  keep  without  outside  assistance.  His 
procedure  will  be  something  like  this:  He  will  make  an  alli- 
ance with  a  foreign  nation  by  which  the  latter  will  be  given  the 
power  to  carry  on  foreign  relations  on  behalf  of  his  country. 
In  the  eyes  of  foreigners,  China  will  have  been  destroyed,  but 


162  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

the  people  will  continue  deceived  and  made  to  believe  that  their 
country  is  still  in  existence.  This  is  the  first  step.  The  sec- 
ond step  will  be  to  imitate  the  example  of  Korea  and  make  a 
treaty  with  a  certain  power,  whereby  China  is  annexed  and  the 
throne  abolished.  The  imperial  figure-head  then  flees  to  the 
foreign  country  where  he  enjoys  an  empty  title.  Should  you 
then  try  to  make  him  devise  means  for  regaining  the  lost  terri- 
tory it  will  be  too  late.  For  China  will  have  been  entirely  de- 
stroyed by  that  time.  This  is  the  second  procedure  in  the 
annexation  of  Chinese  territory.  The  reason  why  that  foreign 
country  desires  to  change  the  republic  into  the  monarchy  is  to 
set  one  man  on  the  throne  and  make  him  witness  the  whole  proc- 
ess of  annexation  of  his  country,  thereby  simplifying  the  mat- 
ter. When  that  time  has  come,  the  people  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  make  any  comment  upon  the  form  of  government  suit- 
able for  China,  or  upon  the  destruction  of  their  country.  The 
rebels  who  raised  the  standard  of  the  republic  have  no  prin- 
ciples and  if  they  now  find  that  some  other  tactics  will  help  to 
increase  their  power  they  will  adopt  these  tactics.  China's 
republic  is  doomed,  no  matter  what  happens.  If  we  do  not 
change  it  ourselves,  others  will  do  it  for  us.  Should  we  under- 
take the  change  ourselves  we  can  save  the  nation:  otherwise 
there  is  no  hope  for  China  to  remain  a  nation.  It  is  to  be  re- 
gretted that  our  people  now  assume  an  attitude  of  indifference, 
being  reluctant  to  look  forward  to  the  future,  and  caring  not 
what  may  happen  to  them  and  their  country.  They  are 
doomed  to  become  slaves  after  the  loss  of  their  national  inde- 
pendence. 

Mr.  Ko :  I  am  very  much  frightened  by  what  you  have  said. 
You  have  stated  that  the  adoption  of  a  constitutional  mon- 
archy can  avert  such  terrible  consequences ;  but  is  there  not 
likely  to  be  disturbance  during  the  change  of  the  republic  to 
monarchy,  since  such  disturbance  must  always  accompany  the 
presidential  election? 

Mr.  Hu :  No  comparison  can  be  formed  between  these  two 
things.  There  may  be  tumult  during  the  change  of  the  form 
of  government,  but  it  will  be  better  in  comparison  with  the 
chaos  that  will  some  day  ensue  in  the  republic.     There  is  no 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  163 

executive  head  in  the  country  when  a  repubhc  endeavours  to 
select  a  presidential  successor.  At  such  a  time,  the  ambitious 
try  to  improve  their  future,  while  the  patriotic  are  at  a  loss  now 
to  do  anything  which  will  assist  in  the  maintenance  of  order. 
Those  who  are  rebellious  rise  in  revolt  while  those  who  are  peace- 
loving  are  compelled  by  circumstances  to  join  their  rank  and 
file.  Should  the  form  of  government  be  transformed  into  a 
monarchical  one,  and  should  the  time  for  change  of  the  head  of 
the  state  come,  the  successor  having  already  been  provided  for, 
that  will  be  well-known  to  the  people.  Those  who  are  patriotic 
will  exert  their  utmost  to  preserve  peace,  and  as  result  the 
heir-apparent  can  peacefully  step  on  the  throne.  There  are 
persons  who  will  contend  for  the  office  of  the  President,  but 
not  for  the  throne.  Those  who  contend  for  the  office  of  Presi- 
dent do  not  commit  any  crime,  but  those  who  try  to  seize  the 
throne  are  rebels.     Who  dares  to  contend  for  the  Throne? 

At  the  time  of  the  change  of  the  president  in  a  republic,  am- 
bitious persons  arise  with  the  intention  of  capturing  this  most 
honourable  office,  but  not  so  when  the  emperor  is  changed. 
Should  there  be  a  body  of  persons  hostile  to  the  heir-apparent, 
that  body  must  be  very  small.  Therefore  I  say  that  the  ene- 
mies of  a  succeeding  Emperor  are  a  few,  whilst  there  are  many 
in  the  case  of  a  presidential  successor.  This  is  the  first  dif- 
ference. 

Those  who  oppose  the  monarchy  are  republican  enthusiasts 
or  persons  who  desire  to  make  use  of  the  name  of  the  republic 
for  their  own  benefit.  These  persons  will  raise  trouble  even 
without  the  change  of  the  government.  They  do  not  mind  dis- 
turbing the  peace  of  the  country  at  the  present  time  when  the 
republic  exists.  It  is  almost  certain  that  at  the  first  unfurling 
of  the  imperial  flags  they  will  at  once  grasp  such  an  opportune 
moment  and  try  to  satisfy  their  ambition.  Should  they  rise  in 
revolt  at  the  time  when  the  Emperor  is  changed  the  Government, 
supported  by  the  loyal  statesmen  and  officials,  whose  interests 
are  bound  up  with  the  welfare  of  the  imperial  family  and  whose 
influence  has  spread  far  and  wide,  will  be  able  to  deal  easily 
with  any  situation  which  may  develop.  Therefore  I  declare 
that  the  successor  to  the  throne  has  more  supporters  while  the 


164  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

presidential  successor  has  few.  This  is  the  second  difference 
between  the  republic  and  the  constitutional  monarchy. 

Why  certain  persons  will  contend  for  the  office  of  the  Presi- 
dent can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  there  is  not  a  single  man 
in  the  country  whose  qualifications  are  above  all  the  others. 
Succession  to  the  throne  is  a  question  of  blood-relation  with 
the  reigning  Emperor,  and  not  a  question  of  qualifications. 
The  high  officials  whose  qualifications  are  unusually  good  are 
not  subservient  to  others  but  they  are  obedient  to  the  suc- 
ceeding Emperor,  because  of  their  gratitude  for  what  the  im- 
perial family  has  done  for  them,  and  because  their  well-being 
is  closely  associated  with  that  of  the  imperial  household.  I 
can  cite  an  historical  incident  to  support  my  contention. 
Under  the  Manchu  Dynasty,  at  one  time  General  Chu  Chung- 
tang  was  entrusted  with  the  task  of  suppressing  the  Moham- 
medan rebellion.  He  appointed  General  Liu  Sung  San  gen- 
eralissimo. Upon  the  death  of  General  Liu,  Chu  Chung-tang 
appointed  his  subordinate  officers  to  lead  the  army,  but  the 
subordinate  officers  competed  for  power.  Chu  Chung-tang 
finally  made  the  step-son  of  General  Liu  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  and  the  officers  and  soldiers  all  obeyed  his  order  as  they 
did  his  father's.  But  it  may  be  mentioned  that  this  young  man 
was  not  more  able  than  any  of  his  father's  subordinate  com- 
manders. Nevertheless  prestige  counted.  He  owed  his  suc- 
cess to  his  natural  qualification,  being  a  step-son  to  General 
Liu.  So  is  the  case  with  the  emperor  whose  successor  nobody 
dares  openly  to  defy — to  say  nothing  of  actually  disputing  his 
right  to  the  throne.  This  is  the  third  difference  between  the 
republic  and  the  monarchy. 

I  will  not  discuss  the  question:  as  to  whether  there  being  no 
righteous  and  able  heir-apparent  to  succeed  his  Emperor- 
father,  great  danger  may  not  confront  the  nation.  However, 
in  order  to  provide  against  any  such  case,  I  advocate  that  the 
formation  of  a  constitutional  government  should  go  hand  in 
hand  with  the  establishment  of  the  monarchy.  At  first  it  is 
difficult  to  establish  and  carry  out  a  constitutional  government, 
but  once  it  is  formed  it  will  be  comparatively  easy.  When  the 
constitutional  government  has  been  established,  the  Emperor 


»*fr* 


The  "P'ai  Lou"  or  Memorial  Arch,  Which  is  a  Conspic- 

UOT'S    FeATTHIE    IX    NORTHERX    ChINA 


A  I'RixcELv  BiKiAi,-c;Korxi),  THE  Memoriai.  Tahi,ets  Beixg 
Placed  ox  thk  Backs  of  Giaxt  Marbi,k-tort()ises 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  165 

will  have  to  seek  his  fame  in  such  useful  things  as  tii»-  defence 
of  his  country  and  the  conquest  of  his  enemy.  Everything  has 
to  progress,  and  men  possessing  European  education  will  be 
made  use  of  by  the  reigning  family.  The  first  Emperor  will 
certainly  do  all  he  can  to  capture  the  hearts  of  the  people  by 
means  of  adopting  and  carrying  out  in  letter  as  well  as  in  spirit 
constitutional  government.  The  heir-apparent  will  pay  atten- 
tion to  all  new  reforms  and  new  things.  Should  he  do  so,  the 
people  will  be  able  to  console  themselves  by  saying  that  they 
will  always  be  the  people  of  a  constitutional  monarchy  even 
after  the  succession  to  the  throne  of  the  heir-apparent.  When 
the  time  comes  for  the  heir-apparent  to  mount  the  throne  the 
people  will  extend  to  him  their  cordial  welcome,  and  there  will 
be  no  need  to  worry  about  internal  disturbances. 

Therefore,  I  conclude  that  the  successor  to  the  presidential 
chair  has  to  prevent  chaos  by  wielding  the  monarchical  power, 
while  the  new  emperor  can  avert  internal  disquietude  forever 
by  means  of  his  constitutional  government.  This  is  the  fourth 
difference  between  the  republic  and  the  monarchy.  These  four 
differences  are  accountable  for  the  fact  that  there  will  not  be 
as  much  disturbance  at  the  time  of  the  change  of  emperors  as 
at  the  time  when  the  president  is  changed. 

Mr.  Ko :  I  can  understand  what  you  have  said  with  regard 
to  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  republic  and  the 
monarchy,  but  there  are  many  problems  connected  with  the 
formation  of  a  constitutional  monarchy  which  we  have  to  solve. 
Why  is  it  that  the  attempt  to  introduce  constitutional  govern- 
ment during  the  last  years  of  the  Manchu  Dynasty  proved  a 
failure? 

Mr.  Hu:  The  constitutional  government  of  the  Manchu 
Dynasty  was  one  in  name  only,  and  as  such  the  forerunner  of 
the  revolution  of  1911.  Towards  the  end  of  the  Manchu 
Dynasty,  the  talk  of  starting  a  revolution  to  overthrow  the 
imperial  regime  was  in  everybody's  mouth,  although  the  con- 
stitutional party  endeavoured  to  accomplish  something  really 
useful.  At  that  time  His  Excellency  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  the 
grand  chancellor,  and  realizing  the  fact  that  nothing  except  the 
adoption  of  a  constitutional  government  could  save  the  throne 


166  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

of  the  Mai»chus,  he  assumed  the  leadership  of  the  constitutional 
party,  which  surpassed  in  strength  the  revolutionary  party  as 
a  result  of  his  active  support.  The  people's  hearts  completely 
turned  to  the  constitutional  party  for  salvation,  while  the 
revolutionary  party  lost  that  popular  support  which  it  had 
formerly  enjoyed.  Then  it  seemed  that  the  imperial  house- 
hold would  soon  adopt  the  constitutional  monarchy  and  the 
threatening  revolution  could  be  averted.  Unfortunately,  the 
elaborate  plans  of  His  Excellency  Yuan  Shih-kai  regarding  the 
adoption  of  the  constitutional  government  were  not  carried  out 
by  the  imperial  household.  A  great  change  took  place:  His 
Excellency  retired  to  his  native  province ;  and  after  losing  this 
powerful  leader  the  constitutional  party  was  pitilessly  shat- 
tered. A  monarchist  party  suddenly  made  its  appearance  on 
the  political  arena  to  assist  the  imperial  family,  which  pretended 
to  do  its  very  best  for  the  development  of  a  constitutional  gov- 
ernment, but  secretly  exerted  itself  to  the  utmost  for  the  pos- 
session and  retention  of  the  real  power.  This  double-dealing 
resulted  in  bringing  about  the  revolution  of  1911.  For  in- 
stance, when  the  people  cried  for  the  convening  of  a  parliament, 
the  imperial  family  said  "No."  The  people  also  failed  to  se- 
cure the  abolition  of  certain  official  organs  for  the  imperialists. 
They  lost  confidence  in  the  Reigning  House,  and  simultaneously 
the  revolutionary  party  raised  its  banner  and  gathered  its 
supporters  from  every  part  of  the  country.  As  soon  as  the 
revolt  started  at  Wuchang  the  troops  all  over  the  country 
joined  in  the  movement  to  overthrow  the  Manchu  Dynasty. 
The  members  of  the  Imperial  Senate,  most  of  whom  were  mem- 
bers of  the  constitutional  party,  could  not  help  showing  their 
sympathy  with  the  revolutionists.  At  last  the  imperial  house- 
hold issued  a  proclamation  containing  Nineteen  Articles — a 
veritable  magna  carta — but  it  was  too  late.  The  constitu- 
tional government  which  was  about  to  be  formed  was  thus  laid 
aside.  What  the  imperial  family  did  was  the  mere  organiza- 
tion of  an  advisory  council.  A  famous  foreign  scholar  aptly 
remarked:  "A  false  constitutional  government  will  eventually 
result  in  a  true  revolution."  In  trying  to  deceive  the  people  by 
means  of  a  false  constitutional  government  the  imperial  house 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  167 

encompassed  its  own  destruction.  Once  His  Excellency  Yuan- 
Shih-kai  stated  in  a  memorial  to  the  throne  that  there  were  only 
two  alternatives :  to  give  the  people  a  constitutional  government 
or  to  have  them  revolt.  What  happened  afterwards  is  a  mat- 
ter of  common  knowledge.  Therefore  I  say  that  the  govern- 
ment which  the  imperial  family  attempted  to  form  was  not  a  con- 
stitutional government. 

Mr.  Ko:  Thank  you  for  your  discussion  of  the  attempt  of 
the  imperial  household  to  establish  a  constitutional  government ; 
but  how  about  the  Provisional  Constitution,  the  parUament 
and  the  cabinet  in  the  first  and  second  years  of  the  Republic? 
The  parliament  was  then  so  powerful  that  the  government  was 
absolutely  at  its  mercy,  thereby  disturbing  the  peaceful  condi- 
tion of  the  country.  The  people  have  tasted  much  of  the  bit- 
terness of  constitutional  government.  Should  you  mention  the 
name  of  constitutional  government  again  they  would  be  thor- 
oughly frightened.     Is  that  true? 

Mr.  Hu :  During  the  first  and  second  years  of  the  Republic, 
in  my  many  conversations  with  the  members  of  the  Kuo  Ming 
Tang,  I  said  that  the  republic  could  not  form  an  efficient  method 
of  control,  and  that  there  would  be  an  over  centration  of  power 
through  the  adoption  of  monarchical  methods  of  ruling,  know- 
ing as  well  as  I  did  the  standards  of  our  people.  When  the 
members  of  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  came  to  draw  up  the  Provi- 
sional Constitution  they  purposely  took  precisely  the  opposite 
course  of  action  and  ignored  my  suggestion.  It  may,  however, 
be  mentioned  that  the  Provisional  Constitution  made  in  Nank- 
ing was  not  so  bad,  but  after  the  government  was  removed  to 
Peking,  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  people  tied  the  hand  and  foot  of  the 
government  by  means  of  the  Cabinet  System  and  other  re- 
strictions with  the  intention  of  weakening  the  power  of  the  cen- 
tral administration  in  order  that  they  might  be  able  to  start 
another  revolution.  From  the  dissolution  of  the  Nanking  gov- 
ernment to  the  time  of  the  second  revolution  they  had  this  one 
object  in  view,  namely  to  weaken  the  power  of  the  central  ad- 
ministration so  that  they  could  contend  for  the  office  of  the 
president  by  raising  further  internal  troubles  in  China.  Those 
members  of  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  who  made  the  constitution  know 


168  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

as  well  as  I  that  China's  republic  must  be  governed  through  a 
monarchical  administration ;  and  therefore  the  unreasonable 
restrictions  in  the  Provisional  Constitution  were  purposely 
inserted. 

Mr.  Ko:  What  is  the  difference  between  the  constitutional 
government  which  you  have  proposed  and  the  constitutional  gov- 
ernment which  the  Manchu  Dynasty  intended  to  adopt? 

Mr.  Hu:  The  difference  lies  in  the  proper  method  of  pro- 
cedure and  in  honesty  of  purpose,  which  are  imperative  if  con- 
stitutional government  expects  to  be  successful. 

Mr.  Ko :  What  do  you  mean  by  the  proper  method  of  pro- 
cedure ? 

Mr.  Hu:  The  Provisional  Constitution  made  in  Nanking, 
which  was  considered  good,  is  not  suitable  for  insertion  in  the 
future  constitution,  should  a  constitutional  monarchy  be  estab- 
lished. In  making  a  constitution  for  the  future  constitutional 
monarchy  we  have  to  consult  the  constitutions  of  the  monarchies 
of  the  world.  They  can  be  divided  into  three  classes  which  are 
represented  by  England,  Prussia  and  Japan.  England  is  ad- 
vanced in  its  constitutional  government,  which  has  been  in  ex- 
istence for  thousands  of  years,  {sic)  and  is  the  best  of  all  in 
the  world.  The  English  king  enjoys  his  empty  title  and  the 
real  power  of  the  country  is  exercised  by  the  parliament,  which 
makes  all  the  laws  for  the  nation.  As  to  Prussia,  the  consti- 
tutional monarchy  was  established  when  the  people  started  a 
revolution.  The  ruler  of  Prussia  was  compelled  to  convene  a 
parliament  and  submitted  to  that  legal  body  a  constitution. 
Prussia's  constitution  was  made  by  its  ruler  together  with  the 
parliament.  Its  constitutional  government  is  not  so  good  as 
the  English.  As  to  the  Japanese  constitutional  monarchy,  the 
Emperor  made  a  constitution  and  then  convened  a  parliament. 
The  constitutional  power  of  the  Japanese  people  is  still  less 
than  that  of  the  Prussian  people.  According  to  the  standard 
of  our  people  we  cannot  adopt  the  English  constitution  as  our 
model,  for  it  is  too  advanced.  The  best  thing  for  us  to  do  is 
to  adopt  part  of  the  Prussian  and  part  of  the  Japanese  in  our 
constitution-making.  As  our  people  are  better  educated  now 
than  ever  before,  it  is  decidedly  unwise  entirely  to  adopt  the 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  169 

Japanese  method,  that  is,  for  the  Emperor  to  make  a  consti- 
tution without  the  approval  of  the  parhament  and  then  to  con- 
voke a  legislative  body.  In  the  circumstances  China  should 
adopt  the  Prussian  method  as  described  above  with  some  modi- 
fications, which  will  be  very  suitable  to  our  conditions.  As  to 
the  contents  of  the  constitution  we  can  copy  such  articles  as 
those  providing  the  right  for  the  issue  of  urgent  orders  and 
appropriation  of  special  funds,  etc.  from  the  Japanese  Con- 
stitution, so  that  the  power  of  the  ruler  can  be  increased  with- 
out showing  the  slightest  contempt  for  the  legislative  organ. 
I  consider  that  this  is  the  proper  method  of  procedure  for  the 
formation  of  a  constitutional  monarchy  for  China. 

Mr.  Ko :  Can  I  know  something  about  the  contents  of  our 
future  constitution  in  advance? 

Mr.  Hu:  If  you  want  to  know  them  in  detail  I  recommend 
you  to  read  the  Constitutions  of  Prussia  and  Japan.  But  I 
can  tell  you  this  much.  Needless  to  say  that  such  stipulations 
as  articles  guaranteeing  the  rights  of  the  people  and  the  power 
of  the  parliament  will  surely  be  worked  into  the  future  consti- 
tution. These  are  found  in  almost  every  constitution  in  the 
world.  But  as  the  former  Provisional  Constitution  has  so  pro- 
vided that  the  power  of  the  parliament  is  unlimited,  while  that 
of  the  president  is  very  small  the  Chief  Executive,  besides  con- 
ferring decorations  and  giving  Orders  of  Merit,  having  almost 
nothing  to  do  without  the  approval  of  the  Senate,  it  is  certain 
that  nothing  will  be  taken  from  that  instrument  for  the  future 
constitution.  Nor  will  the  makers  of  the  future  constitution 
take  anything  from  the  nineteen  capitulations  offered  by  the 
Manchu  Government,  which  gave  too  much  power  to  the  legis- 
lative organ.  According  to  the  Nineteen  Articles  the  Advisory 
Council  was  to  draw  up  the  constitution,  which  was  to  be  rati- 
fied by  the  parliament ;  the  Premier  being  elected  by  the  parlia- 
ment ;  whilst  the  use  of  the  army  and  navy  required  the  parlia- 
ment's sanction ;  the  making  of  treaties  with  foreign  countries 
have  likewise  to  be  approved  by  the  parliament,  etc,  etc.  Such 
strict  stipulations  which  are  not  even  known  in  such  an  ad- 
vanced country  in  matters  constitutional  as  England  were  ex- 
torted   from    the    imperial    family    by    the    advisory    council. 


170  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Therefore  it  is  most  unlikely  that  the  makers  of  the  future 
constitution  will  take  any  article  from  the  nineteen  capitula- 
tions of  "confidence."  They  will  use  the  Constitutions  of  Japan 
and  Prussia  as  joint  model  and  will  always  have  in  their  mind 
the  actual  conditions  of  this  country  and  the  standard  of  the 
people.  In  short,  they  will  copy  some  of  the  articles  in  the 
Japanese  constitution,  and  adopt  the  Prussian  method  of  pro- 
cedure for  the  making  of  the  constitution. 

Mr.  Ko :     What  do  you  mean  by  honesty  ? 

Mr.  Hu:  It  is  a  bad  policy  to  deceive  the  people.  Indi- 
vidually the  people  are  simple,  but  they  cannot  be  deceived 
collectively.  The  Manchu  Government  committed  an  irretriev- 
able mistake  by  promising  the  people  a  constitutional  govern- 
ment but  never  carrying  out  their  promise.  This  attitude  on 
the  part  of  the  then  reigning  house  brought  about  the  first 
revolution.  As  the  standard  of  our  people  at  the  present  time 
is  not  very  high,  they  will  be  satisfied  with  less  power  if  it  is 
properly  given  to  them.  Should  any  one  attempt  to  deceive 
them  his  cause  wUl  finally  be  lost.  I  do  not  know  how  much 
power  the  people  and  the  parliament  will  get  in  the  constitu- 
tional monarchy,  but  I  would  like  to  point  out  here  that  it  is 
better  to  give  them  less  power  than  to  deceive  them.  If  they 
are  given  less  power,  and  if  they  want  more,  they  will  contend 
for  it.  Should  the  government  deem  it  advisable  to  give  them 
a  little  more,  well  and  good.  Should  they  be  unfit  for  the  pos- 
session of  greater  power,  the  government  can  issue  a  proclama- 
tion giving  the  reasons  for  not  complying  with  their  request, 
and  they  will  not  raise  trouble  knowing  the  true  intention  of 
the  government.  However,  honesty  is  the  most  important  ele- 
ment in  the  creation  of  a  constitutional  monarchy.  It  is  easy 
and  simple  to  practise  it.  The  parliament  must  have  the  power 
to  decide  the  laws  and  fix  the  budgets.  Should  its  decision  be 
too  idealistic  or  contrary  to  the  real  welfare  of  the  country, 
the  Government  can  explain  its  faults  and  request  it  to  recon- 
sider its  decision.  Should  the  parliament  return  the  same  de- 
cision, the  Government  can  dissolve  it  and  convoke  another 
parliament.  In  so  doing  the  Government  respects  the  parlia- 
ment instead  of  despising  it.     But  what  the  parliament  has  de- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  171 

cided  should  be  carried  out  strictly  by  the  Government,  and 
thus  we  will  have  a  real  constitutional  Government.  It  is  easy 
to  talk  but  difficult  to  act,  but  China  like  all  other  countries 
has  to  go  through  the  experimental  stage  and  face  all  kinds  of 
difficulties  before  a  genuine  constitutional  government  can  be 
evolved.  The  beginning  is  difficult  but  once  the  difficulty  is 
over  everything  will  go  on  smoothly.  I  emphasize  that  it  is 
better  to  give  the  people  less  power  at  the  beginning  than  to 
deceive  them.     Be  honest  with  them  is  my  policy. 

Mr.  Ko:  I  thank  you  very  much  for  what  you  have  said. 
Your  discussion  is  interesting  and  I  can  understand  it  well. 
The  proper  method  of  procedure  and  honesty  of  purpose  which 
you  have  mentioned  will  tend  to  wipe  out  all  former  corruption. 

Mr.  Ko,  or  the  stranger,  then  departed. 

On  this  note  the  pamphleteer  abruptly  ends.  Hav- 
ing discussed  ad  nauseam  the  inadequacy  of  all  existing 
arrangements,  even  those  made  by  Yuan  Shih-kai  him- 
self, to  secure  a  peaceful  succession  to  the  presidency; 
and  having  again  insisted  upon  the  evil  part  soldiery 
cannot  fail  to  play,  he  introduces  a  new  peril,  the  cer- 
tainty that  the  foreign  Powers  will  set  up  a  puppet 
Emperor  unless  China  solves  this  problem  herself,  the 
case  of  Korea  being  invoked  as  an  example  of  the  fate 
of  divided  nations.  Fear  of  Japan  and  the  precedent 
of  Korea,  being  familiar  phenomena,  are  given  a  capital 
in  all  this  debate,  being  secondary  only  to  the  crucial 
business  of  ensuring  the  peaceful  succession  to  the  su- 
preme office.  The  transparent  manner  in  which  the 
history  of  the  first  three  years  of  the  Republic  is  handled 
in  order  to  drive  home  these  arguments  will  be  very  ap- 
parent. A  fit  crown  is  put  on  the  whole  business  by 
the  final  suggestion  that  the  Constitutional  Government 
of  China  under  the  new  empire  must  be  a  mixture  of 


172  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

the  Prussian  and  Japanese  systems,  Yang  Tu's  last 
words  being  that  it  is  best  to  be  honest  with  the  people ! 
No  more  damning  indictment  of  Yuan   Shih-kai's 
regime  could  possibly  have  been  penned. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   MONARCHY   PLOT 

THE    MEMORANDUM    OF    DR.    GOODNOW 

Although  this  extraordinary  pamphlet  was  soon  ac- 
cepted by  Chinese  society  as  a  semi-official  warning  of 
what  was  coming,  it  alone  was  not  sufficient  to  launch  a 
movement  which  to  be  successful  required  the  benign 
endorsement  of  foreign  opinion.  The  Chinese  pam- 
phleteer had  dealt  with  the  emotional  side  of  the  case :  it 
was  necessary  to  reinforce  his  arguments  with  an  ap- 
peal which  would  be  understood  by  Western  statesmen 
as  well  as  by  Eastern  politicians.  Yuan  Shih-kai,  still 
pretending  to  stand  aside,  had  kept  his  attention  con- 
centrated on  this  very  essential  matter;  for,  as  we  have 
repeatedly  pointed  out,  he  never  failed  to  understand 
the  superlative  value  of  foreign  support  in  all  his  en- 
terprises,— that  support  being  given  an  exaggerated 
value  by  the  public  thanks  to  China's  reliance  on  for- 
eign money.  Accordingly,  as  if  still  unconvinced,  he 
now  very  naively  requested  the  opinion  of  his  chief 
legal  adviser.  Dr.  Goodnow,  an  American  who  had  been 
appointed  to  his  office  through  the  instrumentality  of 
the  Board  of  the  Carnegie  Institute  as  a  most  compe- 
tent authority  on  Administrative  Law. 

Even  in  this  most  serious  matter  the  element  of  com- 
edy was  not  lacking.  Dr.  Goodnow  had  by  special  ar- 
rangement returned  to  Peking  at  the  psychological 
moment ;  for  having  kicked  his  heels  during  many  weary 

173 


174,  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

months  in  the  capital,  he  had  been  permitted  in  1914 
to  take  up  the  appointment  of  President  of  an  Ameri- 
can University  on  condition  that  he  would  be  available 
for  legal  "advice"  whenever  wanted.  The  Summer  va- 
cation gave  him  the  opportunity  of  revisiting  in  the 
capacity  of  a  transient  the  scenes  of  his  former  idle- 
ness ;  and  the  holiday-task  set  him  by  his  large-hearted 
patron  was  to  prove  in  as  few  folios  as  possible  that 
China  ought  to  be  a  Monarchy  and  not  a  Republic — a 
theme  on  which  every  schoolboy  could  no  doubt  write 
with  fluency.  Consequently  Dr.  Goodnow,  arming  him- 
self with  a  limited  amount  of  paper  and  ink,  produced 
in  very  few  daj^s  the  Memorandum  which  follows, — a 
document  which  it  is  difficult  to  speak  of  dispassionately 
since  it  seems  to  have  been  deliberately  designed  to  play 
into  the  hands  of  a  man  who  was  now  openly  set  on 
betraying  the  trust  the  nation  reposed  in  him,  and  who 
was  ready  to  wade  through  rivers  of  blood  to  satisfy 
his  insensate  ambition. 

Nothing  precisely  similar  to  this  Goodnow  Memo- 
randum has  ever  been  seen  before  in  the  history  of  Asia : 
it  was  the  ultramodern  spirit  impressed  into  the  service 
of  mediaeval  minds.  In  any  other  capital  of  the  world 
the  publication  of  such  a  subversive  document,  follow- 
ing the  Yang  Tu  pamphlet,  would  have  led  to  riot  and 
tumult.  In  China,  the  home  of  pacifism,  the  politicians 
and  people  bowed  their  heads  and  bided  their  time. 
Even  foreign  circles  in  China  were  somewhat  non- 
plussed by  the  insouciance  displayed  by  the  peripatetic 
legal  authority;  and  the  Memorandum  was  for  marly 
days  spoken  of  as  an  unnecessary  indiscretion.^     Fasten- 

1  It  is  perhaps  of  importance  to  note  that  Dr.  Goodnow  carried  out  all 
his  studies  in  Germany. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  175 

ing  at  once  on  the  point  to  which  Yang  Tu  had  ascribed 
such  importance — the  question  of  succession — Dr. 
Goodnow  in  his  arguments  certainly  shows  a  detach- 
ment from  received  principles  which  has  an  old-world 
flavour  about  it,  and  which  has  damned  him  forever  in 
the  eyes  of  the  rising  generation  in  China.  The  ver- 
sion which  follows  is  the  translation  of  the  Chinese 
translation,  the  original  English  Memorandum  having 
been  either  mislaid  or  destroyed;  and  it  is  best  that  this 
argument  should  be  carefully  digested  before  we  add  our 
comments. 

DR.  GOODNOw's  MEMORANDUM 

A  country  must  have  a  certain  form  of  government,  and 
usually  the  particular  form  of  government  of  a  particular  coun- 
try is  not  the  result  of  the  choice  of  the  people  of  that  country. 
There  is  not  any  possibility  even  for  the  most  intellectual  to 
exercise  any  mental  influence  over  the  question.  Whether  it 
be  a  monarchy  or  republic,  it  cannot  be  the  creation  of  human 
power  except  when  it  is  suitable  to  the  historical,  habitual,  so- 
cial and  financial  conditions  of  that  country.  If  an  unsuitable 
form  of  government  is  decided  upon,  it  may  remain  for  a  short 
while,  but  eventually  a  system  better  suited  will  take  its 
place. 

In  short,  the  form  of  government  of  a  country  is  usually  the 
natural  and  only  result  of  its  circumstances.  The  reasons  for 
such  an  outcome  are  many,  but  the  principal  one  is  Force.  If 
we  study  the  monarchical  countries  we  will  find  that  usually 
a  dynasty  is  created  by  a  person  who  is  capable  of  controlling 
the  force  of  the  entire  country  and  overthrowing  other  persons 
opposed  to  him,  working  towards  his  goal  with  an  undaunted 
spirit.  If  this  man  is  capable  of  ruling  the  nation  and  if  he 
is  a  rare  genius  of  the  day,  and  the  conditions  of  the  country 
are  suited  for  a  monarchical  government,  he  as  a  rule  creates 
a  new  dynasty  and  his  descendants  inherit  the  same  from  gen- 
eration to  generation. 

If  this  is  so,  then  the  solution  of  a  difficult  position  of  a  coun- 


176  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

try  is  to  be  found  in  a  monarchy  rather  than  a  repubhc.  For 
on  the  death  of  a  monarch  no  doubt  exists  as  to  who  shall  suc- 
ceed him,  and  there  is  no  need  of  an  election  or  other  procedure. 
Englishmen  say,  "The  King  is  dead,  Long  live  the  King." 
This  expresses  the  point.  But  in  order  to  attain  this  point  it 
is  necessary  that  the  law  of  succession  be  definitely  defined  and 
publicly  approved;  otherwise  there  will  not  be  lacking,  on  the 
death  of  the  monarch,  men  aspiring  to  the  throne ;  and  as  no 
one  is  qualified  to  settle  the  dispute  for  power,  internal  dis- 
turbance will  be  the  result. 

Historically  speaking  no  law  of  succession  is  so  permanently 
satisfactory  as  that  used  by  the  nations  of  Europe.  Accord- 
ing to  this  system  the  right  of  succession  belongs  to  the  eldest 
son  of  the  monarch,  or  failing  him,  the  nearest  and  eldest  male 
relative.  The  right  of  succession,  however,  may  be  voluntarily 
surrendered  by  the  rightful  successor  if  he  so  desires ;  thus 
if  the  eldest  son  declines  to  succeed  to  the  throne  the  second 
son  takes  his  place.     This  is  the  rule  of  Europe. 

If  instead  of  this  law  of  a  succession  a  system  is  adopted  by 
which  the  successor  is  chosen  by  the  monarch  from  among  his 
sons  or  relatives  without  any  provision  being  made  for  the 
rights  of  the  eldest  son,  disturbance  will  be  the  inevitable  re- 
sult. There  will  not  be  a  few  who  would  like  to  take  posses- 
sion of  the  throne  and  they  will  certainly  plot  in  the  very  con- 
fines of  the  palace,  resulting  in  an  increase  of  the  sufferings  of 
an  aged  monarch ;  and,  even  if  the  disaster  of  civil  war  be 
avoided,  much  dispute  will  arise  owing  to  the  uncertainty  of 
the  successor — a  dangerous  situation  indeed. 

Such  is  the  lesson  we  learn  from  history.  The  conclusion 
is,  speaking  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  problem  of  transmission 
of  power,  that  the  superiority  of  the  monarchical  system  over 
the  republican  system  is  seen  in  the  law  of  succession, — that  is 
the  eldest  son  of  the  ruler  should  succeed  to  the  throne. 

Leaving  out  the  nations  of  ancient  times,  the  majority  of 
countries  in  Europe  and  Asia  have  adopted  the  monarchical 
system.  There  are,  however,  exceptions  such  as  Wen-ni-shih 
(Venice)  and  Switzerland,  which  adopted  the  republican  form 
of  government;  but  they  are  in  the  minority  while  most  of  the 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  177 

great  nations  of  the  world  have  adopted  the  monarchical  form 
of  government. 

During  the  recent  century  and  a  half  the  attitude  of  Europe 
has  undergone  a  sudden  change  and  the  general  tendency  is  to 
discredit  monarchism  and  adopt  republicanism.  The  one  great 
European  power  which  first  attempted  to  make  a  trial  of  re- 
publicanism is  Great  Britain.  In  the  Seventeenth  Century  a 
revolution  broke  out  in  England  and  King  Charles  I  was  con- 
demned to  death  by  Parliament  and  executed  as  a  traitor  to  the 
nation.  A  republic  was  established  and  the  administration  was 
called  republican  with  Cromwell  as  regent,  i.e.  President. 
Cromwell  was  able  to  control  the  power  of  government  because 
at  the  head  of  the  revolutionary  army  he  defeated  the  King. 
This  English  republic  however,  only  existed  for  a  few  years  and 
was  finally  defeated  in  turn.  The  reason  was  that  the  problem 
of  succession  after  the  death  of  Cromwell  was  difficult  to  solve. 
Cromwell  had  a  desire  to  place  his  son  in  his  place  as  regent 
after  his  death,  but  as  the  English  people  were  then  unsuited 
for  a  republic  and  his  son  had  not  the  ability  to  act  as  chief 
executive,  the  republic  of  England  suddenly  disappeared.  The 
British  people  then  abandoned  the  republican  system  and  re- 
adopted  the  monarchical  system.  Thus  Charles  II,  the  son  of 
Charles  I,  was  made  King  not  only  with  the  support  of  the 
army  but  also  with  the  general  consent  of  the  country. 

The  second  European  race  which  attempted  to  have  a  repub- 
lic was  the  American.  In  the  Eighteenth  Century  the  United 
States  of  America  was  established  in  consequence  of  the  success 
of  a  revolution.  But  the  American  revolution  was  not  at  first 
intended  to  overthrow  the  monarchy.  What  it  sought  to  do  was 
to  throw  off  the  yoke  of  the  monarchy  and  become  independent. 
The  revolution,  however,  succeeded  and  the  circumstances  were 
such  that  there  was  no  other  alternative  but  to  have  a  republic : 
for  there  was  no  royal  or  Imperial  descendant  to  shoulder  the 
responsibilities  of  the  state.  Another  factor  was  the  Influence 
of  the  advocates  of  republicanism  who  came  to  America  in  the 
previous  century  from  England  and  saturated  the  minds  of  the 
Americans  with  the  ideas  of  republicanism.  The  minds  of  the 
American  people  were  so  imbued  with  the  ideas  of  republicanism 


178  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

that  a  republican  form  of  government  was  the  ideal  of  the  entire 
race.  Had  General  Washington — the  leader  of  the  revolution- 
ary army — had  the  desire  to  become  a  monarch  himself  he 
would  probably  have  been  successful.  But  Washington's  one 
aim  was  to  respect  republicanism  and  he  had  no  aspiration  to 
become  King.  Besides  he  had  no  son  capable  of  succeeding  him 
on  the  throne.  Consequently  on  the  day  Independence  was  won, 
the  republican  form  of  government  was  adopted  without  hesita- 
tion, and  it  has  survived  over  a  hundred  years. 

There  is  no  need  to  ask  whether  the  result  of  the  establish- 
ment of  the  American  Republic  has  been  good  or  bad.  The 
republican  form  of  government  is  really  the  making  of  the 
United  States  of  America.  But  it  should  be  remembered  that 
long  before  the  establishment  of  the  republic,  the  American 
people  had  already  learned  the  good  laws  and  ordinances  of 
England,  and  the  constitution  and  parliamentary  system  of 
England  had  been  long  in  use  in  America  for  over  a  hundred 
years.  Therefore  the  change  In  1789  from  a  colony  Into  a 
Republic  was  not  a  sudden  change  from  a  monarchy  to  a  re- 
public. Thorough  preparations  had  been  made  and  self- 
government  was  well  practised  before  the  establishment  of  the 
republic.  Not  only  this,  but  the  intellectual  standard  of  the 
American  people  was  then  already  very  high ;  for  ever  since  the 
beginning  of  American  history  attention  was  given  to  universal 
education.  No  youth  could  be  found  who  could  not  read,  and 
the  extent  of  education  can  thus  be  gauged. 

Soon  after  the  formation  of  the  American  Republic,  the 
French  Republic  followed  In  her  footsteps.  Now  In  France  a 
monarchical  government  was  in  existence  before  the  declaration 
of  independence,  and  the  supreme  power  of  administration  was 
in  the  hands  of  the  King.  The  people,  having  never  partici- 
pated in  the  administration  and  lacking  experience  in  self- 
government,  made  a  poor  experiment  of  the  republican  system 
which  they  suddenly  set  up.  The  result  was  that  for  many 
years  disorder  reigned,  and  the  tyranny  of  the  military  govern- 
ments held  sway  one  after  another.  After  the  defeat  of  Na- 
poleon, the  monarchical  system  was  restored  as  a  result  of  the 
intervention  of  other  Powers.     The  second  revolution  in  1830 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  179 

again  resulted  in  the  restoration  of  the  monarchy  but  the  power 
of  the  common  people  was  considerably  increased.  The 
monarchy  was  again  overthrown  in  1848  and  a  Republic  formed 
in  its  stead — the  nephew  of  Napoleon  was  then  made  President. 
This  President,  however,  once  more  discarded  republicanism  and 
set  up  a  monarchy  for  himself.  It  was  not  until  after  the 
Franco-Prussian  war  of  1870  that  Napoleon  III  was  over- 
thrown and  the  final  Republic  established  which  has  lived  for 
half  a  century  now,  there  being  every  likelHiood  of  its  continu- 
ing in  its  present  form. 

Indeed  the  Republic  of  France  has  every  prospect  of  being 
permanent,  but  the  permanency  is  only  the  result  of  a  hundred 
years'  political  revolution.  For  a  hundred  years  the  founda- 
tions were  being  laid  by  means  of  an  energetic  and  persistent 
campaign  of  education,  which  increased  the  political  knowledge 
of  the  people.  The  people  were  also  allowed  to  participate  in 
political  affairs,  and  so  gained  experience  in  self-government. 
This  is  why  the  French  Republic  is  a  success.  Then  in  France 
and  America  they  have  found  a  solution  for  the  difficult  problem 
of  the  nation,  that  is  the  problem  of  succession  of  the  govern- 
ment in  power.  The  President  of  France  is  elected  by  the 
Parliament  while  the  President  of  America  is  elected  by  the 
people.  The  people  of  these  two  countries  are  all  experienced 
in  self-government  as  a  result  of  participation  in  political 
affairs.  Furthermore,  for  the  last  fifty  years  these  two  coun- 
tries have  all  laid  emphasis  on  universal  education  by  having 
an  extensive  system  of  schools,  subsidized  by  the  Government. 
The  intellectual  standard  of  these  two  people  is  therefore  fairly 
high. 

As  a  result  of  the  examples  set  up  by  France  and  America, 
at  the  end  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  the  Spanish  colonies  in 
Central  and  South  America  also  declared  their  independence 
one  after  the  other.  The  conditions  then  prevailing  in  those 
countries  were  somewhat  similar  to  those  of  America.  When 
their  independence  was  declared,  it  seemed  that  the  republican 
system  was  best  suited  to  their  condition.  For  on  the  one 
hand  there  was  no  imperial  house  to  direct  the  people,  on  the 
other  hand  the  Republic  of  North  America  was  a  good  example 


180  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

to  follow.  Public  opinion  was  at  that  time  unanimous  that 
since  the  republican  form  of  government  was  the  ideal  form, 
it  was  suitable  for  any  country  and  any  people.  The  idea 
thus  quickly  spread  and  almost  every  country  became  a  re- 
public. The  independence  of  these  countries,  however,  was 
secured  only  at  the  cost  of  a  hard  struggle  and  once  the  spirit 
of  rebellion  was  aroused  it  became  difficult  to  suppress  in  a 
short  while.  And  since  education  was  not  then  universal  the 
intellect  of  the  people  was  low.  What  they  were  expert  in  was 
in  autocratic  methods.  No  task  is  harder  than  to  establish  a 
republic  in  a  country,  the  intelligence  of  whose  people  is  low. 
These  republics,  therefore,  reaped  no  good  results  although 
they  tried  to  retain  republicanism  unnaturally.  The  conse- 
quence is  that  the  republics  of  Central  and  South  America  have 
been  a  living  drama  of  continuous  internal  disturbance.  One 
after  another  their  military  leaders  have  grasped  the  power  of 
administration.  Occasionally  there  has  been  peace  but  this 
peace  has  only  been  secured  by  the  iron  hand  of  one  or  two 
powerful  men  holding  the  power.  Such  powerful  men,  however, 
seldom  pay  a,ny  attention  to  educational  matters,  and  one  never 
hears  of  their  establishing  any  schools.  As  to  the  people  under 
them,  they  are  not  allowed  to  participate  in  political  affairs  by 
which  their  experience  in  politics  may  be  ripened.  The  result 
is,  on  the  man  in  power  becoming  sick  or  dying — and  the  iron 
rule  relaxed — that  those  who  wish  to  usurp  the  power  of  the 
state  rise  at  once ;  and  as  the  satisfactory  solution  of  the 
problem  of  succession  cannot  be  found,  those  undertakings 
which  have  made  progress  during  the  time  of  peace  are  swept 
away  without  a  single  exception.  In  extreme  cases  the  dis- 
turbances continues  to  such  an  extent  that  the  country  falls 
into  a  state  of  anarchy.  Thus  the  social  and  financial  factors 
of  the  whole  country  are  trodden  on  and  destroyed  under  foot. 
The  conditions  now  prevailing  in  Mexico  have  been  many 
times  duplicated  in  other  republics  in  Central  and  South  Amer- 
ica. For  this  can  be  the  only  result  from  adopting  the  republi- 
can form  of  government  where  the  political  and  financial  condi- 
tions are  unsuited.  Diaz,  a  military  leader,  once  held  the 
power  of  state  in  his  own  hand,  and  when  he  became  the  Presi- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  181 

dent  of  Mexico  it  looked  as  if  the  political  problem  was  solved 
thereby.  Diaz,  however,  did  not  push  education  but  instead 
oppressed  the  people  and  did  not  allow  them  to  participate  in 
politics.  When  he  was  advanced  in  age  and  his  influence  de- 
creased, he  lost  entire  control  once  the  banner  of  rebellion  was 
raised.  Ever  since  the  overthrow  of  Diaz,  military  leaders  of 
that  country  have  been  fighting  one  another  and  the  disturb- 
ance is  developing  even  today.  In  the  present  circumstances 
there  is  no  other  means  to  solve  the  political  problem  of  Mexico 
except  by  intervention  from  abroad.      (Sic.) 

Among  the  republics  of  Central  and  South  America,  how- 
ever, there  are  some  which  have  made  fairly  good  progress,  the 
most  prominent  of  which  are  Argentina,  ChUi,  and  Peru.  For 
some  time  there  was  disorder  in  the  first  two  republics  immedi- 
ately after  the  adoption  of  the  republican  system,  but  later 
peace  was  gradually  restored  and  the  people  have  been  enjoying 
peace.  As  regards  Peru,  although  some  disturbances  have  oc- 
curred since  the  establishment  of  the  republican  government, 
the  life  of  the  Republic  as  a  whole  has  been  peaceful.  All  of 
these  three  countries,  however,  developed  constitutional  govern- 
ment with  the  utmost  vigour.  Even  as  far  back  as  in  the 
earlier  part  of  the  Nineteenth  Century  Argentina  and  Chili 
were  already  endeavouring  to  excel  each  other  in  their  progress, 
and  as  for  Peru,  its  people  were  encouraged  even  while  under 
the  Imperial  regime,  to  participate  in  political  affairs.  The 
success  of  these  three  republics  is,  therefore,  not  a  mere  chance 
happening. 

The  study  of  the  experiences  of  these  republics  of  Central 
and  South  America  and  the  history  of  France  and  the  United 
States  brings  forward  two  points  which  we  should  carefully  con- 
sider : — 

1.  In  order  to  make  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem 
of  succession  to  the  chief  executive  in  a  republican  country,  it  is 
necessary  that  the  country  be  in  possession  of  an  extensive  sys- 
tem of  schools ;  that  the  intellect  of  its  people  has  been  brought 
up  to  a  high  standard  by  means  of  a  patient  process  of  uni- 
versal education  ;  and  that  they  be  given  a  chance  to  participate 
in  political  affairs  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  the  needed  ex- 


182  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

perience,  before  the  republican  form  can  be  adopted  without 
harm ;  ^ 

2.  It  is  certain  that  the  adoption  of  a  republican  form  of 
government  in  a  country  where  the  people  are  low  in  intellect 
and  lack  experience  and  knowledge  in  political  affairs,  will  not 
yield  any  good  result.  For  as  the  position  of  the  President  is 
not  hereditary,  and  consequently  the  problem  of  succession  can- 
not be  satisfactorily  solved,  the  result  will  be  a  military  dic- 
tatorship. It  might  be  possible  to  have  a  short-lived  peace  but 
such  a  period  of  peace  is  usually  intermingled  with  periods  of 
disturbances,  during  which  the  unduly  ambitious  people  may 
rise  and  struggle  with  each  other  for  the  control  of  power,  and 
the  disaster  which  will  follow  will  be  irremediable. 

This  is  not  all.  The  present  tendency  is  that  the  European 
and  other  western  Powers  will  not  tolerate  the  existence  of  a 
military  government  in  the  world ;  for  experience  shows  that 
the  result  of  military  government  is  anarchy.  Now  this  is  of 
vital  importance  to  the  interests  of  the  European  Powers. 
Since  their  financial  influence  has  extended  so  far,  their  capital 
as  well  as  their  commercial  undertakings  of  all  branches  and 
sorts  have  reached  every  corner  of  the  world,  they  will  not  hesi- 
tate to  express  their  views  for  the  sake  of  peace,  as  to  the  sys- 
tem of  government  a  country  should  adopt,  although  they 
have  no  right  to  interfere  with  the  adoption  of  a  form  of  gov- 
ernment by  another  nation.  For  unless  this  is  done  they  can- 
not hope  to  get  the  due  profit  on  the  capital  they  have  invested. 
If  this  view  is  carried  to  the  extreme,  the  political  independence 
of  a  nation  may  be  interfered  with  or  even  the  Government  may 
be  replaced  with  some  other  organ.  If  such  steps  are  necessary 
to  attain  their  views  the  Powers  will  not  scruple  to  take  them. 
Therefore  no  nation  will  be  allowed  hereafter  to  choose  its  own 
form  of  government  if  that  results  in  constant  revolution,  as  in 
the  case  of  South  America  in  the  last  century.  The  Govern- 
ments of  the  future  should,  therefore,  carefully  consider  the 
system  to  be  adopted  for  the  maintenance  of  peace;  otherwise 
control  by  foreigners  will  be  unavoidable. 

We  will  now  proceed  to  consider  what  significance  these 
points  reviewed  above  have  for  the  political  conditions  of  China. 


^J^^ 


The  Bas-relief  in  a  Peking  Temple,  Well  Illustrating 
Indo-Chinese  Infi>uences 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  183 

China,  owing  to  the  follj  of  an  absolute  monarchical  system, 
has  neglected  the  education  of  the  masses,  whose  intellectual 
attainments  have  been  consequently  of  a  low  standard.  Then, 
there  is  the  additional  fact  that  the  people  have  never  had  a 
voice  in  the  doings  of  their  government.  Therefore  they  have 
not  the  ability  to  discuss  politics.  Four  years  ago  the  absolute 
monarchy  was  suddenly  changed  into  a  Republic.  This  move- 
ment was  all  too  sudden  to  expect  good  results.  If  the  Man- 
chus  had  not  been  an  alien  race,  which  the  country  wished  to 
overthrow,  the  best  step  which  could  then  have  been  adopted 
was  to  retain  the  Emperor  and  gradually  lead  him  to  a  con- 
stitutional government.  What  the  Commissioners  on  Consti- 
tutional Government  suggested  was  quite  practical  if  carried 
out  gradually  until  perfection  was  reached.  Unfortunately 
the  feeling  of  alien  control  was  bitter  to  the  people  and  the 
maintenance  of  the  throne  was  an  utter  impossibility.  Thus 
the  monarchy  was  overthrown  and  the  adoption  of  a  republican 
system  was  the  only  alternative. 

Thus  we  see  that  China  has  during  the  last  few  years  been 
progressing  in  constitutional  government.  The  pioneering 
stage  of  the  process  was,  however,  not  ideal.  The  results  could 
have  been  much  better  if  a  person  of  royal  blood,  respected  by 
the  people,  had  come  out  and  offered  his  service.  Under  the 
present  conditions  China  has  not  yet  solved  the  problem  of  the 
succession  to  the  Presidency.  What  provisions  we  have  now 
are  not  perfect.  If  the  President  should  one  day  give  up  his 
power  the  difficulties  experienced  by  other  nations  will  manifest 
themselves  again  in  China.  The  conditions  in  other  countries 
are  similar  to  those  obtaining  in  China  and  the  dangers  are  also 
the  same.  It  is  quite  within  the  bounds  of  possibility  that  the 
situation  might  threaten  China's  independence  if  internal  dis- 
turbance should  occur  in  connection  with  this  problem  and  not 
be  immediately  put  down. 

What  attitude  then  should  those  who  have  the  good  of  the 
nation  at  heart,  take  under  the  present  circumstances  ?  Should 
they  advocate  the  continuance  of  the  Republic  or  suggest  a 
change  for  a  monarchy?  It  is  difficult  to  answer  these  ques- 
tions.    But  I  have  no  doubt  in  saying  that  the  monarchical 


184  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

system  is  better  suited  to  China  than  the  republican  system. 
For,  if  China's  independence  is  to  be  maintained,  the  govern- 
ment should  be  constitutional,  and  in  consideration  of  China's 
conditions  as  well  as  her  relations  with  other  Powers,  it  will  be 
easier  to  form  a  constitutional  government  by  adopting  a 
monarchy  than  a  Republic. 

However,  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  order  to  secure  the 
best  results  from  changing  the  Republic  into  a  Monarchy  not  a 
single  one  of  the  following  points  can  be  dispensed  with : 

1.  Such  a  change  must  not  arouse  the  opposition  of  the  Chi- 
nese people  or  the  Foreign  Powers,  which  will  cause  the  disturb- 
ances so  energetically  suppressed  by  the  Republican  Govern- 
ment to  appear  again  in  China.  For  the  peace  now  prevailing 
in  the  country  should  be  maintained  at  any  price  so  that  no 
danger  may  come  therefrom. 

2.  If  the  law  of  succession  be  not  definitely  defined  in  such  a 
way  that  it  will  leave  no  doubts  as  to  the  proper  successor,  no 
good  can  come  from  the  change  from  Republic  to  Monarchy. 
I  have  said  enough  about  the  necessity  of  not  allowing  the 
monarch  to  choose  his  own  successor.  Although  the  power  of 
an  Emperor  is  greater  than  that  of  a  President,  when  the 
majority  of  the  people  know  nothing,  it  is  more  respected  by 
the  people.  But  the  reason  for  such  a  change  will  not  be  valid 
if  the  change  is  brought  about  merely  to  add  to  the  power  of 
the  chief  executive  without  the  question  of  succession  being 
definitely  settled.  For  the  definiteness  about  succession  is  the 
most  prominent  point  of  superiority  of  the  monarchical  system 
over  the  republican  system. 

3.  If  the  Government  should  fail  to  make  provisions  for  the 
development  of  the  constitutional  government,  no  permanent 
benefit  will  result  from  the  change  of  a  republic  into  a  mon- 
archy. For  if  China  wishes  to  occupy  a  suitable  place  among 
the  world  powers,  the  patriotism  of  her  people  must  be  made  to 
grow  so  that  the  government  will  be  more  than  strong  enough 
to  cope  with  outside  aggression.  The  patriotism  of  the  people 
will  not  grow  if  they  are  not  allowed  to  participate  in  political 
affairs,  and  without  the  hearty  assistance  of  the  people  no  gov- 
ernment can  become  strong.     For  the  reason  why  the  people 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  185 

will  assist  the  government  is  because  they  feel  they  are  a  part 
of  the  government.  Therefore  the  government  should  make 
the  people  realize  that  the  government  is  the  organ  which  aims 
at  bringing  blessing  to  the  people,  and  make  the  people  under- 
stand that  they  have  the  right  to  superintend  the  government 
before  the  government  can  achieve  great  things. 

Every  one  of  the  points  mentioned  above  are  indispensable 
for  the  change  of  the  Republic  into  a  monarchy.  Whether  the 
necessary  conditions  are  present  must  be  left  to  those  who  know 
China  well  and  are  responsible  for  her  future  progress.  If 
these  conditions  are  all  present  then  I  have  no  doubt  that  the 
change  of  the  form  of  the  government  will  be  for  the  benefit  of 
China. 

The  first  illuminating  point,  as  we  have  already  said, 
to  leap  up  and  lock  attention  to  the  exclusion  of  every- 
thing else  in  this  memorandum,  is  that  the  chief  diffi- 
culty which  perplexes  Dr.  Goodnow  is  not  the  consoli- 
dation of  a  new  govermnent  which  had  been  recognized 
by  all  the  Treaty  Powers  only  two  years  previously 
but  the  question  of  succession  to  the  supreme  office  in 
the  land,  a  point  which  had  already  been  fully  provided 
for  in  the  one  chapter  of  the  Permanent  Constitution 
which  had  been  legally  passed  prior  to  the  Coup  d'etat 
of  the  4th  November,  1913.  But  Yuan  Shih-kai's  first 
care  after  that  coup  d'etat  had  been  to  promulgate  with 
the  assistance  of  Dr.  Goodnow  and  others,  a  bogus  Law, 
resting  on  no  other  sanction  than  his  personal  volition, 
with  an  elaborate  flurmnery  about  three  candidates 
whose  names  were  to  be  deposited  in  the  gold  box  in  the 
Stone  House  in  the  gardens  of  the  Palace.  Therefore 
since  the  provisional  nature  of  this  prestidigitation  had 
always  been  clear,  the  learned  doctor's  only  solution  is 
to  recommend  the  overthrow  of  the  government;  the 
restoration  of  the  Empire  under  the  name  of  Consti- 


186  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

tutional  Monarchy ;  and,  by  means  of  a  fresh  plot  to  do 
in  China  what  all  Europe  has  long  been  on  the  point  of 
abandoning,  namely,  to  substitute  Family  rule  for  Na- 
tional rule. 

Now  had  these  suggestions  been  gravely  made  in  any 
country  but  China  by  a  person  officially  employed  it 
is  difficult  to  know  what  would  have  happened.  Even 
in  China  had  an  Englishman  published  or  caused  to  be 
published — especially  after  the  repeated  statements 
Yuan  Shih-kai  had  given  out  that  any  attempt  to  force 
the  sceptre  on  him.  would  cause  him  to  leave  the  coun- 
try and  end  his  days  abroad  ^ — that  Englishman,  we 
say,  would  have  been  liable  under  the  Orders  in  Coun- 
cil to  summary  imprisonment,  the  possibility  of  tumult 
and  widespread  internal  disturbances  being  sufficient 
to  force  a  British  Court  to  take  action.  What  are  the 
forces  which  brought  an  American  to  say  things  which 
an  Englishman  would  not  dare  to  say — that  in  1915 
there  was  a  sanction  for  a  fresh  revolutionary  move- 
ment in  China?     First,  an  interpretation  of  history  so 

1  The  most  widely-quoted  statement  on  this  subject  is  the  remarkable 
interview,  published  in  the  first  week  of  July,  1915,  throughout  the  metro- 
politan press,  between  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  General  Feng  Kuo-chang, 
commanding  the  forces  on  the  lower  Yangtsze.  This  statement  was  tele- 
graphed by  foreign  correspondents  all  over  the  world.  Referring  to  the 
many  rumours  ailoat  that  titles  of  nobility  would  be  revived  as  a  precursor 
to  the  monarchy  the  President  declared  that  even  if  he  seized  the  Throne 
that  would  not  increase  his  powers,  whilst  as  for  transmitting  the  Imperial 
Yellow  to  his  sons  none  were  fitted  for  that  honour  which  would  mean  the 
collapse  of  any  new  dynasty.  Here  General  Feng  Kuo-chang  interrupted 
with  the  remark  that  the  people  of  South  China  would  not  oppose  such  a 
change  ultimately,  though  they  thought  it  was  too  early  to  talk  about  it 
just  now.  Thereupon  the  president's  features  became  stern  and  he  de- 
clared in  a  heightened  voice:  "You  and  others  seem  still  to  believe  that  I 
harbour  secret  ambitions.  I  aflSrm  positively  that  when  I  sent  my  sons  to 
study  in  England,  I  privately  ordered  the  purchase  of  a  small  estate  there 
as  a  possible  home.  If  the  people  of  China  insist  upon  my  accepting  the 
sceptre  I  shall  leave  this  country  and  spend  the  remaining  days  of  my  life 
abroad." 

This  interview,  so  far  from  being  denied,  has  been  afiBrmed  to  the  present 
writer  as  being  substantially  correct. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  187 

superficial,  combined  with  such  an  amazing  suppression 
of  contemporary  political  thought,  that  it  is  difficult  to 
believe  that  the  requirements  of  the  country  were  taken 
in  the  least  bit  seriously;  secondly,  in  the  comparisons 
made  between  China  and  the  Latin  republics,  a  delib- 
erate scouting  of  the  all-important  racial  factor;  and, 
lastly,  a  total  ignorance  of  the  intellectual  qualities 
which  are  by  far  the  most  outstanding  feature  of  Chi- 
nese civilization. 

Dr.  Goodnow's  method  is  simplicity  itself.  In  order 
to  prove  the  superiority  of  Monarchism  over  Repub- 
licanism— and  thus  deliberately  ignoring  the  moral  of 
the  present  cataclysmic  war — ^he  ransacks  the  dust-laden 
centuries.  The  English  Commonwealth,  which  dis- 
appeared nearly  three  hundred  years  ago,  is  brought 
forward  as  an  example  of  the  dangers  which  beset  a 
republic,  though  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  relation  an 
experiment  made  before  the  idea  of  representative  gov- 
ernment had  been  even  understood  bears  to  our  times. 
But  there  is  worse.  The  statement  is  deliberately  made 
that  the  reason  for  the  disappearance  of  that  Common- 
wealth was  "that  the  problem  of  succession  after  the 
death  of  Cromwell  was  difficult  to  solve."  English  his- 
torians would  no  doubt  have  numerous  remarks  to  offer 
on  this  strange  untruth  which  dismiss  a  remarkably  in- 
teresting chapter  of  history  in  the  most  misleading  way, 
and  which  tells  Chinese  pohtical  students  nothing  about 
the  complete  failure  which  military  government — not 
republicanism — must  always  have  among  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  peoples  and  which  is  the  sole  reason  why  Crom- 
wellism  disappeared.  Even  when  treating  the  history 
of  his  own  country  Dr.  Goodnow  seems  to  take  pleasure 
in  being  absurd.     For  he  says:  *'The  mind  of  the  Amer- 


188  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

ican  people  was  so  imbued  with  the  idea  of  repubUc- 
anism  that  a  republican  form  of  government  was  the 
ideal  of  the  whole  race" ;  then  adding  as  if  to  refute  his 
own  statements,  "Had  General  Washington — the 
leader  of  the  revolutionary  army — had  the  desire  to  be- 
come a  monarch  he  would  probably  have  been  success- 
ful." We  do  not  know  how  Americans  will  like  this 
kind  of  interpretation  of  their  history ;  but  at  least  they 
will  not  fail  to  note  what  dismal  results  it  hastened  on 
in  China.  With  the  experimental  Eighteenth  Century 
French  Republic ;  with  the  old  Spanish  Colonies  of  Cen- 
tral and  South  America;  and  above  all  with  Mexico, 
Dr.  Goodnow  deals  in  the  same  vein.  Vast  move- 
ments, which  can  be  handled  only  tentatively  even  in 
exhaustive  essays  are  dismissed  in  misleading  sentences 
framed  so  as  to  serve  as  mere  introduction  to  the  in- 
evitable climax — the  Chinese  Constitutional  Monarchy 
of  1915  with  Yuan  Shih-kai  as  Emperor. 

Yet  this  is  not  all.  As  if  in  alarm  at  the  very  con- 
clusions he  so  purposely  reaches,  at  the  end  of  his  Mem- 
orandum he  reduces  these  conclusions  to  naught  by 
stating  that  three  impossible  conditions  are  necessary 
to  consummate  the  Restoration  of  the  Monarchy  in 
China,  (1)  no  opposition  should  be  aroused  (2)  the  law 
of  succession  must  be  properly  settled,  (3)  Full  pro- 
vision must  be  made  for  the  development  of  Constitu- 
tional Government.  That  these  conditions  were  known 
to  be  impossible,  everyone  in  the  Far  East  had  long 
admitted.  Had  Dr.  Goodnow  paid  the  slightest  at- 
tention to  the  course  of  history  in  China  he  would  have 
known  (a)  that  any  usurpation  of  the  Throne  would 
infallibly  lead  to  rebelhon  in  China  and  intervention 
on  the  part  of  Japan,  (b)  that  Yuan  Shi-kai's  power 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  189 

was  purely  personal  and  as  such  could  not  be  trans- 
mitted to  any  son  by  any  means  known  to  the  human 
intellect,  (c)  that  all  Yuan  Shih-kai's  sons  were  worth- 
less, the  eldest  son  being  semi-paralyzed,  (d)  that  con- 
stitutional government  and  the  Eastern  conception  of 
kingship,  which  is  purely  theocratic,  are  so  antithetical 
that  they  cannot  possibly  co-exist,  any  re-establishment 
of  the  throne  being  ipso  facto  the  re-establishment  of  a 
theocracy,  (e)  that  although  he  so  constantly  speaks  of 
the  low  political  knowledge  of  the  people,  the  Chinese 
have  had  a  most  complete  form  of  local  self-government 
from  the  earliest  times,  the  political  problem  of  the  day 
being  simply  to  gather  up  and  express  these  local  forms 
in  some  centralized  system:  (f)  the  so-called  non-pa- 
triotism of  the  Chinese  is  non-existent  and  is  an  idea 
which  has  been  spread  abroad  owing  to  the  complete 
foreign  misunderstanding  of  certain  basic  facts — for 
instance  that  under  the  Empire  foreign  affairs  were  the 
sole  concern  of  the  Emperors,  provincial  China  prior 
to  1911  being  a  socio-economic  confederation  resembling 
mediaeval  contrivances  such  as  the  Hanseatic  League — 
a  provincial  confederation  not  concerning  itself  with 
any  matter  which  lay  outside  its  everyday  economic 
life,  such  as  territorial  overlordship  or  frontier  ques- 
tions or  the  regulation  of  sea-port  intercourse  etc.,  be- 
cause such  matters  were  meaningless.  It  was  only 
when  foreign  encroachment  in  the  j905f-Japanese  war 
period  (i.  e.  after  1895)  carried  problems  from  the 
fringes  of  the  Empire  into  the  economic  life  of  the  peo- 
ple that  their  pride  was  touched  and  that  in  spite  of 
*'their  lack  of  experience  and  knowledge  in  political 
affairs"  they  suddenly  displayed  a  remarkable  patri- 
otic feeling,  the  history  of  China  during  the  past  two 


190  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

decades  being  only  comprehensible  when  this  capital 
contention,  namely  the  reality  of  Chinese  patriotism,  is 
given  the  central  place. 

It  is  useless,  however,  to  pursue  the  subject:  we  have 
said  enough  to  disclose  the  utter  levity  of  those  who 
should  have  reahzed  from  the  first  that  the  New  China 
is  a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  the  people,  and  that  the 
first  business  of  the  foreigner  is  to  uphold  the  new 
beliefs.  The  Goodnow  Memorandum,  immediately  it 
was  published,  was  put  to  precisely  those  base  uses 
which  any  one  with  an  elementary  knowledge  of  China 
might  have  foreseen:  it  was  simply  exploited  in  an  un- 
scrupulous way,  its  recommendations  being  carried  out 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  increase  one's  contempt  for  the 
men  who  were  pushing  the  monarchist  plot  with  any 
means  that  they  could  seize  hold  of,  and  who  were  not 
averse  from  making  responsible  foreigners  their  tools. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   MONAECHY   MOVEMENT   IS   OPPOSED 

THE  APPEAL  OF  THE  SCHOLAR  LIANG  CH'i-CHAO 

We  have  already  referred  in  several  places  to  the  ex- 
traordinary role  scholarship  and  the  literary  appeal  play 
in  the  governance  of  China.  It  is  necessary  to  go  back 
to  the  times  of  the  birth  of  the  Roman  Empire,  and  to 
invoke  the  great  figure  of  Cicero,  to  understand  how 
greatly  the  voice  of  men  of  recognized  intellectual  quali- 
ties influences  the  nation.  Liang  Ch'i-chao,  a  man  of 
some  forty-five  years,  had  long  been  distinguished  for  his 
literary  attainments  and  for  the  skill  with  which,  though 
unversed  in  any  Western  language,  he  had  expounded 
the  European  theory  and  practice  of  government  to  his 
fellow-countrymen.  To  his  brain  is  due  the  coining  of 
many  exact  expressions  necessary  for  parliamentary 
government,  his  mentality  having  grown  with  the  mod- 
ern growth  of  China  and  adapted  itself  rather  marvel- 
lously to  the  requirements  of  the  Twentieth  Century. 
A  reformer  of  1898 — that  is  one  of  the  small  devoted 
band  of  men  who  under  Kang  Yu  Wei  almost  suc- 
ceeded in  winning  over  the  ill-fated  Emperor  Kwang 
Hsu  to  carrying  out  a  policy  of  modernizing  the  coun- 
try in  the  teeth  of  fierce  mandarin  opposition,  he  pos- 
sessed in  his  armoury  every  possible  argument  against 
the  usurpation  Yuan  Shih-kai  proposed  to  practise. 
He  knew  precisely  where  to  strike — and  with  what 
strength ;  and  he  dehvered  himself  over  to  his  task  with 
whole-hearted  fervour.     It  having  become  known  that 

191 


192  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

he  was  engaged  in  preparing  this  brief  for  the  people 
of  China,  every  influence  was  brought  to  bear  to  pre- 
vent such  a  disastrous  publication.  Influential  deputa- 
tions were  sent  to  him  to  implore  him  to  remember  the 
parlous  international  situation  China  found  herself  in, — 
a  situation  which  would  result  in  ojDen  disaster  if  sub- 
jected to  the  strain  of  f mother  discords.  For  a  time  he 
hesitated  launching  his  counter-stroke.  But  at  length 
the  Republican  Party  persuaded  him  to  deal  the  tyrant 
the  needed  blow;  and  his  now  famous  accusation  of  the 
Chief  Executive  was  published. 

Its  effect  was  immediate  and  very  far-reaching.  Men 
understood  that  armed  revolt  was  in  the  air.  The  al- 
most Biblical  fervour  which  pervades  this  extraordinary 
document  shows  an  unusual  sense  of  moral  outrage. 
The  masterly  analysis  of  the  Diaz  regime  in  Mexico 
coupled  with  the  manner  in  which — always  pretending 
to  be  examining  the  conduct  of  the  Mexican — he  stabs 
at  Yuan  Shih-kai,  won  the  applause  of  a  race  that  de- 
lights in  oblique  attacks  and  was  ample  proof  that  great 
trouble  was  brewing.  The  document  was  read  in  every 
part  of  China  and  everywhere  approved.  Although  it 
suffers  from  translation,  the  text  remains  singularly  in- 
teresting as  a  disclosure  of  the  Chinese  mentality ;  whilst 
the  exhaustive  examination  of  pohtical  terms  it  con- 
tains shows  that  some  day  Chinese  will  carry  their  in- 
ventive genius  into  fields  they  have  hitherto  never 
openly  invaded.  Especially  interesting  is  it  to  contrast 
the  arguments  of  such  a  man  with  those  of  a  decadent 
such  as  Yang  Tu. 

FROM  REPUBLIC  TO  MONARCHY 

Before  I  proceed  with  my  argument  I  wish  to  make  plain  two 
points.     One  is  that  I  am  not  one  of  those  reformers  whose  ears 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  193 

are  their  brains,  and  who  are  intoxicated  with  the  doctrine  of 
republicanism.  I  have,  therefore,  no  partiality  for  the  repub- 
lican form  of  government  nor  any  bias  for  or  against  other 
forms  of  government.  This  can  be  proved  by  my  literary  work 
during  the  last  ten  years.  The  second  point  is  that  I  am  not 
one  of  the  veteran  conservatives  who  lay  so  much  stress  on  the 
importance  of  having  a  dynasty.  For  such  are  the  thoughts  of 
men  who  only  seek  to  adjust  themselves  to  existing  conditions. 
If  one  wishes  to  consider  the  present  situation  of  the  country 
without  bias  or  prejudice  he  must  disregard  the  rise  or  fall  of 
any  particular  family.  Only  those  who  bear  in  mind  these  two 
points  can  read  my  argument  with  real  understanding. 

I.       THE    QUESTION    OF    KUQ-TI 

Some  time  ago  I  said  that,  as  political  students,  we  should 
only  care  for  Cheng-ti,  i.e.,  the  form  of  government  and  not  for 
kuo-ti,  i.e.,  the  form  of  state.  Do  not  call  this  trifling  with 
words,  for  it  is  a  principle  which  all  critics  of  politics  should 
follow  and  never  depart  from.  The  reason  is  that  critics  of 
politics  should  not,  because  they  cannot,  influence  the  question 
of  Kuo-ti.  They  should  not  influence  the  question  of  kuo-ti 
because  so  long  as  the  question  of  kuo-ti  remains  unsettled  the 
major  portion  of  the  administration  remains  at  a  stand-still. 
Thus  there  will  be  no  political  situation  properly  so  called  and 
there  will  be  no  political  questions  to  discuss  (here  the  term 
political  means  really  administrative).  If  a  critic  of  politics, 
therefore,  interfere  with  the  question  of  Kuo-ti,  he  will  be  lead- 
ing the  nation  into  a  condition  of  political  instability,  thus 
undermining  the  ground  on  which  the  people  stand.  Such 
critics  can  be  likened  unto  a  man  trying  to  enter  a  house  with- 
out ascending  the  steps  or  crossing  a  river  without  a  boat. 

They  cannot  influence  the  question  of  Kuo-ti.  The  force 
which  drives  and  steers  the  change  of  one  form  of  State  or  ■vice 
•versa  is  generally  not  derived  from  mere  politics.  If  the  time 
is  not  ripe,  then  no  amount  of  advocacy  on  the  part  of  critics 
can  hasten  it.  If  the  time  is  ripe,  nothing  the  critics  say  can 
prevent  it.  He  who  indulges  himself  in  the  discussion  of  the 
problem  of  Kuo-ti — i.e.,  the  form  of  States,  as  a  political  stu- 


194  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

dent,  is  ignorant  of  his  own  limitations  and  capacity.  This  is 
as  true  of  the  active  politicians  as  of  the  critics ;  for  the  first 
duty  of  an  active  politician  is  to  seek  for  the  improvement  and 
progress  of  the  administration  of  the  existing  foundation  of 
government.  A  step  beyond  this  line  is  revolution  and  intrigue, 
and  such  cannot  be  the  attitude  of  a  right-minded  active  poli- 
tician or  statesman.  This  is  looking  at  it  from  the  negative 
side. 

From  the  positive,  that  is,  the  progressive  point  of  view, 
there  is  also  a  boundary.  Such  actions  under  one  form  of 
government  are  political  activities,  and  under  the  opposite 
form  of  government  are  also  political  activities.  But  these  are 
not  questions  of  pohtical  principle.  For  only  when  a  man 
sacrifices  the  ideals  which  he  has  advocated  and  cherished  dur- 
ing the  whole  of  his  life  does  the  question  of  principle  arise. 
Therefore  the  great  principle  of  looking  to  the  actual  state  of 
administration  of  the  form  of  government  and  leaving  the  mere 
form  of  state  in  the  back-ground  is  a  principle  that  is  appli- 
cable under  all  circumstances  and  should  be  followed  by  all 
critics  of  politics. 

n.       THE    ARGUMENT    AGAINST    CHANGE 

No  form  of  government  is  ideal.  Its  reason  of  existence  can 
only  be  judged  by  what  it  has  achieved.  It  is  the  height  of 
folly  to  rely  on  theoretical  conclusions  as  a  basis  for  artificial 
arbitration  as  to  what  should  be  accepted  and  what  discarded. 
Mere  folly,  however,  is  not  to  be  seriously  condemned.  But  the 
danger  and  harm  to  the  country  will  be  unmeasurable  if  a  per- 
son has  prejudiced  views  respecting  a  certain  form  of  govern- 
ment and  in  order  to  prove  the  correctness  of  his  prejudiced 
views,  creates  artificially  a  situation  all  by  himself.  For  this 
reason  my  view  has  always  been  not  to  oppose  any  form  of 
government.  But  I  am  always  opposed  to  any  one  who 
engages  in  a  propaganda  in  favour  of  a  form  of  government 
other  than  the  one  under  which  we  actually  live.  In  the  past  I 
opposed  those  who  tried  to  spread  the  republican  form  of  gov- 
ernment while  the  country  was  under  monarchical  government, 
and  the  arguments  I  advanced  in  support  of  my  views  were 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  195 

written  in  no  fewer  than  200,000  words.  Even  so  late  as  the 
ninth  month  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  I  issued  a 
pamphlet  entitled  "The  Problem  of  the  Building  of  the  New 
China,"  which  was  my  last  attempt  to  express  my  views  respect- 
ing the  maintenance  of  the  old  form  of  government. 

What  obligations  had  I  to  the  then  Imperial  House?  Did  it 
not  heap  persecution  and  humiliation  on  me  to  the  utmost  of  its 
power  and  resources?  I  would  have  been  an  exile  even  to  this 
day  had  it  not  been  for  the  Revolution.  Further,  I  was  no 
child  and  I  was  fully  aware  of  the  disappointment  which  the 
then  Government  caused  in  the  minds  of  the  people.  Yet  I 
risked  the  opposition  of  the  whole  country  and  attempted  to 
prolong  the  life  of  the  dying  dynasty.  I  had  no  other  view  in 
mind  except  that  there  would  be  some  possibility  of  our  hope 
being  realized  if  the  whole  nation  would  unite  in  efforts  to  im- 
prove the  administration  under  the  then  existing  form  of  gov- 
ernment. I  believed  that  because  the  people  were  not  educated 
for  a  change.  But  if  the  status  of  the  country  should  be 
changed  before  the  people  are  educated  and  accustomed  to  the 
new  order  of  things,  the  danger  and  hardship  during  the  transi- 
tional period  of  several  years  would  be  incalculable.  In  certain 
circumstances  this  might  lead  to  the  destruction  of  the  nation. 
Even  if  we  are  spared  the  tragedy  of  national  extinction,  the 
losses  sustained  by  the  retarding  of  the  progress  of  the  adminis- 
tration would  be  unredeemable.  It  is  painful  to  recall  past 
experiences ;  but  if  my  readers  will  read  once  more  my  articles 
in  the  Hsin  Min  Tung  Pao  during  the  years  1905  and  1906 
they  will  see  that  all  the  suff'erings  which  the  Republic  has 
experienced  bear  out  the  predictions  made  then.  The  different 
stages  of  the  sinister  development  have  been  unfolding  them- 
selves one  by  one  just  as  I  said  they  would.  It  was  unfortunate 
that  my  words  were  not  heeded  although  I  wept  and  pleaded. 
Such  has  been  the  consequence  of  the  change  of  the  state  of  the 
country — a  change  of  Kuo-ti. 

Yet  before  we  have  hardly  ceased  panting,  this  talk  of  a 
second  change  is  on  us.  I  am  not  In  a  position  to  say  exactly 
how  this  talk  had  its  beginning.  Ostensibly  it  was  started  by 
the  remarks  of  Dr.  Goodnow.     But  I  am  unable  to  say  whether 


196  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Dr.  Goodnow  actually  gave  out  such  a  view  or  for  what  purpose 
he  expressed  such  a  view.  From  what  he  told  the  representa- 
tive of  a  Peking  newspaper  he  never  expressed  the  views  at- 
tributed to  him.  Be  this  as  it  may,  I  cannot  help  having  my 
doubts.  All  Dr.  Goodnow  is  alleged  to  have  said  bearing  on  the 
merits  of  the  monarchical  and  republican  system  of  government 
as  an  abstract  subject  of  discussion,  such  as  the  necessity  of  the 
form  of  state  (Kuo-ti)  being  suited  to  the  general  conditions  of 
the  country  and  the  lessons  we  should  learn  from  the  Central 
and  South  American  republics,  are  really  points  of  a  very  simple 
nature  and  easily  deduced.  How  strange  that  among  all  this 
large  number  of  politicians  and  scholars,  who  are  as  numerous 
as  the  trees  in  the  forest  and  the  perch  in  the  stream,  should 
have  failed  for  all  these  years  to  notice  these  simple  points ;  and 
now  suddenly  make  a  fetish  of  them  because  they  have  come  out 
of  the  mouth  of  a  foreigner.  Is  it  because  no  one  except  a 
foreign  doctor  can  discover  such  facts?  Why  even  a  humble 
learner  hke  myself,  though  not  so  learned  even  to  the  extent  of 
one  ten-thousandth  part  of  his  knowledge,  more  than  ten  years 
ago  anticipated  what  the  good  doctor  has  said ;  and  I  said  much 
more  and  in  much  more  comprehensive  terms.  I  have  no  desire 
to  talk  about  my  work,  but  let  my  readers  glance  through  the 
copies  of  the  Hsin  Min  Tsung  Pao,  Yin  Ping  Shih  Wen  Chi,  the 
"Fight  between  Constitutional  Advocates"  and  "Revolutionary 
Advocates,"  the  "Question  of  the  Building  of  the  New  China," 
etc.,  etc.  My  regret  is  that  my  eyes  are  not  blue  and  my  hair 
not  brown,  and  hence  my  words  were  not  acceptable  to  the 
nation ! 

ni.       RES    JUDICATA 

I  do  not  say  that  the  merits  or  otherwise  of  the  republican 
system  should  not  be  discussed,  but  the  time  for  such  a  discus- 
sion has  passed.  The  most  opportune  time  for  such  a  discus- 
sion was  in  1911  when  the  Revolution  had  just  begun ;  but  since 
then  further  discussions  should  not  be  tolerated.  There  might 
have  been  some  excuse  if  this  subject  had  been  brought  up  for 
discussion  when  the  second  revolution  broke  out  at  Hukow  on 
the  Yangtsze  river  or  before  the  President  was  formally  in- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  197 

augurated,  or  before  the  Powers  formally  recognized  the  Re- 
public; but  the  excuse  even  then  would  have  been  a  weak  one. 
Where  were  you  then,  advocates  of  monarchy?  Could  you  not 
at  that  time  have  brought  out  an  essay  by  one  of  the  great 
scholars  of  the  world  as  a  subject  for  discussion?  Could  you 
not  have  cited  the  cases  of  American  republics  as  a  warning 
for  us  that  these  republic  were  by  no  means  peaceful?  Yet  at 
that  time  when  the  heroes  of  discretion  were  daily  pushing  the 
progress  of  the  republican  cause,  stating  that  republicanism 
was  the  panacea  for  all  the  world's  administrations  and  that 
republicanism  was  not  a  new  factor  in  Chinese  history,  a  humble 
and  ignorant  man  like  myself,  then  a  stranger  in  a  foreign  land, 
was  burdened  with  the  fear  of  the  unsuitability  of  the  republi- 
can system  to  China  and  wrote  articles  in  support  of  his  own 
views  and  wept  till  his  eyes  were  dry. 

Do  you  not  realize  that  the  State  is  a  thing  of  great  import- 
ance and  should  not  be  disturbed  carelessly?  How  can  you 
then  experiment  with  it  and  treat  it  as  if  you  were  putting  a 
chest  into  a  dead  hole,  saying  "Let  me  place  it  here  for  the 
moment  and  I  will  see  to  it  later."  The  status  of  the  State  can 
be  likened  to  marriage  between  man  and  woman.  The  greatest 
care  should  be  taken  during  courtship.  The  lady  should  then 
exercise  care  to  see  that  the  man  whom  she  is  taking  to  be  a 
life  companion  is  worthy  of  her.  During  this  period  it  is  the 
duty  of  her  relatives  and  friends  to  point  out  to  her  any  danger 
or  misunderstanding  even  to  the  extent  of  offending  her  feel- 
ings. But  if  you  leave  her  alone  at  this  stage  when  there  is 
plenty  of  time  to  change  her  course,  and — what  is  more — urge 
her  to  tie  the  knot  despite  incompatibility,  what  right  have  you 
afterward  to  make  the  impudent  suggestion  to  the  wife  that 
her  husband  is  not  a  man  to  whom  she  should  cling  for  life?  Is 
such  a  course  a  charitable  way  of  doing  things? 

If  indeed  the  republican  cause  is  enough  to  cause  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  nation  then  you,  the  advocates  of  monarchy,  have 
placed  the  country  in  a  position  from  which  she  has  no  hope  of 
ever  coming  out  independent.  You  are  the  men  who — to  the 
best  of  your  ability — inculcated  and  pressed  the  adoption  of 
the  republican  cause.     The  proverb  says,  "If  now,  why  not 


198  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

then?"  How  many  days  can  a  person  live  that  you,  not  satis- 
fied with  one  great  sin,  are  again  to  commit  another.  It  is  not 
long  since  the  Republic  was  first  established;  yet  you,  the  vet- 
erans of  republicanism,  are  the  leaders  today  in  advocating 
the  overthrow  of  the  Republic.  Yes.  It  is  indeed  strange  that 
I,  a  man  who  once  opposed  the  republican  cause,  should  now  be 
opposing  you.     Nothing  is  stranger  and  nothing  is  so  fateful. 

But  our  modern  critics  say  we  prefer  a  constitutional  mon- 
archy to  an  autocratic  republic.  Now  whether  we  are  consti- 
tutional or  not  is  a  question  concerning  the  administration, 
while  the  question  whether  we  are  republican  or  not  is  a  question 
concerning  the  form  or  status  of  the  country.  We  have  always 
held  that  the  question  of  Kuo-ti  is  above  discussion  and  that 
what  we  should  consider  is  the  actual  condition  of  administra- 
tion. If  the  administration  (government)  is  constitutional, 
then  it  matters  not  whether  the  country  is  a  Republic  or  a 
Monarchy.  If  the  government  is  not  constitutional  then 
neither  a  republic  nor  a  monarchy  will  avail.  There  is  no 
connexion,  therefore,  between  the  question  of  Kuo-ti  and  the 
question  oi  Cheng -ti.  It  is  an  absurd  idea  to  say  that  in  order 
to  improve  the  administration  we  must  change  the  Kuo-ti — the 
status  or  form  of  the  country — as  a  necessity.  If  this  idea  is 
to  be  entertained  for  a  single  moment  the  changes  even  in  con- 
stitutional countries  will  be  endless.  But  the  curious  paradox 
is  that  in  former  days  the  critics  said  that  only  a  republic,  not 
a  monarchy,  could  be  constitutional;  whereas,  the  critics  now 
say  that  a  monarchy,  not  a  republic,  can  alone  be  constitu- 
"  tional ! 

IV.       THE    PRESIDENT    AND    THE    CONSTITUTION 

Let  me  therefore  lay  down  a  simple  definition  of  what  a  Con- 
stitution is  before  discussing  whether  the  contentions  of  the 
critics  are  reasonable.  My  opponents  will  agree  with  me  that 
the  main  principle  of  a  constitutional  government  is  that  the 
legislative  organ  should  always  balance  the  executive  and  that 
the  exercising  of  the  administrative  power  is  always  limited  to 
a  certain  extent.  They  will  also  agree  that  the  most  important 
point  of  a  so-called  constitutional  monarchy  is  that  the  mon- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  199 

arch  should  act  as  a  figurehead,  and  that  the  establishment  of  a 
responsible  cabinet  is  an  indispensable  accompaniment.  If 
these  simple  principles  are  recognized  then  we  must  put  up  the 
theory  for  discussion.  Let  us  then  raise  the  question  who  shall 
be  the  monarch.  In  plain  words,  is  the  person  in  our  mind  the 
President?  or  any  other  person?  (In  view  of  the  repeated 
declarations  of  the  President  that  he  will  never  consent  to  be- 
come an  Emperor,  this  suggestion  on  my  part  is  a  gross  insult 
to  his  character,  but  I  crave  to  excuse  myself  as  this  is  only 
mere  speculation  and  supposition.)  What  shall  we  do  with  the 
President  if  we  find  another  man?  The  President,  having  so 
long  borne  the  burdens  of  the  State,  will  certainly  be  only  too 
willing  to  vacate  his  post  to  live  in  retirement  as  far  as  his  own 
person  is  concerned,  but  can  we  imagine  that  the  country  will 
allow  the  President  to  retire?  If  not,  then  are  we  going  to  ask 
the  President  to  form  a  responsible  cabinet  under  a  figurehead 
monarch?  Even  if  we  take  it  for  granted  that  the  President, 
out  of  love  for  the  country,  would  be  willing  to  sacrifice  his  own 
principles  and  yield  to  the  wish  of  the  country,  it  will  be  dan- 
gerous indeed  if  he — a  person  on  whom  the  whole  nation  de- 
pends— is  placed  in  the  path  of  parliament.  Therefore  the 
contention  that  a  constitutional  monarchy  will  be  attained  if  a 
person  other  than  the  President  be  made  a  monarch  is  false  and 
baseless. 

Shall  we  then  make  the  present  President  a  monarch?  Of 
course  the  President  will  not  consent  to  this.  But  leaving  this 
aside  let  us  suppose  that  the  President,  in  consideration  of  the 
permanent  welfare  of  the  country,  is  willing  to  sacrifice  every- 
thing to  satisfy  the  wish  of  the  people,  do  we  expect  that  he  will 
become  a  mere  figurehead?  A  figurehead  monarch  is,  to  adapt 
the  saying  of  the  west  a  fat  porker,  a  guinea-pig,  that  is,  good 
as  an  expensive  ornament.  Will  it  be  wise  to  place  so  valuable 
a  personage  in  so  idle  a  position  at  a  time  when  the  situation 
is  so  extremely  critical? 

Even  if  we  are  willing  to  suffer  the  President  to  become  a 
figurehead  it  will  remain  a  question  whether  a  responsible  cab- 
inet can  ever  be  formed.  I  do  not  say  that  the  President  will 
not  allow  a  responsible  cabinet  to  exist  under  him.     My  conten- 


200  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

tion  is  that  there  is  no  one  within  my  knowledge,  who  commands 
respect  enough  and  is  capable  of  taking  over  the  responsibilities 
of  President  Yuan.  For  who  can  replace  the  Great  President 
in  coping  with  our  numerous  difficulties?  If  we  select  an  ordi- 
nary man  and  make  him  bear  the  great  burdens,  we  will  find 
that  in  addition  to  his  lack  of  ability  rendering  him  unequal  to 
the  occasion,  his  lack  of  dominating  influence  will  disqualify  him 
from  exercising  authority.  It  was  for  the  purpose  of  meeting 
the  requirements  of  the  existing  conditions  that  the  Cabinet  sys- 
tem was  changed  into  a  Presidential  system — an  excellent  sub- 
stitution for  a  weakened  administration.  Conditions  in  the 
next  two  or  three  years  will  not  be  very  much  different  from 
what  they  are  now.  Therefore,  the  contention  that  the  admin- 
istration will  be  changed  overnight  for  the  better  after  a 
change  in  the  form  of  the  State  is,  if  not  a  wicked  untruth  to 
deceive  the  common  people,  the  ridiculous  absurdity  of  a  book- 
worm. Thus  the  theory  that  a  constitutional  monarchy  will 
immediately  follow,  if  the  President  consents  to  become  a  mon- 
arch, is  also  fallacious. 

Can  it  be  possible  that  those  who  are  now  holding  up  the  con- 
stitutional principle  as  a  shield  for  their  monarchical  views 
have  a  different  definition  for  the  term  "constitution".'^  The 
Ching  (Manchu)  Dynasty  considered  itself  as  possessing  a  con- 
stitution in  its  last  days.  Did  we  recognize  it  as  such?  Let 
me  also  ask  the  critics  what  guarantee  they  have  to  offer  that 
the  constitution  will  be  put  into  effect  without  hindrance  as  soon 
as  the  form  of  State  is  changed.  If  they  cannot  give  any 
definite  guarantee,  then  what  they  advocate  is  merely  an  abso- 
lute monarchy  and  not  a  constitutional  monarchy.  As  it  is 
not  likely  to  be  a  constitutional  monarchy,  we  may  safely  as- 
sume that  it  will  be  an  imperial  autocracy.  I  cannot  regard  it 
as  a  wise  plan  if,  owing  to  dislike  of  its  defects,  the  Republic 
should  be  transformed  into  an  Imperial  autocracy.  Owing  to 
various  unavoidable  reasons,  it  is  excusable  in  spite  of  violent 
opposition  to  adopt  temporarily  autocratic  methods  in  a  repub- 
lican country.  But  if  the  plan  proposed  by  present-day  critics 
be  put  into  effect,  that  on  the  promise  of  a  constitution  we 
should  agree  to  the  adoption  of  a  monarchy,  then  the  promise 


The    Scholar    Liang    Chi-chao,    Sometimes    Minister    of 
Justice,  and  the  Foremost  "Brain"  in  China 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  201 

must  be  definitely  made  to  the  country  at  the  time  of  transition 
that  a  constitutional  government  will  become  an  actuality. 
But  if,  after  the  promise  is  made,  existing  conditions  are 
alleged  to  justify  the  continuance  of  autocratic  methods,  I  am 
afraid  the  whole  country  will  not  be  so  tolerant  towards  the 
Chief  Executive.  To  assume  outwardly  the  role  of  constitu- 
tional government,  but  in  reality  to  rule  in  an  unconstitutional 
manner,  was  the  cause  of  the  downfall  of  the  Ching  Dynasty. 
The  object  lesson  is  not  obscure.     Let  us  take  warning  by  it. 

V.       FALLACIES    OF    THE    MONARCHISTS 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  present  day  critics  are  really  in 
earnest  for  a  constitution,  then  I  am  unable  to  understand  why 
they  believe  that  this  cannot  be  secured  under  the  Republic  but 
must  be  obtained  in  a  roundabout  way  by  means  of  a  monarchy. 
In  my  view  the  real  hindrances  to  the  adoption  of  a  constitution 
at  the  present  day  in  China  are  the  existing  conditions,  "viz.  the 
attitude  of  the  officials  and  the  traditions  and  intellectual  stan- 
dards of  the  people.  But  these  hindrances  have  not  resulted 
from  the  adoption  of  republicanism.  Therefore  they  cannot 
be  expected  to  disappear  with  the  disappearance  of  the  Re- 
public. For  instance,  from  the  President  downward  to  the 
minor  official  of  every  official  organ  in  the  capital  or  in  the 
provinces,  every  one  inclines  to  be  independent  of  the  law,  and 
considers  it  convenient  to  deal  with  affairs  as  he  pleases.  This 
is  the  greatest  obstacle  to  constitutional  government.  Now 
has  that  anything  to  do  with  the  change  or  not  of  the  form  of 
State?  Again,  the  absence,  on  the  part  of  the  people,  of  inter- 
est in  political  affairs,  of  knowledge  of  politics,  of  political 
morality  and  strength,  and  their  inability  to  organize  proper 
political  parties  to  make  use  of  an  inviolable  parliament,  are 
also  hindrances  to  the  attainment  of  a  constitution.  Now  what 
have  these  things  to  do  with  a  change  in  the  form  of  the  States? 
If  I  were  to  go  on  naming  such  hindrances  one  by  one,  I  should 
count  my  fingers  many  times  over  and  I  should  not  be  through. 
Yet  it  is  quite  plain  that  not  a  single  one  of  these  hindrances 
can  be  attributed  to  republicanism. 

To  say  that  what  we  cannot  get  under  the  republic  can  be 


202  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

secured  immediately  upon  accepting  a  monarchical  regime,  or 
to  say  that  what  can  be  secured  under  a  monarchical  regime 
can  never  be  secured  in  a  republican  period  is  beyond  the  under- 
standing of  a  stupid  man  like  myself,  although  I  have  searched 
my  brain  for  a  valid  reason. 

My  view  is  that  if  China  is  really  in  earnest  for  a  constitu- 
tion, the  President  should  set  the  example  himself  by  treating 
the  Constitutional  Compact  as  sacredly  inviolable  and  compel 
his  subordinates  to  do  the  same.  Every  letter  of  the  compact 
should  be  carried  out  and  no  attempt  should  be  made  to  step 
beyond  its  limits. 

Meantime  give  the  people  as  many  opportunities  as  possible 
to  acquaint  themselves  with  political  affairs,  and  do  not 
stifle  the  aspirations  of  the  people  or  weaken  their  strength  or 
damp  their  interest  or  crush  their  self-respect.  Then  witliin  a 
few  years  we  shall  be  rewarded  with  results.  If,  instead  of 
doing  all  these  things,  we  vainly  blame  the  form  of  State,  we 
are,  as  Chu  Tse  says,  like  a  boat  that  blames  the  creek  for 
its  curves. 

The  most  powerful  argument  of  those  who  advocate  a  change 
to  a  monarchy  is  that  there  is  every  possibility  of  disturbance 
at  the  time  of  a  Presidential  election.  This  is  a  real  danger. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  ten  years  ago  I  did  not  dare  to  asso- 
ciate myself  with  the  advocates  of  republicanism.  If  the  critics 
want  to  attack  me  on  this  point  to  support  of  their  conten- 
tions, I  advise  them  not  to  write  another  article  but  to  reprint 
my  articles  written  some  time  ago,  which,  I  think,  will  be  more 
effective.  Fortunately,  however,  we  have  discovered  a  compar- 
atively effective  remedy.  For,  according  to  the  latest  Presi- 
dent Election  Law  the  term  of  the  President  is  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  a  term  for  life.  It  is  therefore  impossible  for  such 
dangers  to  appear  during  the  life  of  the  President.  What  con- 
cerns us  is  therefore  what  will  happen  after  the  departure  of 
the  present  President  for  another  world.  This,  of  course,  is  a 
question  that  we  do  not  wish  to  touch  upon ;  but  since  every  one, 
even  the  patriarchs  nwist  die  some  day,  let  us  face  the  matter 
openly.  If  Heaven  blesses  China  and  allows  the  Great  Presi- 
dent to  devote  himself  to  the  country  for  ten  or  more  years — 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  203 

during  which  he  will  be  able  to  assert  the  authority  of  the 
government,  cleanse  officialdom,  store-up  strength,  consolidate 
the  country,  and  banish  all  hidden  dangers — then  there  will  be 
notliing  to  choose  between  a  republic  or  a  monarchy.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  Heaven  should  not  be  pleased  so  to  favour  us 
and  takes  away  our  Great  President  before  he  is  half  through 
with  his  great  task,  then  the  fate  of  China  is  sealed.  No 
changes  in  the  form  of  State  will  avail  under  any  circum- 
stances. Therefore  the  question  whether  China  will  be  left  in 
peace  or  not  depends  entirely  on  the  length  of  years  the  Great 
President  will  live  and  what  he  will  be  able  to  accomplish 
in  his  lifetime.  Whether  the  country  is  ruled  as  a  republic  or 
a  monarchy,  the  consequences  will  be  the  same. 

Do  you  still  doubt  my  words  .-^  Let  me  go  deeper  into  the 
analysis.  The  difference  between  a  republic  and  a  monarchy 
lies  only  in  the  methods  of  succession  of  the  head  of  the  nation. 
It  is  evident  that  although  a  certain  law  of  succession  may  be 
made  during  the  life-time  of  the  Head,  it  cannot  take  effect 
until  his  death ;  and  whether  or  not  the  effect  thus  intended  will 
come  up  to  expectations  will  depend  on  two  factors :  ( 1 ) 
whether  or  not  the  merits  and  personal  influence  of  the  prede- 
cessor will  continue  effective  after  his  death,  and  (2)  whether  or 
not  there  will  be  unscrupulous  and  insubordinate  claimants  at 
the  death  of  the  Head,  and,  if  any,  the  number  of  such  men  and 
whether  the  point  of  dispute  they  raise  be  well-founded.  If 
these  are  taken  as  the  basis  for  discerning  the  future  we  will 
arrive  at  the  same  conclusion  whether  the  country  be  a  republic 
or  a  monarchy. 

VI.       THE    PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION    LAW 

The  Presidential  Election  Law,  however,  provides  that  the 
successor  should  be  nominated  by  his  predecessor,  and  the  name 
of  the  successor  so  nominated  is  to  be  locked  in  the  golden  box 
in  the  stone  strong-room.  The  President  may  now,  on  the  one 
hand,  multiply  his  merits  and  strengthen  his  personal  influence 
so  that  the  whole  country  will  gladly  bow  to  his  wishes  to  the 
extent  that  even  after  his  death  they  will  not  want  to  disobey 
his  last  wish,  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  President  may  quietly 


204  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

ascertain  the  likely  causes  which  would  produce  dissension,  and 
take  suitable  steps  to  prevent  and  be  rid  of  them.  If  the  seed 
of  dissension  is  in  the  ordinances,  then  alter  the  ordinances  so 
that  they  may  not  be  used  as  a  tool  by  possible  claimants. 
If  the  seed  of  dissension  is  in  a  person  then  cultivate  that  man, 
lead  him  to  righteousness,  place  him  in  a  suitable  position  so 
that  he  may  be  protected  from  temptation.  Meanwhile  let  the 
President  carefully  select  his  successor  on  whom  he  may  even- 
tually lay  the  responsibilities  of  State  (according  to  the  Presi- 
dential Election  Law  the  President  is  at  liberty  to  suggest  any 
one  he  likes,  his  own  son  or  some  one  else).  Let  the  nominee 
be  placed  in  a  responsible  position  so  as  to  bring  him  to  public 
notice.  Give  him  real  authority  so  that  he  may  establish  his 
influence.  Place  his  name  at  the  head  of  other  men  of  little 
consequence  in  the  golden  box.  Then  there  will  be  absolutely 
no  ground  for  dispute  when  the  time  comes  to  open  the  box. 

If  every  President  will  do  likewise  this  system  can  be  used 
without  fear  of  a  break  for  hundreds  of  years.  Otherwise  we 
will  have  only  the  Imperial  system  on  paper  to  rely  on  for 
assistance,  which  is  not  even  to  be  thought  of.  A  glance 
through  the  pages  of  Chinese  history  will  show  the  numerous 
cases  in  the  reign  of  Emperors  when  princes  fought  in  the  very 
confines  of  the  Emperor's  palace  while  the  corpse  of  their  royal 
father  lay  unburied  in  the  hall.  Thus  it  is  seen  that  the  hidden 
cause  of  the  safety  or  otherwise  of  the  country  does  not  lie  with 
the  mere  formahty  of  a  constitution  either  in  a  republic  or  a 
monarchy. 

VII.       THE    CASI3    OF    DIAZ,    THE    DICTATOR 

The  critics  bring  up  the  example  of  Mexico  where  live  rivals 
have  been  struggling  with  each  other  for  the  presidency,  and 
the  internal  confusion  of  the  Central  and  South  American  re- 
publics as  well  as  Portugal,  as  an  unquestionable  proof  of  their 
contention  that  a  republic  is  not  so  good  as  a  monarchy.  I 
imagine  that  the  idea  of  these  critics  is  that  all  these  disturb- 
ances can  be  avoided  if  all  these  republics  were  changed  into 
monarchies.  Let  me  tell  them  that  Diaz  ruled  over  Mexico  for 
thirty  years,  and  only  died  as  an  exile  in  May  last  (I  am  not 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  205 

quite  sure  of  the  exact  month).  If  indeed  the  struggle  in  Mex- 
ico was  a  fight  for  succession  then  the  fight  should  not  have 
begun  until  this  year.  And  indeed  if  it  were  necessary  to  have 
a  monarch  to  avoid  the  disturbance,  and  supposing  that  Diaz, 
thirty  years  ago,  had  a  man  like  Dr.  Goodnow  to  make  the 
suggestion,  and  men  like  the  Chou  An  Hui  to  spread  it,  and 
suppose  that  Diaz  boldly  took  the  advice  and  set  up  an  Imperial 
system  for  himself,  would  Mexico  then  have  a  peace  that  would 
last  as  long  as  the  ages  ? 

If  Diaz  had  assumed  the  throne  I  am  positive  he  would  long 
ago  have  been  an  exile  in  a  foreign  country  before  his  imperial 
system  could  have  come  into  effect  or  he  himself  become  the 
proud  founder  of  a  new  dynasty.  What  he  would  have  held  as 
an  imperial  charter  would  have  become  a  mere  scrap  of  paper. 
If  he  could  not  prevent  rebellion  even  during  his  life-time  how 
can  we  expect  an  empty  Imperial  system  to  prevent  it  after  his 
death.  Even  a  child  can  see  this.  The  disturbances  in  Mexico 
were  unavoidable  no  matter  under  a  republic  or  a  monarchy. 
The  reason?  It  is  because  Diaz,  under  the  mask  of  a  republic, 
actually  played  the  role  of  a  despot.  During  all  the  thirty 
years  he  held  office  he  never  devoted  liimself  to  the  strengthening 
of  the  fundamental  things  of  State,  but  diligently  strengthened 
his  own  position.  He  massed  an  enormous  number  of  troops 
for  his  own  protection  so  that  he  might  overawe  the  people. 
For  fear  that  the  troops  might  become  arrogant  and  insubor- 
dinate, he  provoked  disagreement  among  them  in  order  that  he 
might  play  them  round  his  fingers.  He  banished  all  those  who 
opposed  him,  relying  on  force  alone.  In  dealing  with  those  who 
were  really  patriotic,  he  either  corrupted  their  character  by 
buying  them  with  silver  or  removed  them  by  assassination.  He 
was  a  vainglorious  man  and  spent  money  like  water.  From  the 
foreign  capitalists  he  borrowed  in  a  most  indiscriminate  man- 
ner, while  on  the  Mexican  people  he  levied  all  sorts  of  cruel 
taxes.  Thus  the  strength  of  the  people  was  drained  and  the 
resources  of  the  country  were  exhausted,  creating  a  position 
over  which  he  eventually  had  no  control  whatever.  Ten  years 
ago  I  wrote  an  article  in  the  Hsin  Min  Tsung  Pao  remarking 
that  Diaz  was  a  matchless  fraud.     I  said  then  that  a  nation- 


206  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

wide  calamity  would  befall  Mexico  after  his  death  and  that  the 
Mexican  nation  would  be  reduced  to  a  mere  shadow.  (My 
friend  Mr.  Tang  Chio-tun  also  wrote  an  article,  before  the 
internal  strife  in  Mexico  broke  out,  on  the  same  subject  and  in 
an  even  more  comprehensive' way).  Luckily  for  Diaz  he  ruled 
under  the  mask  of  republicanism,  for  only  by  so  doing  did  he 
manage  to  usurp  and  keep  the  presidential  chair  for  thirty 
years.  He  would  long  ago  have  disappeared  had  he  attempted 
to  assume  the  role  of  an  emperor.  This  is  also  true  of  the 
other  republics  of  Central  and  South  America.  Their  presi- 
dents almost  without  a  single  exception  used  military  force  as 
a  stepping-stone  to  the  presidential  chair.  We  have  yet  to  see 
the  last  military  aspirant.  The  unsuitability  of  the  country 
to  the  republican  system  is  of  course  one  of  the  reasons 
but  I  cannot  agree  with  those  who  say  that  this  is  the  only 
reason. 

As  to  Portugal  it  is  true  that  the  change  from  the  monarchy 
to  republic  has  not  stopped  internal  disturbance ;  but  is  it  not 
a  fact  that  Portugal  became  a  republic  as  a  result  of  internal 
disturbance  and  was  it  not  during  the  existence  of  the  monarch 
that  the  disturbance  started?  It  is  ridiculous  to  suppose  that 
a  republic  will  surely  court  disturbance  while  a  monarchy  will 
surely  ensure  peace  and  order.  Is  not  Persia  a  monarchy?  Is 
not  Turkey  a  monarchy?     Is  not  Russia  a  monarchy? 

Read  their  history  in  recent  decades  and  see  how  many  years 
of  peace  they  have  had.  There  have  been  no  election  of  presi- 
dents in  these  countries.     Why  then  such  unrest? 

Again,  why  was  the  state  of  affairs  during  the  Sixteen  States 
of  the  Five  Dynasty-Period  and  the  Ten  States  of  the  Five  Suc- 
cessions as  deplorably  miserable  and  disastrous  as  the  state  of 
affairs  now  prevailing  in  Mexico,  although  there  was  no  election 
of  Presidents  then?  In  quoting  objective  facts  as  illustrations 
the  critic  should  not  allow  his  choice  to  be  dictated  by  his 
personal  like  or  dislike.  Otherwise  he  will  not  be  deceiving 
others  than  himself.  Soberly  speaking,  any  form  of  state  is 
capable  of  either  ensuring  a  successful  government  or  causing 
rebellion.  And  nine  cases  out  of  ten  the  cause  of  rebellion  lies 
in  the  conditions  of  the  administration  and  not  in  the  form  of 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  207 

state.  It  cannot  be  denied,  however,  that  the  chances  of  re- 
bellion and  dissension  are  more  frequent  and  easier  when  the 
form  of  state  does  not  suit  the  conditions  of  the  people.  That 
is  why  I  did  not  advocate  republicanism;  and  even  now  I  am 
not  a  blind  believer  in  republicanism.  In  this  I  agree  with  you, 
the  Chou  An  Hui  people. 

The  reason  why  I  have  not  decided  to  advocate  boldly  a 
change  in  the  form  of  state  is  because  for  years  my  heart  has 
been  burdened  with  an  unspeakable  sorrow  and  pain,  believing 
that  ever  since  the  mistake  made  in  1911  the  hope  for  China's 
future  has  dwindled  to  almost  nothing.  On  one  hand  I  have 
been  troubled  with  our  inability  to  make  the  Republic  a  success, 
and  on  the  other  I  have  been  worrying  over  the  fact  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  restore  the  monarchy.  The  situation 
has  so  worked  on  my  troubled  mind  that  at  times  I  seemed  to 
be  beside  myself.  But  as  the  whole  country  seemed  to  be  al- 
ready in  a  state  of  desperation  I  have  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  it  would  not  do  any  good  to  add  pain  to  sorrow.  There- 
fore, instead  of  uttering  pessimistic  views  I  have  been  speaking 
words  of  encouragement  to  raise  our  spirits.  In  this,  however, 
I  have  exhausted  my  own  strength.  My  friend,  Mr.  Hsu 
Fo-su,  told  me  some  five  or  six  years  ago  that  it  was  impossible 
for  China  to  escape  a  revolution,  and  as  a  result  of  the  revolu- 
tion could  not  escape  from  becoming  a  republic,  and  by  becom- 
ing a  republic  China  would  be  bound  to  disappear  as  a  nation.  V 
I  have  been  meditating  on  these  words  of  ill  omen  and  sought 
to  help  the  country  to  escape  from  his  prediction  but  I  have 
not  yet  found  the  way. 

IX.     "divinity  doth  hedge  a  king" 

Now  my  friends,  you  have  stated  in  a  worthy  manner  the 
reasons  why  the  republican  form  of  state  cannot  assist  China 
to  maintain  her  existence ;  now  let  me  state  why  it  is  impossible 
to  restore  the  monarchical  system.  The  maintenance  of  the 
dignity  of  a  monarch  depends  on  a  sort  of  mystical,  historical, 
traditional  influence  or  belief.  Such  an  influence  was  capable 
of  producing  unconsciously  and  spontaneously  a  kind  of  effect 
to  assist  directly  or  indirectly  in  maintaining  order  and  im- 


208  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

parting  blessing  to  the  country.  In  this  lies  the  value  of  a 
monarchy.  But  dignity  is  a  thing  not  to  be  trifled  with.  Once 
it  is  trodden  down  it  can  never  rise  again.  We  carve  wood  or 
mould  clay  into  the  image  of  a  person  and  call  it  a  god  (idol). 
Place  it  in  a  beautiful  temple,  and  seat  it  in  a  glorious  shrine 
and  the  people  will  worship  it  and  find  it  miraculously  potent. 
But  suppose  some  insane  person  should  pull  it  down,  tread  it 
under  foot  and  throw  it  into  a  dirty  pond  and  suppose  some  one 
should  discover  it  and  carry  it  back  to  its  original  sacred  abode, 
you  will  find  the  charm  has  gone  from  it.  Ever  since  the  days 
of  monarchical  government  the  people  have  looked  on  the  mon- 
arch with  a  sort  of  divine  reverence,  and  never  dared  to  ques- 
tion or  criticize  his  position.  After  a  period  of  republicanism, 
however,  this  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  common  people  has 
been  abruptly  terminated  with  no  possibility  of  resurrection. 
A  survey  of  all  the  republics  of  the  world  will  tell  us  that 
although  a  large  number  of  them  suffered  under  republican  rule, 
not  a  single  one  succeeded  in  shaking  itself  free  of  the  republi- 
can fetters.  Among  the  world  republics  only  France  has  had 
her  monarchical  system  revived  twice  after  the  republic  was 
first  inaugurated.  The  monarchy,  however,  disappeared  al- 
most immediately.  Thus  we  may  well  understand  how  difficult 
it  is  for  a  country  to  return  to  its  monarchical  state  after  a 
republican  regime.  It  may  be  said  that  China  has  had  only  a 
short  experience  of  the  republican  regime ;  but  it  must  also  be 
remembered  that  the  situation  has  been  developing  for  more 
than  ten  years  and  in  actual  existence  for  about  four  years. 
During  the  period  of  development  the  revolutionists  denounced 
the  monarch  in  most  extravagant  terms  and  compared  him  to 
the  devil.  Their  aim  was  to  kill  the  mystic  belief  of  the  people 
in  the  Emperor ;  for.  only  by  diminishing  the  dignity  of  the 
monarch  could  the  revolutionary  cause  make  headway.  And 
during  and  after  the  change  all  the  official  documents,  school 
textbooks,  press  views  and  social  gossip  have  always  coupled 
the  word  monarch  with  reprobation.  Thus  for  a  long  while 
this  glorious  image  has  been  lying  in  the  dirty  pond !  Leaving 
out  the  question  that  it  is  diflficult  to  restore  the  monarchy  at 
the  present  day,  let  us  suppose  that  by  arbitrary  method  we  do 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  209 

succeed  in  restoring  it.  You  will  then  find  that  it  will  be  im- 
possible for  it  to  regain  in  former  dignity  and  influence. 

Turning  to  another  aspect,  the  most  natural  course  would 
seem  to  be  a  revival  of  the  last  dynasty.  It  might  have  been 
possible  for  a  Charles  II  and  Louis  XVIII  of  China  to  appear 
again,  if  not  for  the  hatred  of  racial  domination.  But  since 
the  last  dynasty  was  Manchu  this  is  out  of  the  question.  If  a 
new  dynasty  were  set  up  it  would  require  many  years  of  hard 
labour  and  a  great  deal  of  organizing  to  succeed.  Even  then 
only  a  few  have  succeeded  in  this  way  in  prolonging  their  dyn- 
asties by  actually  convincing  the  people  of  their  merits. 
Therefore  for  several  years  I  have  been  saying  to  myself  that  it 
would  be  easier  to  strengthen  the  country  and  place  it  on  a 
sounder  basis  if  it  were  possible  for  us  to  return  to  our 
monarchical  state.  And  to  revive  the  monarchical  government 
there  are  two  ways. 

One  is  that  after  thoroughly  reforming  the  internal  admin- 
istration under  the  leadership  of  the  present  Great  President, 
that  is,  when  all  the  neglected  affairs  of  the  country  have  been 
well  attended  to,  every  family  in  the  land  made  happy  and 
prosperous,  the  army  well-trained  and  all  the  necessary  bitter- 
ness "eaten,"  the  President,  when  a  suitable  opportunity  pre- 
sented itself,  should  have  the  rare  fortune  to  gain  a  decisive 
victory  over  a  foreign  foe ;  then  his  achievements  would  be  such 
that  the  millions  of  people  would  compel  him  to  ascend  the 
throne,  and  so  he  would  hand  his  sceptre  on  to  his  descendants 
for  endless  ages. 

The  second  possibility  is  that  after  a  second  great  internal 
disturbance,  resulting  in  the  whole  country  being  thrown  into  a 
state  of  utter  confusion  and  cut  up  into  small  independent 
states,  the  President  should  suppress  them  and  unite  the  coun- 
try into  one  empire.  We  will,  of  course,  not  pray  for  the 
second  possibility  to  come  about  as  then  there  will  be  little  left 
of  the  Chinese  people.  And  no  one  can  be  certain  whether  the 
person  who  shall  succeed  in  suppressing  the  internal  strife  will 
be  a  man  of  our  own  race  or  not.  Thus  the  result  will  not 
differ  very  much  from  national  extinction.  As  to  the  first  pos- 
sibility, we  know  that  an  exceedingly  capable  man  is  now  in  a 


210  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

most  powerful  position ;  let  him  be  given  time  and  he  will  soon 
show  himself  to  be  a  man  of  success.  Does  not  the  last  ray  of 
hope  for  China  depend  on  this? 

X.       THE    UNRIPE    PEAR 

This  is  why  I  say  we  should  not  deliberately  create  trouble 
for  the  Republic  at  this  time  to  add  to  the  worries  of  the 
Great  President  so  that  he  might  devote  his  puissant  thoughts 
and  energies  to  the  institution  of  great  reforms.  Then  our 
final  hope  will  be  satisfied  some  day.  But  what  a  year  and 
what  a  day  we  are  now  living  in?  The  great  crisis  (Note: 
The  reference  is  to  the  Japanese  demands)  has  just  passed  and 
we  have  not  yet  had  time  for  a  respite.  By  the  pressure  of  a 
powerful  neighbour  we  have  been  compelled  to  sign  a  "certain" 
Treaty.  Floods,  drought,  epidemics  and  locusts  visit  our 
country  and  the  land  is  full  of  suffering  while  robbers  plunder 
the  people.  In  ancient  times  this  would  have  been  a  day  for 
the  Imperial  Court  to  remove  their  ornaments  and  live  in 
humiliation.  What  do  the  people  of  our  day  mean  by  advising 
and  urging  the  President  to  ascend  the  throne?  To  pluck  the 
fruit  before  it  is  ripe,  injures  the  roots  of  the  tree ;  and  to  force 
the  premature  birth  of  a  child  kills  the  mother.  If  the  last 
"ray  of  hope"  for  China  should  be  extinguished  by  the  failure 
of  a  premature  attempt  to  force  matters,  how  could  the  advo- 
cates of  such  a  premature  attempt  excuse  themselves  before  the 
whole  country?  Let  the  members  of  the  Chou  An  Hui  meditate 
on  this  point. 

The  odes  say,  "The  people  are  tired.  Let  them  have  a  re- 
spite.'* In  less  than  four  years'  time  from  the  8th  moon  of  the 
year  Hsin  Hai  we  have  had  many  changes.  Like  a  bolt  from 
the  blue  we  had  the  Manchu  Constitution,  then  "the  Republic 
of  Five  Races,"  then  the  Provisional  President,  then  the  formal 
Presidency,  then  the  Provisional  Constitution  was  promulgated, 
then  it  was  suddenly  amended,  suddenly  the  National  Assembly 
was  convoked,  suddenly  it  was  dissolved,  suddenly  we  had  a 
Cabinet  System,  suddenly  it  was  changed  to  a  Presidential 
System,  suddenly  it  was  a  short-term  Presidency,  sud- 
denly it  was  a  life-term  Presidency,  suddenly  the  Provisional 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  211 

Constitution  was  temporarily  placed  in  a  legal  position  as  a 
Permanent  Constitution,  suddenly  the  drafting  of  the  Perma- 
nent Constitution  was  pressed.  Generally  speaking  the  aver- 
age life  of  each  new  system  has  been  less  than  six  months,  after 
which  a  new  system  quite  contrary  to  the  last  succeeded  it. 
Thus  the  whole  country  has  been  at  a  loss  to  know  where  it 
stood  and  how  to  act ;  and  thus  the  dignity  and  credit  of  the 
Government  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  have  been  lowered  down 
to  the  dust.  There  are  many  subjects  respecting  internal  and 
diplomatic  affairs  which  we  can  profitably  discuss.  If  you 
wish  to  serve  the  country  in  a  patriotic  way  you  have  many 
ways  to  do  so.  Why  stir  the  peaceful  water  and  create  a  sea 
of  troubles  by  your  vain  attempt  to  excite  the  people  and  sow 
seeds  of  discord  for  the  State? 

XI.       THE  ASSEVERATIONS  OF  THE  PRESIDENT 

One  or  two  points  more,  and  I  am  finished.  These  will  be  in 
the  nature  of  a  straight  talk  to  the  Chou  An  Hui.  The  ques- 
tion I  would  ask  in  plain  words  is,  who  is  the  person  you  have 
in  your  mind  as  the  future  Emperor.''  Do  you  wish  to  select 
a  person  other  than  the  Great  President  .'^  You  know  only  too 
well  that  the  moment  the  President  relieves  his  shoulder  of  the 
burdens  of  State  the  country  will  be  thrown  into  confusion.  If 
you  entertain  this  plot  with  the  deliberation  of  a  person  bent 
upon  the  destruction  of  the  country,  then  the  four  hundred 
million  of  people  will  not  excuse  you. 

Is  the  man  you  have  in  mind  the  present  President.''  Heaven 
and  earth  as  well  as  all  living  creatures  in  China  and  other 
lands  know  what  the  President  swore  to  when  he  took  the  oath 
of  office  as  President.  Rumours  have  indeed  been  circulated, 
but  whenever  they  reached  the  ears  of  the  President  he  has 
never  hesitated  to  express  his  righteous  mind,  saying  that  no 
amount  of  pressure  could  compel  him  to  change  his  determina- 
tion. All  officials  who  have  come  into  close  contact  with  the 
President  have  heard  such  sentiments  from  the  lips  of  the 
President  on  not  a  few  occasions.  To  me  his  words  are  still 
ringing  in  my  ears.  General  Feng  Kuo-chang  has  conveyed  to 
me  what  he  was  told  by  the  President.     He  says  that  the  Presi- 


212  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

ident  has  prepared  a  "few  rooms"  in  England,  and  that  if  the 
people  would  not  spare  him  he  would  flee  to  the  refuge  he  has 
prepared.  Thus  we  may  clearly  see  how  determined  the  Presi- 
dent is.  Can  it  be  possible  that  you  have  never  heard  of  this 
and  thus  raise  this  extraordinary  subject  without  any  cause. 
If  the  situation  should  become  such  that  the  President  should 
be  compelled  to  carry  out  his  threat  and  desert  the  Palace,  what 
would  you  say  and  do  then? 

Or,  perhaps,  you  are  measuring  the  lordly  conduct  of  a  gen- 
tleman with  the  heart  of  a  mean  man,  saying  to  yourself  that 
what  the  President  has  been  saying  cannot  be  the  truth,  but, 
as  Confucius  has  said,  "say  you  are  not  but  make  a  point  to 
do  it,"  and  that,  knowing  that  he  would  not  condemn  you,  you 
have  taken  the  risk.  If  so,  then  what  do  you  take  the  Presi- 
dent for?  To  go  back  on  one's  words  is  an  act  despised  by  a 
vagabond.  To  suggest  such  an  act  as  being  capable  of  the 
President  is  an  insult,  the  hideousness  of  which  cannot  be 
equalled  by  the  number  of  hairs  on  one's  head.  Any  one  guilty 
of  such  an  insult  should  not  be  spared  by  the  four  hundred  mil- 
lion of  people. 

Xn.   THE  CHOU  AN   HUI  AND  THE  LAW 

Next  let  me  ask  if  you  have  read  the  Provisional  Constitu- 
tion, the  Provisional  Code,  the  Meeting  and  Association  Law, 
the  Press  Regulations,  the  various  mandates  bearing  on  the 
punishment  of  persons  who  dare  conspire  against  the  existing 
form  of  state?  Do  you  not  know  that  you,  as  citizens  of  the 
Republic,  must  in  duty  bound  observe  the  Constitution  and 
obey  the  laws  and  mandates?  Yet  you  have  dared  openly  to 
call  together  your  partisans  and  incite  a  revolution  (the  rec- 
ognized definition  in  political  science  for  revolution  is  "to 
change  the  existing  form  of  state").  As  the  Judiciary  have 
not  been  courageous  enough  to  deal  with  you  since  you  are 
all  so  closely  in  touch  with  the  President,  you  have  become 
bolder  still  and  carry  out  your  sinister  scheme  in  broad  day- 
light. I  do  not  wish  to  say  what  sort  of  peace  you  are  planning 
for  China ;  but  this  much  I  know,  that  the  law  has  been  violated 
by  you  to  the  last  letter.     I  will  be  silent  if  you  believe  that  a 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  213 

nation  can  be  governed  without  law.     Otherwise  tell  me  what 
you  have  got  to  say? 

It  is  quite  apparent  that  you  will  not  be  satisfied  with  mere 
shouting  and  what  you  aim  at  is  the  actual  fulfilment  of  your 
expectations.  That  is,  you  wish  that  once  the  expected  mon- 
archy is  established  it  may  continue  for  ever.  Now  by  what 
principle  can  such  a  monarchy  continue  for  ever,  except  that 
the  laws  and  orders  of  that  dynasty  be  obeyed,  and  obeyed  im- 
plicitly by  all,  from  the  Court  down  to  the  common  people? 
For  one  to  adopt  methods  that  violate  the  law  while  engaged 
in  creating  a  new  dynasty  is  like  a  man,  who  to  secure  a  wife, 
induces  the  virtuous  virgin  to  commit  fornication  with  him,  on 
the  plea  that  as  a  marriage  will  be  arranged  preservation  of 
her  virtue  need  not  be  insisted  upon.  Can  such  a  man  blame 
his  wife  for  immorality  after  marriage?  If,  while  still  citizens 
of  a  republican  country,  one  may  openly  and  boldly  call  meet- 
ings and  organize  societies  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Republic, 
who  shall  say  that  we  may  not  in  due  time  openly  and  boldly 
call  meetings  and  organize  societies  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
monarchy?  What  shall  you  say  if  in  future  there  should  be 
another  foreign  doctor  to  suggest  another  theory  and  another 
society  to  engage  in  another  form  of  activity?  The  Odes  have 
it,  "To  prevent  the  monkey  from  climbing  a  tree  is  like  putting 
mud  on  a  man  in  the  mire."  For  a  person  to  adopt  such 
methods  while  engaged  in  the  making  of  a  dynasty  is  the  height 
of  folly.  Mencius  says,  "a  Chuntse  when  creating  a  dynasty 
aims  at  things  that  can  be  handed  down  as  good  examples." 
Is  it  not  the  greatest  misfortune  to  set  up  an  example  that  can- 
not be  handed  down  as  a  precedent?  The  present  state  of  af- 
fairs is  causing  me  no  small  amount  of  anxiety. 

Xm.       A  POSTSCRIPT 

A  copy  of  Yang  Tu's  pamphlet,  "Constitutional  Monarchy 
or  the  Salvation  of  China"  reached  me  after  I  had  finished 
writing  the  above  discussion.  On  a  casual  glance  through  it  I 
alighted  upon  the  following  passage :  "Wliat  is  known  as  a  con- 
stitutional country  is  a  country  which  has  definite  laws  and  in 
which  no  one,  from  the  ruler  down  to  the  common  people,  can 


214  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

take  any  action  that  is  not  permitted  by  law.  Good  men  can- 
not do  good  outside  of  the  bounds  of  law ;  neither  can  bad  men 
do  evil  in  violation  of  it."  This  is  indeed  a  passage  that 
breathes  the  very  spirit  of  constitutionalism.  Let  us  ask  Mr. 
Yang  if  the  activities  of  the  Chou  An  Hui,  of  which  he  is  the 
President,  are  acts  within  the  bounds  of  law.?  Mr.  Yang  is  a 
good  man.  It  is  therefore  possible  for  him  to  believe  that  he 
is  not  doing  evil  in  violation  of  the  law ;  but  has  he  not  at  least 
been  doing  good  outside  of  the  bounds  of  law?  If  an  advocate 
of  constitutional  monarchy  is  capable  of  doing  such  unlawful 
acts,  we  may  easily  imagine  what  sort  of  a  constitutional  mon- 
archy he  advocates ;  and  we  may  also  easily  imagine  what  the 
fate  of  his  constitutional  monarchy  will  be. 

Mencius  says,  "Am  I  argumentative.''  I  cannot  help  it." 
Who  would  have  thought  that  a  man,  who  cares  not  for  the 
question  of  the  form  of  state  like  myself  and  who  opposed  you — 
Mr.  Yang  Tu — during  your  first  campaign  for  the  change  in 
the  form  of  State — you  were  a  Republican  then — would  be 
opposing  you  again  now  that  you  are  engaged  in  advocating 
another  change  in  the  form  of  state?  A  change  in  the  form 
of  government  is  a  manifestation  of  progress  while  a  change 
in  the  status  of  the  State  is  a  sign  of  revolution.  The  path  of 
progress  leads  to  further  progress,  but  the  path  of  revolution 
leads  to  more  revolution.  This  is  a  fact  proved  by  theory  as 
well  as  actual  experience.  Therefore  a  man  who  has  any  love 
for  his  country,  is  afraid  to  mention  revolution;  and  as  for 
myself  I  am  always  opposed  to  revolution.  I  am  now  opposing 
your  theory  of  monarchical  revolution,  just  as  I  once  opposed 
your  theory  of  republican  revolution,  in  the  same  spirit,  and  I 
am  doing  the  same  duty.  My  belief  is  that  since  the  country 
is  now  in  a  most  weakened  state,  we  may  yet  fail  even  if  we  do 
all  we  can  at  all  times  to  nurse  its  wound  and  gather  up  its 
scattered  strength.  How  can  any  one  devote  his  time  and 
energy  to  the  discussion  of  a  question  of  no  importance  such 
as  the  form  of  state,  and  so  obstruct  the  progress  of  the  ad- 
ministration? But  this  is  not  all.  The  whole  country  is  now 
stirred  up  to  an  excited  state  and  is  wondering  how  long  this 
ever-changing  situation  is  going  to  stop.     The  loss  caused  by 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  215 

this  state  of  affairs,  though  unnoticed,  is  incalculable.  In  the 
Odes,  it  is  written  "Alas !  my  brethren.  Befriended  of  the 
countrymen.  No  one  wants  rebellion.  What  has  no  parents?" 
Let  the  critics  remember  this — let  them  remember. 

Some  will  say  to  me  that  a  revolution  is  an  unavoidable  thing. 
Of  all  things  only  the  facts  cannot  be  undone.  Why  then 
should  I  bother  myself  especially  as  my  last  effort  fell  on  deaf 
ears.  This  I  realize ;  but  it  is  not  my  nature  to  abandon  what 
is  my  conviction.  Therefore,  although  aware  of  the  futility 
of  my  words,  I  cannot  refrain  from  uttering  them  all  the  same. 
Chu  Yuan  drowned  himself  in  the  Pilo  and  Chia  Sheng  died 
from  his  horse.  Ask  them  why  they  did  these  things,  they  will 
say  they  did  not  know.  Once  I  wrote  a  piece  of  poetry  con- 
taining the  following  lines : 

"Ten  years  after  you  will  think  of  me, 

The  country  is  excited.     To  whom  shall  I  speak.'"' 

I  have  spoken  much  in  my  life,  and  all  my  words  have  become 
subjects  for  meditation  ten  years  after  they  were  uttered. 
Never,  however,  have  any  of  my  words  attracted  the  attention 
of  my  own  countrymen  before  a  decade  has  spent  itself.  Is  it 
a  misfortune  for  my  words  or  a  misfortune  to  the  Country? 
My  hope  is  that  there  will  be  no  occasion  for  the  country  to 
think  of  my  present  words  ten  years  hence. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE   DREAM   EMPIRE 
"the  people's  voice,"  and  the  action  of  the  powers 

(from    SEPTEMBER    TO    DECEMBER,    1915) 

The  effect  of  Liang  Ch'i-chao's  appeal  was  noticeable 
at  once:  there  were  ominous  mutterings  among  all  the 
great  class  of  "intellectuals"  who  form  such  a  remark- 
able element  throughout  the  country.  Nevertheless 
there  were  no  overt  acts  attempted  against  the  authority 
of  Peking.  Although  literary  and  liberal  China  was 
now  thoroughly  convinced  that  the  usurpation  which 
Yuan  Shih-kai  proposed  to  practise  would  be  a  na- 
tional disgrace  and  lead  to  far-reaching  complications, 
this  force  were  too  scattered  and  too  much  under  the 
power  of  the  military  to  tender  at  once  any  active  op- 
position as  would  have  been  the  case  in  Western  coun- 
tries. Yuan  Shih-kai,  measuring  this  situation  very 
accurately,  and  aware  that  he  could  easily  become  an 
object  of  popular  detestation  if  the  people  followed  the 
lead  of  the  scholars,  decided  to  place  himself  outside 
and  beyond  the  controversy  by  throwing  the  entire  re- 
sponsibility on  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan,  the  puppet  Sen- 
ate he  had  erected  in  place  of  the  parliament  destroyed 
by  his  coup  d'etat  of  the  4th  November,  1913.  In  a 
message  issued  to  that  body  on  the  6th  September,  1915, 
he  declared  that  although  in  his  opinion  the  time  was 
inappropriate  for  making  any  change  in  the  form  of 
State,  the  matter  demanded  the  most  careful  and  seri- 

216 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  217 

ous  consideration  which  he  had  no  doubt  would  be  given 
to  it.  If  a  change  of  so  momentous  a  character  as  was 
now  being  pubHcly  advocated  were  decided  in  too  great 
a  haste  it  might  create  grave  complications:  therefore 
the  opinion  of  the  nation  should  be  consulted  by  the 
method  of  the  ballot.  And  with  this  nunc  dimittis  he 
officially  washed  his  hands  of  a  plot  in  which  he  had  been 
the  prime  mover. 

The  Senate  now  openly  delivered  itself  over  to  the 
accomphshment  of  the  scheme  which  had  been  broached 
by  Yang  Tu,  the  monarchist  pamphleteer.  Although 
this  individual  still  posed  as  the  leader  of  the  movement, 
in  reality  he  was  nothing  but  the  tool  of  a  remarkable 
man,  one  Liang  Shih-yi,  famous  throughout  the  coun- 
try as  the  most  unscrupulous  and  adroit  pohtician  the 
Revolution  had  thrown  up.  This  person,  who  is  known 
to  have  been  gravely  implicated  in  many  assassina- 
tions, and  who  was  the  instrument  used  in  1912  by 
Yuan  Shih-kai  to  persuade  the  Manchu  Imperial  Fam- 
ily to  abdicate,  had  in  a  brief  four  years  accumulated 
a  vast  fortune  by  the  manipulations  he  had  indulged  in 
as  Director-General  of  The  Bank  of  Communications, 
an  institution  which,  because  it  disposed  of  all  the  rail- 
way receipts,  was  always  in  funds  even  when  the  Cen- 
tral Treasury  itself  was  empty.  By  making  himself 
financially  indispensable  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  he  had  be- 
come recognized  as  the  power  behind  the  Throne;  for 
although,  owing  to  foreign  clamour,  he  had  been  dis- 
missed from  his  old  office  of  Chief  Secretary  to  the 
President  (which  he  had  utilized  to  effect  the  sale  of 
offices  far  and  wide)  he  was  a  daily  visitor  to  the  Presi- 
dential Palace  and  his  creatures  daily  pulled  all  the 
numerous  strings. 


218  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

The  scheme  now  adopted  by  the  Senate  was  to  cause 
the  provinces  to  flood  Peking  with  petitions,  sent  up 
through  the  agency  of  "The  Society  for  the  Preserva- 
tion of  Peace,"  demanding  that  the  Repubhc  be  replaced 
by  that  form  of  government  which  the  people  alone 
understood,  the  name  Constitutional  IMonarchy  being 
selected  merely  as  a  piece  of  political  window-dressing 
to  please  the  foreign  world.  A  vast  amount  of  or- 
ganizing had  to  be  done  behind  the  scenes  before  the 
preliminaries  were  completed :  but  on  the  6th  October 
the  scheme  was  so  far  advanced  that  in  response  to 
"hosts  of  petitions"  the  Senate,  sitting  in  its  capacity 
of  Legislative  Chamber  (Li  Fa  Yuan)  passed  a  so- 
called  King-making  bill  in  which  elaborate  regulations 
were  adopted  for  referring  the  question  under  discus- 
sion to  a  provincial  referendum.  According  to  this 
naive  document  the  provinces  were  to  be  organized  into 
electoral  colleges,  and  the  votes  of  the  electors,  after 
being  recorded,  were  to  be  sent  up  to  Peking  for  scru- 
tiny. Some  attempt  was  made  to  follow  Dr.  Good- 
now's  advice  to  secure  as  far  as  possible  that  the  vari- 
ous classes  of  the  community  should  be  specially  rep- 
resented: and  provision  was  therefore  made  in  the  vot- 
ing for  the  inclusion  of  "learned  scholars,"  Chambers 
of  Commerce,  and  "oversea  merchants,"  whose  votes 
were  to  be  directly  recorded  by  their  special  delegates. 
To  secure  uniformly  satisfactory  results,  the  whole  elec- 
tion was  placed  absolutely  and  without  restriction  in 
the  hands  of  the  high  provincial  authorities,  who  were 
invited  to  bestow  on  the  matter  their  most  earnest  at- 
tention. 

In  a  Mandate,  issued  in  response  to  this  Bill,  Yuan 
Shih-kai  merely  limits  himself  to  handing  over  the  con- 


MoDKi.  Military  J'oi.icE  ix  I*i:kixg  Under  the  Command 
OF  General  Munthe,  a  Norwegian,  Raised  for  the 
J'rotection  of  thf.  Legation  Qtarter 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  219 

trol  of  the  elections  and  voting  to  the  local  authorities, 
safe  in  the  knowledge  that  every  detail  of  the  plot  had 
been  carefully  worked  out  in  advance.  By  this  time 
the  fact  that  a  serious  and  dangerous  movement  was 
being  actively  pushed  had  been  well-impressed  on  the 
Peking  Legations,  and  some  anxiety  was  publicly  mani- 
fested. It  was  known  that  Japan,  as  the  active  enemy 
of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  could  not  remain  permanently  silent : 
and  on  the  28th  October  in  association  with  Great  Brit- 
ain and  Russia,  she  indeed  made  official  inquiries  at 
the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  regarding  the  meaning  of 
the  movement.  She  was  careful,  however,  to  declare 
that  it  was  her  solicitude  for  the  general  peace  that  alone 
dictated  her  action.^  Nevertheless,  her  warning  had  an 
unmistakable  note  about  it  and  occasioned  grave  an- 
xiety, since  the  ultimatum  of  the  previous  May  in  con- 
nection with  the  Twenty-one  Demands  had  not  been 
forgotten.  At  the  beginning  of  November  the  Chinese 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  replying  verbally  to  these 
representations,  alleged  that  the  movement  had  gone 
too  far  for  it  to  be  stopped  and  insisted  that  no  appre- 

1  A  very  remarkable  illustration  of  the  manner  in  which  Yuan  Shih-kai 
was  trapped  by  official  Japan  during  the  monarchist  movement  has  re- 
cently been  extensively  quoled  in  the  Far  Eastern  press.  Here  is  the  sub- 
stance of  a  Japanese  (vernacular)  newspaper  account  showing  the  uses  to 
which  Japanese  politicians   put  the  Press: 

"...  When  that  question  was  being  hotly  discussed  in  China  Marquis 
Okuma,  interviewed  by  the  Press,  stated  that  monarchy  was  the  right  form 
of  government  for  China  ^nd  that  in  case  a  monarchical  regime  was  re- 
vived Yuan  Shih-kai  was  the  only  suitable  person  to  sit  on  the  Throne. 
When  this  statement  by  Marquis  Okuma  was  published  in  the  Japanese 
papers,  Yuan  Shih-kai  naturally  concluded  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, at  the  head  of  which  Marquis  Okuma  was,  was  favourably  disposed 
towards  him  and  the  monarchical  movement.  It  can  well  be  imagined, 
therefore,  how  intense  was  his  surprise  when  he  later  received  a  warning 
from  the  Japanese  Government  against  the  resuscitation  of  the  monarchy 
in  China.  When  this  inconsistency  in  the  Marquis's  actions  was  called  in 
question  in  the  Japanese  House  of  Representatives,  the  ex-Premier  abso- 
lutely denied  the  truth  of  the  statement  attributed  to  him  by  the  Japanese 
papers,  without  any  show  of  hesitancy,  and  thus  boldly  shirked  the  re- 
sponsibility which,  in  reality,  lay  on  him.  .  .  ." 


220  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

hensions  need  be  felt  by  the  Foreign  Powers  regarding 
the  pubHc  safety.  Dissatisfied  by  this  reply  all  the  En- 
tente Powers,  now  including  France  and  Italy,  re- 
newed their  representations,  receiving  a  few  days  later 
a  formal  Note  in  which  absolute  guarantees  were  given 
that  law  and  order  would  be  sedulously  preserved. 
Baffled  by  this  firmness,  and  conscious  that  further  in- 
tervention in  such  matter  would  be  fraught  with  grave 
difficulties,  the  Entente  Powers  decided  to  maintain  a 
watchful  attitude  but  to  do  no  more  publicly.  Conse- 
quently events  marched  forward  so  rapidlly  that  by 
December  the  deed  was  done,  and  Yuan  Shih-kai  had 
apparently  been  elected  unanimously  Emperor  of  China 
by  the  provincial  ballot. 

The  explanation  of  this  extraordinary  business  was 
only  made  public  months  later  with  the  outbreak  of  the 
Yunnan  rebellion  and  the  secession  of  the  Southern 
provinces.  In  a  remarkable  publication,  entitled  satir- 
ically "The  People's  Will,"  the  Southern  RepubHcan 
Party,  which  now  possessed  access  to  all  the  confi- 
dential archives  of  the  provinces,  published  in  full  the 
secret  instructions  from  Peking  which  had  brought 
about  this  elaborate  comedy.  Though  considerations 
of  space  prevent  all  documents  being  included  in  our 
analysis,  the  salient  ones  are  here  textually  quoted  so 
as  to  exhibit  in  its  proper  historical  light  the  character 
of  the  chief  actor,  and  the  regime  the  Powers  had  sup- 
ported— until  they  were  forced  by  Japan  to  be  more 
honest.  These  documents,  consisting  mainly  of  tele- 
graphic despatches  sent  from  Peking  to  the  provinces, 
do  more  to  explain  the  working  of  the  Government  of 
China  than  a  dozen  treatises;  for  they  drag  into  the 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  221 

garish  light  of  day  the  most  secret  Yamen  machinery 
and  show  precisely  how  it  is  worked. 

The  play  was  set  in  motion  by  a  circular  code  tele- 
gi-am  sent  out  on  the  30th  August  by  Tuan  Chih-kuei, 
Governor  of  Moukden  and  one  of  Yuan  Shih-kai's 
most  trusted  lieutenants,  the  device  of  utilizing  a  centre 
other  than  the  capital  to  propagate  revolutionary  ideas 
being  a  familiar  one  and  looked  upon  as  a  very  discreet 
procedure.  This  initial  telegram  is  a  document  that 
speaks  for  itself: 

CODE  TELEGRAM  DATED  AUGUST  30,  1915,  FROM  TUAN  CHI-KUEI, 
MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  MOUKDEN,  ET  ALIA,  CONTAINING  IN- 
STRUCTIONS FOR  PRESENTING  PETITIONS  TO  PEKING  IN  THE 
NAME  OF  THE  CITIZENS  OF  THE  PROVINCES 

To  the  Military  and  Civil  Governors  of  the  Provinces: — 
(To  be  deciphered  personally  vt^ith  the  Council  of  State  Code) 

The  proposal  of  changing  the  form  of  the  State  into  a  mon- 
archy having  been  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  provinces,  the 
first  step  to  be  taken  has  now  to  be  decided.  We  propose  that 
petitions  be  sent  in  the  name  of  the  citizens  of  the  respective 
provinces  to  the  Senate  acting  in  the  capacity  of  Legislative 
Chamber,  so  as  to  demonstrate  the  wish  of  the  people  to  have  a 
monarchy.  The  acting  Legislative  Chamber  will  then  decide 
upon  the  course  to  be  adopted. 

The  plan  suggested  is  for  each  province  to  send  in  a  separate 
petition,  the  draft  of  which  will  be  made  in  Peking  and  wired 
to  the  respective  provinces  in  due  course.  If  you  approve, 
you  will  insert  your  name  as  well  as  those  of  the  gentry  and 
merchants  of  the  province  who  agree  to  the  draft.  These  peti- 
tions are  to  be  presented  one  by  one  to  the  Legislative  Chamber, 
as  soon  as  it  is  convoked.  At  all  events,  the  change  in  the 
form  of  the  State  will  have  to  be  effected  under  the  colour  of 
carrying  out  the  people's  will. 

As  leading  members  of  political  and  military  bodies,  we  should 
wait  till  the  opportune  moment  arrives  when  we  will  give  col- 


222  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

lateral  support  to  the  movement.     Details  of  the  plan  will  be 
made  known  to  you  from  time  to  time. 

This  method  of  circular  telegrams,  which  had  bee.n 
inherited  from  the  last  days  of  the  Manchus,  and  vastly 
extended  during  the  po5^-revolutionary  period,  was  now 
to  be  used  to  the  very  utmost  in  indoctrinating  the  prov- 
inces with  the  idea  that  not  only  was  the  Republic 
doomed  but  that  prompt  steps  must  be  taken  to  erect 
the  Constitutional  Monarchy  by  use  of  fictitious  legal 
machinery  so  that  it  should  not  be  said  that  the  whole 
enterprise  was  a  mere  plot.  Accordingly,  on  the  10th 
September,  as  a  sequel  to  the  telegram  we  have  just 
quoted,  an  enormous  circular  message  of  several  thou- 
sand words  was  sent  in  code  from  Peking  to  all  the 
JMilitary  and  Civil  Governors  in  the  provinces  instruct- 
ing them  precisely  how  to  act  in  order  to  throw  a  cloak 
over  the  nefarious  deed.  After  explaining  the  so-called 
"Law  on  the  General  Convention  of  the  Citizens'  Rep- 
resentatives" (i.  e.  national  referendum)  the  following 
illuminating  sentences  occur  which  require  no  comment 
showing  as  they  do  what  apt  pupils  reactionary  Chinese 
are  in  the  matter  of  ballot-fraud. 

...  (1)  The  fact  that  no  fewer  than  one  hundred  petitions 
for  a  change  in  the  form  of  State  have  been  received  from  peo- 
ple residing  in  all  parts  of  the  country  shows  that  the  people 
are  of  one  mind  concerning  this  matter.  Hence  the  words  in  the 
"General  Convention  Law" :  "to  be  decided  by  the  General  Con- 
vention of  the  Citizens'  Representatives,"  refer  to  nothing 
more  than  the  formal  approval  of  the  Convention  and  are  by 
no  means  intended  to  give  room  for  discussion  of  anj'  kind. 
Indeed,  it  was  never  intended  that  the  citizens  should  have  any 
choice  between  a  republic  and  a  monarchy.  For  this  reason  at 
the  time  of  voting  all  the  representatives  must  be  made  unani- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  223 

mously  to  advocate  a  change  of  the  Republic  into  a  Monarchy. 

It  behooves  jou,  therefore,  prior  to  the  election  and  voting, 
privately  to  search  for  such  persons  as  are  willing  to  express 
the  people's  will  in  the  sense  above  indicated.  You  will  also 
make  the  necessary  arrangements  beforehand,  and  devise  every 
means  to  have  such  persons  elected,  so  that  there  may  be  no 
divergence  of  opinion  when  the  time  arrives  for  putting  the 
form  of  the  State  to  the  vote. 

(2)  Article  2  provides:  "The  citizens'  representatives  shall 
be  elected  by  separate  ballot  signed  by  the  person  voting.  The 
person  who  obtains  the  greatest  number  of  votes  cast  shall  be 
declared  elected." 

The  citizens'  representatives,  though  nominally  elected  by 
the  electors,  are  really  appointed  beforehand  by  you  acting  in 
the  capacity  of  Superintendent  of  Election.  The  principle  of 
separate  signed  ballot  is  adopted  in  this  article  with  the  object 
of  preventing  the  voters  from  casting  their  votes  otherwise 
than  as  directed,  and  of  awakening  in  them  a  sense  of  responsi- 
bility for  their  votes.  .  .  . 

These  admirable  principles  having  been  officially  laid 
down  by  Peking,  it  is  not  hard  to  understand  that  the 
Military  and  Civil  Governors  in  the  provinces,  being 
anxious  to  retain  their  posts  and  conciliate  the  great 
personage  who  would  be  king,  gave  the  problem  their 
most  earnest  attention,  and  left  no  stone  unturned  to 
secure  that  there  should  be  no  awkward  contretemps. 
On  the  28th  September,  the  Peking  Government,  be- 
ing now  entirely  surrendered  into  the  hands  of  the  plot- 
ters, thought  it  advisable  to  give  the  common  people  a 
direct  hint  of  what  was  coming,  by  sending  circular  in- 
structions regarding  the  non-observance  of  the  Repub- 
lican anniversary  (lOth  October).  The  message  in 
question  is  so  frankly  ingenuous  that  it  merits  inclusion 
in  this  singular  dossier: 


224  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

CODE  TEUEGRAM  DATED  SEPTEMBER  26,  1915,  FROM  THE  COUNCIL 
OF  STATE  TO  THE  MILITARY  AND  CIVIL  GOVERNORS  OF  THE 
PROVINCES  RESPECTING  THE  NON-OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  AJST- 
NIVERSARY  OF  THE  REPUBLIC 

To  the  Military  and  Civil  Governors  and  the  Military  Commis- 
sioners of  the  Provinces  and  the  Intendant  of  Shanghai : — 

(Code  Telegram) 

Now  that  a  monarchical  form  of  government  has  been  advo- 
cated, the  National  Anniversary  in  commemoration  of  the  Re- 
public should,  of  course,  be  observed  with  least  possible  dis- 
play, under  the  pretext  either  of  the  necessity  for  economy 
owing  to  the  impoverished  condition  of  the  people,  or  of  the 
advisability  of  celebrating  the  occasion  quietly  so  as  to  prevent 
disturbances  arising  in  consequence  of  the  many  rumours  now 
afloat.  In  this  way  public  peace  and  order  may  be  maintained 
on  the  one  hand,  money  and  trouble  saved  on  the  other.  How 
to  put  this  suggestion  into  practice  will  be  left  to  your  dis- 
cretion. (Signed)      Council  of  State. 

By  October  such  progress  had  been  made  in  Peking 
in  the  general  work  of  organizing  this  coup  d'etat  that 
as  we  have,  seen,  the  Senate  had  passed  on  the  6th  of 
that  month  the  so-called  "King-making  Bill."  The 
very  next  day,  so  that  nothing  should  be  left  in  doubt, 
the  following  circular  telegram  was  dispatched  to  all 
the  provinces : 

code  telegram  dated  OCTOBER  7,  1915,  from  CHU  CHI-CHUN, 
MINISTER  OF  THE  INTERIOR,  ET  ALIA,  DEVISING  PLANS  FOR. 
NOMINATING    YUAN    SHIH-KAI    AS    EMPEROR 

To  the  Military  and  Civil  Governors  of  the  Provinces : — ■ 

(To  be  deciphered  with  the  Hua  Code) 

Our  telegram  of  the  12th  ult.  must  have  reached  you  by  this 
time. 

The  Administrative  Council,  at  a  meeting  held  on  the  4th 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  225 

inst.,  passed  the  Bill  for  a  General  Convention  of  the  Citizens' 
Representatives.  Article  12  of  the  Bill  was  amended  so  as  to 
contain  the  following  clause: — "The  Superintendent  of  Elec- 
tion may,  in  case  of  necessity,  delegate  his  functions  to  the 
several  district  magistrates."  This  will  soon  be  communicated 
officially  to  the  provinces.  You  are  therefore  requested  to 
make  the  necessary  preparations  beforehand  in  accordance 
with  the  instructions  contained  in  our  telegram  of  the  29th 
September. 

We  propose  that  the  following  steps  be  taken  after  the  votes 
have  been  duly  polled: — 

(1)  After  the  form  of  the  state  has  been  put  to  the  vote, 
the  result  should  be  reported  to  the  sovereign  (meaning  Yuan- 
shihkai)  and  to  the  Administrative  Council  in  the  name  of  the 
General  Convention  of  the  Citizens'  Representatives. 

(2)  In  the  telegrams  to  be  sent  by  the  General  Convention 
of  the  Citizens'  Representatives  for  nominating  the  emperor, 
the  following  words  should  be  specifically  used :  "We  respect- 
fully nominate  the  present  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  as  Em- 
peror of  the  Chinese  Empire." 

(3)  The  telegrams  investing  the  Administrative  Council  with 
general  powers  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  General  Convention  of 
the  Citizens'  Representatives  should  be  dispatched  in  the  name 
of  the  General  Convention  of  the  Citizens  of  the  Provinces. 

The  drafts  of  the  dispatches  under  the  above-mentioned  three 
heads  will  be  wired  to  you  beforehand.  As  soon  as  the  votes 
are  cast,  these  are  to  be  shown  to  the  representatives,  who  will 
sign  them  after  perusal.  Peking  should  be  immediately  in- 
formed by  telegram. 

As  for  the  telegrams  to  be  sent  by  the  commercial,  military, 
and  political  bodies,  they  should  bear  as  many  signatures  as 
possible,  and  be  wired  to  the  Central  Government  within  three 
days  after  the  voting. 

When  the  enthronement  is  promulgated  by  edict,  letters  of 
congratulation  from  the  General  Convention  of  the  Citizens' 
Representatives,  as  well  as  from  the  commercial,  military,  and 
political  bodies,  will  also  have  to  be  sent  in.  You  are  therefore 
requested  to  draw  up  these  letters  in  advance. 


226  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

This  is  specially  wired  for  your  information  beforehand. 
The  details  will  be  communicated  by  letter. 

In  ordinary  circumstances  it  would  have  been  thought 
that  sufficiently  implicit  instructions  had  ali'eady  been 
given  to  permit  leaving  the  matter  in  the  hands  of  the 
provincial  authorities.  Great  anxiety,  however,  was 
beginning  to  reign  in  Peking  owing  to  continual 
rumours  that  dangerous  opposition,  both  internal  and 
external,  was  developing.  It  was  therefore  held  neces- 
sary to  clinch  the  matter  in  such  a  way  that  no  possible 
questions  should  be  raised  later.  Accordingly,  before 
the  end  of  October — and  only  two  days  before  the  "ad- 
vice" was  tendered  by  Japan  and  her  Allies, — the  fol- 
lowing additional  instructions  were  telegraphed  whole- 
sale to  the  provinces,  being  purposely  designed  to  make 
it  absolutely  impossible  for  any  slip  to  occur  between 
cup  and  lip.  The  careful  student  will  not  fail  to  no- 
tice in  these  remarkable  messages  that  as  the  game  de- 
velops, all  disguise  is  thrown  to  the  four  winds,  and 
the  central  and  only  important  point,  namely  the 
promfjt  election  and  enthronement  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  as 
Emperor,  insisted  on  with  almost  indecent  directness, 
every  possible  precaution  being  taken  to  secure  that 
end: 

CODE  TELEGRAM  DATED  OCTOBER  26,  1915,  FROM  CHU  CHI-CHUN, 
MINISTER  OF  THE  INTERIOR,  ET  ALIA,  RESPECTING  THE  NOM- 
INATION   OF    YUAN    SHIH-KAI    AS    EMPEROR 

To  the  Military  and  Civil  Governors  of  the  Provinces : — 

(To  be  deciphered  with  the  Hua  Code) 

Your  telegram  of  the  24th  inst.  came  duly  to  hand. 
After  the  form  of  the  state  has  been  put  to  the  vote,  the 
nomination  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  as  emperor  should  be  made  forth- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  227 

with  without  further  voting.  You  should  address  the  repre- 
sentatives and  tell  them  that  a  monarchy  having  been  decided 
on,  not  even  a  single  day  should  pass  without  an  emperor ;  that 
the  citizens'  representatives  present  should  nominate  Yuan  Shih- 
kai  as  the  Great  Emperor  of  the  Chinese  Empire;  and  that  if 
they  are  in  favour  of  the  proposal,  they  should  signify  their 
assent  by  standing  up.  This  done,  the  text  of  the  proposed 
letter  of  nomination  from  the  citizens  should  be  handed  to  the 
representatives  for  their  signatures ;  after  which  you  should 
again  address  them  to  the  effect  that  in  all  matters  concerning 
the  nomination  and  the  petition  for  immediate  enthronement, 
they  may,  in  the  name  of  the  citizens'  representatives,  invest 
the  acting  Legislative  Council  with  general  powers  to  act  on 
their  behalf  and  to  do  the  necessary  things  until  their  petition 
is  granted.  The  text  (already  prepared)  of  the  proposed 
telegram  from  the  citizens'  representatives  to  the  acting  Leg- 
islative Council  should  then  be  shown  to  the  representatives 
for  approval.  Whereupon  three  separate  telegrams  are  to  be 
drawn  up :  one  giving  the  number  of  votes  in  favour  of  a  change 
in  the  form  of  the  state,  one  containing  the  original  text  of  the 
letter  of  nomination,  and  the  third  concerning  the  vesting  of 
the  acting  Legislative  Council  with  general  powers  to  act  on 
behalf  of  the  citizens'  representatives.  These  should  be  sent 
officially  to  the  acting  Legislative  Council  in  the  name  of  the 
citizens'  representatives.  You  should  at  the  same  time  wire  to 
the  President  all  that  has  taken  place.  The  votes  and  the 
letter  of  nomination  are  to  be  forwarded  to  Peking  in  due 
course. 

As  for  the  exact  words  to  be  inserted  in  the  letter  of  nomina- 
tion, they  have  been  communicated  to  you  in  our  telegram  of 
the  23rd  inst.  These  characters,  forty-five  in  all,  must  on  no 
account  be  altered.  The  rest  of  the  text  is  left  to  your  dis- 
cretion. 

We  may  add  that  since  the  letter  of  nomination  and  the 
vesting  of  the  acting  Legislative  Council  with  general  powers 
to  act  on  behalf  of  the  citizens'  representatives  are  matters 
which  transgress  the  bounds  of  the  law,  you  are  earnestly  re- 
quested not  to  send  to  the  National  Convention  Bureau  any 


228  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

telegraphic  enquiry  concerning  them,  so  that  the  latter  may  not 
find  itself  in  the  awkward  position  of  having  to  reply. 

Two  days  after  this  telegram  had  been  dispatched 
the  long-feared  action  on  the  part  of  Japan  had  been 
taken  and  a  new  situation  had  been  created.  The  Japa- 
nese "advice"  of  the  28th  October  was  in  fact  a  veritable 
bombshell  playing  havoc  with  the  house  of  cards  which 
had  been  so  carefully  erected.  But  the  intrigue  had 
gone  so  far,  and  the  prizes  to  be  won  by  the  monarchical 
supporters  were  so  great  that  nothing  could  induce 
them  to  retrace  their  footsteps.  For  a  week  and  more 
a  desperate  struggle  went  on  behind  the  scenes  in  the 
Presidential  Palace,  since  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  too  astute 
a  man  not  to  understand  that  a  most  perilous  situation 
was  being  rapidly  created  and  that  if  things  went  wrong 
he  would  be  the  chief  victim.  But  family  influences 
and  the  voice  of  the  intriguers  proved  too  strong  for  him, 
and  in  the  end  he  gave  his  reluctant  consent  to  a  fur- 
ther step.  The  monarchists,  boldly  acting  on  the  prin- 
ciple that  possession  is  nine  points  of  the  law,  called 
u^Jon  the  provinces  to  anticipate  the  vote  and  to  sub- 
stitute the  title  of  Emperor  for  that  of  Presidenc  in  all 
government  documents  and  petitions  so  that  morally 
the  question  would  be  chose  jugee. 

CODE  TELEGRAM  DATED  NOVEMBER  7,  1915,  FROM  CHU  CHI-CHUN, 
MINISTER  or  THE  INTERIOR,  ET  ALIA,  ENJOINING  A  STRONG 
ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  INTERFERENCE  ON  THE  PART  OF  A  CER- 
TAIN  FOREIGN  POWER 

To  the  Military  and  Civil  Governors  of  the  Provinces : — 

(To  be  deciphered  personally  with  the  Council  of  State  Code) 

A  certain  foreign  power,  under  the  pretext  that  the  Chinese 
people  are  not  of  one  mind  and  that  troubles  are  to  be  appre- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  229 

hended,  has  lately  forced  England  and  Russia  to  take  part  in 
tendering  advice  to  China.  In  truth,  all  foreign  nations  know- 
perfectly  well  that  there  will  be  no  trouble,  and  they  are  obliged 
to  follow  the  example  of  that  power.  If  we  accept  the  advice 
of  other  Powers  concerning  our  domestic  affairs  and  postpone 
the  enthronement,  we  should  be  recognizing  their  right  to  in- 
terfere. Hence  action  should  under  no  circumstance  be  de- 
ferred. When  all  the  votes  of  the  provinces  unanimously  rec- 
ommending the  enthronement  shall  have  reached  Peking,  the 
Government  will,  of  course,  ostensibly  assume  a  wavering  and 
compromising  attitude,  so  as  to  give  due  regard  to  international 
relations.  The  people,  on  the  other  hand,  should  show  their 
firm  determination  to  proceed  with  the  matter  at  all  costs,  so 
as  to  let  the  foreign  powers  know  that  our  people  are  of  one 
mind.  If  we  can  only  make  them  believe  that  the  change  of  the 
republic  into  a  monarchy  will  not  in  the  least  give  rise  to 
trouble  of  any  kind,  the  effects  of  the  advice  tendered  by  Japan 
will  ipso  facto  come  to  nought. 

At  present  the  whole  nation  is  determined  to  nominate  Yuan 
Shih-kai  Emperor.  All  civil  and  military  officers,  being  the 
natural  leaders  of  the  people,  should  accordingly  give  effect 
to  the  nomination.  If  this  can  be  done  without  friction,  the 
confidence  of  both  Chinese  and  foreigners  in  the  Government 
will  be  greatly  strengthened.  This  is  why  we  suggested  to  you 
in  a  previous  telegram  the  necessity  of  immediately  substitut- 
ing the  title  of  "Emperor"  for  "President."  We  trust  you  will 
concur  in  our  suggestion  and  carry  it  out  without  delay. 

We  may  add  that  this  matter  should  be  treated  as  strictly 
confidential. 

A  reply  is  requested.  (Signed) 

The  die  now  being  cast  all  that  was  left  to  be  done 
was  to  rush  through  the  voting  in  the  Provinces.  Ob- 
sequious officials  returned  to  the  use  of  the  old  Imperial 
phraseologj^  and  Yuan  Shih-kai,  even  before  his  "elec- 
tion," was  memorialized  as  though  he  were  the  legiti- 
mate successor  of  the  immense  line  of  Chinese  sover- 


230  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

eigns  who  stretch  back  to  the  mythical  days  of  Yao  and 
Shun  (2,800  B.  C.)  •  The  beginning  of  December  saw 
the  voting  completed  and  the  results  telegraphed  to  Pe- 
king; and  on  the  11th  December,  the  Senate  hastily 
meeting,  and  finding  that  "the  National  Convention  of 
Citizens"  had  unanimously  elected  Yuan  Shih-kai  Em- 
peror, formally  offered  him  the  Throne  in  a  humble  pe- 
tition. Yuan  Shih-kai  modestly  refused :  a  second  peti- 
tion was  promptly  handed  to  him,  which  he  was  pleased 
to  accept  in  the  following  historic  document: 

YUAN  SHIH-KAl's  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  IMPERIAL  THRONE 

The  prosperity  and  decline  of  the  country  is  a  part  of  the 
responsibility  of  every  individual,  and  my  love  for  the  country 
is  certainly  not  less  than  that  of  others.  But  the  task  imposed 
on  me  by  the  designation  of  the  millions  of  people  is  of  extraor- 
dinary magnitude.  It  is  therefore  impossible  for  one  without 
merit  and  without  virtue  like  myself  to  shoulder  the  burdens  of 
State  involved  in  the  enhancing  of  the  welfare  of  the  people,  the 
strengthening  of  the  standing  of  the  country,  the  reformation 
of  the  administration  and  the  advancement  of  civilization.  My 
former  declaration  was,  therefore,  the  expression  of  a  sincere 
heart  and  not  a  mere  expression  of  modesty.  My  fear  was  such 
that  I  could  not  but  utter  the  words  which  I  have  expressed. 
The  people,  however,  have  viewed  with  increasing  impatience 
that  declaration  and  their  expectation  of  me  is  now  more  press- 
ing than  ever.  Thus  I  find  myself  unable  to  offer  further  argu- 
ment just  as  I  am  unable  to  escape  the  position.  The  laying  of 
a  great  foundation  is,  however,  a  thing  of  paramount  impor- 
tance and  it  must  not  be  done  in  a  hurry.  I,  therefore,  order 
that  the  different  Ministries  and  Bureaux  take  concerted  action 
in  making  the  necessary  preparations  in  the  affairs  in  which 
they  are  concerned;  and  when  that  is  done,  let  the  same  be  re- 
ported to  me  for  promulgation.  Meanwhile  all  our  citizens 
should  go  on  peacefully  in  their  daily  vocations  with  the  view 
to  obtain  mutual  benefit.     Let  not  your  doubts  and  suspicions 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  231 

hinder  you  in  your  work.  All  the  officials  should  on  their  part 
be  faithful  at  their  posts  and  maintain  to  the  best  of  their  ability 
pv,ace  and  order  in  their  localities,  so  that  the  ambition  of  the 
Great  President  to  work  for  the  welfare  of  the  people  may 
thus  be  realized.  Besides  forwarding  the  memorial  of  the  prin- 
cipal representatives  of  the  Convention  of  the  Repi'esentatives 
of  Citizens  and  that  of  the  provinces  and  special  administrative 
area  to  the  Cheng  Shih  Tang  and  publishing  the  same  by  a 
mandate,  I  have  the  honour  to  notify  the  acting  Li  Fan  Yuan 
as  the  principal  representatives  of  the  Convention  of  the  Rep- 
resentatives of  Citizens,  to  this  effect. 

Cautious  to  the  end,  it  will  be  seen  that  Yuan  Shi- 
kai's  very  acceptance  is  so  worded  as  to  convey  the  idea 
that  he  is  being  forced  to  a  course  of  action  which  is 
against  his  better  instincts.  There  is  no  word  of  what 
came  to  be  called  the  Grand  Ceremony  i.  e.  the  enthrone- 
ment. That  matter  is  carefully  left  in  abeyance  and 
the  government  departments  simply  told  to  make  the 
necessary  preparations.  The  attitude  of  Peking  offi- 
cialdom is  well-illustrated  in  a  circular  telegram  dis- 
patched to  the  provinces  three  days  later,  the  analysis 
of  Japan's  relationship  to  the  Entente  Powers  being 
particularly  revealing.  The  obsequious  note  which 
pervades  this  document  is  also  particularly  noticeable 
and  shows  how  deeply  the  canker  of  sycophancy  had  now 
eaten  in. 

CODE  TELEGRAM  DATED  DECEMBER  14,  1915,  FROM  THE  OFFICE  OF 
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  OF  THE  LAND  AND  NAVAL  FORCES,  RE- 
SPECTING china's  ATTITUDE   TOWARDS   FOREIGN   NATIONS 

To  the  Military  and  Civil  Governors  of  the  Provinces : — 

(To  be  deciphered  with  the  Hua  Code) 

On  the  11th  inst.  the  acting  Legislature  Council  submitted 
a  memorial  to  the  Emperor,  reporting  on  the  number  of  votes 
cast  by  the  people  in  favour  of  a  monarchy  and  the  letters  of 


232  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

nomination  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  as  Emperor  received  from  all  parts 
of  the  country,  and  begged  that  he  would  ascend  the  Throne  at 
an  early  date.  His  Majesty  was,  however,  so  modest  as  to  de- 
cline. The  Council  presented  a  second  memorial  couched  in  the 
most  entreating  terms,  and  received  an  order  to  the  effect  that 
all  the  ministries  and  departments  were  to  make  the  necessary 
preparations  for  the  enthronement.  The  details  of  this  de- 
cision appeared  in  the  Presidential  Orders  of  the  past  few  days, 
so  need  not  be  repeated  now. 

The  people  are  unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  in  a  republic 
the  foundation  of  the  state  is  very  apt  to  be  shaken  and  the 
policy  of  the  government  to  be  changed ;  and  that  consequently 
there  is  no  possibility  of  enjoying  everlasting  peace  and  pros- 
perity, nor  any  hope  for  the  nation  to  become  powerful.  Now 
that  the  form  of  the  state  has  been  decided  in  favour  of  a  mon- 
archy and  the  person  who  is  to  sit  on  the  Throne  agreed  upon, 
the  country  is  placed  on  a  secure  basis,  and  the  way  to  national 
prosperity  and  strength  is  thus  paved. 

Being  the  trustworthy  ministers  and,  as  it  were,  the  hands 
and  feet  of  His  Majesty,  we  are  united  to  him  by  more  ties 
than  one.  On  this  account  we  should  with  one  mind  exert  our 
utmost  efforts  in  discharging  our  duty  of  loyalty  to  the  coun- 
try. This  should  be  the  spirit  which  guides  us  in  our  action 
at  the  beginning  of  the  new  dynasty.  As  for  the  enthronement, 
it  is  purely  a  matter  of  ceremony.  Whether  it  takes  place 
earlier  or  later  is  of  no  moment.  Moreover  His  Majesty  has 
always  been  modest,  and  does  everything  with  circumspection. 
We  should  all  appreciate  his  attitude. 

So  far  as  our  external  relations  are  concerned,  a  thorough 
understanding  must  be  come  to  with  the  foreign  nations,  so  that 
recognition  of  the  new  regime  may  not  be  delayed  and  diplomatic 
intercourse  interrupted.  Japan,  has,  in  conjunction  with  the 
Entente  Powers,  tendered  advice  to  postpone  the  change  of  the 
Republic  into  an  empire.  As  a  divergence  of  opinion  exists 
between  Japan  and  the  Entente  Powers,  the  advice  is  of  no 
great  effect.  Besides,  the  Elders  and  the  Military  Party  in 
Japan  are  all  opposed  to  the  action  taken  by  their  Govern- 
ment.    Only  the  press  In  Tokyo  has  spread  all  sorts  of  threat- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  233 

ening  rumours.  This  is  obviously  the  upshot  of  ingenious  plots 
on  the  part  of  irresponsible  persons.  If  we  postpone  the 
change  we  shall  be  subject  to  foreign  interference,  and  the  coun- 
try will  consequently  cease  to  exist  as  an  independent  state. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  we  proclaim  the  enthronement  forthwith, 
we  shall  then  be  flatly  rejecting  the  advice, — an  act  which,  we 
apprehend,  will  not  be  tolerated  by  Japan.  As  a  result,  she 
will  place  obstacles  in  the  way  of  recognition  of  the  new  order 
of  things. 

Since  a  monarchy  has  been  decided  to  be  the  future  form  of 
the  state,  and  His  Majesty  has  consented  to  accept  the  Throne, 
the  change  may  be  said  to  be  an  accomplished  fact.  There  is 
no  question  about  it.  All  persons  of  whatever  walk  of  life 
can  henceforth  continue  their  pursuits  without  anxiety.  In  the 
meantime  we  will  proceed  slowly  and  surely  with  the  enthrone- 
ment, as  it  involves  many  ceremonies  and  diplomatic  etiquette. 
In  this  way  both  our  domestic  and  our  foreign  policies  will  re- 
main unchanged. 

We  hope  you  will  comprehend  our  ideas  and  treat  them  as 
strictly  confidential. 

(Signed)      Office  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Land  and  Naval  Force. 


After  this  one  last  step  remained  to  be  taken — it  was 
necessary  to  burn  all  the  incriminating  evidence.  On 
the  21st  December,  the  last  circular  telegram  in  connec- 
tion with  this  extraordinary  business  was  dispatched 
from  Peking,  a  delightful  naivete  being  displayed  re- 
garding the  possibility  of  certain  letters  and  telegrams 
having  transgressed  the  bounds  of  the  law.  All  such 
delinquencies  are  to  be  mercifully  wiped  out  by  the  sim- 
ple and  admirable  method  of  invoking  the  help  of  the 
kitchen-fires.  And  in  this  appropriate  way  does  the 
monster-play  end. 


234  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

CODE  TELEGRAM  BATED  DECEMBER  21,  1915,  FROM  THE  NATIONAX 
CONVENTION  BUREAU,  ORDERING  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  DOCU- 
MENTS CONNECTED  WITH  THE  ELECTIONS 

To  the  Military  and  Civil  Governors  of  the  Provinces,  the  Mili- 
tary Commissioners  at  Foochow  and  Kweiyang;  the  Mili- 
tary Commandants  at  Changteh,  Kweihuating,  and  Kal- 
gan;  and  the  Commissioner  of  Defence  at  Tachienlu: — 

(To  be  deciphered  with  the  Hua  Code) 

The  change  in  the  form  of  the  state  is  now  happily  accom- 
plished. This  is  due  not  only  to  the  unity  of  the  people's 
minds,  but  more  especially  to  the  skill  with  which,  in  realizing 
the  object  of  saving  the  country,  you  have  carried  out  the  prop- 
aganda from  the  beginning,  managed  affairs  according  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  occasions,  and  adapted  the  law  to  suit  the 
circumstances.  The  people  have,  to  be  sure,  become  tired  of 
the  Republic;  yet  unless  you  had  taken  the  lead,  they  would 
not  have  dared  to  voice  their  sentiments.  We  all  appreciate 
your  noble  efforts. 

Ever  since  the  monarchical  movement  was  started,  the  people 
as  well  as  the  high  officials  in  the  different  localities  have  re- 
peatedly petitioned  for  the  change,  a  fact  which  proves  that 
the  people's  will  is  in  favour  of  it.  In  order  to  enable  the 
people  to  express  their  will  through  a  properly  constituted 
organ,  the  General  Convention  of  the  Citizens'  Representatives 
has  been  created. 

Since  the  promulgation  of  the  Law  on  the  Organization  of 
the  Citizens'  Representatives,  we,  who  are  devoted  to  the  wel- 
fare of  the  state,  desire  to  see  that  the  decisions  of  that  Con- 
vention do  not  run  counter  to  the  wishes  of  the  people.  We  are 
so  anxious  about  the  matter  that  we  have  striven  so  to  apply 
the  law  to  meet  the  circumstances  as  to  carry  out  our  designs. 
It  is  out  of  patriotic  motives  that  we  have  adopted  the  policy 
of  adhering  to  the  law,  whenever  possible,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  of  yielding  to  expediency,  whenever  necessary.  During 
the  progress  of  this  scheme  there  may  have  been  certain  letters 
and  telegrams,  both  official  and  private,  which  have  transgressed 
the  bounds  of  the  law.     They  will  become  absolutely  useless 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  235 

after  the  affair  is  finished.  Moreover,  no  matter  how  carefully 
their  secrets  may  have  been  guarded,  still  they  remain  as  per- 
manent records  which  might  compromise  us ;  and  in  the  event 
of  their  becoming  known  to  foreigners,  we  shall  not  escape 
severe  criticism  and  bitter  attacks,  and,  what  is  worse,  should 
they  be  handed  down  as  part  of  the  national  records,  they  will 
stain  the  opening  pages  of  the  history  of  the  new  dynasty. 
The  Central  Government,  after  carefully  considering  the  mat- 
ter, has  concluded  that  it  would  be  better  to  sort  out  and  burn 
the  document  so  as  to  remove  all  unnecessary  records  and  pre- 
vent regrettable  consequences.  For  these  reasons  you  are 
hereby  requested  to  sift  out  all  telegrams,  letters,  and  dispatches 
concerning  the  change  in  the  form  of  the  state,  whether  official 
or  private,  whether  received  from  Peking  or  the  provinces  (ex- 
cepting those  required  by  law  to  be  filed  on  record),  and  cause 
the  same  to  be  burnt  in  your  presence.  As  for  those  which 
have  already  been  communicated  to  the  local  officials,  you  are 
likewise  requested  to  order  them  to  be  returned  immediately ; 
to  commit  them  to  the  flames ;  and  to  report  to  this  Bureau 
for  future  reference  the  total  number  of  documents  so  de- 
stroyed. 

The  present  change  in  the  form  of  the  state  constitutes  the 
most  glorious  episode  of  our  national  history.  Not  only  is  this 
far  superior  to  the  succession  of  dynasties  by  right  of  conquest 
or  in  virtue  of  voluntary  transfer  (as  in  the  days  of  Yao  and 
Shun),  but  it  compares  favourably  with  all  the  peaceful  changes 
that  have  taken  place  in  western  politics.  Everything  will  be 
perfect  if  whatever  mars  it  (meaning  the  documents)  is  done 
away  with. 

All  of  you  have  acquired  greatness  in  founding  the  dynasty. 
You  will  doubtless  concur  with  us,  and  will,  we  earnestly  hope, 
lose  no  time  in  cautiously  and  secretly  carrying  out  our  request. 

We  respectfully  submit  this  to  your  consideration  and  wait 
for   a   reply.     (Signed)     National   Convention  Bureau. 


CHAPTER  XII 

"the  third  revolution" 

THE    REVOLT    OF    YUNNAN 

In  all  the  circumstances  it  was  only  natural  that  the 
extraordinary  chapter  of  history  we  have  just  narrated 
should  have  marched  to  its  appointed  end  in  just  as  ex- 
traordinary a  manner  as  it  had  commenced.  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  the  uncrowned  king,  actually  enjoyed  in  peace 
his  empty  title  only  for  a  bare  fortnight,  the  curious 
air  of  unreality  becoming  more  and  more  noticeable 
after  the  first  burst  of  excitement  occasioned  by  his  ac- 
ceptance of  the  Throne  had  subsided.  Though  the 
year  1915  ended  with  Peking  brightly  illuminated  in 
honour  of  the  new  regime,  which  had  adopted  in  con- 
formity with  Eastern  precedents  a  new  calendar  under 
the  style  of  Hung  Hsien  or  "glorious  Constitution- 
alism," that  official  joy  was  just  as  false  as  the  rest  had 
been  and  awakened  the  incredulity  of  the  crowd. 

On  Christmas  Day  ominous  rumours  had  spread  in  the 
diplomatic  circle  that  dramatic  developments  in  South 
China  had  come  which  not  only  directly  challenged  the 
patient  plotting  of  months  but  made  a  debacle  appear 
inevitable.  Very  few  days  afterwards  it  was  generally 
known  that  the  southernmost  province  of  China,  Yun- 
nan— on  the  borders  of  French-Indo-China — had  tele- 
graphed the  Central  Government  a  thinly  veiled  ulti- 
matum, that  either  the  monarchy  must  be  cancelled  and 
the  chief  monarchists  executed  at  once  or  the  province 

236 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  237 

would  take  such  steps  as  were  deemed  advisable.  The 
text  of  these  telegrams  which  follows  was  published  by 
the  courageous  editor  of  the  Peking  Gazette  on  the 
31st  December  and  electrified  the  capital.  The  reader 
will  not  fail  to  note  how  richly  allegorical  they  are  in 
spite  of  their  dramatic  nature : 

FIRST  TELEGEAM 

To  the  Great  President : 

Since  the  question  of  Kuo-ti  (form  of  State)  was  raised  con- 
sternation has  seized  the  pubhc  mind;  and  on  account  of  the 
interference  of  various  Powers  the  spirit  of  the  people  has 
been  more  and  more  aroused.  They  have  asked  the  question : — 
"Who  has  invited  the  disaster,  and  brought  upon  us  such  great 
disgrace?"  Some  one  must  be  responsible  for  the  alien  insults 
heaped  on  us. 

We  have  learned  that  each  day  is  given  to  rapid  preparations 
for  the  Grand  Ceremony ;  and  it  is  now  true  that,  internally, 
public  opinion  has  been  slighted,  and,  externally,  occasions 
have  been  offered  to  foreigners  to  encroach  on  our  rights.  Our 
blood  runs  cold  when  we  face  the  dangers  at  the  door.  Not 
once  but  twice  hath  the  President  taken  the  oath  to  observe 
and  obey  the  Constitution  and  protect  and  maintain  the  Repub- 
lic. The  oath  was  sworn  before  Heaven  and  Earth;  and  it  is 
on  record  in  the  hearts  of  millions  of  people  and  the  words 
thereof  still  echo  in  the  ears  of  the  people  of  all  nations.  In 
the  Classics  it  is  said  that  "in  dealing  with  the  people  of  the 
country,  faith  is  of  the  essence  of  great  rule."  Again  it  is 
written  that  "without  faith  a  people  cannot  endure  as  a  na- 
tion." How  then  can  one  rule  the  people  when  he  "eats"  his 
own  words  and  tears  his  own  oath?  Principle  has  now  been 
cast  to  the  winds  and  the  Kuo-ti  has  been  changed.  We  know 
not  how  the  country  can  be  administered. 

Since  the  suspension  of  the  National  Assembly  and  the  re- 
vision of  the  Constitution,  the  powers  of  Government  have  been 
centred  in  one  person,  with  the  implied  freedom  to  do  whatever 
seems  meet  without  let  or  hindrance.     If  the  Government  were 


238  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

to  use  this  power  in  order  to  reform  the  administration  and 
consolidate  the  foundations  of  the  nation,  there  would  be  no 
fear  of  failure.  For  the  whole  country  would  submit  to  the 
measures  of  the  Central  Government.  Thus  there  is  not  the 
least  necessity  to  commit  treason  by  changing  the  Kuo-ti. 

But  although  the  recent  decision  of  the  Citizens'  Representa- 
tives in  favour  of  a  monarchy  and  the  request  of  the  high  local 
officials  for  the  President's  accession  to  the  Throne  have  been 
represented  as  inspired  by  the  unanimous  will  of  the  people,  it 
is  well  known  that  the  same  has  been  the  work  of  ignoble  men 
whose  bribery  and  intimidation  have  been  sanctioned  by  the 
authorities.  Although  inept  efforts  have  been  made  to  disguise 
the  deceit,  the  same  is  unhidden  to  the  eyes  of  the  world. 

Fortunately  it  is  said  that  the  President  has  from  the  very 
beginning  maintained  a  calm  attitude,  speaking  not  his  mind 
on  the  subject.  It  is  now  as  easy  to  turn  the  tide  as  the  re- 
versing of  the  palm.  It  may  be  objected  that  if  the  "face" 
of  the  nation  is  not  preserved  in  view  of  the  interference  of  For- 
eign Powers,  there  will  be  great  danger  in  future.  But  it  must 
be  observed  that  official  declaration  can  only  be  made  in  accord- 
ance with  the  will  of  the  people,  the  tendency  of  which  can  easily 
be  ascertained  by  searching  for  the  facts.  If  the  will  of  the 
people  that  the  country  should  be  the  common  property  of  the 
Nation  be  obeyed  and  the  idea  of  the  President  that  a  Dynasty 
is  as  cheap  as  a  worn-out  shoe  is  heeded,  the  latter  has  it  in  his 
power  to  loosen  the  string  that  suspends  the  bell  just  as  much 
as  the  person  who  has  hung  it.  If  the  wrong  path  is  not  for- 
saken, it  is  feared  that  as  soon  as  the  heart  of  the  people  is 
gone,  the  country  will  be  broken  to  pieces  and  the  dismember- 
ment of  the  Nation  will  take  place  when  alien  pressure  is 
applied  to  us.  We  who  have  hitherto  received  favours  from 
the  President  and  have  received  high  appointments  from  him 
hereby  offer  our  faithful  advice  in  the  spirit  of  men  who  are 
sailing  in  common  in  a  boat  that  is  in  danger;  we  speak  as  do 
those  who  love  sincerity  and  cherish  the  unbroken  word.  We 
hope  that  the  President  will,  with  courage,  refuse  to  listen  to 
the  speech  of  evil  counsellors  and  heed  the  voice  of  conscience 
and  of  honour.     We  further  hope  that  he  will  renew  his  prom- 


Courtesy   Major    Isa;u'    Newell,    l'.    S.    Military    Attache 

The  Yunman  Rebklliox  of  1915-16,  Which  Led  to  the 
Downfall  of  Yuan  Shih-kai.  A  Big  Junk  Loaded 
WITH  Supplies  Passing  Up  the  Rapids  of  the  Upper 
Yangtsze 


-*-**'*^'^ 


Courtesy    Major    lsaa<'   Newell,    U.    S.   Military   Attache 

The  Rapids  of  the  Upper  Yangtsze 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  239 

ise  to  protect  the  Republic;  and  will  publicly  swear  that  a 
monarchical  system  will  never  again  appear. 

Thus  the  heart  of  the  people  will  be  settled  and  the  founda- 
tions of  the  Nation  will  be  consolidated.  Then  by  enlisting 
the  services  of  sagacious  colleagues  in  order  to  surmount 
the  difficidties  of  the  time  and  sweeping  away  all  corruption 
and  beginning  anew  with  the  people,  it  may  be  that  the  welfare 
and  interest  of  the  Nation  will  be  furthered.  In  sending  this 
telegram  our  eyes  are  wet  with  tears  knowing  not  what  more 
to  say.  We  respectfully  await  the  order  of  the  President  with 
our  troops  under  arms. 

(Signed)     The  Governors  of  Yunnan. 

SECOND    TELEGRAM 

For  the  Perusal  of  the  Great  President: — 

In  our  humble  opinion  the  reason  why  the  people — Chinese 
and  foreign — cannot  excuse  the  President  is  because  the  move- 
ment for  the  change  of  Kuo-ti  has  been  inspired,  and  indeed 
actually  originated  in  Peking,  and  that  the  ringleaders  of  the 
plot  against  the  Mm  Kuo  are  all  "bosom-men"  of  the  President. 
The  Chou  An  Hui,  organized  by  Yang  Tu  and  five  other  men, 
set  the  fire  ablaze  and. the  circular  telegram  sent  by  Chu  Chi- 
chien  and  six  other  persons  precipitated  the  destruction  of 
the  Republican  structure.  The  President  knew  that  the  bad 
deed  was  being  done  and  yet  he  did  nothing  to  arrest  the  same 
or  punish  the  evil-doers.  The  people  therefore,  are  suspicious. 
A  mandate  was  issued  on  the  24th  of  the  11th  month  of  the 
3rd  year  in  which  it  is  affirmed :  "Democracy  and  republican- 
ism are  laid  down  in  the  Constitutional  Compact ;  and  there  is 
also  a  law  relating  to  the  punishment  of  those  who  spread  sedi- 
tion In  order  to  disturb  the  minds  of  the  people.  If  any  one 
shall  hereafter  dare  to  advance  strange  doctrines  and  miscon- 
strue the  meaning  of  the  Constitution,  he  will  be  punished 
severely  in  accordance  vdth  the  law  of  sedition." 

Yang  Tu  for  having  publicly  organized  the  said  Society  and 
Chu  Chl-chien  for  having  directly  plotted  by  telegram  are  the 
principal  offenders  in  the  present  flagrant  case  of  sedition.  As 
their  crimes  are  obvious  and  the  subject  of  abundant  proof j 


240  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

we  hereby  ask  the  President  to  carry  out  at  once  the  terms  of 
the  said  mandate  and  publicly  execute  Yang  Tu,  Sun  Yu-yun, 
Yen  Fu,  Liu  Shih-pei,  Li  Hsieh-ho,  Hu  Ying,  Chu  Chi-chien, 
Tuan  Chih-kuei,  Chow  Tze-chi,  Liang  Shih-yi,  Chang  Cheng- 
fang  and  Yuan  Nai-kuan  to  the  end  that  the  whole  nation 
may  be  pacified.  Then,  and  not  till  then,  will  the  world  be- 
lieve in  the  sincerity  of  the  President,  in  his  love  for  the 
country  and  his  intention  to  abide  by  the  law.  All  the  troops 
and  people  here  are  in  anger ;  and  unless  a  substantial  proof 
from  the  Central  Authorities  is  forthcoming,  guaranteeing 
the  maintenance  of  the  Republic,  it  will  be  impossible  to  sup- 
press or  pacify  them.  We  await  a  reply  within  twenty-four 
hours. 

(Signed)     The  Governors  of  Yunnan  Province. 

It  was  evident  from  the  beginning  that  pride  pre- 
vented Yuan  Shih-kai  from  retreating  from  the  false 
position  he  had  taken  up.  Under  his  instructions  the 
State  Department  sent  a  stream  of  powerful  tele- 
graphic messages  to  Y^unnan  attempting  to  dissuade  the 
Republican  leaders  from  revolt.  But  the  die  had  been 
cast  and  very  gravely  the  standard  of  rebellion  was 
raised  in  the  capital  city  of  Yunnan  and  the  people  ex- 
horted to  shed  their  blood.  Everything  pointed  to  the 
fact  that  this  rising  was  to  be  very  different  from  the 
abortive  July  outbreak  of  1913.  There  was  a  soberness 
and  a  deliberation  about  it  all  which  impressed  close 
observers  with  a  sense  of  the  ominous  end  which  was 
now  in  sight. 

Still  Peking  remained  purblind.  During  the  month 
of  January  the  splendour  of  the  dream  empire,  which 
was  already  dissolving  into  thin  air,  filled  the  news- 
papers. It  was  reported  that  an  Imperial  Edict 
printed  on  Yellow  Paper  announcing  the  enthronement 
was  ready  for  universal  distribution :  that  twelve  new  Im- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  241 

perial  Seals  in  jade  or  gold  were  being  manufactured: 
that  a  golden  chair  and  a  magnificent  State  Coach  in 
the  style  of  Louis  XV  were  almost  ready.  Homage 
to  the  portrait  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  by  all  officials  through- 
out the  country  was  soon  to  be  ordered;  sycophantic 
scholars  were  busily  preparing  a  volume  poetically  en- 
titled "The  Golden  Mirror  of  the  Empire,"  in  which 
the  virtues  of  the  new  sovereign  were  extolled  in  high- 
sounding  language.  A  recondite  significance,  it  was 
said,  was  to  be  given  to  the  old  ceremonial  dress,  which 
was  to  be  revived,  from  the  fact  that  every  official  would 
carry  a  Hu  or  Ivory  Tablet  to  be  held  against  the  breast. 
The  very  mention  of  this  was  sufficient  to  make  the  local 
price  of  ivory  leap  skywards !  In  the  privacy  of  draw- 
ing-rooms the  story  went  the  rounds  that  Yuan  Shih-kai, 
now  completely  deluded  into  believing  in  the  success  of 
his  great  scheme,  had  held  a  full-dress  rehearsal  of  a  cere- 
mony which  would  be  the  first  one  at  his  new  Court  when 
he  would  invest  the  numerous  ladies  of  his  establishment 
with  royal  rank.  Seated  on  his  Throne  he  had  been 
engaged  in  instructing  these  interested  females,  already 
robed  in  magnificent  costumes,  in  the  parts  they  were 
to  play,  when  he  had  noticed  the  absence  of  the  Korean 
Lady — a  consort  he  had  won,  it  is  said,  in  his  Seoul  days 
in  competition  against  the  Japanese  Envoy  accredited 
to  Korea,  thereby  precipitating  the  war  of  1894-95.-^ 
The  Korean  Lady  had  refused  to  enter  the  Throne- 
room,  he  was  told,  because  she  was  dissatisfied  with  the 
rank  he  proposed  to  confer  on  her.  Sternly  he  sent 
for  her  and  told  her  to  take  her  place  in  the  circle.  But 
no  sooner  had  she  arrived  than  hysterically  she  screamed, 

1  This  story  is  firmly  believed  by  many,  namely  that  a  beautiful  woman 
caused  the  loss  of  Korea. 


242  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

"You  told  me  when  you  wedded  me  that  no  wife  would 
be  my  superior:  now  I  am  counted  only  a  secondary 
consort."  With  that  she  hurled  herself  at  the  eldest 
wife  who  was  occupying  the  post  of  honour  and  assailed 
her  bitterly.  Amidst  the  general  confusion  the  would- 
be-Emperor  hastily  descended  from  his  Throne  and 
vainly  intervened,  but  the  women  were  not  to  be  parted 
until  their  robes  were  in  tatters. 

In  such  childishnesses  did  Peking  indulge  when  a 
great  disaster  was  preparing.  To  explain  what  had 
occurred  in  Yunnan  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  and  tell 
the  story  of  a  remarkable  young  Chinese — General 
Tsao-ao,  the  soul  of  the  new  revolt. 

In  the  revolution  of  1911  each  province  had  acted  on 
the  assumption  that  it  possessed  inherent  autonomous 
rights  and  could  assume  sovereignty  as  soon  as  local 
arrangements  had  allowed  the  organization  of  a  com- 
plete provisional  government.  Yunnan  had  been  one 
of  the  earliest  provinces  to  follow  the  lead  of  the  Wu- 
chang rebels  and  had  virtually  erected  itself  into  a 
separate  republic,  which  attracted  much  attention  be- 
cause of  the  iron  discipline  which  was  preserved.  Pos- 
sessing a  fairly  well-organized  military  system,  largely 
owing  to  the  proximity  of  the  French  frontier  and  the 
efforts  which  a  succession  of  Viceroys  had  made  to  pro- 
vide adequate  frontier  defence,  it  was  amply  able  to 
guarantee  its  newly  won  autonomy.  General  Tsao-ao, 
then  in  command  of  a  division  of  troops  had  been 
elected  Generalissimo  of  the  province ;  and  bending  him- 
self to  his  task  in  very  few  weeks  he  had  driven  into  exile 
all  officials  who  adhered  to  the  Imperialist  cause  and 
made  all  local  institutions  completely  self-supporting. 
Even  in  1911  it  had  been  reported  that  this  young  man 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  243 

dreamed  of  founding  a  dynasty  for  himself  in  the  moun- 
tains of  South  China — an  ambition  by  no  means  impos- 
sible of  realization  since  he  had  received  a  first-class 
military  education  in  the  Tokio  Military  Schools  and 
was  thoroughly  up-to-date  and  conversant  with  modern 
theories  of  government. 

These  reports  had  at  the  time  greatly  concerned 
Yuan  Shih-kai  who  heard  it  stated  by  all  who  knew  him 
that  the  Yunnan  leader  was  a  genius  in  his  own  way. 
In  conformity  with  his  policy  of  bringing  to  Peking  all 
who  might  challenge  his  authority,  he  had  induced  Gen- 
eral Tsao-ao,  since  the  latter  had  played  no  part  in  the 
rebellion  of  1913,  to  lay  down  his  office  of  Yunnan 
Governor-General  and  join  him  in  the  capital  at  the 
beginning  of  1914 — another  high  provincial  appoint- 
ment being  held  out  to  him  as  a  bait. 

Once  in  Peking,  however,  General  Tsao-ao  had  been 
merely  placed  in  charge  of  an  office  concerned  with  the 
reorganization  of  the  land-tax,  nominally  a  very  impor- 
tant piece  of  work  long  advocated  by  foreign  critics. 
But  as  there  were  no  funds  available,  and  as  the  pur- 
pose was  plainly  merely  to  keep  him  under  observation, 
he  fretted  at  the  restraint,  and  became  engaged  in 
secret  political  correspondence  with  men  who  had  been 
exiled  abroad.  As  he  was  soon  an  open  suspect,  in 
order  to  avoid  arrest  he  had  taken  the  bold  step  at  the 
very  inception  of  the  monarchy  movement  of  heading 
the  fist  of  Generals  in  residence  in  Peking  who  peti- 
tioned the  Senate  to  institute  a  Monarchy,  this  act  se- 
curing him  against  summary  treatment.  But  owing  to 
his  secret  connection  with  the  scholar  Liang  Chi-chao, 
who  had  thrown  up  his  post  of  Minister  of  Justice  and 
left  the  capital  in  order  to  oppose  the  new  movement. 


2U  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

he  was  watched  more  and  more  carefully — his  death  be- 
ing even  hinted  at. 

He  was  clever  enough  to  meet  this  ugly  development 
with  a  masterly  piece  of  trickery  conceived  in  the  East- 
ern vein.  One  day  a  carefully  arranged  dispute  took 
place  between  him  and  his  wife,  and  the  police  were 
angrily  called  in  to  see  that  his  family  and  all  their 
belongings  were  taken  away  to  Tientsin  as  he  refused 
any  longer  to  share  the  same  roof  with  them.  Being 
now  alone  in  the  capital,  he  apparently  abandoned  him- 
self to  a  life  of  shameless  debauch,  going  nightly  to  the 
haunts  of  pleasure  and  becoming  a  notorious  figure  in 
the  great  district  in  the  Outer  City  of  Peking  which  is 
filled  with  adventure  and  adventuresses  and  which  is 
the  locality  from  which  Haroun-Al  Raschid  obtained 
through  the  medium  of  Arab  travellers  his  great  story  of 
"Aladdin  and  the  Wonderful  Lamp."  When  govern- 
mental suspicions  were  thoroughly  lulled,  he  arranged 
with  a  singing-girl  to  let  him  out  by  the  backdoor  of  her 
house  at  dawn  from  whence  he  escaped  to  the  railway- 
station,  rapidly  reaching  Tientsin  entirely  unob- 
served. 

The  morning  was  well-advanced  before  the  detectives 
who  nightly  watched  his  movements  became  suspicious. 
Then  finding  that  his  whereabouts  were  unknown  to  the 
coachman  dozing  on  the  box  of  his  carriage,  they 
roughly  entered  the  house  where  he  had  passed  the 
night  only  to  find  that  the  bird  had  flown.  Hasty  tele- 
gr£.ms  were  dispatched  in  every  direction,  particularly 
to  Tientsin — the  great  centre  for  political  refugees — 
and  his  summary  arrest  ordered.  But  fortune  favoured 
hmi.  A  bare  quarter-of-an-hour  before  the  police  be- 
gan their  search  he  had  embarked  with  his  family  on  a 


General  Tsai-ao,    vuk   IIkko   of   the   Yixxan  Rebei.i>ion 
OF  1915-16,  Who  Died  from  thp:  Effects  of  the  Campaign 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  245 

Japanese  steamer  lying  in  the  Tientsin  river  and  could 
snap  his  fingers  at  Yuan  Shih-kai. 

Once  in  Japan  he  lost  no  time  in  assembling  his  revo- 
lutionary friends  and  in  a  body  they  embarked  for  South 
China.  As  rapidly  as  possible  he  reached  Yunnan 
province  from  Hongkong,  travelling  by  way  of  the 
French  Tonkin  railway.  Entering  the  province  early 
in  December  he  found  everything  fairly  ready  for  re- 
volt, though  there  was  a  deficiency  in  arms  and  muni- 
tions which  had  to  be  made  good.  Yuan  Shih-kai,  furi- 
ous at  this  evasion,  had  telegi'aphed  to  confidential 
agents  in  Yunnan  to  kill  him  at  sight,  but  fortunately 
he  was  warned  and  spared  to  perform  his  important 
work.  Had  a  fortnight  of  grace  been  vouchsafed  him, 
he  would  have  probably  made  the  most  brilliant  modern 
campaign  that  has  been  witnessed  in  China,  for  he  was 
an  excellent  soldier.  Acting  from  the  natural  fortress 
of  Yunnan  it  was  his  plan  to  descend  suddenly  on  the 
Yangtsze  Valley  by  way  of  Chungking  and  to  capture 
the  upper  river  in  one  victorious  march  thus  closing  the 
vast  province  of  Szechuan  to  the  Northern  troops.  But 
circumstances  had  made  it  imperative  for  him  and  his 
friends  to  telegraph  the  Yunnan  ultimatum  a  fortnight 
sooner  than  it  should  have  been  dispatched,  and  the 
warning  thus  conveyed  to  the  Central  Government 
largely  crippled  the  Yunnan  offensive. 

The  circumstances  which  had  made  instant  action 
necessary  were  as  follows.  As  we  have  seen  from  the 
record  of  the  previous  risings,  the  region  of  the  Yangtsze 
river  has  superlative  value  in  Chinese  politics.  Offer- 
ing as  it  does  an  easy  road  into  the  heart  of  the  country 
and  touching  more  than  half  the  Provinces,  it  is  indeed  a 
priceless  means  of  communication,  and  for  this  reason 


246  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  careful  after  the  crushing  of  the 
rebelHon  of  1913  to  load  the  river-towns  with  his  troops 
under  the  command  of  Generals  he  believed  incorrupt- 
ible. Chief  of  these  was  General  Feng  Kuo-chang  at 
Nanking  who  held  the  balance  of  power  on  the  great 
river,  and  whose  politics,  though  not  entirely  above  sus- 
picion, had  been  proof  against  all  the  tempting  offers 
South  China  made  to  him  until  the  ill-fated  monarchy 
movement  had  commenced.  But  during  this  movement 
General  Feng  Kuo-chang  had  expressed  himself  in  such 
contemptuous  terms  of  the  would-be  Emperor  that  or- 
ders had  been  given  to  another  high  official — Admiral 
Tseng,  Garrison  Commissioner  at  Shanghai — to  have 
him  assassinated.  Instead  of  obeying  his  instructions, 
Admiral  Tseng  had  conveyed  a  warning  to  his  proposed 
yictim,  the  consequence  being  that  the  unfortunate  ad- 
miral was  himself  brutally  murdered  on  the  streets  of 
Shanghai  by  revolver-shots  for  betraying  the  confidence 
of  his  master.  After  this  denouement  it  was  not  very 
strange  that  General  Feng  Kuo-chang  should  have  inti- 
mated to  the  Republican  Party  that  as  soon  as  they  en- 
tered the  Yangtsze  Valley  he  would  throw  his  lot  with 
them  together  with  all  his  troops.  Of  this  Yuan  Shih- 
kai  became  aware  through  his  extraordinary  system  of 
intelligence ;  and  following  his  usual  practice  he  had  or- 
dered General  Feng  Kuo-chang  to  Peking  as  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff — an  appointment  which  would  place 
him  under  direct  surveillance.  First  on  one  excuse,  then 
on  another,  General  Feng  Kuo-chang  had  managed  to 
delay  his  departure  from  day  to  day  without  actually 
coming  under  the  grave  charge  of  refusing  to  obey 
orders.  But  finally  the  position  was  such  that  he  tele- 
graphed to  General  Tsao-ao  that  unless  the  Yunnan 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  247 

arrangements  were  hastened  he  would  have  to  leave 
Nanking — and  abandon  this  important  centre  to  one 
of  Yuan  Shih-kai's  own  henchmen — which  meant  the 
end  of  all  hopes  of  the  Yangtsze  Valley  rising  en  masse. 

It  was  to  save  Feng  Kuo-chang,  then,  that  the  young 
patriot  Tsao-ao  caused  the  ultimatum  to  be  dispatched 
fourteen  days  too  soon  i.e.,  before  the  Yunnan  troops 
had  marched  over  the  mountain-barrier  into  the  neigh- 
bouring province  of  Szechuan  and  seized  the  city  of 
Chungking — which  would  have  barred  the  advance  of 
the  Northern  troops  permanently  as  the  river  defiles  even 
when  lightly  defended  are  impassable  here  to  the  strong- 
est force.  It  was  largely  due  to  the  hardships  of  forced 
marches  conducted  over  these  rugged  mountains,  which 
raise  their  precipitous  peaks  to  the  heavens,  that  Tsao-ao 
subsequently  lost  his  life,  his  health  being  undermined 
by  exposure,  tuberculosis  finally  claiming  him.  But 
one  thing  at  least  did  his  resolute  action  secure.  With 
Yunnan  in  open  revolt  and  several  other  provinces 
about  to  follow  suit,  General  Feng  Yuo-chang  was  able 
to  telegraph  Peking  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to 
leave  his  post  at  Nanking  without  rebellion  breaking 
out.  This  veiled  threat  was  understood  by  Yuan  Shih- 
kai.     Grimly  he  accepted  the  checkmate. 

Yet  all  the  while  he  was  acting  with  his  customary 
energy.  Troops  were  dispatched  towards  Szechuan  in 
great  numbers,  being  tracked  up  the  rapids  of  the  upper 
river  on  board  fleets  of  junks  which  were  ruthlessly  com- 
mandeered. Now  commenced  an  extraordinary  race 
between  the  Yunnan  mountaineers  and  the  Northern 
plainsmen  for  the  strategic  city  of  Chungking.  For 
some  weeks  the  result  was  in  doubt;  for  although 
Szechuan  province  was  held  by  Northern  garrisons,  they 


248  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

were  relatively  speaking  weak  and  surrounded  by  hos- 
tile Szechuan  troops  whose  politics  were  doubtful.  In 
the  end,  however,  Yuan  Shih-kai's  men  reached  their 
goal  first  and  Chungking  was  saved.  Heavy  and  con- 
tinuous mountain-fighting  ensued,  in  which  the  South- 
em  troops  were  only  partially  successful.  Being  less 
well-equipped  in  mountain  artillery  and  less  well-found 
in  general  supplies  they  were  forced  to  rely  largely  on 
guerilla  warfare.  There  is  little  accurate  record  of  the 
desperate  fighting  which  occurred  in  this  wild  region  but 
it  is  known  that  the  original  Yunnan  force  was  nearly 
annihilated,  and  that  of  the  remnant  numbers  perished 
from  disease  and  exposure. 

Other  events  were,  however,  hastening  the  debacle. 
Kueichow  province  had  almost  at  once  followed  the 
example  of  Yunnan.  A  third  province,  Kwangsi,  un- 
der a  veteran  who  was  much  respected,  General  Lu  Yun 
Ting,  was  soon  added;  and  gradually  as  in  1911  it 
became  clear  that  the  army  was  only  one  chessman  in  a 
complicated  and  very  ingenious  game. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

"the  third  revolution"   (Continued) 

THE    DOWNFALL    AND    DEATH    OF    YUAN    SHIH-KAI 

As  had  been  the  case  during  the  previous  revolts,  it 
was  not  publicly  or  on  the  battlefield  that  the  most 
crucial  work  was  performed:  the  decisive  elements  in 
this  new  and  conclusive  struggle  were  marshalled  behind 
the  scenes  and  performed  their  task  unseen.  Though 
the  mandarinate,  at  the  head  of  which  stood  Yuan  Shih- 
kai,  left  no  stone  unturned  to  save  itself  from  its  im- 
pending fate,  all  was  in  vain.  Slowly  but  inexorably  it 
was  shown  that  a  final  reckoning  had  to  be  faced. 

The  reasons  are  not  far  to  seek.  Too  long  had  the 
moral  sense  of  educated  men  been  outraged  by  common 
fraud  and  deceit  for  any  continuance  of  a  regime  which 
had  disgraced  China  for  four  long  years  to  be  humanly 
possible.  Far  and  wide  the  word  was  rapidly  passing 
that  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  not  the  man  he  had  once  been : 
he  was  in  reality  feeble  and  choleric — prematurely  old 
from  too  much  history-making  and  too  many  hours 
spent  in  the  harem.  He  had  indeed  become  a  mere  Co- 
lossus with  feet  of  clay, — a  man  who  could  be  hurled 
to  the  ground  by  precisely  the  same  methods  he  had 
used  to  destroy  the  Manchus.  Even  his  foreign  sup- 
porters were  becoming  tired  and  suspicious  of  him,  end- 
less trouble  being  now  associated  with  his  name,  there 
being  no  promise  that  quieter  times  could  possibly  come 
so  long  as  he  lived.     A  very  full  comprehension  of  the 

249 


250  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

general  position  is  given  by  perusing  the  valedictory  let- 
ter of  the  leader  of  the  Chinese  intellectuals,  that  re- 
markable man — Liang  Chi-ch'ao,  who  in  December  had 
silently  and  secretly  fled  from  Tientsin  on  information 
reaching  him  that  his  assassination  was  being  planned. 
On  the  eve  of  his  departure  he  had  sent  the  following 
brilliant  document  to  the  Emperor-elect  as  a  reply  to  an 
attempt  to  entrap  him  to  Peking,  a  document  the  mean- 
ing of  which  was  clear  to  every  educated  man.  Its  ex- 
quisite irony  mixed  with  its  bluntness  told  all  that  was 
necessary  to  tell — and  forecasted  the  inevitable  fall. 
It  runs : — 

For  the  Kind  Perusal  of  the  Great  President : — 

A  respectful  reading  of  your  kind  instructions  reveals  to  me 
your  modesty  and  the  brotherly  love  which  you  cherish  for  your 
himible  servant,  who  is  so  moved  by  your  heart-touching  sym- 
pathy that  he  does  not  know  how  to  return  your  kindness. 
A  desire  then  seized  him  to  submit  his  humble  views  for  your 
wise  consideration ;  though  on  the  one  hand  he  has  thought  that 
he  might  fail  to  express  what  he  wishes  to  say  if  he  were  to  do 
so  in  a  set  of  brief  words,  while  on  the  other  hand  he  has  no 
desire  to  trouble  the  busy  mind  of  one  on  whose  shoulders  fall 
myriads  of  affairs,  with  views  expressed  in  many  words. 
Furthermore,  what  Ch'i-chao  desires  to  say  relates  to  what  can 
be  likened  to  the  anxiety  of  one  who,  fearing  that  the  heavens 
may  some  day  fall  on  him,  strives  to  ward  off  the  catastrophe. 
If  his  words  should  be  misunderstood,  it  would  only  increase 
his  offence.  Time  and  again  he  has  essayed  to  write ;  but 
each  time  he  has  stopped  short.  Now  he  is  going  South  to 
visit  his  parents ;  and  looking  at  the  Palace-Gate  from  afar, 
he  realizes  that  he  is  leaving  the  Capital  indefinitely.  The 
thought  that  he  has  been  a  protege  of  the  Great  President  and 
that  dangers  loom  ahead  before  the  nation  as  well  as  his  sense 
of  duty  and  friendly  obligations,  charge  him  with  the  responsi- 
bility of  saying  something.     He  therefore  begs  to   take  the 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  251 

liberty  of  presenting  his  humble  but  extravagant  views  for 
the  kind  consideration  of  the  Great  President. 

The  problem  of  Kuo-ti  (form  of  State)  appears  to  have 
gone  too  far  for  reconsideration:  the  position  is  like  unto  a 
man  riding  on  the  back  of  a  wild  tiger.  .  .  .  Ch'i-chao  there- 
fore at  one  moment  thought  he  would  say  no  more  about  it, 
since  added  comment  thereon  might  make  him  all  the  more 
open  to  suspicion.  But  a  sober  study  of  the  general  situa- 
tion and  a  quiet  consideration  of  the  possible  future  make  him 
tremble  like  an  autumn  leaf;  for  the  more  he  meditates,  the 
more  dangerous  the  situation  appears.  It  is  true  that  the 
minor  trouble  of  "foreign  advice"  and  rebel  plotting  can  be 
settled  and  guarded  against;  but  what  Ch'i-chao  bitterly  de- 
plores is  that  the  original  intention  of  the  Great  President  to 
devote  his  life  and  energy  to  the  interest  of  the  country — an 
intention  he  has  fulfilled  during  the  past  four  years — will  be 
difficult  to  explain  to  the  world  in  future.  The  trust  of  the 
world  in  the  Great  President  would  be  shattered  with  the  result 
that  the  foundation  of  the  country  will  be  unsettled.  Do  not 
the  Sages  say:  "In  dealing  with  the  people  aim  at  faithful- 
ness?" If  faithfulness  to  promises  be  observed  by  those  in 
authority,  then  the  people  will  naturally  surrender  themselves. 
Once,  however,  a  promise  is  broken,  it  will  be  as  hard  to  win 
back  the  people's  trust  as  to  ascend  to  the  very  Heavens.  Sev- 
eral times  have  oaths  of  office  been  uttered ;  yet  even  before  the 
lips  are  dry,  action  hath  falsified  the  words  of  promise.  In 
these  circumstances,  how  can  one  hope  to  send  forth  his  orders 
to  the  country  in  the  future,  and  expect  them  to  be  obeyed? 
The  people  will  say  "he  started  in  righteousness  but  ended  in 
self-seeking:  how  can  we  trust  our  lives  in  his  hands,  if  he 
should  choose  to  pursue  even  further  his  love  of  self-enrich- 
ment?" It  is  possible  for  Ch'i-chao  to  believe  that  the  Great 
President  has  no  desire  to  make  profit  for  himself  by  the  sac- 
rifice of  the  country,  but  how  can  the  mass  of  the  people — 
who  believe  only  what  they  are  told — understand  what  Ch'i- 
chao  may,  perchance,  believe? 

The  Great  President  sees  no  one  but  those  who  are  always 
near  him;  and  these  are  the  people  who  have  tried  to  win  his 


252  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

favour  and  gain  rewards  by  concocting  the  alleged  unanimous 
petitions  of  the  whole  country  urging  his  accession  to  the 
Throne.  In  reality,  however,  the  will  of  the  people  is  pre- 
cisely the  opposite.  Even  the  high  officials  in  the  Capital  talk 
about  the  matter  in  a  jeering  and  sarcastic  way.  As  for  the 
tone  of  the  newspapers  outside  Peking,  that  is  better  left  un- 
mentioned.  And  as  for  the  "small  people"  who  crowd  the 
streets  and  the  market-places,  they  go  about  as  if  something 
untoward  might  happen  at  any  moment.  If  a  kingdom  can  be 
maintained  by  mere  force,  then  the  disturbance  at  the  time  of 
Ch'in  Chih-huang  and  Sui  Yang  Ti  could  not  have  been  suc- 
cessful. If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  necessary  to  secure  the 
co-operation  and  the  willing  submission  of  the  hearts  of  the 
people,  then  is  it  not  time  that  our  Great  President  bethinks 
himself  and  boldly  takes  his  own  stand? 

Some  argue  that  to  hesitate  in  the  middle  of  a  course  after 
indulging  in  much  pomp  and  pageantry  at  the  beginning  will 
result  in  ridicule  and  derision  and  that  the  dignity  of  the 
Chief  Executive  will  be  lowered.  But  do  they  even  know 
whether  the  Great  President  has  taken  the  least  part  in  con- 
nection with  the  phantasies  of  the  past  four  months?  Do  they 
know  that  the  Great  President  has,  on  many  occasions,  sworn 
fidelity  before  high  Heaven  and  the  noon-day  sun?  Now  if  he 
carries  out  his  sacrosanct  promise  and  is  deaf  to  the  unright- 
eous advice  of  evil  counsellors,  his  high  virtue  will  be  made  even 
more  manifest  than  ever  before.  Wherein  then  is  there  need 
of  doubt  or  fear? 

Others  may  even  suggest  that  since  the  proposal  was  initiated 
by  military  men,  the  tie  that  has  hitherto  bound  the  latter  to 
the  Great  President  may  be  snapped  in  case  the  pear  fails  to 
ripen.  But  in  the  humble  opinion  of  Ch'i-chao,  the  troops 
are  now  all  fully  inspired  with  a  sense  of  obedience  to  the 
Chief  Executive.  Who  then  can  claim  the  right  to  drag  our 
Great  President  into  unrighteousness  for  the  sake  of  vanity  and 
vainglory?  Who  will  dare  disobey  the  behests  of  the  Great 
President  if  he  should  elect  to  open  his  heart  and  follow  the 
path  of  honour  and  unbroken  vows  ?  If  today,  as  Head  of  the 
nation,  he  is  powerless  to  silence  the  riotous  clamour  of  the 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  253 

soldiery  as  happened  at  Chen-chiao  in  ancient  time,  then  be 
sure  in  the  capacity  of  an  Emperor  he  will  not  be  able  to 
suppress  an  outbreak  of  troops  even  as  it  happened  once  at 
Yuyang  in  the  Tang  dynasty.^  To  give  them  the  handle 
of  the  sword  is  simply  courting  trouble  for  the  future.  But 
can  we  suspect  the  troops — so  long  trained  under  the  Great 
President — of  such  unworthy  conduct? 

The  ancients  say  "However  a  thing  is  done,  do  not  hurt  the 
feelings  of  those  who  love  you,  or  let  your  enemy  have  a 
chance  to  rejoice."  Recently  calamities  in  the  forms  of 
drought  and  flood  have  repeatedly  visited  China ;  and  the  an- 
cients warn  us  that  in  such  ways  does  Heaven  manifest  its  Will 
regarding  great  movements  in  our  country.  In  addition  to 
these  we  must  remember  the  prevailing  evils  of  a  corrupt  official- 
dom, the  incessant  ravages  of  robbers,  excesses  in  punishment, 
the  unusually  heavy  burdens  of  taxation,  as  well  as  the  irregu- 
larity of  weather  and  rain,  which  all  go  to  increase  the  mur- 
murs and  complaints  of  the  people.  Internally,  the  rebels  are 
accumulating  strength  against  an  opportune  time  to  rise ;  ex- 
ternally, powerful  neighbouring  countries  are  waiting  for  an 
opportunity  to  harass  us.  Why  then  should  our  Great  Presi- 
dent risk  his  precious  person  and  become  a  target  of  public 
criticism  ;  or  "abandon  the  rock  of  peace  in  search  of  the  tiger's 
tail" ;  or  discourage  the  loyalty  of  faithful  ones  and  encourage 
the  sinister  ambitions  of  the  unscrupulous?  Ch'i-chao  sincerely 
hopes  that  the  Great  President  will  devote  himself  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  new  era  which  shall  be  an  inspiration  to  heroism 

1  The  incident  of  Chen-chiao  is  very  celebrated  in  Chinese  annals.  A  yel- 
low robe,  the  symbol  of  Imperial  authority,  was  thrown  around  General 
Chao  Kuang-ying,  at  a  place  called  Chen-chiao,  by  his  soldiers  and  ofScers 
when  he  commanded  a  force  ordered  to  the  front.  Chao  returned  to  the 
Capital  immediately  to  assume  the  Imperial  Throne,  and  was  thus  "  com- 
pelled "  to  become  the  founder  of  the  famous  Sung  dynasty. 

The  "  incident  of  Yuyang  "  refers  to  the  execution  of  Yang  Kuei-fei,  the 
favourite  concubine  of  Emperor  Yuan  Tsung  of  the  Tang  dynasty.  The 
Emperor  for  a  long  time  was  under  the  alluring  influence  of  Yang  Kuei-fei, 
who  had  a  paramour  named  An  Lo-hsan.  The  latter  finally  rebelled  against 
the  Emperor.  The  Emperor  left  the  capital  and  proceeded  to  another  place 
together  with  his  favourite  concubine,  guarded  by  a  large  force  of  troops. 
Midway,  however,  the  soldiers  threatened  to  rebel  unless  the  concubine  was 
killed  on  the  spot.  The  clamour  was  such  that  the  Emperor  was  forced  to 
sacrifice  the  favourite  of  his  harem,  putting  her  to  death  in  the  presence  of 
his  soldiers. 


254,  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

and  thus  escape  the  fate  of  those  who  are  stigmatized  in  our 
annals  with  the  name  of  Traitor.  He  hopes  that  the  renown 
of  the  Great  President  will  long  be  remembered  in  the  land 
of  Chung  Hua  (China)  and  he  prays  that  the  fate  of  China 
may  not  end  with  any  abrupt  ending  that  may  befall  the  Great 
President.  He  therefore  submits  his  views  with  a  bleeding 
heart.  He  realizes  that  his  words  may  not  win  the  approval 
of  one  who  is  wise  and  clever ;  but  Ch'i-chao  feels  that  unless  he 
unburdens  what  is  in  his  heart,  he  will  be  false  to  the  duty 
which  bids  him  speak  and  be  true  to  the  kindness  that  has 
been  showered  on  him  by  the  Great  President.  Whether  his 
loyalty  to  the  Imperative  Word  will  be  rewarded  with  approval 
or  with  reproof,  the  order  of  the  Great  President  will  say. 

There  are  other  words  of  which  Ch'i-chao  wishes  to  tender 
to  the  Great  President.  To  be  an  independent  nation  today, 
we  must  need  follow  the  ways  of  the  present  age.  One  who 
opposes  the  current  of  the  world  and  protects  himself  against 
the  enriching  influence  of  the  world-spirit  must  eventually  share 
the  fate  of  the  unselected.  It  is  sincerely  hoped  that  the 
Great  President  will  refrain  to  some  extent  from  restoring  the 
old  and  withal  work  for  real  reform.  Law  can  only  be  made  a 
living  force  by  both  the  ruler  and  the  people  obeying  it  with 
sincerity.  When  the  law  loses  its  strength,  the  people  will  not 
know  how  to  act ;  and  then  the  dignity  of  Government  will  dis- 
appear. It  is  hoped  that  the  Great  President  will  keep  him- 
self within  the  bounds  of  law  and  not  lead  the  officials  and 
the  people  to  juggle  with  words.  Participation  in  politics  and 
patriotism  are  closely  related.  Bear  well  in  mind  that  it  is 
impossible  to  expect  the  people  to  share  the  responsibilities 
of  the  country,  unless  they  are  given  a  voice  in  the  transac- 
tion of  public  business.  The  hope  is  expressed  that  the  Great 
President  will  establish  a  real  organ  representing  the  true  will 
of  the  people  and  encourage  the  natural  growth  of  the  free 
expression  of  public  opinion.  Let  us  not  become  so  arrogant 
and  oppressive  that  the  people  will  have  no  chance  to  express 
their  views,  as  this  may  inspire  hatred  on  the  part  of  the  people. 
The  relation  between  the  Central  Government  and  the  pro- 
vincial centres  is  like  that  between  the  trunk  and  branches  of 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  255 

a  tree.  If  the  branches  are  all  withered,  how  can  the  trunk 
continue  to  grow?  It  is  hoped  that  the  Great  President,  wliile 
giving  due  consideration  to  the  maintenance  of  the  dignity  of 
the  Central  Government,  will  at  the  same  time  allow  the  local 
life  of  the  provinces  to  develop.  Ethics,  Righteousness,  Purity 
and  Conscientiousness  are  four  great  principles.  When  these 
four  principles  are  neglected,  a  country  dies.  If  the  whole 
country  should  come  in  spirit  to  be  like  "concubines  and 
women,"  weak  and  open  to  be  coerced  and  forced  along  with 
whomsoever  be  on  the  stronger  side,  how  can  a  State  be  estab- 
lished? May  the  Great  President  encourage  principle,  and 
virtue,  stimulate  purity  of  character,  reject  men  of  covetous 
and  mean  character,  and  grant  wise  tolerance  to  those  who 
know  no  fear  in  defending  the  right.  Only  then  will  the  vitality 
of  the  country  be  retained  in  some  degree;  and  in  time  of 
emergency,  there  will  be  a  reserve  of  strength  to  be  drawn 
upon  in  support  of  the  State.  All  these  considerations  are  of 
the  order  of  obvious  truths  and  it  must  be  assumed  that  the 
Great  President,  who  is  greatly  wise,  is  not  unaware  of  the 
same.  The  reason  why  Ch'i-chao  ventures  to  repeat  them  is 
this.  He  holds  it  true  that  a  duty  is  laid  on  him  to  submit 
whatever  humble  thoughts  are  his,  and  at  the  same  time  he 
believes  that  the  Great  President  will  not  condemn  a  proper 
physic  even  though  it  may  be  cheap  and  simple.  How  fortu- 
nate will  Ch'i-chao  be  if  advice  so  tendered  shall  meet  with 
approval.  He  is  proceeding  farther  and  farther  away  from  the 
Palace  every  day  and  he  does  not  know  how  soon  he  will  be 
able  to  seek  an  audience  again.  He  writes  these  words  with 
tears  dropping  into  the  ink-slab  and  he  trusts  that  his  words 
may  receive  the  attention  of  the  Great  President. 

So  ends  this  remarkable  missive  which  has  become  an 
historic  document  in  the  archives  of  the  Republic.  Once 
again  it  was  whispered  that  so  great  an  impression  did 
this  fateful  warning  produce  on  the  Emperor-elect  that 
he  was  within  an  ace  of  cancelling  the  disastrous  scheme 
which  now  enmeshed  him.     But  in  the  end  family  influ- 


256  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

ence  won  the  day;  and  stubbornly  and  doggedly  the 
doomed  man  pushed  on  with  his  attempt  to  crush  revolt 
and  consolidate  his  crumbling  position. 

Every  possible  effort  was  made  to  minimize  the  effect 
of  international  influence  on  the  situation.  As  the  syco- 
phantic vernacular  press  of  the  capital,  long  drilled  to 
blind  subservience,  had  begun  to  speak  of  his  enthrone- 
ment as  a  certainty  on  the  9th  February,  a  Circular 
Note  was  sent  to  the  Five  Allied  Powers  that  no  such 
date  had  been  fixed,  and  that  the  newspaper  reports  to 
that  effect  were  inventions.  In  order  specially  to  con- 
ciliate Japan,  a  high  official  was  appointed  to  proceed 
on  an  Embassy  to  Toldo  to  grant  special  industrial  con- 
cessions— a  manoeuvre  which  was  met  with  the  official 
refusal  of  the  Tokio  Government  to  be  so  placated. 
Peking  was  coldly  informed  that  owing  to  "court  en- 
gagements" it  would  be  impossible  for  the  Emperor  of 
Japan  to  receive  any  Chinese  Mission.  After  this  open 
rebuff  attention  was  concentrated  on  "the  punitive  ex- 
pedition" to  chastise  the  disaffected  South,  80,000  men 
being  put  in  the  field  and  a  reserve  of  80,000  mobilized 
behind  them.  An  attempt  was  also  made  to  win  over 
waverers  by  an  indiscriminate  distribution  of  patents  of 
nobility.  Princes,  Dukes,  Marquises,  Viscounts  and 
Barons  were  created  in  great  batches  overnight  only  to 
be  declined  in  very  many  cases,  one  of  the  most  precious 
possessions  of  the  Chinese  race  being  its  sense  of  hu- 
mour. Every  one,  or  almost  every  one,  knew  that  the 
new  patents  were  not  worth  the  paper  they  were  written 
on,  and  that  in  future  years  the  members  of  this  spurious 
nobility  would  be  exposed  to  something  worse  than  con- 
tempt. France  was  invited  to  close  the  Tonkin  frontier, 
but  this  request  also  met  with  a  rebuff,  and  revolution- 


Liang  Shih-yi,  Who  was  the  Power  Behind  Yuan  Shih- 
KAi,  Now  Proscribed  and  Living  in  Exile  at  Hongkong 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  257 

ists  and  arms  were  conveyed  in  an  ever-more  menacing 
manner  into  the  revolted  province  of  Yunnan  by  the 
French  railways.  A  Princedom  was  at  length  con- 
ferred on  Lung  Chi  Kwang,  the  Military  Governor  of 
Canton,  Canton  being  a  pivotal  point  and  Lung  Chi 
Kwang,  one  of  the  most  cold-blooded  murderers  in 
China,  in  the  hope  that  this  would  spur  him  to  such  an 
orgy  of  crime  that  the  South  would  be  crushed.  Pre- 
cisely the  opposite  occurred,  since  even  murderers  are 
able  to  read  the  signs  of  the  times.  Attempts  were 
hkewise  made  to  enforce  the  use  of  the  new  Imperial 
Calendar,  but  little  success  crowned  such  efforts,  no  one 
outside  the  metropolis  believing  for  a  moment  that  this 
innovation  possessed  any  of  the  elements  of  permanence. 
Meanwhile  the  monetary  position  steadily  worsened, 
the  lack  of  money  becoming  so  marked  as  to  spread 
panic.  Still,  in  spite  of  this,  the  leaders  refused  to 
take  warning,  and  although  the  political  impasse  was 
constantly  discussed,  the  utmost  concession  the  mon- 
archists were  willing  to  make  was  to  turn  China  into 
a  Federal  Empire  with  the  provinces  constituted  into 
self-governing  units.  The  over-issue  of  paper  cur- 
rency to  make  good  the  gaps  in  the  National  Finance, 
now  slowly  destroyed  the  credit  of  the  Central  Gov- 
ernment and  made  the  suspension  of  specie  payment  a 
mere  matter  of  time.  By  the  end  of  February  the  prov- 
ince of  Kueichow  was  not  only  officially  admitted  by  the 
Peking  Government  to  be  in  open  revolt  as  well  as 
Yunnan,  but  rebel  troops  were  reported  to  be  invading 
the  neighbouring  province  of  Hunan.  Kwangsi  was 
also  reported  to  be  preparing  for  secession  whilst  in 
Szechuan  local  troops  were  revolting  in  increasing  num- 
bers.    Rumours  of  an  attempted  assassination  of  Yuan 


258  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Shih-kai  by  means  of  bombs  now  circulated, — and  there 
were  many  arrests  and  suicides  in  the  capital.  Though 
by  a  mandate  issued  on  the  23rd  February,  the  enthrone- 
ment ceremony  was  indefinitely  postponed,  that  move 
came  too  late.  The  whole  country  was  plainly  trem- 
bling on  the  edge  of  a  huge  outbreak  when,  less  than 
four  weeks  later.  Yuan  Shih-kai  reluctantly  and  pub- 
licly admitted  that  the  game  was  up.  It  is  understood 
that  a  fateful  interview  he  had  with  the  British  Minister 
greatly  influenced  him,  though  the  formal  declaration 
of  independence  of  Kwangsi  on  the  16th  March,  whither 
the  scholar  Liang  Ch'i-chao  had  gone,  was  also  a  power- 
ful argument.  On  the  22nd  March  the  Emperor-elect 
issued  the  mandate  categorically  cancelling  the  entire 
monarchy  scheme,  it  being  declared  that  he  would  now 
form  a  Responsible  Cabinet.  Until  that  date  the  Gov- 
ernment Gazette  had  actually  perpetrated  the  folly  of 
publishing  side  by  side  Imperial  Edicts  and  Presidential 
Mandates — the  first  for  Chinese  eyes,  the  second  for 
foreign  consumption.  Never  before  even  in  China  had 
such  a  farce  been  seen.  A  rapid  perusal  of  the  Man- 
date of  Cancellation  will  show  how  lamely  and  poorly 
the  retreat  is  made : 

DECREE    CANCELLING    THE    EMPIRE    (22d    MARCH ) 

After  the  establishment  of  the  Min  Kuo  (i.e.  the  RepubHc), 
disturbances  rapidly  followed  one  another;  and  a  man  of  little 
virtue  like  me  was  called  to  take  up  the  vast  burden  of  the 
State.  Fearing  that  disaster  might  befall  us  any  day,  all  those 
who  had  the  welfare  of  the  country  at  heart  advocated  the 
reinstitution  of  the  monarchical  system  of  government  to  the 
end  that  a  stop  be  put  to  all  strife  for  power  and  a  regime  of 
peace  be  inaugurated.  Suggestions  in  this  sense  have  unceas- 
ingly been  made  to  me  since  the  days  of  Kuei  Chou  (the  year 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  259 

of  the  first  Revolution,  1911)  and  each  time  a  sharp  rebuke 
has  been  administered  to  the  one  making  the  suggestion.  But 
the  situation  last  year  was  indeed  so  different  from  the  circum- 
stances of  preceding  years  that  it  was  impossible  to  prevent 
the  spread  of  such  ideas. 

It  was  said  that  China  could  never  hope  to  continue  as  a 
nation  unless  the  constitutional  monarchical  form  of  state  were 
adopted;  and  if  quarrels  like  those  occurring  in  Mexico  and 
Portugal  were  to  take  place  in  China,  we  would  soon  share  the 
fate  of  Annam  and  Burmah.  A  large  number  of  people  then 
advocated  the  restoration  of  a  monarchy  and  advanced  argu- 
ments which  were  reasonable.  In  this  proposal  all  the  mili- 
tary and  civil  officials,  scholars  and  people  concurred;  and 
prayers  were  addressed  to  me  in  most  earnest  tone  by  telegram 
and  in  petitions.  Owing  to  the  position  I  was  at  the  time  hold- 
ing, which  laid  on  me  the  duty  of  maintaining  the  then  existing 
situation,  I  repeatedly  made  declarations  resisting  the  adoption 
of  the  advice ;  but  the  people  did  not  seem  to  realize  my  em- 
barrassment. And  so  it  was  decided  by  the  acting  Li  Fa  Yuan 
(i.e.  the  Senate)  that  the  question  of  Kuo-ti  (form  of  State) 
should  be  settled  by  the  Convention  of  Citizens'  Representatives. 
As  the  result,  the  representatives  of  the  Provinces  and  of  the 
Special  Administrative  Areas  unanimously  decided  in  favour 
of  a  constitutional  monarchy,  and  in  one  united  voice  elected 
me  as  the  Emperor.  Since  the  sovereignty  of  the  country  has 
been  vested  in  the  citizens  of  China  and  as  the  decision  was 
made  by  the  entire  body  of  the  representatives,  there  was  no 
room  left  to  me  for  further  discussion.  Nevertheless,  I  con- 
tinued to  be  of  the  conviction  that  my  sudden  elevation  to  the 
Great  Seat  would  be  a  violation  of  my  oath  and  would  compro- 
mise my  good  faith,  leaving  me  unable  to  explain  myself;  I, 
therefore,  declined  in  earnest  words  in  order  to  make  clear  the 
view  which  hath  always  been  mine.  The  said  Senate  however, 
stated  with  firmness  that  the  oath  of  the  Chief  Executive  rested 
on  a  peculiar  sanction  and  should  be  observed  or  discarded 
according  to  the  will  of  the  people.  Their  arguments  were 
so  ivresistible  that  there  was  in  truth  no  excuse  for  me  further 
to  decline  the  offer. 


260  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Therefore  I  took  refuge  behind  the  excuse  of  "preparations" 
in  order  that  the  desire  of  the  people  might  be  satisfied.  But 
I  took  no  steps  actually  to  carry  out  the  program.  When  the 
trouble  in  Yunnan  and  Kueichow  arose,  a  mandate  was  officially 
issued  announcing  the  decision  to  postpone  the  measure  and 
forbidding  further  presentation  of  petitions  praying  for  the 
enthronement.  I  then  hastened  the  convocation  of  the  Li  Fa 
Yuan  (i.e.,  a  new  Parliament)  in  order  to  secure  the  views  of 
that  body  and  hoping  thus  to  turn  back  to  the  original  state  of 
affairs,  I,  being  a  man  of  bitter  experiences,  had  at  once  given  up 
all  ideas  of  world  affairs ;  and  having  retired  into  the  obscurity 
of  the  river  Yuan  (in  Honan),  I  had  no  appetite  for  the  politi- 
cal affairs  of  the  country.  As  the  result  of  the  revolution  in 
Hsin  Hai,  I  was  by  mistake  elected  by  the  people.  Reluctantly 
I  came  out  of  my  retirement  and  endeavoured  to  prop  up  the 
tottering  structure.  I  cared  for  nothing,  but  the  salvation  of 
the  country.  A  perusal  of  our  history  of  several  thousand 
years  will  reveal  in  vivid  manner  the  sad  fate  of  the  descendants 
of  ancient  kings  and  emperors.  What  then  could  have 
prompted,  me  to  aspire  to  the  Throne?  Yet  while  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  people  were  unwilling  to  believe  in  the  sincerity 
of  my  refusal  of  the  offer,  a  section  of  the  people  appear  to 
have  suspected  me  of  harbouring  the  desire  of  gaining  more 
power  and  privileges.  Such  difference  in  thought  has  resulted 
in  the  creation  of  an  exceedingly  dangerous  situation.  As  my 
sincerity  has  not  been  such  as  to  win  the  hearts  of  the  people 
and  my  judgment  has  not  been  sound  enough  to  appraise 
every  man,  I  have  myself  alone  to  blame  for  lack  of  virtue. 
Why  then  should  I  blame  others?  The  people  have  been 
thrown  into  misery  and  my  soldiers  have  been  made  to  bear 
hardships ;  and  further  the  people  have  been  cast  into  panic 
and  commerce  has  rapidly  declined.  When  I  search  my  own 
heart  a  measure  of  sorrow  fills  it.  I  shall,  therefore,  not  be 
unwilling  to  suppress  myself  in  order  to  yield  to  others. 

I  am  still  of  the  opinion  that  the  "designation  petitions" 
submitted  through  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan  are  unsuited  to  the 
demands  of  the  time ;  and  the  official  acceptance  of  the  Imperial 
Throne  made  on  the  11th  day  of  the  12th  month  of  last  year 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  261 

(11th  December,  1915)  is  hereby  cancelled.  The  "designation 
petitions"  of  the  Provinces  and  of  the  Special  Administrative 
Areas  are  hereby  all  returned  through  the  State  Department 
to  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan,  i.e.,  the  acting  Li  Fa  Yuan  (Parlia- 
ment), to  be  forwarded  to  the  petitioners  for  destruction;  and 
all  the  preparations  connected  therewith  are  to  cease  at  once. 
In  this  wise  I  hope  to  imitate  the  sincerity  of  the  Ancients  by 
taking  on  myself  all  the  blame  so  that  my  action  may  fall  in 
line  with  the  spirit  of  humanity  which  is  the  expression  of  the 
will  of  Heaven.  I  now  cleanse  my  heart  and  wash  my  thoughts 
to  the  end  that  trouble  may  be  averted  and  the  people  may 
have  peace.  Those  who  advocated  the  monarchical  system 
were  prompted  by  the  desire  to  strengthen  the  foundation  of 
the  country ;  but  as  their  methods  have  proved  unsuitable  their 
patriotism  might  harm  the  country.  Those  who  have  opposed 
the  monarchy  have  done  so  out  of  their  desire  to  express  their 
political  views.  It  may  be  therefore  presumed  that  they  would 
not  go  to  the  extreme  and  so  endanger  the  country.  They 
should,  therefore,  all  hearken  to  the  voice  of  their  own  con- 
science and  sacrifice  their  prejudices,  and  with  one  mind  and 
one  purpose  unite  in  the  effort  of  saving  the  situation  so  that 
the  glorious  descendants  of  the  Sacred  Continent  may  be  spared 
the  horrors  of  internal  warfare  and  the  bad  omens  may  be 
changed  into  lucky  signs. 

In  brief  I  now  confess  that  all  the  faults  of  the  country  are 
the  result  of  my  own  faults.  Now  that  the  acceptance  of  the 
Imperial  Throne  has  been  cancelled  every  man  will  be  respon- 
sible for  his  own  action  if  he  further  disturbs  the  peace  of  the 
locality  and  thus  give  an  opportunity  to  others.  I,  the  Great 
President,  being  charged  with  the  duty  of  ruling  over  the  whole 
country,  cannot  remain  idle  while  the  country  is  racing  to  per- 
dition. At  the  present  moment  the  homesteads  are  in  misery, 
discipline  has  been  disregarded,  administration  is  being  neg- 
lected and  real  talents  have  not  been  given  a  chance.  WTien  I 
think  of  such  conditions  I  awake  in  the  darkness  of  midnight. 
How  can  we  stand  as  a  nation  if  such  a  state  of  affairs  is 
allowed  to  continue?  Hereafter  all  officials  should  thoroughly 
get  rid  of  their  corrupt  habits  and  endeavour  to  achieve  merits. 


262  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

They  should  work  with  might  and  main  in  their  duties,  whether 
in  introducing  reforms  or  in  abolishing  old  corruptions.  Let 
all  be  not  satisfied  with  empty  words  and  entertain  no  bias 
regarding  any  affair.  They  should  hold  up  as  their  main 
principle  of  administration  the  policy  that  only  reality  will 
count  and  deal  out  reward  or  punishment  with  strict  prompt- 
ness. Let  all  our  generals,  officials,  soldiers  and  people  all, 
all,  act  in  accordance  with  this  ideal. 

This  attempt  at  an  Amende  honourable,  so  far  from 
being  well-received,  was  universally  looked  upon  as  an 
admission  that  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  almost  been  beaten 
anjd  that  a  little  more  would  complete  his  ruin.  Though, 
as  we  have  said,  the  Northern  troops  were  fighting  well 
in  his  cause  on  the  upper  reaches  of  the  great  Yangtsze, 
the  movement  against  him  was  now  spreading  as  though 
it  had  been  a  dread  contagious  disease,  the  entire  South 
uniting  against  Peking.  His  promise  to  open  a  proper 
Legislative  Chamber  on  1st  May  was  met  with  derision. 
By  the  middle  of  April  five  provinces — Yunnan,  Kuei- 
chow,  Kwangsi,  Kwangtung  and  Chekiang — had  de- 
clared their  independence,  and  eight  others  were  prepar- 
ing to  follow  suit.  A  Southern  Confederacy,  with  a 
Supreme  Military  Council  sitting  at  Canton,  was  or- 
ganized, the  brutal  Governor  Limg  Chi  Kwang  having 
been  won  over  against  his  master,  and  the  scholar  Liang 
Ch'i-chao  flitting  from  place  to  place,  inspiring  move 
after  move.  The  old  parliament  of  1913  was  reported 
to  be  assembling  in  Shanghai,  whilst  terrorist  methods 
against  Peking  officials  were  bruited  abroad  precipitat- 
ing a  panic  in  the  capital  and  leading  to  an  exodus  of 
well-to-do  families  who  feared  a  general  massacre. 

An  open  agitation  to  secure  Yuan  Shih-kai's  com- 
plete  retirement   and   exile   now   commenced.     From 


The  Funeral  of  Yuan  Shih-kai — the  Catafalque  Over 
THE  Coffin  on  Its  Way  to  the  Railway  Station 


The  Funeral  of  Yuan  Shih-kai — the  Procession  Passing 
Down  the  Great  Palace  Approach  with  the  Famous 
Ch'ien  Men  (Gate)   in  the  Distance 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  263 

every  quarter  notables  began  telegraphing  him  that  he 
must  go, — including  General  Feng  Kuo-chang  who  still 
held  the  balance  of  power  on  the  Yangtsze.  Every 
enemy  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  ever  had  was  also  racing  back 
to  China  from  exile.  By  the  beginning  of  May  the  situ- 
ation was  so  threatening  that  the  Foreign  Legations 
became  alarmed  and  talked  of  concerting  measures  to 
insure  their  safety.  On  the  6th  May  came  the  coup  de 
grace.  The  great  province  of  Szechuan,  which  has  a 
population  greater  than  the  population  of  France,  de- 
clared its  independence;  and  the  whole  Northern  army 
on  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Yangtsze  was  caught  in  a 
trap.  The  story  is  still  told  with  bated  breath  of  the 
terrible  manner  in  which  Yuan  Shih-kai  sated  his  rage 
when  this  news  reached  him — Szechuan  being  governed 
by  a  man  he  had  hitherto  thoroughly  trusted — one  Gen- 
eral Chen  Yi.  Arming  himself  with  a  sword  and  beside 
himself  with  rage  he  burst  into  the  room  where  his 
favourite  concubine  was  lying  with  her  newly-delivered 
baby.  With  a  few  savage  blows  he  butchered  them 
both,  leaving  them  lying  in  their  gore,  thus  relieving  the 
apoplectic  stroke  which  threatened  to  overwhelm  him. 
Nothing  better  illustrates  the  real  nature  of  the  man 
who  had  been  so  long  the  selected  bailiff  of  the  Powers. 
On  the  12th  May  it  became  necessary  to  suspend 
specie  payment  in  Peking,  the  government  banks  hav- 
ing scarcely  a  dollar  of  silver  left,  a  last  attempt  to 
negotiate  a  loan  in  America  having  failed.  Meanwhile 
under  inspiration  of  General  Feng  Kuo-chang,  a  con- 
ference to  deal  with  the  situation  was  assembling  at 
Nanking;  but  on  the  11th  May,  the  Canton  Military 
Government,  representing  the  Southern  Confederacy, 
had   already   unanimously   elected   Vice-President    Li 


264  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Yuan  Hung  as  president  of  the  Republic,  it  being  held 
that  legally  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  ceased  to  be  President 
when  he  had  accepted  the  Throne  on  the  previous  13th 
December.  The  Vice-President,  who  had  managed  to 
remove  his  residence  outside  the  Palace,  had  already  re- 
ceived friendly  offers  of  protection  from  certain  Powers 
which  he  declined,  showing  courage  to  the  end.  Even 
the  Nanking  Conference,  though  composed  of  trimmers 
and  wobblers,  decided  that  the  retirement  of  Yuan 
Shih-kai  was  a  political  necessity.  General  Feng  Kuo- 
chang  as  chairman  of  the  Conference  producing  at  the 
last  moment  a  telegram  from  the  fallen  Dictator  de- 
claring that  he  was  willing  to  go  if  his  life  and  property 
were  guaranteed. 

A  more  dramatic  collapse  was,  however,  in  store.  As 
May  drew  to  an  end  it  was  plain  that  there  was  no 
government  at  all  left  in  Peking.  The  last  phase  had 
been  truly  reached.  Yuan  Shih-kai's  nervous  collapse 
was  known  to  all  the  Legations  which  were  exceedingly 
anxious  about  the  possibility  of  a  soldiers'  revolt  in  the 
capital.  The  arrival  of  a  first  detachment  of  the  savage 
hordes  of  General  Chang  Hsun  added  Byzantine 
touches  to  a  picture  already  lurid  with  a  sickened  ruler 
and  the  Mephistophelian  figure  of  that  ruler's  dine 
damnee,  the  Secretary  Liang  Shih-yi,  vainly  striving  to 
transmute  paper  into  silver,  and  find  the  wherewithal 
to  prevent  a  sack  of  the  capital.  It  was  said  at  the 
time  that  Liang  Shih-yi  had  won  over  his  master  to 
trying  one  last  throw  of  the  dice.  The  troops  of  the 
remaining  loyal  Generals,  such  as  Ni  Shih-chung  of 
Anhui,  were  transported  up  the  Yangtsze  in  an  attempt 
to  restore  the  situation  by  a  savage  display, — but  that 
effort  came  to  nought. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  265 

The  situation  had  become  truly  appalHng  in  Peking. 
It  was  even  said  that  the  neighbouring  province  of 
Shantung  was  to  become  a  separate  state  under  Japan- 
ese protection.  Although  the  Peking  administration 
was  still  nominally  the  Central  Govermnent  of  China, 
it  was  amply  clear  to  observers  on  the  spot  that  by  a 
process  of  successive  collapses  all  that  was  left  of  gov- 
ernment was  simply  that  pertaining  to  a  city-state  of  the 
antique  Greek  type — a  mal-administration  dominated 
by  the  enigmatic  personality  of  Liang  Shih-yi.  The 
writ  of  the  capital  no  longer  ran  more  than  ten  miles 
beyond  the  city  walls.  The  very  Government  Depart- 
ments, disgusted  with,  and  distrustful  of,  the  many  hid- 
den influences  at  work,  had  virtually  declared  their 
independence  and  went  their  own  way,  demanding  for- 
eign dollars  and  foreign  banknotes  from  the  public,  and 
refusing  all  Chinese  money.  The  fine  residium  of  undis- 
puted power  left  in  the  hands  of  the  Mal-administrator- 
in-Chief,  Liang  Shih-yi,  was  the  control  of  the  copper 
cash  market  which  he  busily  juggled  with  to  the  very 
end  netting  a  few  last  thousands  for  his  own  purse,  and 
showing  that  men  like  water  inevitably  find  their  true 
level.  In  all  China's  tribulations  nothing  similar  had 
ever  been  seen.  Even  in  1900,  after  the  Boxer  bubble 
had  been  pricked  and  the  Court  had  sought  safety  in 
flight,  there  was  a  certain  dignity  and  majesty  left. 
Then  an  immense  misfortune  had  fallen  across  the  cap- 
ital; but  that  misfortune  was  like  a  cloak  which  hid  the 
nakedness  of  the  victim;  and  there  was  at  least  no 
pretence  at  authority.  In  the  Summer  of  1916,  had  it 
not  been  for  the  fact  that  an  admirable  police  and 
gendarmerie  system,  comprising  16,000  men,  secured 
the  safety  of  the  people,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 


266  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

firing  and  looting  would  have  daily  taken  place  and  no 
woman  been  safe.  It  was  the  last  phase  of  pohtical 
collapse  with  a  vengeance :  and  small  wonder  if  all  Chi- 
nese officials,  including  even  high  police  officers,  sent 
their  valuables  either  out  of  the  city  or  into  the  Legation 
Quarter  for  safe  custody.  Extraordinary  rumours  cir- 
culated endlessly  among  the  common  people  that  there 
would  be  great  trouble  on  the  occasion  of  the  Dragon 
Festival,  the  5th  June;  and  what  actually  took  place 
was  perhaps  more  than  a  coincidence. 

Early  on  the  6th  June  an  electric  thrill  ran  through 
Peking — Yuan  Shih-kai  was  dead!  At  fii'st  the  news 
was  not  believed,  but  by  eleven  o'clock  it  was  definitely 
known  in  the  Legation  Quarter  that  he  had  died  a  few 
minutes  after  ten  o'clock  that  morning  from  ureemia 
of  the  blood — the  surgeon  of  the  French  Legation  being 
in  attendance  almost  to  the  last.  A  certificate  issued 
later  by  this  gentleman  immediately  quieted  the  rumours 
of  suicide,  though  many  still  refused  to  believe  that  he 
was  actually  dead.  "I  did  not  wish  this  end,"  he  is 
reported  to  have  whispered  hoarsely  a  few  minutes  be- 
fore he  expired,  "I  did  not  wish  to  be  Emperor.  Those 
around  me  said  that  the  people  wanted  a  king  and 
named  me  for  the  Throne.  I  believed  and  was  misled." 
And  in  this  way  did  his  light  flicker  out.  If  there  are 
sermons  in  stones  and  books  in  the  running  brooks  surely 
there  is  an  eloquent  lesson  in  this  tragedy !  Before  ex- 
piring the  wretched  man  issued  the  following  Death 
JNIandate  in  accordance  with  the  ancient  tradition,  at- 
tempting as  the  long  night  fell  on  him  to  make  his  peace 
with  men: — 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  267 

LAST    MANDATE    OF    YUAN    SHIH-KAI 

The  Min  Kuo  has  been  established  for  five  years.  Un- 
worthily have  I,  the  Great  President,  been  entrusted  with  the 
great  task  by  the  citizens.  Owing  to  my  lack  of  virtue  and 
ability  I  have  not  been  able  fully  to  transform  into  deeds 
what  I  have  desired  to  accomplish;  and  I  blush  to  say  that  I 
have  not  realized  one  ten-thousandth  part  of  my  original  inten- 
tion to  save  the  country  and  the  people.  I  have,  since  my 
assumption  of  the  office,  worked  in  day  and  thought  in  the 
night,  planning  for  the  country.  It  is  true  that  the  founda- 
tion of  the  country  is  not  yet  consolidated,  the  hardships  of  the 
people  not  yet  relieved,  and  innumerable  reforms  are  still  un- 
attended to.  But  by  the  valuable  services  of  the  civil  officials 
and  militarymen,  some  semblance  of  peace  and  order  has  been 
maintained  in  the  provinces  and  friendly  relations  with  the 
Powers  upheld  till  now. 

While  on  the  one  hand  I  comfort  myself  with  such  things 
accomplished,  on  the  other  hand  I  have  much  to  blame  myself 
for.  I  was  just  thinking  how  I  could  retire  into  private  life 
and  rest  myself  in  the  forest  and  near  the  springs  in  fulfilment 
of  my  original  desire,  when  illness  has  suddenly  overtaken  me. 
As  the  affairs  of  the  State  are  of  gravest  importance,  the  right 
man  must  be  secured  to  take  over  charge  of  the  same.  In 
accordance  with  Article  29  of  the  Provisional  Constitution, 
which  states  that  in  case  the  office  of  the  Great  President  should 
be  vacated  for  certain  reasons  or  when  the  Great  President  is 
incapacitated  from  doing  his  duties,  the  Vice-President  shall 
exercise  authority  and  power  in  his  stead.  I,  the  Great  Presi- 
dent, declare  in  accordance  with  the  Provisional  Constitution 
that  the  Vice-President  shall  exercise  in  an  acting  capacity, 
the  authority  and  power  of  the  Great  President  of  the  Chung 
Hua  Min  Kuo. 

The  Vice-President  being  a  man  of  courtesy,  good  nature, 
benevolence  and  wisdom,  will  certainly  be  capable  of  greatly 
lessening  the  difficulties  of  the  day  and  place  the  country  on  the 
foundation  of  peace,  and  so  remedy  the  defects  of  me,  the  Great 
President,  and  satisfy  the  expectations  of  the  people  of  the 
whole  country.     The  civil  and  military  officials  outside  of  the 


268  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Capital  as  well  as  the  troops,  police  and  scholars  and  people 
should  doubly  keep  in  mind  the  difficulties  and  perils  of  the 
nation,  and  endeavour  to  maintain  peace  and  order  to  the  best 
of  their  ability,  placing  before  everything  else  the  welfare  of 
the  country.  The  ancients  once  said:  "It  is  only  when  the 
living  do  try  to  become  strong  that  the  dead  are  not  dead." 
This  is  also  the  wish  of  me,  the  Great  President. 
(Signed)      Tuan  Chi-jui, 

Secretary  of  State  and 
Minister  of  War. 
Tsao  Ju-un, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and 
Communications, 
Wang  Yi-tang, 

Minister  of  Interior. 
Chow  Tzu-chi, 

Minister  of  Finance. 

LiU-KUAN-HSIUNG, 

Minister  of  Navy. 
Chang  Tsung-hsiang, 

Minister   of  Justice   and 

Agriculture  and  Commerce. 
Chang  Kuo-kan, 

Minister  of  Education. 
6th  day  of  the  6th  month  of  the  5th  year  of  Chung  Hua 
Min  Kuo. 

This  tragic  denouement  did  not  fail  to  awaken  within 
very  few  days  among  thinking  minds  a  feeling  of  pro- 
found sympathy  for  the  dead  man  coupled  with  sharp 
disgust  for  the  part  that  foreigners  had  played — not  all, 
of  course — but  a  great  number  of  them.  Briefly,  when 
all  the  facts  are  properly  grouped  it  can  be  said  that 
Yuan  Shih-kai  was  killed  by  his  foreign  friends — by  the 
sort  of  advice  he  has  been  consistently  given  in  Consti- 
tutional Law,  in  Finance,  in  Politics,  in  Diplomacy.  It 
is  easy  to  trace  step  by  step  the  broad  road  he  had  been 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  269 

tempted  to  travel,  and  to  see  how  at  each  turning-point 
the  men  who  should  have  taught  him  how  to  be  true  and 
loyal  to  the  Western  things  the  country  had  nominally 
adliered  to  from  the  proclamation  of  the  Republic, 
showed  him  how  to  be  disloyal  and  untrue.  The 
tragedy  is  one  which  is  bound  to  be  deeply  studied 
throughout  the  whole  world  when  the  facts  are  prop- 
erly known  and  there  is  time  to  think  about  them,  and 
if  there  is  anything  today  left  to  poetic  justice  the  West 
will  know  to  whom  to  apportion  the  blame. 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  the  man,  when  he  came  out  of  retire- 
ment in  1911,  was  in  many  ways  a  wonderful  Chinese: 
he  was  a  fount  of  energy  and  of  a  physical  sturdiness 
rare  in  a  country  whose  governing  classes  have  hitherto 
been  recruited  from  attenuated  men,  pale  from  study 
and  the  lotus  life.  He  had  a  certain  task  to  which  to 
put  his  hand,  a  huge  task,  indeed,  since  the  reforma- 
tion of  four  hundred  millions  was  involved,  yet  one 
which  was  not  beyond  him  if  wisely  advised.  He  was 
an  ignorant  man  in  certain  matters,  but  he  had  had  much 
political  experience  and  apparently  possessed  a  marvel- 
lous aptitude  for  learning.  The  people  needed  a  leader 
to  guide  them  through  the  great  gateway  of  the  West, 
to  help  them  to  acquire  those  jewels  of  wisdom  and 
experience  which  are  a  common  heritage.  An  almost 
Elizabethan  eagerness  filled  them,  as  if  a  New  World 
they  had  never  dreamed  of  had  been  suddenly  discovered 
for  them  and  lay  open  to  their  endeavours.  China, 
hitherto  derided  as  a  decaying  land,  had  been  born 
anew;  and  in  single  massive  gesture  had  proclaimed  that 
she,  too,  would  belong  to  the  elect  and  be  governed 
accordingly. 

What  was  the  foreign  response — the  official  response? 


270  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

In  eveiy  transaction  into  which  it  was  possible  to  import 
them,  reaction  and  obscurantism  were  not  only  com- 
monly employed  but  heartily  recommended.  Not  one 
trace  of  genuine  statesmanship,  not  one  flash  of  altru- 
ism, was  ever  seen  save  the  American  flash  in  the  pan 
of  1913,  when  President  Wilson  refused  to  allow 
American  participation  in  the  gi-eat  Reorganization 
Loan  because  he  held  that  the  terms  on  which  it  was 
to  be  granted  infringed  upon  China's  sovereign  rights. 
Otherwise  there  was  nothing  but  a  tacit  endorsement  of 
the  very  policy  which  has  been  tearing  the  entrails  out 
of  Europe — namely  militarism.  That  was  the  fine  fruit 
which  was  offered  to  a  hopeful  nation — something  that 
would  wither  on  the  branch  or  poison  the  people  as  they 
plucked  it.  They  were  taught  to  believe  that  political 
instinct  was  the  ability  to  misrepresent  in  a  convincing 
way  the  actions  and  arguments  of  your  opponents  and 
to  profit  by  their  mistakes — not  that  it  is  a  mighty 
impulse  which  can  re-make  nations.  The  Republic  was 
declared  by  the  actions  of  Western  bureaucrats  to  be  a 
Republic  pour  rire,  not  a  serious  thing ;  and  by  this  false 
and  cruel  assumption  they  killed  Yuan  Shih-kai. 

If  that  epitaph  is  written  on  his  political  tombstone, 
it  will  be  as  full  of  blinding  truth  as  is  only  possible 
with  Last  Things. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE   NEW   REGIME, — FROM    1916   TO   1917 

Within  an  hour  of  the  death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  the 
veteran  General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  in  his  capacity  of  Secre- 
tary of  State,  had  called  on  Vice-President  Li  Yuan- 
hung — the  man  whom  years  before  he  had  been  sent 
to  the  Yangtsze  to  bring  captive  to  Peking — and  wel- 
comed him  as  President  of  the  Republic.  At  one 
o'clock  on  the  same  day  the  Ministers  of  the  Allied 
Powers  who  had  hastily  assembled  at  the  Waichiaopu 
(Foreign  Office) ,  were  informed  that  General  Li  Yuan- 
hung  had  duly  assumed  office  and  that  the  peace  and 
security  of  the  capital  were  fully  guaranteed.  No  un- 
rest of  any  sort  need  be  apprehended ;  for  whilst  rumours 
would  no  doubt  circulate  wildly  as  soon  as  the  populace 
realized  the  tragic  nature  of  the  climax  which  had  come, 
the  Gendarmerie  Corps  and  the  Metropolitan  Police — 
two  forces  that  numbered  18,000  armed  men — were  tak- 
ing every  possible  precaution. 

In  spite  of  these  assurances  great  uneasiness  was  felt. 
The  foreign  Legations,  which  are  very  imperfectly  in- 
formed regarding  Chinese  affairs  although  living  in  the 
midst  of  them,  could  not  be  convinced  that  internal 
peace  could  be  so  suddenly  attained  after  five  years  of 
such  fierce  rivalries.  Among  the  many  gloomy  predic- 
tions made  at  the  time,  the  most  common  to  fall  from 
the  hps  of  Foreign  Plenipotentiaries  was  the  remark 
that  the  Japanese  would  be  in  full  occupation  of  the 
country  within  three  months — the  one  effective  barrier 

271 


272  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

to  their  advance  having  been  removed.  No  better  illus- 
tration could  be  given  of  the  inadequate  grasp  of  politics 
possessed  by  those  whose  peculiar  business  it  should  be 
to  become  expert  in  the  science  of  cause  and  effect.  In 
China,  as  in  the  Balkans,  professional  diplomacy  errs 
so  constantly  because  it  has  in  the  main  neither  the  desire 
nor  the  training  to  study  dispassionately  from  day  to 
day  all  those  complex  phenomena  which  go  to  make  up 
modern  nationalism.  Guided  in  its  conduct  almost  en- 
tirely by  a  policy  of  personal  predilections,  which  is 
fitfully  reinforced  by  the  recollection  of  precedents,  it  is 
small  wonder  if  such  mountains  of  mistakes  choke  every 
Legation  dossier.  Determined  to  having  nothing  what- 
ever to  do,  save  in  the  last  resort,  with  anything  that 
savours  of  Radicalism,  and  inclining  naturally  towards 
ideals  which  have  long  been  abandoned  in  the  workaday 
world,  diplomacy  is  the  instinctive  lover  of  obscurantism 
and  the  furtive  enemy  of  progress.  Distrusting  all 
those  generous  movements  which  spring  from  the  popu- 
lar desire  to  benefit  by  change,  it  follows  from  this  that 
the  diplomatic  brotherhood  inclines  towards  those  truly 
detestable  things — secret  compacts.  In  the  present  in- 
stance, having  been  bitterly  disappointed  by  the  com- 
plete collapse  of  the  strong  man  theory,  it  was  only 
natural  that  consolation  should  be  sought  by  casting 
doubt  on  the  future.  Never  have  sensible  men  been  so 
absurd.  The  life-story  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  and  the  part 
European  and  Japanese  diplomacy  played  in  that  story, 
form  a  chapter  which  should  be  taught  as  a  warning  to 
all  who  enter  politics  as  a  career,  since  there  is  exhibited 
in  this  history  a  complete  compendium  of  all  the  more 
vicious  traits  of  Byzantinism. 

The  first  acts  of  President  Li  Yuan-hung  rapidly 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  273 

restored  confidence  and  advertised  to  the  keen-eyed  that 
the  end  of  the  long  drawn-out  Revolution  had  come. 
Calling  before  him  ail  the  generals  in  the  capital,  he 
told  them  with  sincerity  and  simplicity  that  their  coun- 
try's fortunes  rested  in  their  hands ;  and  he  asked  them 
to  take  such  steps  as  would  be  in  the  nature  of  a  perma- 
nent insurance  against  foreign  interference  in  the  af- 
fairs of  the  Republic.  He  was  at  once  given  fervent 
support.  A  mass  meeting  of  the  military  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  whole  body  of  commissioned  men  volun- 
teering to  hold  themselves  personally  responsible  for  the 
maintenance  of  peace  and  order  in  the  capital.  The 
dreadful  disorders  which  had  ushered  in  the  Yuan  Shih- 
kai  regime  were  thus  made  impossible;  and  almost  at 
once  men  went  about  their  business  as  usual. 

The  financial  wreckage  left  by  the  mad  monarchy 
adventure  was,  however,  appalling.  Not  only  was 
there  no  money  in  the  capital  but  hardly  any  food  as 
well;  for  since  the  suspension  of  specie  payments  coun- 
try supplies  had  ceased  entering  the  city  as  farmers 
refused  to  accept  inconvertible  paper  in  payment  for 
their  produce.  It  became  necessary  for  the  govern- 
ment to  sell  at  a  nominal  price  the  enormous  quantities 
of  grain  which  had  been  accumulated  for  the  army  and 
the  punitive  expedition  against  the  South ;  and  for  many 
days  a  familiar  sight  was  the  endless  blue-coated  queues 
waiting  patiently  to  receive  as  in  war-time  then*  stipu- 
lated pittance. 

Meanwhile,  although  the  troops  remained  loyal  to  the 
new  regime,  not  so  the  monarchist  politicians.  Seeing 
that  their  hour  of  obliteration  had  come,  they  spared 
no  effort  to  sow  secret  dissensions  and  prevent  the  prov- 
inces from  uniting  again  with  Peking.     It  would  be 


274  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

wearisome  to  give  in  full  detail  the  innumerable  schemes 
which  were  now  hourly  formulated,  to  secure  that  the 
control  of  the  country  should  not  be  exercised  in  a  law- 
ful way.  Finding  that  it  was  impossible  to  conquer  the 
general  detestation  felt  for  them,  the  monarchists,  led 
by  Liang  Shih-yi,  changed  their  tactics  and  exhausted 
themselves  in  attempting  to  secure  the  issue  of  a  general 
annesty  decree.  But  in  spite  of  every  argument  Pres- 
ident Li  Yuan-hung  remained  unmoved  and  refused  ab- 
solutely to  consider  their  pardon.  A  just  and  merciful 
man,  it  was  his  intention  to  allow  the  nation  to  speak 
its  mind  before  issuing  orders  on  the  subject;  but  to 
show  that  he  was  no  advocate  of  the  terrorist  methods 
practised  by  his  predecessor,  he  now  issued  a  Mandate 
summarily  abolishing  the  infamous  Chili  Fa  Chu,  or 
Military  Court,  which  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  turned  into 
an  engine  of  judicial  assassination,  and  within  whose 
gloomy  precincts  many  thousands  of  unfortunate  men 
had  perished  practically  untried  in  the  period  1911- 
1916. 

Meanwhile  the  general  situation  throughout  the  coun- 
try only  slowly  ameliorated.  The  Northern  Military 
party,  determined  to  prevent  political  power  from  pass- 
ing solely  into  the  hands  of  the  Southern  Radicals,  bit- 
terly opposed  the  revival  of  the  Nanking  Provisional 
Constitution,  and  denounced  the  re-convocation  of  the 
old  Parliament  of  1913,  which  had  already  assembled  in 
Shanghai,  preparatory  to  coming  up  to  the  capital.  It 
needed  a  sharp  manoeuvre  to  bring  them  to  their  senses. 
The  Chinese  Navy,  assembled  in  the  waters  near 
Shanghai,  took  action;  and  in  an  ultimatum  communi- 
cated to  Peking  by  their  Admiral,  declared  that  so  long 
as  the  government  in  the  hands  of  General  Tuan  Chi- 


r.uirtcs.v  Major  Isaac  Newell,  U.  S.  Military  Attache 

An  Excampment  of  "the  Punitive  Expedition"  of  1916 
ON  thl;  Upper  Yangtsze 


Kevivai>  of  the  Impeuialistic  Worship  of  Heaven  by 
Yuan  Shih-kai  in  1914,  Scene  on  the  Altar  of 
Heaven,  with  Sacrificial  Officers  Clothed  in  Cos- 
tumes Dating  from  2,000  Years  Ago 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  275 

jui  refused  to  conform  to  popular  wishes  by  reviving  the 
Nanking  Provisional  Constitution  and  resummoning  the 
old  Parliament,  so  long  would  the  Navy  refuse  to  recog- 
nize the  authority  of  the  Central  Government.  With 
the  fleet  in  the  hands  of  the  Southern  Confederacy, 
which  had  not  yet  been  formally  dissolved,  the  Peking 
Government  was  powerless  in  the  whole  region  of  the 
Yangtsze ;  consequently,  after  many  vain  manoeuvres  to 
avoid  this  reasonable  and  proper  solution,  it  was  at  last 
agreed  that  things  should  be  brought  back  precisely 
where  they  had  been  before  the  coup  d'etat  of  the  4th 
November,  1913 — the  Peking  Government  being  re- 
constituted by  means  of  a  coalition  cabinet  in  which  there 
would  be  both  nominees  of  the  North  and  South — the 
premiership  remaining  in  the  hands  of  General  Tuan 
Chi- jui. 

On  the  28th  June  a  long  funeral  procession  wended 
its  way  from  the  Presidential  Palace  to  the  railway  sta- 
tion ;  it  was  the  remains  of  the  great  dictator  being  taken 
to  their  last  resting-place  in  Honan.  Conspicuous  in 
this  cortege  was  the  magnificent  stagecoach  which  had 
been  designed  to  bear  the  founder  of  the  new  dynasty  to 
his  throne  but  which  only  accompanied  him  to  his  grave. 
The  detached  attitude  of  the  crowds  and  the  studied 
simplicity  of  the  procession,  which  was  designed  to  be 
republican,  proved  more  clearly  than  reams  of  argu- 
ments that  China — despite  herself  perhaps — had  become 
somewhat  modernized,  the  oldest  country  in  the  world 
being  now  the  youngest  republic  and  timidly  trying  to 
learn  the  lessons  of  youth. 

Once  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  buried,  a  Mandate 
ordering  the  summary  arrest  of  all  the  chief  monarch- 
ist plotters  was  issued;  but  the  gang  of  corrupt  men 


276  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

had  already  sought  safety  in  ignominious  flight;  and  it 
was  understood  that  so  long  as  they  remained  on  soil 
under  foreign  jurisdiction,  no  attempt  would  be  made 
even  to  confiscate  their  goods  and  chattels  as  would  cer- 
tainly have  been  done  under  former  governments.  The 
days  of  treachery  and  double-deahng  and  cowardly 
revenge  were  indeed  passing  away  and  the  new  regime 
was  committed  to  decency  and  fairplay.  The  task  of 
the  new  President  was  no  mean  one,  and  in  all  the 
circumstances  if  he  managed  to  steer  a  safe  middle 
course  and  avoid  both  Csesarism  and  complete  efface- 
ment,  that  is  a  tribute  to  his  training.  Born  in  1864 
in  Hupeh,  one  of  the  most  important  mid-Yangtsze 
provinces.  President  Li  Yuan-hung  was  now  fifty-two 
years  old,  and  in  the  prime  of  life ;  but  although  he  had 
been  accustomed  to  a  military  atmosphere  from  his 
earliest  youth  his  policy  had  never  been  militaristic. 
His  father  having  been  in  command  of  a  force  in  North 
China  for  many  years,  rising  from  the  ranks  to  the  post 
of  Tsan  Chiang  (Lieutenant-Colonel),  had  been  con- 
strained to  give  him  the  advantage  of  a  thoroughly 
modern  training.  At  the  age  of  20  he  had  entered  the 
Naval  School  at  Tientsin ;  whence  six  years  later  he  had 
graduated,  seeing  service  in  the  navy  as  an  engineer 
officer  during  the  Chino- Japanese  war  of  1894.  After 
that  campaign  he  had  been  invited  by  Viceroy  Chang 
Chih-tung,  then  one  of  the  most  distinguished  of  the 
older  viceroys,  to  join  his  staff  at  Nanking,  and  had  been 
entrusted  with  the  supervision  of  the  construction  of  the 
modern  forts  at  the  old  Southern  capital,  which  played 
such  a  notable  part  in  the  Revolution.  When  Chang 
Chih-tung  was  transferred  to  the  Wuchang  viceroyalty. 
General  Li  Yuan-hung  had  accompanied  him,  actively 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  277 

participating  in  the  training  of  the  new  Hupeh  army, 
and  being  assisted  in  that  work  by  German  instructors. 
In  1897  he  had  gone  to  Japan  to  study  educational, 
mihtary  and  administrative  methods,  returning  to  China 
after  a  short  stay,  but  again  proceeding  to  Tokyo  in 
1897  as  an  officer  attached  to  the  Imperial  Guards.  In 
the  autumn  of  the  following  year  he  had  returned  to 
Wuchang  and  been  appointed  Commander  of  the  Cav- 
alry. Yet  another  visit  was  paid  by  him  to  Japan  in 
1902  to  attend  the  grand  military  manoeuvres,  these 
journeys  giving  him  a  good  working  knowledge  of  Jap- 
anese, in  addition  to  the  English  which  had  been  an 
important  item  in  the  curriculum  of  the  Naval  School, 
and  which  he  understands  moderately  well.  In  1903  he 
was  promoted  Brigadier  General,  being  subsequently 
gazetted  as  the  Commander  of  the  2nd  Division  of  Reg- 
ulars (Chang  Pei  Chun)  of  Hupeh.  He  also  con- 
stantly held  various  subsidiary  posts,  in  addition  to  his 
substantive  appointment,  connected  with  educational 
and  administrative  work  of  various  kinds,  and  has  there- 
fore a  sound  grasp  of  provincial  government.  He  was 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  8th  Division  during  the 
famous  military  manoeuvres  of  1906  at  Changtehfu  in 
Honan  province,  which  are  said  to  have  been  given  birth 
to  the  idea  of  a  universal  revolt  against  the  Manchus  by 
using  the  army  as  the  chief  instrument. 

On  the  memorable  day  of  October  11,  1911,  when 
the  standard  of  revolt  was  raised  at  Wuchang,  some- 
what against  his  will  as  he  was  a  loyal  officer,  he  was 
elected  military  Governor,  thus  becoming  the  first  real 
leader  of  the  Republic.  Within  the  space  of  ten  days 
his  leadership  had  secured  the  adhesion  of  fourteen  prov- 
inces to  the  Republican  cause;  and  though  confronted 


278  THE  FIGHT  FOK  THE 

by  grave  difficulties  owing  to  insufficiency  of  equipment 
and  military  supplies,  he  fought  the  Northern  soldiery 
for  two  months  around  Wuchang  with  varying  success. 
He  it  was,  when  the  Republic  had  been  formally  estab- 
hshed  and  the  Manchu  regime  made  a  thing  of  the  past, 
who  worked  earnestly  to  bring  about  better  relations 
between  the  armies  of  North  and  South  China  which 
had  been  arrayed  against  one  another  during  many  bit- 
ter weeks.  It  was  he,  also,  who  was  the  first  to  advocate 
the  complete  separation  of  the  civil  and  military  admin- 
istration— the  administrative  powers  in  the  early  days  of 
the  Republic  being  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  military 
governors  of  the  provinces  who  recruited  soldiery  in  total 
disregard  to  the  wishes  of  the  Central  Government. 
Although  this  reform  has  even  today  only  been  partially 
successful,  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  before  the 
Republic  is  many  years  older  the  idea  of  the  military  dic- 
tating the  policy  and  administration  of  the  country  will 
pass  away.  The  so-called  Second  Revolution  of  1913 
awakened  no  sympathy  in  General  Li  Yuan-hung,  be- 
cause he  was  opposed  to  internal  strife  and  held  that  all 
Chinese  should  work  for  unity  and  concerted  reform 
rather  than  indulge  in  fruitless  dissensions.  His  dis- 
approval of  the  monarchy  movement  had  been  equally 
emphatic  in  the  face  of  an  ugly  outlook.  He  was 
repeatedly  approached  by  the  highest  personages  to  give 
in  his  adhesion  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  becoming  emperor,  but 
he  persistently  refused  although  grave  fears  were  j^ub- 
licly  expressed  that  he  would  be  assassinated.  Upon 
the  formal  acceptance  of  the  Throne  by  Yuan  Shih-kai, 
he  had  had  conferred  on  him  a  princedom  which  he 
steadfastly  refused  to  accept;  and  when  the  allowances 
of  a  prince  were  brought  to  liim  from  the  Palace  he  re- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  279 

turned  them  with  the  statement  that  as  he  had  not 
accepted  the  title  the  money  was  not  his.  Every  effort 
to  break  his  will  proved  unavailing,  his  patience 
and  cahnness  contributing  ver}^  materially  to  the  vast 
moral  opposition  which  finally  destroyed  Yuan  Shih- 
kai. 

Such  was  the  man  who  was  called  upon  to  preside  over 
the  new  government  and  parliament  which  was  now 
assembUng  in  Peking;  and  certainly  it  may  be  counted 
as  an  evidence  of  China's  traditional  luck  which  brought 
him  to  the  helm.  General  Li  Yuan  Hung  knew  well 
that  the  cool  and  singular  plan  which  had  been  pursued 
to  forge  a  national  mandate  for  a  revival  of  the  empire 
would  take  years  completely  to  obliterate,  and  that  the 
octopus-hold  of  the  Military  Party — the  army  being  the 
one  effective  organization  which  had  survived  the  Revo- 
lution— could  not  be  loosened  in  a  day, — in  fact  would 
have  to  be  tolerated  until  the  nation  asserted  itself  and 
showed  that  it  could  and  would  be  master.  In  the  cir- 
cumstances his  authority  could  not  but  be  very  limited, 
disclosing  itself  in  passive  rather  than  in  active  ways. 
Wishing  to  be  above  all  a  constitutional  President,  he 
quickty  saw  that  an  interregnum  must  be  philosophically 
accepted  during  which  the  Permanent  Constitution 
would  be  worked  out  and  the  various  parties  forced  to 
a  general  agreement;  and  thanks  to  this  decision  the 
year  which  has  now  elapsed  since  Yuan  Shih-kai's  death 
has  been  almost  entirely  eventless,  with  the  exception  of 
the  crisis  which  arose  over  the  war-issue,  a  matter  which 
is  fully  discussed  elsewhere. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  closing  months  of  1916,  the  posi- 
tion was  not  a  little  singular.  Two  great  political 
parties  had  arisen  through  the  Revolution — the  Kuo 


280  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Ming  Tang  or  Nationalists,  who  included  all  the  Radical 
elements,  and  the  Chinputang  or  Progressives,  whose 
adherents  were  mainly  men  of  the  older  official  classes, 
and  therefore  conservative.  The  Yunnan  movement, 
which  had  led  to  the  overthrow  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  had 
been  insj)ired  and  very  largely  directed  by  the  scholar 
Liang  Ch'i-chao,  a  leader  of  the  Chinputang.  To  this 
party,  then,  though  numerically  inferior  to  the  Kuo 
Ming  Tang,  was  due  the  honour  and  credit  of  re-estab- 
lishing the  Republic,  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  being  under  a 
cloud  owing  to  the  failure  of  the  Second  Revolution  of 
1913  which  it  had  engineered.  Nevertheless,  owing  to 
the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  being  more  genuinely  republican, 
since  it  was  mainly  composed  of  younger  and  more  mod- 
ern minds,  it  was  from  its  ranks  that  the  greatest  check  to 
militarism  sprang;  and  therefore  although  its  work  was 
necessarily  confined  to  the  Council-chamber,  its  moral 
influence  was  very  great  and  constantly  representative 
of  the  civilian  element  as  opposed  to  the  militarist.  By 
staking  everything  on  the  necessity  of  adhering  to  the 
Nanking  Provisional  Constitution  until  a  permanent 
instrument  was  di'awn  up,  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  rapidly 
established  an  ascendancy;  for  although  the  Nanking 
Constitution  had  admittedly  failed  to  bring  representa- 
tive government  because  of  the  difficulty  of  defining 
powers  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  a  practical  autocracy 
impossible,  it  had  at  least  established  as  a  basic  principle 
that  China  could  no  longer  be  ruled  as  a  family  posses- 
sion, which  in  itself  marked  a  great  advance  on  all 
previous  conceptions.  President  Li  Yuan-hung's  pol- 
icy, in  the  circumstances,  was  to  play  the  part  of  a 
moderator  and  to  seek  to  bring  harmony  to  a  mass  of 
heterogeneous  elements  that  had  to  carry  out  the  prac- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  281 

tical  work  of  government  over  four  hundred  millions 
of  people. 

His  success  was  at  the  outset  hampered  by  the  appeal 
the  military  were  quick  in  making  to  a  new  method — 
to  offset  the  power  of  Parliament  in  Peking.  We  have 
ah'eady  dealt  with  the  evils  of  the  circular  telegram  in 
China — surely  one  of  the  most  unexpected  results  of 
adapting  foreign  inventions  to  native  life.  By  means 
of  these  telegraphic  campaigns  a  rapid  exchange  of 
views  is  made  possible  among  the  provincial  governors ; 
and  consequently  in  the  autumn  of  1916,  inspired  by  the 
Military  Party,  a  wholly  illegal  Conference  of  generals 
was  organized  by  the  redoubtable  old  General  Chang 
Hsun  on  the  Pukow  railway  for  the  purpose  of  over- 
awing parliament,  and  securing  that  the  Military  Party 
retained  a  controlling  hand  behind  the  scenes.  It  is 
perhaps  unnecessary  today  to  do  more  than  note  the  fact 
that  the  peace  of  the  country  was  badly  strained  by  this 
procedure ;  but  thanks  to  moderate  counsels  and  the  wis- 
dom of  the  President  no  open  breach  occurred  and  there 
is  reason  to  believe  that  this  experiment  will  not  be 
repeated, — at  least  not  in  the  same  way.^ 

The  difficulty  to  be  solved  is  of  an  unique  nature.  It 
is  not  that  the  generals  and  the  Military  Party  are 
necessarily  reactionary:  it  is  that,  not  belonging  to  the 
intellectual-literary  portion  of  the  ruling  elements,  they 
are  less  advanced  and  less  accustomed  to  foreign  ways, 
and  therefore  more  in  touch  with  the  older  China  which 
lingers  on  in  the  vast  agricultural  districts,  and  in  all 
those  myriad  of  townships  which  are  dotted  far  and  wide 
across  the  provinces  to  the  confines  of  Central  Asia. 

1  Although  the  events  dealt  with  in  Chapter  XVI  have  brought  China 
face  to  face  with  a  new  crisis  the  force  of  the  arguments  used  here  is  in 
no  wise  weakened. 


282  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Naturally  it  is  hard  for  a  class  of  men  who  hold  the 
balance  of  power  and  carry  on  much  of  the  actual  work 
of  governing  to  submit  to  the  paper  decrees  of  an  insti- 
tution they  do  not  accept  as  being  responsible  and  rep- 
resentative: but  many  indications  are  available  that 
when  a  Permanent  Constitution  has  been  promulgated, 
and  made  an  article  of  faith  in  all  the  schools,  a  change 
for  the  better  will  come  and  the  old  antagonisms  gradu- 
ally disappear. 

It  is  on  this  Constitution  that  Parliament  has  been  at 
work  ever  since  it  re-assembled  in  August,  1916,  and 
which  is  now  practically  completed.  Sitting  together 
three  times  a  week  as  a  National  Convention,  the  two 
Houses  have  subjected  the  Draft  Constitution  (which 
was  prepared  by  a  Special  Parhamentary  Drafting 
Committee)  to  a  very  exhaustive  examination  and  dis- 
cussion. Many  violent  scenes  have  naturally  marked 
the  progress  of  this  important  work,  the  two  great  par- 
ties, the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  and  the  Chinputang,  coming 
to  loggerheads  again  and  again.  But  in  the  main  the 
debates  and  the  decisions  arrived  at  have  been  satisfac- 
tory and  important,  because  they  have  tended  to  express 
in  a  concrete  and  indisputable  form  the  present  state 
of  the  Chinese  mind  and  its  immense  underlying  com- 
monsense.  Remarkable  discussions  and  fierce  enmities, 
for  instance,  marked  the  final  decision  not  to  make  the 
Confucian  cult  the  State  Religion;  but  there  is  not  the 
slightest  doubt  that  in  formally  registering  this  veritable 
revolution  in  the  secret  stronghold  of  Chinese  political 
thought,  a  Bastille  has  been  overthrown  and  the  ground 
left  clear  for  the  development  of  individualism  and  per- 
sonal responsibility  in  a  way  which  was  impossible  under 
the  leaden  formulas  of  the  greatest  of  the  Chinese  sages. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  283 

In  defining  tlie  relationship  which  must  exist  between 
the  Central  Government  and  the  provinces  even  more 
formidable  difficulties  have  been  encountered,  the  apos- 
tles of  decentralization  and  the  advocates  of  centraliza- 
tion refusing  for  many  months  to  agree  on  the  so-called 
Provincial  system,  and  then  fighting  a  battle  a  outrance 
on  the  question  of  whether  this  body  of  law  should  form 
a  chapter  in  the  Constitution  or  be  simply  an  annexure 
to  the  main  instrument.  The  agreement  which  was 
finally  arrived  at — to  make  it  part  and  parcel  of  the 
Constitution — was  masterly  in  that  it  has  secured  that 
the  sovereignty  of  the  people  will  not  tend  to  be  ex- 
pressed in  the  provincial  dietines  which  have  now  been 
re-erected  (after  having  been  summarily  destroyed  by 
Yuan  Shih-kai)  the  Central  Parliament  being  left  the 
absolute  master.  This  for  a  number  of  years  will  no 
doubt  be  more  of  a  theory  than  a  practice ;  but  there  is 
every  indication  that  parliamentary  government  will 
within  a  limited  period  be  more  successful  in  China 
than  in  some  European  countries ;  and  that  the  Chinese 
with  their  love  of  well-established  procedure  and  cau- 
tious action,  will  select  open  debate  as  the  best  method 
of  sifting  the  grain  from  the  chaff  and  deciding  every 
important  matter  by  the  vote  of  the  majority.  Already 
in  the  period  of  1916-1917  Parliament  has  more  than 
justified  its  re-convocation  by  becoming  a  National 
Watch  Committee.  Interpellations  on  every  conceiv- 
able subject  have  been  constant  and  frequent;  fierce 
verbal  assaults  are  delivered  on  Cabinet  Ministers;  and 
slowly  but  inexorably  a  real  sense  of  Ministerial  respon- 
sibility is  being  created,  the  fear  of  having  to  run  the 
gauntlet  of  Parliament  abating,  if  it  has  not  yet  entirely 
destroyed,  many  malpractices.     In  the  opinion  of  the 


284  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

writer  in  less  than  ten  years  Parliament  will  have  suc- 
ceeded in  coalescing  the  country  into  an  organic  whole, 
and  will  have  placed  the  Cabinet  in  such  close  daily  rela- 
tions with  it  that  something  very  similar  to  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  theory  of  government  will  be  impregnably  en- 
trenched in  Peking.  That  such  a  miracle  should  be 
possible  in  extreme  Eastern  Asia  is  one  more  proof 
that  there  are  no  victories  beyond  the  capacity  of  the 
human  mind. 

Meanwhile,  for  the  time  being,  in  China  as  in  coun- 
tries ten  thousand  miles  away,  ministerial  irresponsi- 
bility is  the  enemy ;  that  is  to  say  that  so-called  Cabinet- 
rule,  with  the  effacement  of  the  Chief  Executive,  has 
tended  to  make  Cabinet  Ministers  removed  from  effec- 
tive daily  control.  All  sorts  of  things  are  done  which 
should  not  be  done  and  men  are  still  in  charge  of  port- 
folios who  should  be  summarily  expelled  from  the  capi- 
tal for  malpractices.^  But  although  Chinese  are  slow 
to  take  action  and  prefer  to  delay  all  decisions  until 
they  have  about  them  the  inexorable  quality  which  is 
associated  with  Fate,  there  is  not  the  shghtest  doubt 
that  in  the  long  run  the  dishonest  suffer,  and  an  increas- 
ingly efficient  body  of  men  take  their  place.  From 
every  point  of  view  then  there  is  reason  for  congratu- 
lation in  the  present  position,  and  every  hope  that  the 
future  will  unroll  peacefully. 

A  visit  to  Parliament  under  the  new  regime  is  a 
revelation  to  most  men:  the  candid  come  away  with  an 
impression  which  is  never  effaced  from  their  minds. 
There  is  a  peculiar  suggestiveness  even  in  the  location 
of  the  Houses  of  the  National  Assembly.     They  are 

1  Since  this  was  written  two  Cabinet  Ministers  have  been  summarily  ar- 
rested. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  285 

tucked  away  in  the  distant  Western  city  immediately 
under  the  shadow  of  the  vast  Tartar  Wall  as  if  it  had 
been  fully  expected  when  they  were  called  into  being 
that  they  would  never  justify  their  existence,  and  that 
the  crushing  weight  of  the  great  bastion  of  brick  and 
stone  surrounding  the  capital  would  soon  prove  to  them 
how  futile  it  was  for  such  palpable  intruders  to  aspire 
to  national  control.  Under  Yuan  Shih-kai,  as  under 
the  JNIanchus,  they  were  an  exercise  in  the  arm  of  gov- 
ernment, something  which  was  never  to  be  allowed  to 
harden  into  a  settled  practice.  They  were  first  cousins 
to  railways,  to  electrical  power,  to  metalled  roadways 
and  all  those  other  modern  instances  beginning  to 
modify  an  ancient  civilization  entirely  based  on  agri- 
culture; and  because  they  were  so  distantly  related  to 
the  real  China  of  the  farm-yard  it  was  thought  that  they 
would  always  stand  outside  the  national  life. 

That  was  what  the  fools  beheved.  Yet  in  a  copy  of 
the  rules  of  procedure  of  the  old  Imperial  Senate 
(Tzuchengyuan)  the  writer  finds  this  note  written  in 
1910:  "The  Debates  of  this  body  have  been  remarkable 
during  the  very  first  session.  They  make  it  seem  clear 
that  the  first  National  Parliament  of  1913  will  seize 
control  of  China  and  nullify  the  power  of  the  Throne. 
Result,  revolution — "  Though  the  dating  is  a  little 
confused,  the  prophecy  is  worthy  of  record. 

The  watchfulness  of  the  special  police  surrounding 
the  Parliament  of  1916-1917  and  the  great  number  of 
these  men  also  tells  a  story  as  eloquent  as  the  location  of 
the  building.  It  is  not  so  much  that  any  contemplated 
violence  sets  these  guardians  here  as  the  necessity  to 
advertise  that  there  has  been  unconstitutional  violence 
in  the  past  which,  if  possible,  will  be  rigidly  defeated  in 


286  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

the  future.  Probably  no  National  Assembly  in  the 
world  has  been  held  up  to  greater  contempt  than  the 
Parliament  of  Peking  and  probably  no  body  deserves  it 
less.  An  afternoon  spent  in  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives would  certainly  surprise  most  open-minded  men 
who  have  been  content  to  believe  that  the  Chinese  ex- 
periment was  what  some  critics  have  alleged  it  to 
be.  The  Chinese  as  a  people,  being  used  to  guild-house 
proceedings,  debates,  in  which  the  welfare  of  the  ma- 
jority is  decided  after  an  examination  of  the  princi- 
ples at  stake,  are  a  very  old  and  well-established  custom ; 
and  though  at  present  there  are  awkwardnesses  and 
gaucheries  to  be  noted,  when  practice  has  become  better 
fixed,  the  common  sense  of  the  race  will  abundantly 
disclose  itself  and  make  a  lasting  mark  on  contempo- 
rary history.  There  can  be  no  doubt  about  this  at  all. 
Take  your  seat  in  the  gallery  and  see  for  yourself. 
The  first  question  which  rises  to  the  lips  is — where  are 
the  young  men,  those  crude  and  callow  youths  mas- 
querading as  legislators  which  the  vernacular  press  has 
so  excessively  lampooned?  The  majority  of  the  mem- 
bers, so  far  from  being  young,  are  men  of  thirty  or 
forty,  or  even  fifty,  with  intelligent  and  tired  faces 
that  have  lost  the  Spring  of  youth.  Here  and  there 
you  will  even  see  venerable  greybeards  suffering  from 
rheumy  coughs  who  ought  to  be  at  home ;  and  though  oc- 
casionally there  is  a  lithe  youngster  in  European  clothes 
with  the  veneer  he  acquired  abroad  not  yet  completely 
rubbed  off,  the  total  impression  is  that  of  oldish  men  who 
have  reached  years  of  maturity  and  who  are  as  repre- 
sentative of  the  country  and  as  good  as  the  country  is  in  a 
position  today  to  provide.  No  one  who  knows  the  real 
China  can  deny  that. 


^'    E 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  287 

The  Continental  arrangement  of  the  Members'  desks 
and  the  raised  tribune  of  the  Speaker,  with  its  rows  of 
clerks  and  recorders,  make  an  impression  of  orderliness, 
tinged  nevertheless  with  a  faint  revolutionary  flavour. 
Perhaps  it  is  the  straight  black  Chinese  hair  and  the 
rich  silk  clothing,  set  on  a  very  plain  and  unadorned 
background,  which  recall  the  pictures  of  the  French 
Revolution.  It  is  somehow  natural  in  such  circum- 
stances that  there  should  occasionally  be  dramatic  out- 
bursts with  the  blood  of  offenders  bitterly  demanded  as 
though  we  were  not  living  in  the  Twentieth  Century 
when  blood  alone  is  admittedly  no  satisfaction.  The 
presence  of  armed  House  police  at  every  door,  and 
in  the  front  rows  of  the  strangers'  gallery  as  well,  con- 
tributes to  this  impression  which  has  certain  qualities 
of  the  theatre  about  it  and  is  oddly  stimulating.  China 
at  work  legislating  has  already  created  her  first  tradi- 
tions: she  is  proceeding  deliberately  armed — ^with  the 
lessons  of  the  immediate  past  fully  noted. 

This  being  the  home  of  a  literary  race,  papers  and 
notebooks  are  on  most  Members'  desks.  As  the  elec- 
tric bells  ring  sharply  an  unending  procession  of  men 
file  in  to  take  their  seats,  for  there  has  been  a  recess 
and  the  House  has  been  only  half -filled.  Nearly  every 
one  is  in  Chinese  dress  (pien-yi)  with  the  Member's 
badge  pinned  conspicuously  on  the  breast.  The  idea 
speedily  becomes  a  conviction  that  this  after  all  is  not 
extraneous  to  the  nation  but  actually  of  the  living  flesh, 
a  vital  and  imperative  thing.  The  vastness  and  au- 
dacity of  it  all  cannot  fail  to  strike  the  imaginative 
mind,  for  the  four  or  five  hundred  men  who  are  gath- 
ered here  typify,  if  they  do  not  yet  represent,  the  four 
or  five  hundred  millions  who  make  up  the  country. 


288  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

You  see  as  it  were  the  nation  in  profile,  a  ponderous, 
slow-moving  mass,  quickly  responsive  to  curious  sub- 
conscious influences — suddenly  angry  and  suddenly 
calm  again  because  Reason  has  after  all  always  been 
the  great  goddess  which  is  perpetually  worshipped. 
All  are  scholarly  and  deliberate  in  their  movements. 
When  the  Speaker  calls  the  House  in  order  and  the 
debate  commences,  deep  silence  comes  save  for  the  move- 
ment of  hundreds  of  nervous  hands  that  touch  papers 
or  fidget  to  and  fro.  Every  man  uses  his  hands,  par- 
ticularly when  he  speaks,  not  clenched  as  a  European 
would  do,  but  open,  with  the  slim  figures  speaking  a 
language  of  their  own,  twisting,  turning,  insinuating, 
deriding,  a  little  history  of  compromises.  It  would  be 
interesting  to  write  the  story  of  China  from  a  study 
of  the  hands. 

Each  man  goes  to  the  rostrum  to  speak,  and  each  has 
much  to  siay.  Soon  another  impression  deepens — that 
the  Northerners  with  their  clear-cut  speech  and  their 
fuller  voices  have  an  advantage  over  the  Southerners 
of  the  kind  that  all  public  performers  know.  The  man- 
darin language  of  Peking  is  after  all  the  mother-lan- 
guage of  officialdom,  the  madre  linqua,  less  nervous  and 
more  precise  than  any  other  dialect  and  invested  with  a 
certain  air  of  authority  which  cannot  be  denied.  The 
sharp-sounding,  high-pitched  Southern  voice,  though  it 
may  argue  very  acutely  and  rapidly,  ai3pears  at  an 
increasing  disadvantage.  There  seems  to  be  a  tendency 
inherent  in  it  to  become  querulous,  to  make  its  pleading 
sound  specious  because  of  over-much  speech.  These 
are  curious  little  things  which  have  been  not  without 
influence  in  other  regions  of  the  world. 

The  applause  when  it  comes  proves  the  same  thing 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  289 

as  applause  does  everywhere;  that  if  you  want  to  drive 
home  your  points  in  a  large  assembly  you  must  be  con- 
densed and  simple,  using  broad,  slashing  arguments. 
This  is  precisely  what  distinguishes  melodrama  from 
drama,  and  which  explains  why  excessive  analysis  is 
no  argument  in  the  popular  mind.  Generally,  however, 
there  is  not  much  applause  and  the  voice  of  the  speaker 
wanders  through  the  hall  uninterrupted  by  signs  of 
content  or  discontent.  Sometimes,  although  rather 
rarely,  there  is  a  gust  of  laughter  as  a  point  is  scored 
against  a  hated  rival.  But  it  dies  away  as  suddenly  as 
it  arose — almost  before  you  have  noted  it,  as  if  it  were 
superfluous  and  must  make  room  for  more  serious 
things. 

With  the  closing  of  a  debate  there  is  the  vote.  An 
electric  bell  rings  again,  and  with  a  rough  hand  the 
House  police  close  all  the  exits.  The  clerks  come  down 
into  the  aisles.  They  seem  to  move  listlessly  and  in- 
differently; yet  very  quickly  they  have  checked  the 
membership  to  insure  that  the  excessively  large  quorum 
requisite  is  present.  Now  the  Speaker  calls  for  the 
vote.  Massively  and  stiffly,  as  at  a  word  of  command 
the  "ayes"  rise  in  their  seats.  There  is  a  round  of  ap- 
plause; the  bill  has  been  carried  almost  unanimously. 
That,  however,  is  not  always  so.  When  there  is  an 
obstreperous  mood  abroad,  the  House  will  decline  to 
proceed  with  the  agenda,  and  a  dozen  men  will  rise  at 
a  time  and  speak  from  behind  their  desks,  trying  to  talk 
each  other  down.  The  Speaker  stands  patiently  wres- 
tling with  the  problem  of  procedure — and  often  failing 
since  practice  is  still  in  process  of  being  formed. 
Years  must  elapse  before  absolutely  hard-and-fast 
rules  are  established.     Still  the  progress  already  made 


290  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

since  August,  1916,  is  remarkable,  and  something  is  be- 
ing learned  every  day.  The  business  of  a  Parliament  is 
after  all  to  debate — to  give  voice  to  the  uppermost 
thoughts  in  the  nation's  mind;  and  how  those  thoughts 
are  expressed  is  a  continual  exposition  of  the  real  state 
of  the  nation's  political  beliefs.  Parliament  is — or 
should  be — a  microcosm  of  the  race ;  parliament  is  never 
any  better  or  any  worse  than  the  mass  of  the  people. 
The  rule  of  the  majority  as  expressed  in  the  voting  of 
the  National  Assembly  must  be  taken  as  a  fundamental 
thing;  China  is  no  exception  to  the  rule — the  rule  of 
the  majority  must  be  decisive. 

But  here  another  complexity  of  the  new  Chinese  po- 
litical life  enters  into  the  problem.  The  existence  of  a 
responsible  Cabinet,  which  is  not  yet  hnked  to  the  Leg- 
islative body  in  any  well-understood  way,  and  which 
furthermore  has  frequently  acted  in  opposition  to  the 
President's  office,  makes  for  a  daily  struggle  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  country  which  is  strongly  to  be  con- 
demned and  which  has  already  led  to  some  ugly  clashes. 
But  nevertheless  there  are  increasing  indications  that 
parliamentary  government  is  making  steady  headway 
and  that  when  both  the  Permanent  Constitution  and  the 
Local  Government  system  have  been  enforced,  a  new 
note  will  be  struck.  No  doubt  it  will  need  a  younger 
generation  in  office  to  secure  a  complete  abandonment  of 
all  the  old  ways,  but  the  writer  has  noted  with  aston- 
ishment during  the  past  twelve-month  how  eager  even 
viceroys  belonging  to  the  old  Manchu  regime  have  be- 
come to  fall  in  with  the  new  order  and  to  lend  their 
help,  a  sharp  competition  to  obtain  ministerial  posts 
being  evident  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  gauntlet  of 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  291 

Parliament  has  to  be  run  and  a  majority  vote  recorded 
before  any  appointment  is  valid. 

One  last  anomaly  has,  however,  yet  to  be  done  away 
with  in  Peking.  The  deposed  boy  Emperor  still  re- 
sides in  the  Winter  Palace  surrounded  by  a  miniature 
court, — a  state  of  affairs  which  should  not  be  tolerated 
any  longer  as  it  no  doubt  tends  to  assist  the  rumours 
which  every  now  and  again  are  mysteriously  spread  by 
interested  parties  that  a  Restoration  is  imminent.  The 
time  has  arrived  when  not  only  must  the  Manchu  Im- 
perial Family  be  removed  far  from  the  capital  but  a 
scheme  worked  out  for  commuting  the  pension-system 
of  so-called  Bannerman  families  who  still  draw  their 
monthly  allowances  as  under  the  Manchus,  thanks  to 
the  articles  of  Favourable  Treatment  signed  at  the 
time  of  abdication  of  1912.  When  these  two  important 
questions  have  been  settled,  imperialism  in  China  will 
tend  rapidly  to  fade  into  complete  oblivion. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE     REPUBLIC     IN     COLLISION     WITH     REALITY:     TWO 
TYPICAL   INSTANCES   OF   "FOREIGN   AGGRESSION" 

Such,  then,  were  the  internal  conditions  which  the  new 
administration  was  called  upon  to  face  with  the  death 
of  Yuan  Shih-kai.  With  very  little  money  in  the  Na- 
tional Treasury  and  with  the  provinces  unable  or  un- 
willing to  remit  to  the  capital  a  single  dollar,  it  was 
fortunate  that  at  least  one  public  service,  erected  under 
foreign  pressure,  should  be  brilliantly  justifying  its  ex- 
istence. The  Salt  Administration,  efficiently  reorgan- 
ized in  the  space  of  three  years  by  the  great  Indian  au- 
thority. Sir  Richard  Dane,  was  now  providing  a 
monthly  surplus  of  nearly  five  million  dollars;  and  it 
was  this  revenue  which  kept  China  alive  during  a 
troubled  transitional  period  when  every  one  was  declar- 
ing that  she  must  die.  By  husbanding  this  hard  cash 
and  mixing  it  liberally  with  paper  money,  the  Central 
Government  has  been  able  since  June,  1916,  to  meet  its 
current  obligations  and  to  keep  the  general  machinery 
from  breaking  down. 

But  in  a  country  such  as  China  new  dangers  have  to 
be  constantly  faced  and  smoothed  away — the  interests 
of  the  outer  world  pressing  on  the  country  and  conflict- 
ing with  the  native  interest  at  a  myriad  points.  And  in 
order  to  illustrate  and  make  clear  the  sort  of  daily  ex- 
acerbation which  the  nation  must  endure  because  of  the 
vastness  of  its  territory  and  the  octopus-hold  of  the  for- 
eigner we  give  two  typical  cases  of  international  trouble 

292 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  293 

which  have  occurred  since  Yuan  Shih-kai's  death.  The 
first  is  the  well-known  Chengchiatun  incident  which  oc- 
curred in  Manchuria  in  August,  1916:  the  second  is  the 
Laohsikai  affair  which  took  place  in  Tientsin  in  Novem- 
ber of  the  same  year  and  created  a  storm  of  rage  against 
France  throughout  North  China  which  at  the  moment 
of  writing  has  not  yet  abated. 

The  facts  about  the  Chengchiatun  incident  are  incredi- 
bly simple  and  merit  being  properly  told.  Chengchia- 
tun is  a  small  Mongol-Manchurian  market-down  lying 
some  sixty  miles  west  of  the  South  Manchurian  railway 
by  the  ordinary  cart-roads,  though  as  the  crow  flies  the 
distance  is  much  less.  The  country  round  about  is 
"new  country,"  the  prefectm-e  in  which  Chengchiatun 
lies  being  originally  purely  Mongol  territory  on  which 
Chinese  squatted  in  such  numbers  that  it  was  necessary 
to  erect  the  ordinary  Chinese  civil  administration. 
Thirty  or  forty  miles  due  west  of  the  town  cultivation 
practically  ceases;  and  then  nothing  meets  the  eye  but 
the  rolling  grasslands  of  Mongolia,  with  their  sparse 
encampments  of  nomad  horsemen  and  shepherds  which 
stretch  so  monotonously  into  the  infinities  of  High  Asia. 

The  region  is  strategically  important  because  the 
trade-routes  converge  there  from  the  growing  marts  of 
the  Taonanf  u  administration,  which  is  the  extreme  west- 
ernly  limit  of  Chinese  authority  in  the  Mongolian  bor- 
derland. A  rich  exchange  in  hides,  furs,  skins,  cattle 
and  foodstuffs  has  given  this  frontier-town  from  year 
to  year  an  increasing  importance  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Chinese  who  are  fully  aware  of  the  dangers  of  a  laissez 
aller  policy  and  are  determined  to  protect  the  rights 
they  have  acquired  by  pre-emption.  The  fact  that  no- 
torious  Mongol  brigand-chiefs,   such    as   the   famous 


294  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Babacliapu  who  was  allied  to  the  Manchu  Restoration 
Party  and  who  was  said  to  have  been  subsidized  by  the 
Japanese  Military  Party,  had  been  making  Chengchia- 
tun  one  of  their  objectives,  brought  concern  early  in 
1916  to  the  Moukden  Governor,  the  energetic  General 
Chang  Tso-lin,  who  in  order  to  cope  with  the  danger 
promptly  established  a  military  cordon  round  the  dis- 
trict, with  a  relatively  large  reserve  based  on  Cheng- 
chiatun,  di'awn  from  the  28th  Army  Division.  A  cer- 
tain amount  of  desultory  fighting  months  before  any 
one  had  heard  of  the  town  had  given  Chengchiatun 
the  odour  of  the  camp;  and  when  in  the  summer  the 
Japanese  began  military  manoeuvres  in  the  district  with 
various  scattered  detachments,  on  the  excuse  that  the 
South  Manchuria  railway  zone  where  they  alone  had  the 
right  under  the  Portsmouth  Peace  Treaty  to  be,  was  too 
cramped  for  field  exercises,  it  became  apparent  that 
dangerous  developments  might  be  expected — particu- 
larly as  a  body  of  Japanese  infantry  was  billeted  right 
in  the  centre  of  the  town. 

On  the  13th  August  a  Japanese  civilian  at  Cheng- 
chiatun— there  is  a  small  Japanese  trading  community 
there — approached  a  Chinese  boy  who  was  selling  fish. 
On  the  boy  refusing  to  sell  at  the  price  offered  him,  the 
Japanese  caught  hold  of  him  and  started  beating  him. 
A  Chinese  soldier  of  the  28th  Division  who  was  pass- 
ing intervened;  and  a  scuffle  commenced  in  which  other 
Chinese  soldiers  joined  and  which  resulted  in  the  Jap- 
anese being  severely  handled.  After  the  Chinese  had 
left  him,  the  man  betook  himself  to  the  nearest  Japanese 
post  and  reported  that  he  had  been  grievously  assaulted 
by  Chinese  soldiers  for  no  reason  whatsoever.  A  Jap- 
anese gensdarme  made  a  preliminary  investigation  in 


Presidext  Li   YrAX-HcxG 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  295 

company  with  the  man ;  then  returning  to  the  Japanese 
barracks,  declared  that  he  could  find  no  one  in  author- 
ity; that  his  attempts  at  discovering  the  culprits  had 
been  resisted;  and  that  he  must  have  help.  The  Jap- 
anese officer  in  command,  who  was  a  captain,  detailed 
a  lieutenant  and  twenty  men  to  proceed  to  the  Chinese 
barracks  to  obtain  satisfaction  from  the  Chinese  Com- 
mander— using  force  if  necessary.  It  was  precisely  in 
this  way  that  the  play  was  set  in  motion. 

The  detachment  marched  off  to  the  headquarters  of 
the  offending  Chinese  detachment,  which  was  billeted  in 
a  pawnshop,  and  tried  to  force  their  way  past  a  sentry 
who  stood  his  ground,  into  the  inner  courtyards.  A 
long  parley  ensued  with  lowered  bayonets;  and  at  last 
on  the  Chinese  soldier  absolutely  refusing  to  give  way, 
the  heutenant  gave  orders  to  cut  him  down.  There 
appears  to  be  no  doubt  about  these  important  facts — 
that  is  to  say,  that  the  act  of  war  was  the  deliberate  at- 
tack by  a  Japanese  armed  detachment  on  a  Chinese 
sentry  who  was  guarding  the  quarters  of  his  Com- 
mander. 

A  frightful  scene  followed.  It  appears  that  scat- 
tered groups  of  Chinese  soldiers,  some  with  their  arms, 
and  some  without,  had  collected  during  this  crisis  and 
point-blank  firing  at  once  commenced.  The  first  shots 
appear  to  have  been  fired — though  this  was  never  proved 
— by  a  Chinese  regimental  groom,  who  was  standing 
with  some  horses  some  distance  away  in  the  gateway  of 
some  stabling  and  who  is  said  to  have  killed  or  wounded 
the  largest  number  of  Japanese.  In  any  case  seven 
Japanese  soldiers  were  killed  outright,  five  more  mor- 
tally wounded  and  four  severely  so,  the  Chinese  them- 
selves losing  four  killed,  besides  a  number  of  wounded. 


296  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

The  remnant  of  the  Japanese  detachment  after  this 
rude  reverse  managed  to  retreat  with  their  wounded  offi- 
cer to  their  own  barracks  where  the  whole  detachment 
barricaded  themselves  in,  firing  for  many  hours  at  every- 
thing that  moved  on  the  roads  though  absolutely  no  at- 
tempt was  made  by  the  Chinese  soldiery  to  advance 
against  them. 

The  sound  of  this  heavy  firing,  and  the  wild  report 
that  many  Japanese  had  been  killed,  had  meanwhile 
spread  panic  throughout  the  town,  and  there  was  a 
general  sauve  qui  peut,  a  terrible  retribution  being 
feared.  The  local  Magistrate  finally  restored  some 
semblance  of  order;  and  after  dark  proceeded  in  person 
with  some  notables  of  the  town  to  the  Japanese  bar- 
racks to  tender  his  regrets  and  to  arrange  for  the  re- 
moval of  the  Japanese  corpses  which  were  lying  just 
as  they  had  fallen,  and  which  Chinese  custom  demanded 
should  be  decently  cared  for,  though  they  constituted 
important  and  irrefragible  evidence  of  the  armed  in- 
vasion which  had  been  practised.  The  Japanese  Com- 
mander, instead  of  meeting  these  conciliatory  attempts 
half-way,  thereupon  illegally  arrested  the  Magistrate 
and  locked  him  up,  being  impelled  to  this  action  by  the 
general  fear  among  his  men  that  a  mass  attack  would 
be  made  in  the  night  by  the  Chinese  troops  in  garrison 
and  the  whole  command  wiped  out.  Nothing,  however, 
occurred  and  on  the  14th  instant  the  Magistrate  was 
duly  released  on  his  sending  for  his  son  to  take  his  place 
as  hostage.  On  the  16th  the  Magistrate  had  success- 
fully arranged  the  withdrawal  of  all  Chinese  troops  five 
miles  outside  the  town  to  prevent  further  clashes.  On 
the  15th  Japanese  cavalry  and  infantry  began  to  arrive 
in  large  numbers  from  the  South  Manchuria  railway 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  297 

zone  (where  they  alone  have  the  Treaty  right  to  be)  and 
the  town  of  Chengchiatun  was  arbitrarily  placed  by 
them  in  a  state  of  siege. 

Here  is  the  stuff  of  which  the  whole  incident  was 
made :  there  is  nothing  material  beyond  the  facts  stated 
which  illustrate  very  glaringly  the  manner  in  which  a 
strong  Power  acts  towards  a  weak  one. 

Meanwhile  the  effect  in  Tokyo  of  these  happenings 
had  been  electrical.  Relying  on  the  well-known  Jap- 
anese police  axiom,  that  the  man  who  gets  in  his  story 
first  is  the  prosecutor  and  the  accused  the  guilty  party, 
irrespective  of  what  the  evidence  may  be,  the  news- 
papers all  came  out  with  the  same  account  of  a  calcu- 
lated attack  by  "ferocious  Chinese  soldiers"  on  a  Jap- 
anese detachment  and  the  general  public  were  asked  to 
believe  that  a  number  of  their  enlisted  nationals  had  been 
deliberately  and  brutally  murdered.  It  was  not,  how- 
ever, until  more  than  a  week  after  the  incident  that  an 
official  report  was  published  by  the  Tokyo  Foreign  Of- 
fice, when  the  following  garbled  account  was  distributed 
far  and  wide  as  the  Japanese  case : — 

"When  one  Kijokishy  Yoshimoto,  aged  27,  an  employe  of  a 
Japanese  apothecary  at  Chengchiatun,  was  passing  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Chinese  troops  on  the  13th  instant,  a  Chinese 
soldier  stopped  him,  and,  with  some  remarks,  which  were  un- 
inteUigible  to  the  Japanese,  suddenly  struck  him  on  the  head. 
Yoshimoto  became  enraged,  but  was  soon  surrounded  by  a 
large  number  of  Chinese  soldiers  and  others,  who  subjected 
him  to  all  kind  of  humiliation.  As  a  result  of  this  lawless- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  Chinese,  the  Japanese  sustained  injuries 
in  seven  or  eight  places,  but  somehow  he  managed  to  break  away 
and  reach  a  Japanese  police  box,  where  he  applied  for  help. 
On  receipt  of  this  news,  a  policeman,  named  Kowase,  hastened 
to  the  spot,  but  by  the  time  he  arrived  there  all  the  offenders 


298  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

had  fled.  He  therefore  repaired  to  the  headquarters  of  the 
Chinese  to  lay  a  complaint,  but  the  sentry  stopped  him,  and 
presented  a  pistol  at  him,  and  under  these  circumstances  he 
was  obliged  to  apply  to  the  Japanese  Garrison  headquarters, 
where  Captain  Inone  instructed  Lieutenant  Matsuo  with 
twenty  men  to  escort  the  policeman  to  the  Chinese  head- 
quarters. When  the  party  approached  the  Chinese  headquar- 
ters, Chinese  troops  began  to  fire,  and  the  policemen  and  others 
were  either  killed  or  wounded.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  Jap- 
anese troops  retired,  the  Chinese  troops  did  not  give  up  firing, 
but  besieged  the  Japanese  garrison,  delivering  several  severe 
attacks.  Soon  after  the  fighting  ceased,  the  Chinese  authori- 
ties visited  the  Japanese  barracks,  and  expressed  the  desire 
that  the  affair  be  settled  amicably.  It  was  the  origizial  inten- 
tion of  the  Japanese  troops  to  fight  it  out,  but  they  were  com- 
pletely out-numbered,  and  lest  the  safety  of  the  Japanese  resi- 
dents be  endangered,  they  stopped  fighting.  On  examination 
of  the  dead  bodies  of  seven  Japanese  soldiers,  who  were  attacked 
outside  the  barracks,  it  was  discovered  that  they  had  been  all 
slain  by  the  Chinese  troops,  the  bodies  bearing  marks  of  vio- 
lence." 

Without  entering  again  into  the  merits  of  the  case, 
we  would  ask  those  who  are  acquainted  with  recent  his- 
tory whether  it  is  likely  that  Chinese  soldiers,  knowing 
all  the  pains  and  penalties  attaching  to  such  action, 
would  deliberately  attack  a  body  of  twenty  armed  Japa- 
nese under  an  officer  as  the  Japanese  official  account 
states?  We  believe  that  no  impartial  tribunal,  investi- 
gating the  matter  on  the  spot,  could  fail  to  point  out  the 
real  aggressors  and  withal  lay  bare  the  web  of  a  most 
amazing  state  of  affairs.  For  in  order  to  understand 
what  occurred,  on  the  13th  August,  1916,  it  is  necessary 
to  turn  far  away  from  Chengchiatun  and  see  what  hes 
behind  it  all. 

At  the  back  of  the  brain  of  the  Japanese  Military 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  299 

Party,  which  by  no  means  represents  the  Japanese  na- 
tion or  the  Japanese  Government  although  it  exercises 
a  powerful  influence  on  both,  is  the  fixed  idea  that  South 
JNIanchuria  and  Inner  Mongolia  must  be  turned  into  a 
strongly  held  and  fortified  Japanese  enclave,  if  the  bal- 
ance of  power  in  Eastern  Asia  is  to  be  maintained. 
Pursuant  to  this  idea,  Japanese  diplomacy  was  induced 
many  months  ago  to  concentrate  its  efforts  on  winning 
— if  not  wringing — from  Russia  the  strategically  im- 
portant strip  of  railway  south  of  the  Sungari  River, 
because  (and  this  should  be  carefully  noted)  with  the 
Sungari  as  the  undisputed  dividing-line  between  the 
Russian  and  Japanese  spheres  in  Manchuria,  and  with 
Japanese  shallow-draft  gun-boats  navigating  that  wa- 
terway and  entering  the  Nonni  river,  it  would  be  easily 
possible  for  Japan  to  complete  a  "Continental  quadri- 
lateral" which  would  include  Korea,  South  Manchuria 
and  Inner  Mongolia,  the  extreme  western  barrier  of 
which  would  be  the  new  system  of  Inner  Mongolian 
railways  centring  round  Taonanfu  and  terminating 
at  Jehol,  for  which  Japan  akeady  holds  the  building 
rights.^  Policing  rights — in  the  outer  zone  of  this  en- 
clave,— ^with  a  total  exclusion  of  all  Chinese  garrisons, 
is  the  preliminary  goal  towards  which  the  Japanese 
Military  Party  has  been  long  plainly  marching;  and 
long  before  anybody  had  heard  of  Chengchiatun,  a 
scheme  of  reconnoitring  detachments  had  been  put  in 
force  to  spy  out  the  land  and  form  working  alliances 
with  the  Mongol  bands  in  order  to  harass  and  drive  away 
all  the  representatives  of  Chinese  authority.  What  oc- 
curred, then,  at  Chengchiatun  might  have  taken  place 

1  Russian  diplomats  now  deny  that  the  Japanese  proposals  regarding  the 
cession  of  the  railway  south  of  the  Sungari  river  have  ever  been  formally 
agreed  to. 


300  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

at  any  one  of  half-a-dozen  other  places  in  this  vast  and 
little-known  region  whither  Japanese  detachments  have 
silently  gone ;  and  if  Chinese  diplomacy  in  the  month  of 
August,  1916,  was  faced  with  a  rude  surprise,  it  was  only 
what  political  students  had  long  been  expecting.  For 
though  Japan  should  be  the  real  defender  of  Chinese 
liberties,  it  is  a  fact  that  in  Chinese  affairs  Japanese 
diplomacy  has  been  too  long  dictated  to  by  the  Military 
Party  in  Tokio  and  attempts  nothing  save  when  violence 
allows  it  to  tear  from  China  some  fresh  portion  of  her 
independence. 

And  here  we  reach  the  crux  of  the  matter.  One  of 
the  little  known  peculiarities  of  the  day  lies  in  the  fact 
that  Japan  is  the  land  of  political  inaction  because  there 
is  110  tradition  of  action  save  that  which  has  been  built  up 
by  the  military  and  naval  chiefs  since  the  Chinese  war 
of  1894--95.  Having  only  visualized  the  world  in  inter- 
national terms  during  two  short  decades,  there  has  been 
no  time  for  a  proper  tradition  to  be  created  by  the  civil 
government  of  Japan ;  and  because  there  is  no  such  tra- 
dition, the  island  empire  of  the  East  has  no  true  foreign 
policy  and  is  at  the  mercy  of  manufactured  crises,  being 
too  often  committed  to  petty  adventures  which  really 
range  her  on  the  side  of  those  in  Europe  the  Allies  have 
set  themselves  to  destroy.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the 
Chinese  are  consistently  treated  as  though  they  were 
hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water,  helots  who  are 
occasionally  flattered  in  the  columns  of  the  daily  press 
and  yet  are  secretly  looked  upon  as  men  who  have  been 
born  merely  to  be  cuffed  and  conquered.  The  Moukden 
Governor,  General  Chang  Tso-ling,  discussing  the 
Chengchiatun  affair  with  the  writer,  put  the  matter  in  a 
nutshell.     Striking  the  table  he  exclaimed:     "After  all 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  301 

we  are  not  made  of  wood  like  this,  we  too  are  flesh  and 
blood  and  must  defend  our  own  people.  A  dozen  times 
I  have  said,  'Let  them  come  and  take  Manchuria  openly 
if  they  dare,  but  let  them  cease  their  childish  intrigues.' 
Why  do  they  not  do  so?  Because  they  are  not  sure 
they  can  swallow  us — not  at  all  sure.  Do  you  under- 
stand? We  are  weak,  we  are  stupid,  we  are  divided, 
but  we  are  innumerable,  and  in  the  end,  if  they  persist, 
China  will  burst  the  Japanese  stomach." 

Such  passionate  periods  are  all  very  well,  but  when 
it  comes  to  the  sober  business  of  the  council  chamber  it 
is  a  regrettable  fact  that  Chinese,  although  foreign 
friends  implore  them  to  do  so,  do  not  properly  use  the 
many  weapons  in  their  armoury.  Thus  in  this  particu- 
lar case,  instead  of  at  once  hurrying  to  Chengchiatun 
some  of  the  many  foreign  advisers  who  sit  kicking  their 
heels  in  Peking  from  one  end  of  the  year  to  the  other  and 
who  number  competent  jurisconsults,  China  did  next  to 
nothing.  No  proper  report  was  drawn  up  on  the  spot ; 
sworn  statements  were  not  gathered,  nor  were  witnesses 
brought  to  Peking;  and  it  therefore  happened  that  when 
Japan  filed  her  demands  for  redress,  China  had  not  in 
her  possession  anything  save  an  utterly  inadequate  de- 
fence. Mainly  because  of  this  she  was  forced  to  agree 
to  foregoing  any  direct  discussion  of  the  rights  and 
wrongs  of  the  case,  proceeding  directly  to  negotiations 
based  on  the  various  claims  which  Japan  filed  and  which 
were  as  follows : — 

1.  Punishment  of  the  General  commanding  the  28th  Division. 

2.  The  dismissal  of  officers  at  Chengchiatun  responsible  for 
the  occurrence  as  well  as  the  severe  punishment  of  those  who 
took  direct  part  in  the  fracas. 

3.  Proclamations  to  be  posted  ordering  all  Chinese  soldiers 


302  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

and  civilians  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
to  refrain  from  any  act  calculated  to  provoke  a  breach  of  the 
peace  with  Japanese  soldiers  or  civilians. 

4.  China  to  agree  to  the  stationing  of  Japanese  police  offi- 
cers in  places  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
where  their  presence  was  considered  necessary  for  the  protec- 
tion of  Japanese  subjects.  China  also  to  agree  to  the  engage- 
ment by  the  officials  of  South  Manchuria  of  Japanese  police 
advisers. 

And  in  addition: — 

1.  Chinese  troops  stationed  in  South  Manchuria  and  East- 
ern Inner  Mongolia  to  employ  a  certain  number  of  Japanese 
Military  officers  as  advisers. 

2.  Chinese  Military  Cadet  schools  to  employ  a  certain  num- 
ber of  Japanese  Military  officers   as  instructors. 

3.  The  Military  Governor  of  Moukden  to  proceed  person- 
ally to  Port  Arthur  to  the  Japanese  Military  Governor  of 
Kwantung  to  apologize  for  the  occurrence  and  to  tender  sim- 
ilar personal  apologies  to  the  Japanese  Consul  General  in 
Moukden. 

4.  Adequate  compensation  to  be  paid  by  China  to  the  Japan- 
ese sufferers  and  to  the  families  of  those  killed. 

The  merest  tyi'o  will  see  at  once  that  so  far  from 
caring  very  much  about  the  killing  of  her  soldiery,  Japan 
was  bent  on  utilizing  the  opportunity  to  gain  a  certain 
number  of  new  rights  and  privileges  in  the  zone  of 
Southern  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia — 
notably  an  extension  of  her  police  and  military-super- 
vision rights.  In  spite,  however,  of  the  faulty  proced- 
ure to  which  she  had  consented,  China  showed  consider- 
able tenacity  in  the  course  of  negotiations  which  lasted 
nearly  half  a  year,  and  by  the  end  of  January,  1917, 
had  whittled  down  the  question  of  Japanese  compensa- 
tion to  fairly  meagre  proportions.     To  be  precise  the 


> 


X 


^ 

6 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  303 

two  governments  agreed  to  embody  by  the  exchange  of 
Notes  the  five  following  stipulations: 

1.  The  General  commanding  the  28th  Division  to  be  repri- 
manded. 

2.  Officers  responsible  to  be  punished  according  to  law.  If 
the  law  provides  for  severe  punishment,  such  punishment  will 
be  inflicted. 

3.  Proclamations  to  be  issued  enjoining  Chinese  soldiers  and 
civilians  in  the  districts  where  there  is  mixed  residence  to 
accord  considerate  treatment  to  Japanese  soldiers  and  civilians. 

4.  The  Military  Governor  of  Moukden  to  send  a  representa- 
tive to  Port  Arthur  to  convey  his  regret  when  the  Military 
Governor  of  Kwantung  and  Japanese  Consul  General  at 
Moukden  are  there  together. 

5.  A  solatium  of  $500  (Five  Hundred  Dollars)  to  be  given 
to  the  Japanese  merchant  Yoshimoto. 

But  though  the  incident  was  thus  nominally  closed, 
and  amicable  relations  restored,  the  most  important 
point — the  question  of  Japanese  police-rights  in  South- 
ern Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia — was  left 
precisely  where  it  had  been  before,  the  most  vigorous 
Chinese  protests  not  having  induced  Japan  to  abate  in 
the  slightest  her  pretensions.  During  previous  years  a 
number  of  Japanese  police-stations  and  police-boxes  had 
been  established  in  defiance  of  the  local  authorities  in 
these  regions,  and  although  China  in  these  negotiations 
recorded  her  strongest  possible  objection  to  their  pres- 
ence as  being  the  principal  cause  of  the  continual  friction 
between  Chinese  and  Japanese,  Japan  refused  to  with- 
draw from  her  contention  that  they  did  not  constitute 
any  extension  of  the  principle  of  extraterritoriality,  and 
that  indeed  Japanese  police,  distributed  at  such  points 
as  the  Japanese  consular  authorities  considered  neces- 


304  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

sary,  must  be  permanently  accepted.  Here  then  is  a 
matter  which  will  require  careful  consideration  when  the 
Powers  meet  to  revise  their  Chinese  Treaties  as  they 
must  revise  them  after  the  world-war;  for  Japan  in 
JNIanchuria  is  fundamentally  in  no  different  a  position 
from  England  in  the  Yangtsze  Valley  and  what  applies 
to  one  must  apply  to  the  other.  The  new  Chinese  police 
which  are  being  distributed  in  ever  greater  numbers 
throughout  China  form  an  admirable  force  and  are  su- 
perior to  Japanese  police  in  the  performance  of  nearly 
all  their  duties.  It  is  monstrous  that  Japan,  as  well  as 
other  Powers,  should  act  in  such  a  reprehensible  manner 
when  the  Chinese  administration  is  doing  all  it  can  to 
provide  efficient  guardians  of  the  peace. 

The  second  case  was  one  in  which  French  officialdom 
by  a  curious  act  of  folly  gravely  ahenated  Chinese  sym- 
pathies and  gave  a  powerful  weapon  to  the  German 
propaganda  in  China  at  the  end  of  1916.  The  Lao-hsi- 
kai  dispute,  which  involved  a  bare  333  acres  of  land  in 
Tientsin,  has  now  taken  its  place  beside  the  Chengchia- 
tun  affair,  and  has  become  a  leading  case  in  that  great 
dossier  of  griefs  which  many  Chinese  declare  make  up 
the  corpus  of  Euro-Chinese  relations.  Here  again  the 
facts  are  absolutely  simple  and  absolutely  undisputed. 
In  1902  the  French  consular  authorities  in  Tientsin  filed 
a  request  to  have  their  Concession  extended  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  becoming  cramped.  The  Chi- 
nese authorities,  although  not  wishing  to  grant  the  re- 
quest and  indeed  ignoring  it  for  a  long  time,  were  finally 
induced  to  begin  fitful  negotiations;  and  in  October, 
1916,  after  having  passed  through  various  processes  of 
alteration,  reduction,  and  re-statement  during  the  inter- 
val of  fourteen  years,  the  issue  had  been  so  fined  down 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  305 

that  a  virtual  agreement  regarding  the  administration 
of  the  new  area  had  been  reached — an  agreement  which 
the  Peking  Government  was  prepared  to  put  into  force 
subject  to  one  reasonable  stipulation,  that  the  local 
opposition  to  the  new  grant  of  territory  which  was  very 
real,  as  Chinese  feel  passionately  on  the  subject  of  the 
police-control  of  their  land-acreage,  was  first  overcome. 
The  whole  essence  or  soul  of  the  disputes  lay  therein: 
that  the  lords  of  the  soil,  the  people  of  China,  and  in 
this  case  more  particularly  the  population  of  Tientsin, 
should  accept  the  decision  arrived  at  which  was  that  a 
joint  Franco-Chinese  administration  be  established  un- 
der a  Chinese  Chairman. 

When  the  terms  of  this  proposed  agreement  were 
communicated  to  the  Tientsin  Consulate  by  the  French 
Legation  the  arrangement  did  not  please  the  French 
Consul-General,  who  was  under  transfer  to  Shanghai 
and  who  proposed  to  settle  the  case  to  the  satisfaction 
of  his  nationals  before  he  left.  There  is  absolutely  no 
dispute  about  this  fact  either — namely  that  the  main 
pre-occupation  of  a  consular  officer,  charged  primarily 
under  the  Treaties  with  the  simple  preservation  of  law 
and  order  among  his  nationals,  was  the  closing-up  of  a 
vexatious  outstanding  case,  by  force  if  necessary,  before 
he  handed  over  his  office  to  his  successor.  It  was  with 
this  idea  that  an  ultimatum  was  drawn  up  by  the  French 
Consul  General  and,  having  been  weakly  approved  by 
the  French  Legation,  was  handed  to  the  Chinese  local 
authorities.  It  gave  them  a  time-limit  of  twenty-four 
hours  in  which  to  effect  the  complete  police  evacuation 
of  the  coveted  strip  of  territory  on  the  ground  that  the 
delay  in  the  signature  of  a  formal  Protocol  had  been 
wilful  and  deliberate  and  had  closed  the  door  to  fm'ther 


306  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

negotiations ;  and  as  no  response  came  at  the  end  of  the 
time-lunit,  an  open  invasion  of  Chinese  territory  was 
practised  by  an  armed  French  detachment;  nine  uni- 
formed Chinese  constables  on  duty  being  forcibly  re- 
moved and  locked  up  in  French  barracks  and  French 
sentries  posted  on  the  disputed  boundary. 

The  result  of  this  misguided  action  was  an  enormous 
Chinese  outcry  and  the  beginning  of  a  boycott  of  the 
French  in  North  China, — and  this  in  the  middle  of  a 
war  when  France  has  acted  with  inspuing  nobility. 
Some  2,000  native  police,  servants  and  employes 
promptly  deserted  the  French  Concession  en  masse; 
popular  unions  were  formed  to  keep  alive  resentment; 
and  although  in  the  end  the  arrested  police  were  set  at 
liberty,  the  friendly  intervention  of  the  Allies  proved 
unable  to  effect  a  settlement  of  the  case  which  at  the 
moment  of  writing  remains  precisely  where  it  was  a 
year  ago.^ 

Here  you  have  the  matter  of  foreign  interests  in 

1  A  further  illustration  of  the  action  of  French  diplomacy  in  China  has 
just  been  provided  (April,  1917)  in  the  protest  lodged  by  France  against  the 
building  of  a  railway  in  Kwangsi  Province  by  American  engineers  with 
American  capital, — France  claiming  exclusive  rights  in  Kwangsi  by  virtue 
of  a  letter  sent  by  the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  French 
Legation  in  1914  as  settlement  for  a  frontier  dispute  in  that  year.  The 
text  of  the  letter  is  as  follows: 

"The  dispute  that  rose  in  consequence  of  the  disturbance  at  the  border 
of  Annam  and  Kwangsi  has  been  examined  into  by  the  Joint  Committee 
detailed  by  both  parties  concerned,  and  a  conclusion  has  been  reached  to 
the  effect  that  all  matters  relating  to  the  solution  of  the  case  would  be  car- 
ried out  in  accordance  with  the  request  of  Your  Excellency. 

"In  order  to  demonstrate  the  especially  good  friendly  relations  existing 
between  the  two  countries,  the  Republican  Government  assures  Your  Ex- 
cellency that  in  case  a  railway  construction  or  a  mining  enterprise  being 
undertaken  in  Kwangsi  Province  in  the  future,  for  which  foreign  capital  is 
required,  France  would  first  be  consulted  for  a  loan  of  the  necessary  capital. 
On  such  an  occasion,  the  Governor  of  Kwangsi  will  directly  negotiate  with 
a  French  syndicate  and  report  to  the  Government." 

It  is  high  time  that  the  United  States  raises  the  whole  question  of  the 
open  door  in  China  again,  and  refuses  to  tolerate  any  longer  the  old  dis- 
ruptive and  dog-in-the-manger  policy  of  the  Powers.  America  is  now  hap- 
pily in  a  position  to  inaugurate  a  new  era  in  the  Far  East  as  in  the  Far 
West  and  to  stop  exploitation. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  307 

China  explained  in  the  sense  that  they  appear  to  Chinese. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  this  illustration  of  the  de- 
liberate lawlessness,  which  has  too  often  been  practised 
in  the  past  by  consuls  who  are  simply  Justices  of  the 
Peace,  would  be  incredible  elsewhere;  and  yet  it  is  this 
lawlessness  which  has  come  to  be  accepted  as  part  and 
parcel  of  what  is  called  "policy"  in  China  because  in  the 
fifty  years  preceding  the  establishment  of  the  Republic 
a  weak  and  effeminate  mandarinate  consistently  sought 
safety  in  surrenders.  It  is  this  lawlessness  which  must 
at  all  costs  be  suppressed  if  we  are  to  have  a  happy  fu- 
ture. The  Chinese  people  have  so  far  contented  them- 
selves by  pacific  retaliation  and  have  not  exploded  into 
rage ;  but  those  who  see  in  the  gospel  of  boycott  an  ugly 
manifestation  of  what  hes  slumbering  should  give 
thanks  nightly  that  they  live  in  a  land  where  reason 
is  so  supreme.  Think  of  what  might  not  happen  in 
China  if  the  people  were  not  wholly  reasonable! 
Throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  land  you  have 
small  communities  of  foreigners,  mere  drops  in  a 
mighty  ocean  of  four  hundred  millions,  living  abso- 
lutely secure  although  absolutely  at  the  mercy  of  their 
huge  swarms  of  neighbours.  All  such  foreigners — or 
nearly  all — have  come  to  China  for  purposes  of  profit; 
they  depend  for  their  livelihood  on  co-operation  with  the 
Chinese;  and  once  that  co-oj)eration  ceases  they  might 
as  well  be  dead  and  buried  for  all  the  good  residence  will 
do  them.  In  such  circumstances  it  would  be  reasonable 
to  suppose  that  a  certain  decency  would  inspire  their 
attitude,  and  that  a  policy  of  give-and-take  would  al- 
ways be  sedulously  practised ;  and  we  are  happy  to  say 
that  there  is  more  of  this  than  there  used  to  be.  It  is 
only  when  incidents   such   as   the   Chengchiatun  and 


308  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Laihsikai  affairs  occur  that  the  placid  population  is 
stirred  to  action.  Even  then,  instead  of  turning  and 
rending  the  many  little  defenceless  communities — as 
European  mobs  would  certainly  do — they  simply  con- 
fine themselves  to  boycotting  the  offenders  and  hoping 
that  this  evidence  of  their  displeasure  will  finally  induce 
the  world  to  believe  that  they  are  determined  to  get 
reasonable  treatment.  The  Chinese  as  a  people  may  be 
very  irritating  in  the  slovraess  with  which  they  do  certain 
things — though  they  are  as  quick  in  business  as  the 
quickest  Anglo-Saxon — but  that  is  no  excuse  why  men 
who  call  themselves  superior  should  treat  them  with  con- 
tempt. The  Chinese  are  the  first  to  acknowledge  that 
it  will  take  them  a  generation  at  least  to  modernize 
effectively  their  country  and  their  government ;  but  they 
believe  that  having  erected  a  Republic  and  having  de- 
clared themselves  as  disciples  of  the  West  they  are  justi- 
fied in  expecting  the  same  treatment  and  consideration 
which  are  to  be  given  after  the  war  even  to  the  smallest 
and  weakest  nations  of  Europe. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

CHINA   AND   THE   WAE 

The  question  of  Chinese  sentiments  on  the  subject  of 
the  war,  as  well  as  the  precise  relations  between  the  Chi- 
nese Government  and  the  two  groups  of  belligerents,  are 
matters  which  have  been  totally  misunderstood.  To 
those  who  have  grasped  the  significance  of  the  exhaus- 
tive preceding  account  of  the  Republic  in  travail,  this 
statement  should  not  cause  surprise ;  for  China  has  been 
in  no  condition  to  play  anything  but  an  insignificant  and 
unsatisfactory  role  in  world-politics. 

When  the  world-war  broke  out  China  was  still  in  the 
throes  of  her  domestic  troubles  and  without  any  money 
at  all  in  her  Central  Treasury ;  and  although  Yuan  Shih- 
kai,  on  being  suddenly  confronted  with  an  unparalleled 
international  situation,  did  initiate  certain  negotiations 
with  the  German  Legation  with  a  view  to  securing  a 
cancellation  of  the  Kiaochow  lease,  the  ultimatum  which 
Japan  dispatched  to  Germany  on  the  15th  August,  1914, 
completely  nullified  his  tentative  proposals.  Yuan 
Shih-kai  had,  indeed,  not  been  in  the  slightest  degree 
prepared  for  such  a  sensational  development  as  war  be- 
tween Japan  and  Germany  over  the  question  of  a 
cruiser-base  established  on  territory  leased  from  China; 
and  although  he  considered  the  possibility  of  sending  a 
Chinese  force  to  co-operate  in  the  attack  on  the  German 
stronghold,  that  project  was  never  matured,  whilst  his 
subsequent  contrivances,  notably  the  establishment  of  a 

309 


310  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

so-called  war-zone  in  Shantung,  were  without  interna- 
tional value,  and  attracted  no  attention  save  in  Japan. 

Chinese,  however,  did  not  remain  blind  to  the  trend 
of  events.  After  the  fall  of  Tsingtao  and  the  subse- 
quent complications  with  Japan,  which  so  greatly  served 
to  increase  the  complexities  of  a  nebulous  situation,  cer- 
tain lines  of  thought  insensibly  developed.  That  the 
influential  classes  in  China  should  have  desired  that  Ger- 
many should  by  some  means  rehabihtate  herself  in  Eur- 
ope and  so  be  placed  in  a  position  to  chastise  a  nation 
that  for  twenty  years  had  brought  nothing  but  sorrow 
to  them  was  perhaps  only  natural;  and  it  is  primarily 
to  this  one  cause  that  so-called  sympathy  with  Germany 
during  the  first  part  of  the  war  has  been  due.  But  it 
must  also  be  noticed  that  the  immense  German  propa- 
ganda in  China  during  the  first  two  years  of  the  war, 
coupled  with  the  successes  won  in  Russia  and  elsewhere, 
powerfully  impressed  the  population — not  so  much  be- 
cause they  were  attracted  by  the  feats  of  a  Power  that 
had  enthroned  militarism,  but  because  they  wrongly 
supposed  that  sooner  or  later  the  effects  of  this  mih- 
tary  display  would  be  not  only  to  secure  the  relaxation 
of  the  Japanese  grip  on  the  country  but  would  compel 
the  Powers  to  re-cast  their  pre-war  policies  in  China 
and  abandon  their  attempts  at  placing  the  country  un- 
der financial  supervision.  Thus,  by  the  irony  of  Fate, 
Germany  in  Eastern  Asia  for  the  best  part  of  1914, 
1915  and  1916,  stood  for  the  aspirations  of  the  oppressed 
— a  moral  which  we  may  very  reasonably  hope  will  not 
escape  the  attention  of  the  Foreign  Offices  of  the  world. 
Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  the  modern  Chinese  army, 
being  like  the  Japanese,  largely  Germany-trained  and 


KEPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  311 

Germany-armed,  had  a  natural  predilection  for  Teuton- 
ism;  and  since  the  army,  as  we  have  shown,  plays  a 
powerful  role  in  the  politics  of  the  Republic,  public 
opinion  was  greatly  swayed  by  what  it  proclaimed 
through  its  accredited  organs. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  it  was  humanly  impossible  for  such 
a  vast  country  with  such  vast  resources  in  men  and  raw 
materials  to  remain  permanently  quiescent  during  an 
universal  conflagration  when  there  was  so  much  to  be 
salvaged.  Slowly  the  idea  became  general  in  China 
that  something  had  to  be  done;  that  is  that  a  state  of 
technical  neutrahty  would  lead  nowhere  save  possibly  to 
Avernus. 

As  early  as  November,  1915,  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  his 
immediate  henclimen  had  indeed  realized  the  internal 
advantages  to  be  derived  from  a  formal  war-partnership 
with  the  signatories  of  the  Pact  of  London,  the  impulse 
to  the  movement  being  given  by  certain  important  ship- 
ments of  arms  and  ammunition  from  China  which  were 
then  made.  A  half-surreptitious  attempt  to  discuss 
terms  in  Peking  caused  no  little  excitement,  the  matter 
being,  however,  only  debated  in  very  general  terms. 
The  principal  item  proposed  by  the  Peking  government 
was  characteristically  the  stipulation  that  an  immediate 
loan  of  two  million  pounds  should  be  made  to  China,  in 
return  for  her  technical  belligerency.  But  when  the 
proposal  was  taken  to  Tokio,  Japan  rightly  saw  that  its 
main  purpose  was  simply  to  secm-e  an  indirect  foreign 
endorsement  of  Yuan  Shih-kai's  candidature  as  Em- 
peror; and  for  that  reason  she  threw  cold-water  on  the 
whole  project.  To  subscribe  to  a  formula,  which  be- 
sides enthroning  Yuan   Shih-kai  would  have  been  a 


312  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

grievous  blow  to  her  Continental  ambitions,  was  an 
unthinkable  thing;  and  therefore  the  manoeuvre  was 
foredoomed  to  failure. 

The  death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  in  the  Summer  of  1916 
radically  altered  the  situation.  Powerful  mfluences 
were  again  set  to  work  to  stamp  out  the  German  cult 
and  to  incline  the  minority  of  educated  men  who  control 
the  destinies  of  the  country  to  see  that  their  real  interests 
could  only  lie  with  the  Allies,  who  were  beginning  to 
export  Chinese  man-power  as  an  auxiliary  war-aid  and 
who  were  very  anxious  to  place  the  whole  matter  on  a 
sounder  footing.  Little  real  progress  was,  however, 
made  in  the  face  of  the  renewed  German  efforts  to 
swamp  the  country  with  their  propaganda.  By  means 
of  war-maps,  printed  in  English  and  Chinese,  and  also 
by  means  of  an  exhaustive  daily  telegraphic  service 
which  hammered  home  every  possible  fact  illustrative  of 
German  invincibility,  the  German  position  in  China,  so 
far  from  being  weakened,  was  actually  strengthened 
during  the  period  when  Rumania  was  being  overrun. 
By  a  singular  destiny,  any  one  advocating  an  alliance 
with  the  Allies  was  bitterly  attacked  not  only  by  the 
Germans  but  by  the  Japanese  as  well — this  somewhat 
naive  identification  of  Japan's  political  interest  with 
those  of  an  enemy  country  being  an  unique  feature  of 
the  situation  worthy  of  permanent  record. 

It  was  not  until  President  Wilson  sent  out  his  Peace 
offering  of  the  19th  December,  1916,  that  a  distant 
change  came.  On  this  document  being  formally  com- 
mmiicated  to  the  Chinese  Government  great  interest 
was  aroused,  and  the  old  hopes  were  revived  that  it 
would  be  somehow  possible  for  China  to  gain  entry  at 
the  definitive  Peace  Congress  which  would  settle  beyond 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  313 

repeal  the  question  of  the  disposal  of  Kiaochow  and  the 
whole  of  German  interests  in  Shantung  Provinces, — a 
subject  of  burning  interest  to  the  country  not  only  be- 
cause of  the  harsh  treatment  which  had  been  experienced 
at  the  hands  of  Japan,  but  because  the  precedent  estab- 
lished in  1905  at  the  Portsmouth  Treaty  was  one  which 
it  was  felt  must  be  utterly  shattered  if  China  was  not 
to  abandon  her  claim  of  being  considered  a  sovereign 
international  State.  On  that  occasion  Japan  had  simply 
negotiated  direct  with  Russia  concerning  all  matters 
affecting  Manchuria,  dispatching  a  Plenipotentiary  to 
Peking,  after  the  Treaty  of  Peace  had  been  signed,  to 
secure  China's  adhesion  to  all  clauses  en  bloc  without 
discussion.  True  enough,  by  filing  the  Twenty-one 
Demands  on  China  in  1915 — when  the  war  was  hardly 
half-a-year  old — and  by  forcing  China's  assent  to  all 
Shantung  questions  under  the  threat  of  an  Ultimatum, 
Japan  had  reversed  the  Portsmouth  Treaty  procedure 
and  apparently  settled  the  issues  at  stake  for  all  time; 
nevertheless  the  Chinese  hoped  when  the  facts  were 
properly  known  to  the  world  that  this  species  of  diplom- 
acy would  not  be  endorsed,  and  that  indeed  the  Shan- 
tung question  could  be  reopened. 

Consequently  great  pains  were  taken  at  the  Chinese 
Foreign  Office  to  draft  a  reply  to  the  Wilson  Note 
which  would  tell  its  own  story.  The  authorized  transla- 
tion of  the  document  handed  to  the  American  Legation 
on  the  8th  January  has  therefore  a  peculiar  political 
interest.     It  runs  as  follows: — 

"I  have  examined  with  the  care  which  the  gravity  of  the 
question  demands  the  note  concerning  peace  which  President 
Wilson  has  addressed  to  the  Governments  of  the  Allies  and  the 
Central  Powers  now  at  war  and  the  text  of  which  Your  Excel- 


314  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

lency  has  been  good  enough  to  transmit  to  me  under  instruc- 
tions of  your  Government. 

"China,  a  nation  traditionally  pacific,  has  recently  again 
manifested  her  sentiments  in  concluding  treaties  concerning 
the  pacific  settlement  of  international  disputes,  responding 
thus  to  the  voeux  of  the  Peace  Conference  held  at  the  Hague. 

*'0n  the  other  hand,  the  present  war,  by  its  prolongation, 
has  seriously  affected  the  interests  of  China,  more  so  perhaps 
than  those  of  other  Powers  which  have  remained  neutral.  She 
is  at  present  at  a  time  of  reorganization  which  demands  eco- 
nomically and  industrially  the  co-operation  of  foreign  coun- 
tries, a  co-operation  which  a  large  number  of  them  are  unable 
to  accord  on  account  of  the  war  in  which  they  are  engaged. 

*'In  manifesting  her  sympathy  for  the  spirit  of  the  President's 
Note,  having  in  view  the  ending  as  soon  as  possible  of  the 
hostilities,  China  is  but  acting  in  conformity  not  only  with  her 
interests  but  also  with  her  profound  sentiments. 

"On  account  of  the  extent  which  modern  wars  are  apt  to 
assume  and  the  repercussions  which  they  bring  about,  their 
effects  are  no  longer  limited  to  belligerent  States.  All  coun- 
tries are  interested  in  seeing  wars  becoming  as  rare  as  possible. 
Consequently  China  cannot  but  show  satisfaction  with  the  views 
of  the  Government  and  people  of  the  United  States  of  America 
who  declare  themselves  ready,  and  even  eager,  to  co-operate 
when  the  war  is  over,  by  all  proper  means  to  assure  the  respect 
of  the  principle  of  the  equality  of  nations,  whatever  their  power 
may  be,  and  to  relieve  them  of  the  peril  of  wrong  and  violence. 
China  is  ready  to  join  her  efforts  with  theirs  for  the  attainment 
of  such  results  which  can  only  be  obtained  through  the  help 
of  all." 

Already,  then,  before  there  had  been  any  question  of 
Germany's  ruthless  submarine  war  necessitating  a  de- 
cisive move,  China  had  commenced  to  show  that  she 
could  not  remain  passive  during  a  world-conflict  which 
was  indirectly  endangering  her  interests.  America,  by 
placing  herself  in  direct  communication  with  the  Peking 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  315 

Government  on  the  subject  of  a  possible  peace,  had 
given  a  direct  hint  that  she  was  sohcitous  of  China's  fu- 
ture and  determined  to  help  her  as  far  as  possible.  All 
this  was  in  strict  accordance  with  the  traditional  policy 
of  the  United  States  in  China,  a  policy  which  although 
too  idealistic  to  have  had  much  practical  value — being 
too  little  supported  by  battleships  and  bayonets  to  be 
respected — has  nevertheless  for  sixty  years  tempered  the 
wind  to  the  shorn  lamb.  The  ground  had  consequently 
been  well  prepared  for  the  remarkable  denouement 
which  came  on  the  9th  February,  1917,  and  which  sur- 
prised all  the  world. 

On  the  fourth  of  that  month  the  United  States  for- 
mally communicated  with  China  on  the  subject  of  the 
threatened  German  submarine  war  against  neutral  ship- 
ping and  invited  her  to  associate  herself  with  America 
in  breaking-off  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany. 
China  had  meanwhile  received  a  telegraphic  communica- 
tion from  the  Chinese  Minister  in  Berlin  transmitting 
a  Note  from  the  German  Government  making  known 
the  measures  endangering  all  merchant  vessels  navigat- 
ing the  prescribed  zones.  The  effect  of  these  two  com- 
munications on  the  mind  of  the  Chinese  Government 
was  at  first  admittedly  stunning  and  very  varied  expres- 
sions of  opinion  were  heard  in  Peking.  For  the  first 
time  in  the  history  of  the  country  the  government  had 
been  invited  to  take  a  step  which  meant  the  inauguration 
of  a  definite  Foreign  policy  from  which  there  could  be 
no  retreat.  For  four  days  a  discussion  raged  which 
created  the  greatest  uneasiness ;  but  by  the  8th  February, 
President  Li  Yuan-hung  had  made  up  his  mind — the 
final  problem  being  simply  the  "conversion"  of  the  Mili- 
tary Party  to  the  idea  that  a  decisive  step,  which  would 


316  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

forever  separate  them  from  Germany,  must  at  last  be 
taken.  It  is  known  that  the  brilHant  Scholar  Liang 
Ch'i-chao,  who  was  hastily  summoned  to  Peking,  proved 
a  decisive  influence  and  performed  the  seemingly  impos- 
sible in  a  few  hours'  discussion.  Realizing  at  once  the 
advantages  which  would  accrue  from  a  single  masculine 
decision  he  advised  instant  action  in  such  a  convincing 
way  that  the  military  leaders  sm-rendered.  Accord- 
ingly on  the  9th  February  the  presence  of  the  German 
Minister  was  requested  at  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office 
when  the  following  Note  was  read  to  him  and  subse- 
quently transmitted  telegraphically  to  Berlin. 

Your  Excellency: 

A  telegraphic  communication  has  been  received  from  the  Chi- 
nese Minister  at  Berlin  transmitting  a  note  from  the  German 
Government  dated  February  1st,  1917,  which  makes  known  that 
the  measures  of  blockade  newly  adopted  by  the  Government  of 
Germany  will,  from  that  day,  endanger  neutral  merchant  ves- 
sels navigating  in  certain  prescribed  zones. 

The  new  measures  of  submarine  warfare,  inaugurated  by 
Germany,  imperilling  the  lives  and  property  of  Chinese  citizens 
to  even  a  greater  extent  than  the  measures  previously  taken 
which  have  already  cost  so  many  human  lives  to  China,  con- 
stitute a  violation  of  the  principles  of  public  international 
law  at  present  in  force;  the  tolerance  of  their  application 
would  have  as  a  result  the  introduction  into  international  law 
of  arbitrary  principles  incompatible  with  even  legitimate  com- 
mercial intercourse  between  neutral  states  and  between  neutral 
states  and  belligerent  powers. 

The  Chinese  Government,  therefore,  protests  energetically 
to  the  Imperial  German  Government  against  the  measures 
proclaimed  on  February  1st,  and  sincerely  hopes  that  with  a 
view  to  respecting  the  rights  of  neutral  states  and  to  maintain- 
ing the  friendly  relations  between  these  two  countries,  the  said 
measures  will  not  be  carried  out. 

In  case,  contrary  to  its  expectations,  its  protest  be  ineflfec- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  317 

tual  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  will  be  constrained, 
to  its  profound  regret,  to  sever  the  diplomatic  relations  at 
present  existing  between  the  two  countries.  It  is  unnecessary 
to  add  that  the  attitude  of  the  Chinese  Government  has  been 
dictated  purely  by  the  desire  to  further  the  cause  of  the 
world's  peace  and  by  the  maintenance  of  the  sanctity  of  inter- 
national law. 

I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  renew  to  Your  Excel- 
lency the  assurance  of  my  highest  consideration. 

At  the  same  time  the  following  reply  was  handed  to 
the  American  INIinister  in  Peking  thus  definitely  clinch- 
ing the  matter: 

Your  Excellency: 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excel- 
lency's Note  of  the  4th  February,  1917,  informing  me  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America,  in  view  of  the 
adoption  by  the  German  Government  of  its  new  policy  of  sub- 
marine warfare  on  the  1st  of  February,  has  decided  to  take 
certain  action  which  it  judges  necessary  as  regards  Ger- 
many. 

The  Chinese  Government,  like  the  President  of  the  United 
Slates  of  America,  is  reluctant  to  believe  that  the  German 
Government  will  actually  carry  into  execution  those  measures 
which  imperil  the  lives  and  property  of  citizens  of  neutral  states 
and  jeopardize  the  commerce,  even  legitimate,  between  neutrals 
as  well  as  between  neutrals  and  belligerents  and  which  tend,  if 
allowed  to  be  enforced  without  opposition,  to  introduce  a  new 
principle  into  public  international  law. 

The  Chinese  Government  being  in  accord  with  the  principles 
set  forth  in  Your  Excellency's  note  and  firmly  associating  itself 
with  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  has  taken  similar 
action  by  protesting  energetically  to  the  German  Government 
against  the  new  measures  of  blockade.  The  Chinese  Govern- 
ment also  proposes  to  take  such  action  in  the  future  as  will  be 
deemed  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  principles  of 
international  law. 


318  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  renew  to  Your  Excel- 
lency the  assurance  of  my  highest  consideration. 
His  Excellency  Paul  S.  Reinsch, 

Envoy  Extraordinary  &  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of 
The  United  States  of  America. 

When  these  facts  became  generallj'  known  an  extraor- 
dinary ferment  was  noticeable.  What  efforts  had  to  be 
made  to  overcome  the  not  inconsiderable  opposition  of 
the  Military  Party  who  were  opposed  to  any  departure 
from  a  policy  of  passive  neutrality  need  not  now  be  set 
down ;  but  it  is  sufficient  to  state  that  the  decision  arrived 
at  was  in  every  sense  a  victory  of  the  younger  intel- 
lectual forces  over  the  older  mandarinate,  whose  tradi- 
tions of  laissez  faire  and  spineless  diplomacy  had  hitherto 
cost  the  country  so  dear.  A  definite  and  far-reaching 
Foreign  Policy  had  at  last  been  inaugurated.  By  re- 
sponding rapidly  and  firmly  to  the  invitation  of  the 
United  States  to  associate  herself  with  the  stand  taken 
against  Germany's  piratical  submarine  warfare,  China 
has  undoubtedly  won  for  herself  a  new  place  in  the 
world's  esteem.  Both  in  Europe  and  America  the  news 
of  this  development  awakened  well-understandable  en- 
thusiasm, and  convinced  men  that  the  Republic  at  last 
stood  for  something  vital  and  real.  Until  the  9th  Feb- 
ruary, 1917,  what  China  had  been  doing  was  not  really 
to  maintain  her  neutrality,  since  she  had  been  unable 
to  defend  her  territory  from  being  made  a  common 
battleground  in  1914:  she  had  been  engaged  in  guarding 
and  perpetuating  her  traditional  imj^otency.  For  whilst 
it  may  be  accurate  to  declare — a  fact  which  few  West- 
erners have  realized — that  to  the  mass  of  the  Chinese 
nation  the  various  members  of  the  European  Family  are 
undistinguishable  from  one  another,  there  being  little  to 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  319 

choose  in  China  between  a  Russian  or  a  German,  an 
Englishman  or  an  Austrian,  a  Frenchman  or  a  Greek, 
the  trade-contact  of  a  century  had  certainly  taught  to  a 
great  many  that  there  was  profit  in  certain  directions 
and  none  in  certain  others.  It  was  perfectly  well- 
known,  for  instance,  that  England  stood  for  a  sea- 
empire  ;  that  the  sea  was  an  universal  road ;  that  British 
ships,  both  mercantile  and  military,  were  the  most  nu- 
merous; and  that  other  things  being  equal  it  must 
primarily  be  Britain  more  than  any  other  European 
country  which  would  influence  Chinese  destinies.  But 
the  British  Alliance  with  Japan  had  gi-eatly  weakened 
the  trust  which  originally  existed ;  and  this  added  to  the 
fact  that  Germany,  although  completely  isolated  and  im- 
prisoned by  the  sea,  still  maintained  herself  intact  by  rea- 
son of  her  marvellous  war-machine,  which  had  ploughed 
forward  with  such  horrible  results  in  a  number  of  direc- 
tions, had  made  inaction  seem  the  best  policy.  And 
yet,  although  the  Chinese  may  be  pardoned  for  not  form- 
ing clear  concepts  regarding  the  rights  and  wrongs  of 
the  present  conflict,  they  had  undoubtedly  realized  that 
it  was  absolutely  essential  for  them  not  to  remain  out- 
side the  circle  of  international  friendships  when  a  direct 
opportunity  was  offered  them  to  step  within. 

It  was  a  sudden  inkling  of  these  things  which  now 
dawned  on  the  public  mind  and  slowly  awakened  en- 
thusiasm. For  the  first  time  since  Treaty  relations 
with  the  Powers  had  been  established  Chinese  diplo- 
matic action  had  swept  beyond  the  walls  of  Peking  and 
embraced  world-politics  within  its  scope.  The  Con- 
fucianist  conception  of  the  State,  as  being  simply  a 
regional  creation,  a  thing  complete  in  itself  and  all 
sufficient  because  it  was  locked  to  the  past  and  indiffer- 


320  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

ent  to  the  future,  had  hitherto  been  supreme,  foreign 
affairs  being  the  result  of  unwilhng  contact  at  sea-ports 
or  in  the  wastes  of  High  Asia  where  rival  empires  meet. 
To  find  Chinese — five  years  after  the  inauguration  of 
their  Republic — ready  to  accept  literally  and  loyally  in 
the  western  way  all  the  duties  and  obligations  which 
their  rights  of  eminent  domain  confer  was  a  great  and 
fine  discovery.  It  has  been  supposed  by  some  that  a 
f>owerful  role  was  played  in  this  business  by  the  tempta- 
tion to  benefit  materially  by  an  astute  move:  that  is 
that  China  was  greatly  influenced  in  her  decision  by  the 
knowledge  that  the  denouncing  of  the  German  treaties 
would  instantly  suspend  the  German  Boxer  indemnity 
and  pour  into  the  depleted  Central  Treasury  a  monthly 
surplus  of  nearly  two  million  Mexican  dollars.  Para- 
doxical as  it  may  sound  in  a  country  notoriously  hard- 
pressed  for  cash,  monetary  considerations  played  no 
part  whatever  in  convincing  the  Peking  Government 
that  the  hour  for  action  had  arrived ;  nor  again  was  there 
any  question  of  real  hostility  to  a  nation  which  is  so  far 
removed  from  the  East  as  to  be  meaningless  to  the 
masses.  The  deep,  underlying,  decisive  influence  was 
simply  expedienc}^ — the  most  subtle  of  all  political  rea- 
sons and  the  hardest  to  define.  But  just  as  Britain  de- 
clared war  because  the  invasion  of  Belgium  brought  to 
a  head  all  the  vague  grounds  for  opposition  to  German 
policy;  and  just  as  America  broke  off  relations  because 
the  scrapping  of  undertaking  after  undertaking  regard- 
ing the  sea-war  made  it  imperative  for  her  to  act,  so 
did  China  choose  the  right  moment  to  enunciate  the 
doctrine  of  her  independence  by  voicing  her  determina- 
tion to  hold  to  the  whole  corpus  of  international  sanc- 
tions on  which  her  independence  finally  rests.     In  the 


Assault  of  the  Republicax  Troops  ox  the  Imperial  Pal- 
ace IN  Peking,  Jt'ly  12,  1917.  Scaling  the  Palace 
Walls 


Kastehn    I'alack    Kxtkance,    Peking,    After    Assailt    of 
THE  Republican  Troops,  July  12,   1917 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  321 

last  analysis,  then,  the  Chinese  note  of  the  9th  Febru- 
ary to  tlie  German  Government  was  a  categorical  and 
unmistakable  reply  to  all  the  insidious  attempts  which 
had  been  made  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  place 
her  outside  and  beyond  the  operation  of  the  Public  Law 
of  Europe;  and  it  is  solely  and  entirely  in  that  light  that 
her  future  actions  must  be  judged.  The  leaders  who 
direct  the  destinies  of  China  became  fully  prepared  for 
a  state  of  belligerency  from  the  moment  they  decided 
to  speak;  but  they  could  not  but  be  supremely  anxious 
concerning  the  expression  of  that  belligerency,  since 
their  international  position  had  for  years  been  such  that 
a  single  false  move  might  cripple  them. 

Let  us  make  this  clear.  Whilst  China  has  been  from 
the  first  fully  prepared  to  co-operate  with  friendly 
Powers  in  the  taking  of  war-measures  which  would  ulti- 
mately improve  her  world-position,  she  has  not  been 
prepared  to  surrender  the  initiative  in  these  matters  into 
foreign  hands.  The  argument  that  the  mobilization 
of  her  resources  could  only  be  effectively  dealt  with  by 
specially  designated  foreigners,  for  instance,  has  always 
been  repellent  to  her  because  she  knows  from  bitter 
experience  that  although  Japan  has  played  little  or  no 
part  in  the  war,  and  indeed  classifies  herself  as  a  semi- 
belligerent,  the  Tokio  Government  would  not  hesitate 
to  use  any  opportunity  which  presented  itself  in  China 
for  selfish  ends;  and  by  insisting  that  as  she  is  on  the 
spot  she  is  the  most  competent  to  insure  the  effective- 
ness of  Chinese  co-operation,  attempt  to  tighten  her 
hold  on  the  country.  It  is  a  fact  which  is  self-evident 
to  observers  on  the  spot  that  ever  since  the  coup  of  the 
Twenty-onp  Demands,  many  Japanese  believe  that 
their  country  has  succeeded  in  almost  completely  infeo- 


322  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

dating  China  and  has  became  the  sovereign  arbitrator 
of  all  quarrels,  as  well  as  the  pacificator  of  the  Eastern 
World.  Statements  which  were  incautiously  allowed 
to  appear  in  the  Japanese  Press  a  few  days  prior  to 
the  Chinese  Note  of  the  9th  February  disclose  what 
Japan  really  thought  on  the  subject  of  China  identify- 
ing herself  with  the  Allies.  For  instance,  the  follow- 
ing, which  bears  the  hall-mark  of  official  inspiration, 
reads  very  curiously  in  the  light  of  after-events : 

.  .  .  "Dispatches  from  Peking  say  that  England  and  France 
have  already  started  a  flanking  movement  to  induce  China  to 
join  the  anti-German  coalition.  The  intention  of  the  Chinese 
Government  has  not  yet  been  learned.  But  it  is  possible  that 
China  will  agree,  if  conditions  are  favourable,  thus  gaining  the 
right  to  voice  her  views  at  the  coming  peace  conference. 
Should  the  Entente  Powers  give  China  a  firm  guarantee,  it  is 
feared  here  that  China  would  not  hesitate  to  act. 

"The  policy  of  the  Japanese  Government  toward  this  ques- 
tion cannot  yet  be  learned.  It  appears,  however,  that  the 
Japanese  Government  is  not  opposed  to  applying  the  resolu- 
tions of  the  Paris  Economic  Conference,  in  so  far  as  they  con- 
cern purely  economic  questions,  since  Japan  desires  that  Ger- 
man influence  in  the  commerce  and  finance  of  the  Orient  should 
be  altogether  uprooted.  But  should  the  Entente  Powers  of 
Europe  try  to  induce  China  to  join  them,  Japan  may  object 
on  the  ground  that  it  will  create  more  disturbances  in  China 
and  lead  to  a  general  disturbance  of  peace  in  the  Orient." 

Now  there  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  in  the  writer's 
mind — and  he  can  claim  to  speak  as  a  student  of  twenty 
years'  standing — that  this  definition  of  Japanese  aims 
and  objects  is  a  very  true  one;  and  that  the  subsequent 
invitation  to  China  to  join  the  Allies  which  came  from 
Tokyo  after  a  meeting  between  the  Japanese  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Allied  Ambassadors  was 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  323 

simply  made  when  a  new  orientation  of  policy  had  been 
forced  by  stress  of  circumstances.  Japan  has  certainly 
always  wished  German  influence  in  the  Far  East  to  be 
uprooted  if  she  can  take  the  place  of  Germany;  but 
if  she  cannot  take  that  place  absolutely  and  entirely 
she  would  vastly  prefer  the  influence  to  remain,  since  it 
is  in  the  nature  of  counterweight  to  that  of  other  Euro- 
pean Powers  and  of  America — foreign  influence  in 
China,  as  Mr.  Hioki  blandly  told  the  late  President 
Yuan  Shih-kai  in  his  famous  interview  of  the  18th  Janu- 
ary, 1915,  being  a  source  of  constant  irritation  to  the 
Japanese  people,  and  the  greatest  stumbling-block  to 
a  permanent  understanding  in  the  Far  East. 

Chinese  suspicion  of  any  invitation  coming  by  way  of 
Tokyo  has  been,  therefore,  in  every  way  justified, 
if  it  is  a  reasonable  and  legitimate  thing  for  a  nation  of 
four  hundred  millions  of  people  to  be  acutely  concerned 
about  their  independence;  for  events  have  already 
proved  up  to  the  hilt  that  so  far  from  the  expulsion  of 
Germany  from  Shantung  having  resulted  in  the  hand- 
ing-back of  interests  which  were  forcibly  acquired  from 
China  in  1898,  that  expulsion  has  merely  resulted  in 
Japan  succeeding  to  such  interests  and  thereby  obliterat- 
ing all  trace  of  her  original  promise  to  the  world  in  1914 
that  she  would  restore  to  China  what  was  originally 
taken  from  her.  Here  it  is  necessary  to  remark  that  not 
only  did  Japan  in  her  negotiations  over  the  Twenty-one 
Demands  force  China  to  hand  over  the  twelve  million 
pounds  of  German  improvements  in  Shantung  province, 
but  that  Baron  Hayashi,  the  present  Japanese  Minister 
to  China,  has  recently  declared  that  Japan  would 
demand  from  China  a  vast  settlement  or  concession 
at  Tsingtao,  thus  making  even  the  alleged  handing-back 


324  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

of  the  leased  territory — which  Japan  is  pledged  to  force 
from  Germany  at  the  Peace  Conference — wholly  illus- 
ory, the  formula  of  a  Settlement  being  adopted  because 
twelve  years'  experience  of  Port  Ai-thur  has  shown  that 
territorial  "leases,"  with  their  military  garrisons  and 
administrative  offices,  are  expensive  and  antiquated 
things,  and  that  it  is  easier  to  push  infiltration  by  means 
of  a  multitude  of  Settlements  in  which  police-boxes  and 
policemen  form  an  important  element,  than  to  cut  off 
slices  of  territory  under  a  nomenclature  which  is  a 
clamant  advertisement  of  disruptive  aims. 

Now  although  these  matters  appear  to  be  taking  us 
far  from  the  particular  theme  we  are  discussing,  it  is 
not  really  so.  Like  a  dark  thunder-cloud  on  the  hori- 
zon the  menace  of  Japanese  action  has  rendered  frank 
Chinese  co-operation,  even  in  such  a  simple  matter  as 
war-measures  against  Germany,  a  thing  of  supreme 
difficulty.  The  mere  rumour  that  China  might  dispatch 
an  Expeditionary  Force  to  Mesopotamia  was  sufficient 
to  send  the  host  of  unofficial  Japanese  agents  in  Peking 
scurrying  in  every  direction  and  insisting  that  if  the 
Chinese  did  anything  at  all  they  should  limit  them- 
selves to  sending  troops  to  Russia  where  they  would 
be  "lost" — a  suggestion  made  because  that  was  what 
Japan  herself  offered  to  do  when  she  declined  in  1915 
the  Allies'  proposal  to  dispatch  troops  to  Europe. 
Nor  must  the  fact  be  lost  sight  of  that  as  in  other 
countries  so  in  China,  foreign  affairs  provide  an  ex- 
cellent opportunity  for  influencing  the  march  of  in- 
ternal events.  Thus,  as  we  have  clearly  shown,  the 
Military  Party,  although  originally  averse  to  any  action 
at  all,  saw  that  a  strong  foreign  policy  would  greatly 
enliance  its  reputation  and  allow  it  to  influence  the  im- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  325 

portant  elections  for  the  Parliament  of  1918  which,  sit- 
ting as  a  National  Convention,  will  elect  the  next  Presi- 
dent. Thus,  in  the  extraordinary  way  which  happens 
throughout  the  world,  the  whole  of  February  was  con- 
sumed in  the  rival  political  parties  manoeuvring  for  po- 
sition, the  Vice-President,  General  Feng  Kuo-chang, 
himself  coming  hastily  to  Peking  from  Nanking  to  take 
part  in  this  elaborate  game  in  which  many  were  now 
participating  merely  for  what  they  could  get  out  of  it. 

On  the  4th  March  matters  were  brought  to  a  climax 
by  an  open  breach  between  President  Li  Yuan-hung 
and  the  Premier,  General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  at  a  Cabinet 
meeting  regarding  the  procedure  to  be  observed  in 
breaking  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany.  Al- 
though nearly  a  month  had  elapsed,  no  reply  had  been 
received  from  Berlin;  and  of  the  many  plans  of  action 
proposed  nothing  had  been  formally  decided.  Owing 
to  the  pressure  Japan  was  exerting  from  Tokio  to  get 
China  to  come  to  a  definite  arrangement,  popular  anxi- 
ety was  growing.  Over  the  question  of  certain  tele- 
grams to  be  communicated  to  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, of  which  he  had  been  kept  in  ignorance.  Presi- 
dent Li  Yuan-hung  took  a  firm  stand;  with  the  result 
that  the  Premier,  deeply  offended,  abruptly  left  the 
Council  Chamber,  handed  in  his  resignation  and  left 
the  capital — a  course  of  action  which  threatened  to  pro- 
voke a  national  crisis. 

Fortunately  in  President  Li  Yuan-hung  China  had  a 
cool  and  dispassionate  statesman.  At  the  first  grave 
crisis  in  his  administration  he  wished  at  all  costs  to 
secure  that  the  assent  of  Parliament  should  be  given  to 
all  steps  taken,  and  that  nothing  so  speculative  as  a 
policy  which  had  not  been  publicly  debated  should  be 


326  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

put  into  force.  He  held  to  this  point  doggedly;  and 
after  some  negotiations,  the  Premier  was  induced  to 
return  to  the  capital  and  resume  office,  on  the  under- 
standing that  nothing  final  was  to  be  done  until  a  popu- 
lar endorsement  had  been  secured. 

On  the  10th  March  the  question  was  sent  to  Parlia- 
ment for  decision.  After  a  stormy  debate  of  several 
hours  in  the  Lower  House  the  policy  of  the  Government 
was  upheld  by  330  votes  to  87:  on  the  following  day  the 
Senate  endorsed  this  decision  by  158  votes  to  37.  By 
a  coincidence  which  was  too  extraordinary  not  to  have 
been  artificially  contrived,  the  long-awaited  Germany 
reply  arrived  on  the  morning  of  this  10th  March,  copies 
of  the  document  being  circulated  wholesale  by  German 
agents  among  the  Members  of  Parliament  in  a  last  ef- 
fort to  influence  their  decision.  The  actual  text  of 
the  German  reply  was  as  follows,  and  it  will  be  seen  how 
transparently  worded  it  is: 

To  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Republic  of  China: 
Your  Excellency:  By  the  instructions  of  my  home  Gov- 
ernment— which  reached  me  on  the  10th  inst. — I  beg  to  forward 
you  the  following  reply  to  China's  protest  to  the  latest  blockade 
policy  of  Germany: — 

"The  Imperial  German  Government  expresses  its  great  sur- 
prise at  the  action  threatened  by  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public of  China  in  its  Note  of  protest.  Many  other  countries 
have  also  protested,  but  China,  which  has  been  in  friendly  rela- 
tions with  Germany,  is  the  only  State  which  has  added  a  threat 
to  its  protest.  The  surprise  is  doubly  great,  because  of  the 
fact  that,  as  China  has  no  shipping  interests  in  the  seas  of  the 
barred  zones,  she  will  not  suffer  thereby. 

"The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  China  mentions  that 
loss  of  life  of  Chinese  citizens  has  occurred  as  the  results  of 
the  present  method  of  war.     The  Imperial  German  Government 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  327 

wishes  to  point  out  that  the  Government  of  the  Repubhc  of 
China  has  never  communicated  with  the  Imperial  Government 
regarding  a  single  case  of  this  kind  nor  has  it  protested  in  this 
connexion  before.  According  to  reports  received  by  the  Impe- 
rial Government,  such  losses  as  have  been  actually  sustained  by 
Chinese  subjects  have  occurred  in  the  firing  line  while  they  were 
engaged  in  digging  trenches  and  in  other  war  services.  While 
thus  engaged,  they  were  exposed  to  the  dangers  inevitable  to 
all  forces  engaged  in  war.  The  fact  that  Germany  has  on 
several  occasions  protested  against  the  employment  of  Chinese 
citizens  for  warlike  purpose  is  evident  that  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment has  given  excellent  proof  of  its  friendly  feelings  toward 
China.  In  consideration  of  these  friendly  relations  the  Im- 
perial Government  is  willing  to  treat  the  matter  as  if  the  threat 
had  never  been  uttered.  It  is  reasonable  for  the  Imperial 
Government  to  expect  that  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
China  will  revise  its  views  respecting  the  question. 

"Germany's  enemies  were  the  first  to  declare  a  blockade  on 
Germany  and  the  same  is  being  persistently  carried  out.  It  is 
therefore  difficult  for  Germany  to  cancel  her  blockade  policy. 
The  Imperial  Government  is  nevertheless  willing  to  comply  with 
the  wishes  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  China  by 
opening  negotiations  to  arrive  at  a  plan  for  the  protection  of 
Chinese  life  and  property,  with  the  view  that  the  end  may  be 
achieved  and  thereby  the  utmost  regard  be  given  to  the  ship- 
ping rights  of  China.  The  reason  which  has  prompted  the 
Imperial  Government  to  adopt  this  conciliatory  policy  is  the 
knowledge  that,  once  diplomatic  relations  are  severed  with  Ger- 
many, China  will  not  only  lose  a  truly  good  friend  but  will  also 
be  entangled  in  unthinkable  difficulties." 

In  forwarding  to  Your  Excellency  the  above  instructions 
from  my  home  Government,  I  beg  also  to  state  that — if  the 
Government  of  China  be  willing — I  am  empowered  to  open  ne- 
gotiations for  the  protection  of  the  shipping  rights  of  China. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be.  .  .  . 

(Signed  by  the  German  Minister.) 

March  10,  1917. 


328  THE  FIGHT  POK  THE 

With  a  Parliamentary  endorsement  behind  them 
there  remained  nothing  for  the  Peking  Government  but 
to  take  the  vital  step  of  severing  diplomatic  relations. 
Certain  details  remained  to  be  settled  but  these  were 
expeditiously  handled.  Consequently,  without  any 
further  discussion,  at  noon  on  the  14th  March  the  Ger- 
man Minister  was  handed  his  passports,  with  the  fol- 
lowing covering  dispatch  from  the  Chinese  Foreign  Of- 
fice. It  is  worthy  of  record  that  in  the  interval  between 
the  Chinese  Note  of  the  9th  February  and  the  German 
reply  of  the  10th  March  the  French  mail-steamer 
Atlios  had  been  torpedoed  in  the  Mediterranean  and 
five  hundred  Chinese  labourers  proceeding  to  France 
on  board  her  drowned. 

Your  Excellency : — 

With  reference  to  the  new  submarine  policy  of  Germany,  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  China,  dictated  by  the  desire  to 
further  the  cause  of  world's  peace  and  to  maintain  the  sanctity 
of  International  Law,  addressed  a  protest  to  Your  Excellency 
on  February  9th  and  declared  that  in  case,  contrary  to  its 
expectations  its  protest  be  ineffectual,  it  would  be  constrained 
to  sever  the  diplomatic  relations  at  present  existing  between  the 
two  countries. 

During  the  lapse  of  a  month  no  heed  has  been  paid  to  the 
protest  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  in  the  activities  of 
the  German  Submarines,  activities  which  have  caused  the  loss 
of  many  Chinese  lives.  On  March  10,  a  reply  was  received 
from  Your  Excellency.  Although  it  states  that  the  Imperial 
German  Government  is  willing  to  open  negotiations  to  arrive 
at  a  plan  for  the  protection  of  Chinese  life  and  property,  yet 
it  declares  that  it  is  difficult  for  Germany  to  cancel  her  block- 
ade policy.  It  is  therefore  not  in  accord  with  the  object  of 
the  protest  and  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  to  its 
deep  regret,  considers  its  protest  to  be  ineffectual.  The  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  is  constrained  to  sever  the  diplomatic 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  329 

relations  at  present  existing  with  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment. I  have  the  honour  to  send  herewith  to  Your  Ex- 
cellency, the  passport  for  Your  Excellency,  the  members  of'the 
German  Legation  and  their  families  and  retinue  for  protection 
while  leaving  Chinese  territory.  With  regard  to  the  Consular 
Officers  of  Germany  in  China,  this  Ministry  has  instructed  the 
different  Commissioners  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  issue  to  them 
similarly  passports  for  leaving  the  country. 

I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  renew  to  Your  Excel- 
lency the  assurance  of  my  highest  consideration. 

March  14th,  1917. 

It  was  not  until  eleven  days  later — on  the  25th  March 
— that  the  German  Minister  and  his  suite  reluctantly 
left  Peking  for  Germany  via  America.  Meanwhile  the 
Chinese  Government  remained  undecided  regarding  the 
taking  of  the  final  step  as  a  number  of  important  mat- 
ters had  still  to  be  settled.  Not  only  had  arrangements 
to  be  made  with  the  Allies  but  there  was  the  question  of 
adjusting  Chniese  policy  with  American  action.  A 
special  commission  on  Diplomatic  affairs  daily  debated 
the  procedure  to  be  observed,  but  owing  to  the  conflict 
of  opinion  in  the  provinces  further  action  was  greatly 
delayed.  As  it  is  necessary  to  show  the  nature  of  this 
conflict  we  give  two  typical  opinions  submitted  to  the 
Government  on  the  question  of  a  formal  declaration  of 
war  against  Germany  (and  Austria) .  The  first  Mem- 
orandum was  written  for  the  Diplomatic  Commission 
by  the  scholar  Liang  Ch'i-chao  and  is  singularly  lucid : — 

THE    NECESSITY    FOR    WAR 

"Those  who  question  the  necessity  for  war  can  only  quote 
the  attitude  of  America  as  example.  The  position  of  China 
is,  however,  different  from  that  of  America  in  two  points. 
First,  actual  warfare  will  follow  immediately  after  America's 
declaration  of  war,  so  it  is  necessary  for  her  to  make  the 


330  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

necessary  preparations  before  taking  the  step.  For  this  pur- 
pose, America  has  voted  several  hundred  million  dollars  for  an 
increase  of  her  naval  appropriations.  America  therefore  can- 
not declare  war  until  she  has  completed  every  preparation. 
With  China  it  is  different.  Even  after  the  declaration  of  war, 
there  will  be  no  actual  warfare.  It  is  therefore  unnecessary 
for  us  to  wait. 

"Secondly,  America  has  no  such  things  as  foreign  settlements, 
consular  jurisdiction  or  other  un-equal  treaties  with  Germany. 
Under  the  existing  conditions  America  has  no  difficulties  in 
safeguarding  herself  against  the  Germans  residing  in  America 
after  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  even  though  war  has 
not  yet  been  actually  declared,  and  as  to  future  welfare,  Amer- 
ica will  have  notliing  to  suffer  even  though  her  old  treaties 
with  Germany  should  continue  to  be  operative.  It  is  impos- 
sible for  China  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  safeguard  the 
country  against  the  Germans  residing  in  China  unless  the  old 
treaties  be  cancelled.  For  unless  war  is  declared  it  is  impos- 
sible to  cancel  the  consular  jurisdiction  of  the  Germans,  and 
so  long  as  German  consular  jurisdiction  remains  in  China  we 
will  meet  with  difficulties  everywhere  whenever  we  wish  to  deal 
with  the  Germans.  If  our  future  is  to  be  considered,  unless 
war  is  declared,  the  old  treaties  will  again  come  into  force  upon 
the  resumption  of  diplomatic  relations,  in  which  case  we  shall 
be  held  responsible  for  all  the  steps  which  we  have  taken  in 
contravention  of  treaties  during  the  rupture.  It  will  be  ad- 
vantageous to  China  if  the  old  treaties  be  cancelled  by  a 
declaration  of  war  and  new  treaties  be  negotiated  after  the 
conclusion  of  peace. 

"In  short  by  severing  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany 
China  has  already  incurred  the  ill-feehngs  of  that  country. 
We  shall  not  be  able  to  lessen  the  hostile  feelings  of  the  Ger- 
mans even  if  we  refrain  from  declaring  war  on  them.  It  Is 
therefore  our  obligation  to  choose  the  course  that  will  be 
advantageous  to  us.  This  is  not  reluctantly  yielding  to  the 
request  of  the  Entente  Allies.  It  is  the  course  we  must  take 
in  our  present  situation. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  331 

THE    REASON    FOR    DECLARING    WAR 

"The  presumptuous  manner  in  which  Germany  has  replied  to 
our  demand  is  an  open  affront  to  our  national  integrity.  Re- 
cently Germany  has  deliberately  shown  hostility  to  our  advice 
by  reiterating  her  determination  to  carry  out  the  ruthless  sub- 
marine policy  with  increased  vigour.  All  these  are  reasons  for 
diplomatic  rupture  as  well  as  for  declaration  of  war.  Further- 
more, the  peace  of  the  Far  East  was  broken  by  the  occupation 
of  Kiachow  by  Germany.  This  event  marked  the  first  step  of 
the  German  disregard  for  international  law.  In  the  interests 
of  humanity  and  for  the  sake  of  what  China  has  passed  through, 
she  should  rise  and  punish  such  a  country,  that  dared  to  dis- 
regard international  law.  Such  a  reason  for  war  is  certainly 
beyond  criticism. 

THE    TIME    TO    DECLARE    WAR 

"War  should  be  declared  as  soon  as  possible.  The  reason 
for  the  diplomatic  rupture  is  sufficient  reason  for  declaring 
war.  This  has  already  been  explained.  It  would  be  impos- 
sible for  us  to  find  an  excuse  for  declaring  war  if  war  be  de- 
clared now.  According  to  usual  procedure  war  is  declared 
when  the  forces  of  the  two  countries  come  into  actual  conflict. 
Now  such  a  possibility  does  not  exist  between  China  and  Ger- 
many. Since  it  is  futile  to  expect  Germany  to  declare  war  on 
us  first,  we  should  ask  ourselves  if  war  is  necessary.  If  not, 
then  let  us  go  on  as  we  are,  otherwise  we  must  not  hesitate 
any  more. 

"Some  say  that  China  should  not  declare  war  on  Germany 
until  we  have  come  to  a  definite  understanding  with  the  Entente 
Allies  respecting  certain  terms.  This  is  indeed  a  wrong  con- 
ception of  things.  We  declare  war  because  we  want  to  fight 
for  humanity,  international  law  and  against  a  national  enemy. 
It  is  not  because  we  are  partial  towards  the  Entente  or  against 
Germany  or  Austria.  International  relations  are  not  com- 
mercial connexions.  Why  then  should  we  talk  about  exchange 
of  privileges  and  rights  ?  As  to  the  revision  of  Customs  tariff, 
it  has  been  our  aspiration  for  more  than  ten  years  and  a  fore- 


332  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

most  diplomatic  question,  for  which  we  have  been  looking  for 
a  suitable  opportunity  to  negotiate  with  the  foreign  Powers. 
It  is  our  view  that  the  opportunity  has  come  because  foreign 
Powers  are  now  on  very  friendly  terms  with  China.  It  is  dis- 
tinctly a  separate  thing  from  the  declaration  of  war.  Let  no 
one  try  to  confuse  the  two. 

THE    QUESTION    OF    AUSTRIA 

"If  China  decides  to  declare  war  on  Germany  the  same  atti- 
tude should  be  taken  towards  Austria.  We  have  severed  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Germany  but  retain  the  status  quo  with 
Austria.  This  is  fraught  with  danger.  German  intrigue  is  to 
be  dreaded.  What  they  have  done  in  America  and  Mexico  is 
enough  to  shock  us.  The  danger  can  easily  be  imagined  when 
we  remember  that  they  have  in  China  the  Austrian  Legation, 
Austrian  Consulates  and  Austrian  concessions  as  their  bases  of 
operation  for  intrigue  and  plotting.  Some  say  we  should  fol- 
low America,  which  has  not  yet  severed  diplomatic  relations 
with  Austria.  This  is  a  great  mistake.  America  can  afford 
to  ignore- Austria  because  there  are  no  Austrian  concessions 
and  Austrian  consular  jurisdiction  in  America. 

"The  question  is  then  what  steps  should  be  taken  to  sever 
diplomatic  relations  with  and  declare  war  on  Austria.  The 
solution  is  that  since  Austria  has  also  communicated  to  our 
Minister  regarding  her  submarine  policy  we  can  serve  her  with 
an  ultimatum  demanding  that  the  submarine  policy  be  cancelled 
within  twenty-four  hours.  If  Austria  refuses,  China  may  sever 
diplomatic  relations  and  declare  war  at  the  same  time  immedi- 
ately upon  the  expiry  of  the  twenty-four  hour  limit. 

"In  conclusion  I  wish  to  say  that  whenever  a  policy  is 
adopted  we  should  carry  out  the  complete  scheme.  If  we  should 
hesitate  in  the  middle  and  become  afraid  to  go  ahead  we  will 
soon  find  ourselves  in  an  embarrassing  position.  The  Govern- 
ment and  Parliament  should  therefore  stir  up  courage  and 
boldly  make  the  decision  and  take  the  step. 

Unanswerable  as  seem  these  arguments  to  the  West- 
ern mind,  they  were  by  no  means  so  to  the  mass  of 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  333 

Chinese  who  are  always  fearful  lest  some  sudden  re- 
shuffling in  the  relationships  existing  between  foreign 
Powers  exposes  them  to  new  and  greater  calamities. 
This  Chinese  viewpoint,  with  its  ignorance  of  basic  con- 
siderations, is  well-illustrated  by  the  Second  Memoran- 
dum, which  follows.  Written  by  the  famous  reformer 
of  1898  Kang  Yu-wei,  it  demonstrates  how  greatly  the 
revolutionists  of  1911  are  in  advance  of  a  school  which 
was  the  vogue  less  than  twenty  years  ago  and  which  is 
completely  out  of  touch  with  the  thought  which  the  war 
has  made  world-wide.  Nevertheless  the  line  of  argu- 
ment which  characterizes  this  utterance  is  still  a  politi- 
cal factor  in  China  and  must  be  understood. 

MEMORANDUM 

.  .  .  *'The  breach  between  the  United  States  and  Germany  is 
no  concern  of  ours.  But  the  Government  suddenly  severed 
diplomatic  relations  with  Germany  and  is  now  contemplating 
entry  into  the  war.  This  is  to  advance  beyond  the  action  of 
the  United  States  which  continues  to  observe  neutrality.  And 
if  we  analyse  the  public  opinion  of  the  country,  we  find  that  all 
peoples — high  and  low,  well-informed  and  ignorant — betray 
great  alarm  when  informed  of  the  rupture  and  the  proposal  to 
declare  war  on  Germany,  fearing  that  such  a  development  may 
cause  grave  peril  to  the  country.  This  war-policy  is  being 
urged  by  a  handful  of  politicians,  including  a  few  members 
of  Parliament  and  several  party  men  with  the  view  of  creating 
a  diplomatic  situation  to  serve  their  political  ends  and  to  reap 
great  profits. 

"Their  arguments  are  that  China — by  siding  with  the  En- 
tente— may  obtain  large  loans,  the  revision  of  the  Customs 
Tariff  and  the  suspension  of  the  Boxer  indemnity  to  Germany, 
as  well  as  the  recovery  of  the  German  concessions,  mining 
and  railroad  rights  and  the  seizure  of  German  commerce. 
Pray,  how  large  is  Germany's  share  of  the  Boxer  indemnity? 
Seeing  that  German  commerce  is  protected  by  international 


334  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

law,  will  China  be  able  to  seize  it;  and  does  she  not  know  that 
the  Kaiser  may  in  the  future  exact  restitution  ? 

PERILS    OF    WAR 

"News  from  Holland  tells  of  a  rumoured  secret  understand- 
ing between  Germany,  Japan  and  Russia.  The  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment is  pursuing  a  policy  of  friendship  toward  Germany. 
This  is  very  disquieting  news  to  us.  As  to  foreign  loans  and 
the  revision  of  the  Customs  Tariff,  we  can  raise  these  matters 
at  any  time.  Why  then  should  we  traffic  for  these  things  at 
the  risk  of  grave  dangers  to  the  nation?  My  view  is  that 
what  we  are  to  obtain  from  the  transaction  is  far  less  than 
what  we  are  to  give.  If  it  be  argued  that  the  policy  aims  at 
securing  for  China  her  right  to  live  as  an  unfettered  nation, 
then  we  ought  to  ask  for  the  cancellation  of  the  entire  Boxer 
Indemnities,  the  abolition  of  exterritoriality,  the  retrocession 
of  the  foreign  concessions  and  the  repeal  or  amendment  of  all 
unjust  treaties  after  the  war.  But  none  of  these  have  we 
demanded.  If  we  ourselves  cannot  improve  our  internal  ad- 
ministration in  order  to  become  a  strong  country,  it  is  absurd 
to  expect  our  admission  to  the  ranks  of  the  first-class  Powers 
simply  by  being  allowed  a  seat  at  the  Peace  Conference  and  by 
taking  a  side  with  the  Entente! 

"Which  side  will  win  the  war?  I  shall  not  attempt  to  pre- 
dict here.  But  it  is  undoubted  that  all  the  arms  of  Europe 
— and  the  industrial  and  financial  strength  of  the  United 
States  and  Japan — have  proved  unavailing  against  Germany, 
On  the  other  hand  France  has  lost  her  Northern  provinces  and 
Belgium,  Serbia  and  Rumania  are  blotted  off  the  map.  Should 
Germany  be  victorious,  the  whole  of  Europe — not  to  speak  of 
a  weak  country  like  China — would  be  in  great  peril  of  extinc- 
tion. Should  she  be  defeated,  Germany  still  can — after  the 
conclusion  of  peace — send  a  fleet  to  war  against  us.  And  as 
the  Powers  will  be  afraid  of  a  second  world-war,  who  will  come 
to  our  aid?  Have  we  not  seen  the  example  of  Korea?  There 
is  no  such  thing  as  an  army  of  righteousness  which  will  come 
to  the  assistance  of  weak  nations.  I  cannot  bear  to  think  of 
hearing  the  angry  voice  of  German  guns  along  our  coasts ! 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  335 

"If  we  allow  the  Entente  to  recruit  labour  in  our  country 
without  restriction,  thousands  upon  thousands  of  our  fellow 
countrymen  will  die  for  no  worthy  cause ;  and  if  we  allow  free 
exportation  of  foodstuff,  in  a  short  time  the  price  of  daily 
necessaries  will  mount  ten  to  a  hundredfold.  This  is  calculated 
to  cause  internal  troubles.  Yea,  all  gains  from  this  policy  will 
go  to  the  politicians  but  the  people  will  suffer  the  evil  conse- 
quences through  no  fault  of  theirs. 

DIPLOMACY    OF    CONFUCIUS 

*'In  the  matter  of  diplomacy,  we  do  not  need  to  go  to  the 
West  for  the  apt  learning  on  the  point  at  issue.  Confucius 
had  said:  'Be  truthful  and  cultivate  friendship — this  is  the 
foundation  of  human  happiness.'  Our  country  being  weak  and 
undeveloped,  if  we  strive  to  be  truthful  and  cultivate  friend- 
ship, we  can  still  be  a  civilized  nation,  albeit  hoary  with  age. 
But  we  are  now  advised  to  take  advantage  of  the  difficulties  of 
Germany  and  abandon  honesty  in  order  that  we  may  profit 
thereby.  Discarding  treaties  is  to  be  unfaithful,  grasping  for 
gains  is  not  the  way  of  a  gentleman,  taking  advantage  of  an- 
other's difficulties  is  to  be  mean  and  joining  the  larger  in  num- 
bers is  cowardice.  How  can  we  be  a  nation,  if  we  throw  away 
all  these  fundamental  qualities. 

"Even  in  the  press  of  England  and  the  United  States,  there 
is  opposition  to  America  entering  the  war.  If  we  observe 
neutrality,  we  are  not  bound  to  any  side;  and  when  the  time 
comes  for  peace — as  a  friend  to  both  sides — we  may  be  able 
to  bring  about  the  ends  of  the  war.  Is  this  not  a  service  to 
humanity  and  the  true  spirit  of  civilization? 

"Now  it  is  proposed  to  take  the  existence  of  this  great  nation 
of  five  thousand  years  and  four  hundred  million  people  in  order 
to  serve  the  interests  of  politicians  in  their  party  struggles. 
We  are  now  to  be  bound  to  foreign  nations,  without  freedom  to 
act  for  ourselves  and  running  great  risks  of  national  destruc- 
tion. Can  you  gentlemen  bear  to  see  this  come  to  pass?  China 
has  severed  relations  with  Germany  but  the  decision  for  war 
has  not  yet  been  reached.  The  whole  country  is  telegraphing 
opposition   to   the   Government's   policy   and  wants   to   know 


336  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

whether  Germany  will  not  in  the  future  take  revenge  on  ac- 
count of  our  rupture  with  her ;  and  if  we  are  not  secured  against 
this  eventuality,  what  are  the  preparations  to  meet  with  a  con- 
tingency? The  Government  must  not  stake  the  fate  of  the 
nation  as  if  it  be  a  child's  toy,  and  the  people  must  not  be  cast 
into  the  whirlpool  of  slaughter.  The  people  are  the  backbone 
of  a  country,  and  if  the  people  are  all  opposed  to  war  on  Ger- 
many, the  Government — in  spite  of  the  support  of  Parliament 
— must  call  a  great  citizens'  convention  to  decide  the  question. 
We  must  persist  in  our  neutrality.  You  gentlemen  are  pa- 
triotic sons  of  this  country  and  must  know  that  the  existence 
of  China  as  a  nation  depends  upon  what  she  does  now  in  this 
matter.     In  tears,  I  appeal  to  you.  Kang  Yu-wei." 

March  and  April  were  consumed  in  this  fruitless  dis- 
cussion in  which  everybody  participated.  The  Premier, 
General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  in  view  of  the  alleged  provincial 
opposition,  now  summoned  to  Peking  a  Conference  of 
Provincial  Military  Governors  to  endorse  his  policy, 
but  this  action  although  crowned  with  success  so  far  as 
the  army  chiefs  were  concerned — the  conference  voting 
solidly  for  war — was  responsible  for  greatly  alarming 
Parliament  which  saw  in  this  procedure  a  new  attempt 
to  undermine  its  power  and  control  the  country  by  ex- 
tra-legal means.  Furthermore,  publication  in  the  Met- 
ropolitan press  of  what  the  Japanese  were  doing  behind 
the  scenes  created  a  fear  that  extraordinary  intrigues 
were  being  indulged  in  with  the  object  of  securing  by 
means  of  secret  diplomacy  certain  guarantees  of  a 
personal  nature.  Apart  from  being  associated  with 
the  semi-official  negotiations  of  the  Entente  Powers 
in  Peking,  Japan  was  carrying  on  a  second  set  of  ne- 
gotiations partly  by  means  of  a  confidential  agent 
named  Kameio  Nishihara  dispatched  from  Tokio  spe- 
cially for  that  purpose  by  Count  Terauchi,  the  Japanese 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  337 

Premier,  a  procedure  which  led  to  the  circulation  of 
highly  sensational  stories  regarding  China's  future 
commitments.  When  the  Premier,  General  Tuan  Chi- 
jui,  had  made  his  statement  to  Parliament  on  the  10th 
March,  regarding  the  necessity  of  an  immediate  rup- 
ture with  Germany,  he  had  implied  that  China  had 
already  received  assurances  from  the  Allies  that  there 
would  be  a  postponement  of  the  Boxer  Indemnities  for 
a  term  of  years,  an  immediate  increase  in  the  Customs 
Tariff,  and  a  modification  of  the  Peace  Protocol  of 
1901  regarding  the  presence  of  Chinese  troops  near 
Tientsin.  Suddenly  all  these  points  were  declared  to 
be  in  doubt.  Round  the  question  of  the  length  of  time 
the  Indemnities  might  be  postponed,  and  the  actual 
amount  of  the  increase  in  the  Customs  Tariff,  there 
appeared  to  be  an  inexplicable  muddle  largely  owing 
to  the  intervention  of  so  many  agents  and  to  the  fact 
that  the  exchange  of  views  had  been  almost  entirely 
verbal,  unofficial,  and  secret.  It  would  be  wearisome 
to  analyse  a  dispute  which  belongs  to  the  peculiar  at- 
mosphere of  Peking  diplomacy;  but  the  vast  difficulties 
of  making  even  a  simple  decision  in  China  were  glar- 
ingly illustrated  by  this  matter.  With  a  large  sec- 
tion of  the  Metropolitan  press  daily  insisting  that  the 
future  of  democracy  in  China  would  be  again  imperilled 
should  the  Military  Party  have  its  own  way,  small 
wonder  if  the  question  of  a  formal  declaration  of  war 
on  Germany  (and  Austria)  now  assumed  an  entirely 
different  complexion. 

On  the  1st  May,  in  spite  of  all  these  trials  and  tribu- 
lations, being  pressed  by  the  Premier  to  do  so,  the  Cab- 
inet unanimously  decided  that  a  declaration  of  war  was 
imperative;  and  on  the  7th  May,  after  an  agreement 


338  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

with  the  President  had  been  reached,  Parhament  re- 
ceived the  following  dispatch — this  method  of  com- 
munication being  the  usual  one  between  the  executive 
and  legislative  branches  of  the  Government : 

The  President  has  the  honour  to  communicate  to  the  House 
of  Representatives  the  following  proposal.  Since  the  sever- 
ance of  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany,  Germany  has  con- 
tinued to  violate  the  rights  of  the  neutral  nations  and  to  damage 
and  cause  losses  in  life  and  property  to  our  people  as  well  as  to 
trample  on  international  law  and  disregard  principles  of  hu- 
manity. For  the  purpose  of  hastening  peace,  upholding  inter- 
national law  and  protecting  the  life  and  property  of  our  people, 
the  President  is  of  the  view  that  it  is  necessary  to  declare  war 
on  the  German  Government.  In  accordance  with  Article  35 
of  the  Provisional  Constitution,  he  now  asks  for  the  approval 
of  the  House,  and  demands — in  accordance  with  Article  21  of 
the  Provisional  Constitution — that  the  meeting  in  the  House 
be  held  in  secret. 

On  8th  May,  after  hearing  a  statement  made  in  per- 
son by  the  Premier,  the  House  of  Representatives  in 
secret  session  referred  the  question  for  examination  to 
the  House  sitting  as  a  Committee  in  order  to  gain  time 
to  make  up  its  mind.  On  the  same  day  the  Senate  sat 
on  the  same  question.  A  very  heated  and  bitter  dis- 
cussion followed  in  the  upper  House,  not  because  of 
any  real  disagreement  regarding  the  matter  at  issue, 
but  because  a  large  section  of  Senators  were  extremely 
anxious  regarding  the  internal  consequences.  This  is 
well-explained  by  the  following  written  interpellation 
which  was  addressed  to  the  government  by  a  large  num- 
ber of  parliamentarians: 

We,  the  undersigned,  hereby  address  this  interpellation  to 
the  Government.  As  a  declaration  of  war  on  Germany  has 
become  an  object  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Government,  the 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  339 

latter  has  held  informal  meetings  to  ascertain  the  views  of 
parliament  on  the  question ;  and  efforts  are  being  made  by  the 
Government  to  secure  the  unanimous  support  of  both  Houses 
for  its  war  policy.  In  pursuing  this  course,  the  Government 
appears  to  believe  that  its  call  for  support  will  be  readily  com- 
plied with  by  the  Houses.  But  in  our  view  there  are  quite  a 
number  of  members  in  both  Houses  who  fail  thoroughly  to  un- 
derstand the  war  decision  of  the  Government.  The  reason  for 
this  is  that,  according  to  recent  reports,  both  foreign  and 
vernacular,  the  Government  has  entered  into  secret  treaties 
with  a  "neighbouring  country."  It  is  also  reported  that  se- 
cret agents  on  both  sides  are  active  and  are  travelling  between 
the  two  countries.  The  matter  seems  to  be  very  grave ;  and  it 
has  already  attracted  the  attention  of  Parliament,  which  in  the 
near  future  will  discuss  the  war-issue. 

Being  in  doubt  as  to  the  truth  of  such  a  report,  we  hereby 
request  the  Government  for  the  necessary  information  in  the 
matter.  We  also  beg  to  suggest  that,  if  there  is  any  secret 
diplomatic  agreement,  we  consider  it  expedient  for  the  Govern- 
ment to  submit  the  matter  to  Parliament  for  the  latter's  con- 
sideration. This  will  enable  the  members  in  Parliament  to 
study  the  question  with  care  and  have  a  clear  understanding  of 
the  matter.  When  this  is  done.  Parliament  will  be  able  to 
support  the  Government  in  the  prosecution  of  its  war  policy 
according  to  the  dictates  of  conscience.  In  this  event  both 
Parliament  and  Government  will  be  able  to  co-operate  with 
each  other  in  the  solution  of  the*  present  diplomatic  problem. 
Troubled  not  a  little  with  the  present  diplomatic  situation  of 
the  country,  we  hereby  address  this  interpellation  to  the  Gov- 
ernment in  accordance  with  law.  It  is  hoped  that  an  answer 
from  the  Government  will  be  dispatched  to  us  within  three  days 
from  date. 

On  the  10th  May  Parliament  met  in  secret  session 
and  it  was  plain  that  a  crisis  had  come.  Members  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  experienced  great  diffi- 
culties in  forcing  their  way  through  a  mob  of  several 
thousand  roughs  who  surrounded  the  approaches  to 


340  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Parliament,  many  members  being  hustled  if  not  struck. 
The  mob  was  so  plainly  in  control  of  a  secret  organiza- 
tion that  the  House  of  Representatives  refused  to  sit. 
Urgent  messages  were  sent  to  the  Police  and  Gend- 
armerie headquarters  for  reinforcements  of  armed  men 
as  a  protection,  whilst  the  presence  of  the  Premier  was 
also  demanded.  Masses  of  police  were  soon  on  the 
ground,  but  whilst  they  prevented  the  mob  from  en- 
tering Parliament  and  carrying  out  their  threat  of  burn- 
ing the  buildings,  and  murdering  the  members,  they 
could  not — or  would  not — disperse  the  crowds,  it  trans- 
piring subsequently  that  half-a-battalion  of  infantry  in 
plain  clothes  under  their  officers  formed  the  backbone 
of  the  demonstrators. 

It  was  not  until  nearly  dark,  after  six  or  seven  hours 
of  these  disorderly  scenes,  that  the  Premier  finally  ar- 
rived. Cavalry  had  meanwhile  also  been  massed  on 
the  main  street ;  but  it  was  only  when  the  report  spread 
that  a  Japanese  reporter  had  been  killed  that  the  or- 
der was  finally  given  to  charge  the  mob  and  disperse 
it  by  force.  This  was  very  rapidly  done,  as  apart  from 
the  soldiers  in  plain  clothes  the  mass  of  j)eople  belonged 
to  the  lowest  class,  and  had  no  stomach  for  a  fight, 
having  only  been  paid  to  shout.  It  was  nearly  mid- 
night, after  twelve  hours  of  isolation  and  a  foodless 
day,  that  the  Representatives  were  able  to  disperse 
without  having  debated  the  war-question.  The  up- 
shot was  that  with  the  exception  of  the  Minister  of  Edu- 
cation, the  Premier  found  that  his  entire  Cabinet  had 
'  resigned,  the  Ministers  being  unwilling  to  be  associ- 
ated with  what  had  been  an  attempted  coercion  of  Par- 
liament carried  out  by  the  Mihtary. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  341 

The  Premier,  General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  however,  re- 
mained determined  to  carry  his  point,  and  within  a 
week  a  second  dispatch  was  sent  to  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives demanding,  in  spite  of  what  had  happened, 
that  the  declaration  of  war  be  immediately  brought  up 
for  debate.  Meanwhile  publication  in  a  leading  Peking 
newspaper  of  further  details  covering  Japan's  subter- 
ranean activities  greatly  inflamed  the  public,  and  made 
the  Liberal  political  elemets  more  determined  than  ever 
to  stand  firm.  It  was  alleged  that  Count  Terauchi  was 
reviving  in  a  more  subtle  form  Group  V  of  the  Twenty- 
one  Demands  of  1915,  the  latest  Japanese  proposal 
taking  the  form  of  a  secret  Treaty  of  twenty  articles  of 
which  the  main  stipulations  were  to  be  a  loan  of  twenty 
million  yen  to  China  to  reorganize  the  three  main 
Chinese  arsenals  under  Japanese  guidance,  and  a  fur- 
ther loan  of  eighty  million  yen  to  be  expended  on  the 
Japanization  of  the  Chinese  army.  As  a  result  of  this 
publication,  which  rightly  or  wrongly  was  declared  to 
be  without  foundation,  the  editor  of  The  Peking  Ga- 
zette was  seized  in  the  middle  of  the  night  and  thrown 
into  goal ;  but  Parliament  so  far  from  being  intimidated 
passed  the  very  next  day  (19th  May)  a  resolution  re- 
fusing to  consider  in  any  form  the  declaration  of  war 
against  Germany  until  the  Cabinet  had  been  reorgan- 
ized— which  meant  the  resignation  of  General  Tuan 
Chi-jui.  A  last  effort  was  made  by  the  reactionary 
element  to  jockey  the  President  into  submission  by 
presenting  to  the  Chief  Executive  a  petition  from  the 
Military  Governors  assembled  in  Peking  demanding  the 
immediate  dissolution  of  Parliament.  On  this  pro- 
posal being  absolutely  rejected  by  the  President  as 


342  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

wholly  unconstitutional,  and  the  Military  Governors 
soundly  rated  for  their  interference,  an  ominous  calm 
followed. 

Parliament,  however,  remained  unmoved  and  con- 
tinued its  work.  Although  the  draft  of  the  Perma- 
nent Constitution  had  been  practically  completed,  im- 
portant additions  to  the  text  were  now  proposed,  such 
additions  being  designed  to  increase  parliamentary  con- 
trol and  provide  every  possible  precaution  against  ar- 
bitrary acts  in  the  future.  Thus  the  new  provision 
that  a  simple  vote  of  want  of  confidence  in  the  Cabinet 
must  be  followed  by  the  President  either  dismissing 
the  Cabinet  or  dissolving  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives— but  that  the  dissolution  of  the  Lower  House 
could  not  be  ordered  without  the  approval  of  the  Sen- 
ate— ^was  generally  recognized  as  necessary  to  destroy 
the  last  vestiges  of  the  Yuan  Shih-kai  regime.  Fur- 
thermore a  new  article,  conferring  on  the  President  the 
right  to  dismiss  the  Premier  summarily  by  Presidential 
Mandate  without  the  counter-signature  of  the  other 
Cabinet  Ministers,  completed  the  disarray  of  the  con- 
servatives who  saw  in  this  provision  the  dashing  of  their 
last  hopes.^ 

By  the  21st  May,  the  last  remaining  Cabinet  Minis- 
ter— the  Minister  of  Education — ^had  resigned  and  the 
Premier  was  left  completely  isolated.  On  the  23rd 
May  the  President,  relying  on  the  general  support  of 
the  nation,  summarily  dismissed  General  Tuan  Chi-jui 
from  the  Premiership  and  appointed  the  veteran  diplo- 
mat Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang  to  act  during  the  interim  period 
in  his  stead,  at  the  same  time  placing  the  metropolitan 

1  The  final  text  of  the  Permanent  Constitution  as  it  stood  on  the  28th 
May,  1917,  will  be  found  in  the  appendix.  Its  accuracy  has  been  guar- 
anteed to  the  writer  by  the  speakers  of  the  two  Houses. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  343 

districts  under  four  trustworthy  Generals  who  were 
vested  with  provost-marshals'  powers  under  a  system 
which  gave  them  command  of  all  the  so-called  "pre- 
cautionary troops"  holding  the  approaches  to  the  capi- 
tal. The  Military  Governors,  who  a  few  hours  before 
these  events  had  left  Peking  precipitately  in  a  body 
on  the  proclaimed  mission  of  allying  themselves  with 
the  redoubtable  General  Chang  Hsun  at  Hsiichowfu, 
and  threatening  the  safety  of  the  Republic  were,  how- 
ever, coolly  received  in  the  provinces  in  spite  of  all  their 
most  bitter  attempts  to  stir  up  trouble.  This,  however, 
as  will  be  shown,  had  no  influence  on  their  subsequent 
conduct.  The  quiet  disappearance  of  the  ex-Premier 
in  the  midst  of  this  upheaval  caused  the  report  to  spread 
that  all  the  members  of  the  corrupt  camarilla  which  had 
surrounded  him  were  to  be  arrested,  but  the  President 
soon  publicly  disclaimed  any  intention  of  doing  so, — 
which  appears  to  have  been  a  fatal  mistake.  It  is  dis- 
heartening to  have  to  state  that  nearly  all  the  Allied 
Legations  in  Peking  had  been  in  intimate  relations  with 
this  gang — always  excepting  the  American  Legation 
whose  attitude  is  uniformly  correct — the  French  Min- 
ister going  so  far  as  to  entertain  the  Military  Gov- 
ernors and  declare,  according  to  reports  in  the  native 
press,  that  Parliament  was  of  no  importance  at  all, 
the  only  important  thing  being  for  China  promptly  to 
declare  war.  That  some  sort  of  public  investigation 
into  Peking  diplomacy  is  necessary  before  there  can  be 
any  hope  of  decent  relations  between  China  and  the 
Powers  seems  indisputable.^ 

Before  the  end  of  May  the  militarists  being  now  des- 
perate, attempted  the  old  game  of  inciting  the  provin- 

1  Since  this  was  written  certain  diplomatists  in  Peking  have  been  forced 
to  resign. 


344  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

cial  capitals  "to  declare  their  independence,"  although 
the  mass  of  the  nation  was  plainly  against  them.  Some 
measm-e  of  success  attended  this  move,  since  the  sol- 
diery of  the  northern  provinces  obediently  followed  their 
leaders  and  there  was  a  sudden  wild  demand  for  a  march 
on  Peking.  A  large  amount  of  rolling-stock  on  the 
main  railways  was  seized  with  this  object,  the  confusion 
being  made  worse  confounded  by  the  fierce  denuncia- 
tions which  now  came  from  the  southernmost  provinces, 
coupled  with  their  threats  to  attack  the  Northern  troops 
all  along  the  line  as  soon  as  they  could  mobilize. 

The  month  of  June  opened  with  the  situation  more 
threatening  than  it  had  been  for  years.  Emissaries  of 
the  recalcitrant  Military  Governors,  together  with  all 
sorts  of  "politicals"  and  disgruntled  generals,  gathered 
in  Tientsin — which  is  80  miles  from  Peking — and 
openly  established  a  Military  Headquarters  which  they 
declared  would  be  converted  into  a  Provisional  Govern- 
ment which  would  seek  the  recognition  of  the  Powers. 
Troops  were  moved  and  concentrated  against  Peking; 
fresh  demands  were  made  that  the  President  should 
dissolve  Parliament;  whilst  the  Metropolitan  press 
was  suddenly  filled  with  seditious  articles.  The  Presi- 
dent, seeing  that  the  situation  was  becoming  cata- 
clysmic, was  induced,  through  what  influences  is  not 
known,  to  issue  a  mandate  summoning  General  Chang 
Hsun  to  Peking  to  act  as  a  mediator,  which  was  another 
fatal  move.  He  arrived  in  Tientsin  with  many  troops 
on  the  7th  June  where  he  halted  and  was  speedily 
brought  under  subversive  influences,  sending  at  once 
up  to  Peking  a  sort  of  ultimatum  which  was  simply  the 
old  demand  for  the  dissolution  of  Parliament. 

Meanwhile  on  the  5th  June,  the  United  States,  which 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  345 

had  been  alarmed  by  these  occurrences,  had  handed 
China  the  following  Note  hoping  thereby  to  steady  the 
situation : 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  learns  with  the  most 
profound  regret  of  the  dissension  in  China  and  desires  to  ex- 
press the  most  sincere  desire  that  tranquilhty  and  political 
co-ordination  may  be  forthwith  re-established. 

The  entry  of  China  into  war  with  Germany — or  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  status  quo  of  her  relations  with  that  Govern- 
ment— are  matters  of  secondary  consideration. 

The  principal  necessity  for  China  is  to  resume  and  continue 
her  political  entity,  to  proceed  along  the  road  of  national  de- 
velopment on  which  she  has  made  such  marked  progress. 

With  the  form  of  Government  in  China  or  the  personnel 
which  administers  that  Government,  the  United  States  has  an 
interest  only  in  so  far  as  its  friendship  impels  it  to  be  of  service 
to  China.  But  in  the  maintenance  by  China  of  one  Central 
United  and  alone  responsible  Government,  the  United  States 
is  deeply  interested,  and  now  expresses  the  very  sincere  hope 
that  China,  in  her  own  interest  and  in  that  of  the  world,  will 
immediately  set  aside  her  factional  political  disputes,  and  that 
all  parties  and  persons  will  work  for  the  re-establishment  of  a 
co-ordinate  Government  and  the  assumption  of  that  place 
among  the  Powers  of  the  World  to  which  China  is  so  justly 
entitled,  but  the  full  attainment  of  which  is  impossible  in  the 
midst  of  internal  discord. 

The  situation  had,  however,  developed  so  far  and  so 
rapidly  that  this  expression  of  opinion  had  little  weight. 
The  Vice-President  of  the  Republic,  General  Feng 
Kuo-chang,  unwilling  or  unable  to  do  anything,  had  al- 
ready tendered  his  resignation  from  Nanking,  declar- 
ing that  he  would  maintain  the  "neutrality"  of  the  im- 
portant area  of  the  lower  Yangtsze  during  this  extraor- 
dinary struggle ;  and  his  action,  strange  as  it  may  seem, 
typified  the  vast  misgivings  which  filled  every  one's 


346  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

mind  regarding  the  mad  course  of  action  which  the  re- 
beUious  camarilla  had  decided  upon. 

Until  Saturday  the  9th  June,  the  President  had 
seemed  adamant.  On  that  day  he  personally  saw  for- 
eign press  correspondents  and  assured  them  that,  in 
spite  of  every  threat,  he  would  in  no  conceivable  cir- 
cumstances attempt  the  unconstitutional  step  of  dis- 
solving Parliament, — unconstitutional  because  the  Nan- 
king Provisional  Constitution  under  which  the  country 
was  still  governed  pending  the  formal  passage  of  the 
Permanent  Constitution  through  Parliament,  only 
provided  for  the  creation  of  Parliament  as  a  grand  con- 
stitutional Drafting  Committee  but  gave  no  power  to 
the  Chief  Executive  to  dissolve  it  during  its  "life"  which 
was  three  years.  As  we  have  already  shown,  the  period 
between  the  coup  d'etat  of  4th  November,  1913,  and 
the  re-convocation  of  Parliament  on  1st  August,  1916, 
had  been  treated  as  a  mere  interregnum :  therefore  until 
1918,  if  the  law  were  properly  construed,  no  power  in 
the  land  could  interrupt  the  Parliamentary  sessions  ex- 
cept Parliament  itself.  Parliament,  in  view  of  these 
threatening  developments,  had  already  expressed  its 
willingness  (a)  to  re-consider  certain  provisions  of  the 
draft  constitution  in  such  a  conciliatory  manner  as  to 
insure  the  passage  of  the  whole  instrument  through  both 
houses  within  two  weeks  (b)  to  alter  the  Election  Law 
in  such  fashion  as  to  conciliate  the  more  conservative 
elements  in  the  country  (c)  to  prorogue  the  second 
session  (1916-1917)  immediately  these  things  were  done 
and  after  a  very  short  recess  to  open  the  third  session 
(1917-1918)  and  close  it  within  three  months  allow- 
ing new  elections  to  be  held  in  the  early  months  of 
1918, — the  new  Parliament  to  be  summoned  in  April, 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  347 

1918,  to  form  itself  into  a  National  Convention  and 
elect  the  President  for  the  quinquennial  period  1918- 
1923. 

All  these  reasonable  plans  were  knocked  on  the  head 
on  Sunday,  the  10th  June,  by  the  sudden  report  that 
the  President  having  been  peremptorily  told  that  the 
dissolution  of  Parliament  was  the  sole  means  of  sav- 
ing the  Republic  and  preventing  the  sack  of  Peking, 
as  well  as  an  open  armed  attempt  to  restore  the  boy- 
emperor  Hsuan  Tung,  had  at  last  made  up  his  mind 
to  surrender  to  the  inevitable.  He  had  sealed  a  Man- 
date decreeing  the  dissolution  of  Parliament  which 
would  be  promulgated  as  soon  as  it  had  received  the 
counter-signature  of  the  acting  Premier,  Dr.  Wu  Ting- 
fang,  such  counter-signature  being  obligatory  under 
Article  45  of  the  Provisional  Constitution. 

At  once  it  became  clear  again,  as  happens  a  thousand 
times  during  every  year  in  the  East,  that  what  is  not 
nipped  in  the  bud  grows  with  such  malignant  swiftness 
as  finally  to  blight  all  honest  intentions.  Had  steps 
been  taken  on  or  about  the  23rd  May  to  detain  forcibly 
in  Peking  the  ringleader  of  the  recalcitrant  Military 
Governors,  one  General  Ni  Shih-chung  of  Anhui,  his- 
tory would  have  been  very  different  and  China  spared 
much  national  and  international  humiliation.  Six  years 
of  stormy  happenings  had  certainly  bred  in  the  nation 
a  desire  for  constitutionalism  and  a  detestation  of  mili- 
tary domination.  But  this  desire  and  detestation  re- 
quired firm  leadership.  Without  that  leadership  it  was 
inchoate  and  powerless,  and  indeed  made  furtive  by  the 
constant  fear  of  savage  reprisals.  A  great  opportunity 
had  come  and  a  great  opportunity  had  been  lost.  Presi- 
dent Li  Yuan-hung's  personal  argument,  communicated 


348  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

to  the  writer,  was  that  in  seahng  the  Mandate  dissolving 
ParHament  he  had  chosen  the  lesser  of  two  evils,  for 
although  South  China  and  the  Chinese  Navy  declared 
they  would  defend  Parliament  to  the  last,  they  were 
far  away  whilst  large  armies  were  echeloned  along  the 
railways  leading  into  Peking  and  daily  threatening  ac- 
tion. The  events  of  the  next  year  or  so  must  prove  con- 
clusively, in  spite  of  what  has  happened  in  this  month 
of  June,  1917,  that  the  corrupt  power  of  the  sword  can 
no  longer  even  nominally  rule  China. 

JVIeanwhile  the  veteran  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,  true  to  his 
faith,  declared  that  no  power  on  earth  would  cause  him 
to  sign  a  Mandate  possessing  no  legality  behind  it;  and 
he  indeed  obstinately  resisted  every  attempt  to  seduce 
him.  Although  his  resignation  was  refused  he  stood  his 
ground  manfully,  and  it  became  clear  that  some  other 
expedient  would  have  to  be  resorted  to.  In  the  small 
hours  of  the  13th  June  what  this  was  was  made  clear:  by 
a  rapid  reshuffling  of  the  cards  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang's  res- 
ignation was  accepted  and  the  general  officer  command- 
ing the  Peking  Gendarmerie,  a  genial  soul  named  Gen- 
eral Chiang  Chao-tsung,  who  had  survived  unscathed 
the  vicissitudes  of  six  years  of  revolution,  was  appointed 
to  act  in  his  stead  and  duly  counter-signed  the  fateful 
Mandate  which  was  at  once  printed  and  promulgated  at 
four  o'clock  in  the  morning.  It  has  been  stated  to  the 
writer  that  had  it  not  been  so  issued  four  battalions  of 
Chang  Hsun's  savage  pigtailed  soldiery,  who  had  been 
bivouacked  for  some  days  in  the  grounds  of  the  Temple 
of  Heaven,  would  have  been  let  loose  on  the  capital. 
The  actual  text  of  the  Mandate  proves  conclusively  that 
the  President  had  no  hand  in  its  drafting — one  argu- 
ment being  sufficient  to  prove  that,  namely  the  delib- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  349 

erate  ignoring  of  the  fact  that  ParHament  had  been 
called  into  being  by  virture  of  article  53  of  the  Nanking 
Provisional  Constitution  and  that  under  article  54  its 
specific  duty  was  to  act  as  a  grand  constitutional  confer- 
ence to  draft  and  adopt  the  Permanent  Constitution, 
article  55  furthermore  giving  Parliament  the  right  sum- 
marily to  amend  the  Provisional  Constitution  before  the 
Promulgation  of  the  permanent  instrument,  should  that 
be  necessary.  Provisions  of  this  sort  would  naturally 
carry  no  weight  with  generals  of  the  type  of  Chang 
Hsun,  of  whom  it  is  said  that  until  recent  years  he  pos- 
sessed only  the  most  elementary  education ;  but  it  is  a  dis- 
mal thing  to  have  to  record  that  the  Conservative  Party 
in  China  should  have  adopted  a  platform  of  brute  force 
in  the  year  of  grace,  1917. 

MANDATE  DISSOLVING  PABUAMENT 

In  the  6th  month  of  last  year  I  promulgated  a  Mandate  stat- 
ing that  in  order  to  make  a  Constitution  it  was  imperative  that 
Parliament  should  be  convened.  The  Republic  was  inaugu- 
rated five  years  ago  and  yet  there  was  no  Constitution,  which 
should  be  the  fundamental  law  of  a  nation,  therefore  it  was 
ordered  that  Parliament  be  re-convened  to  make  the  Consti- 
tution, etc.,  at  once. 

Therefore  the  main  object  for  the  re-convocation  of  Parlia- 
ment was  to  make  a  formal  constitution  for  the  country.  Re- 
cently a  petition  was  received  from  Meng  En-yuen,  Tu-chun  of 
Kirin,  and  others,  to  the  effect  that  "in  the  articles  passed  by 
the  Constitution  Conference  there  were  several  points  as  fol- 
lows :  'when  the  House  of  Representatives  passes  a  vote  of  want 
of  confidence  against  the  Cabinet  Ministers,  the  President  may 
dismiss  the  Cabinet  Ministers,  or  dissolve  the  said  House,  but 
the  dissolution  of  the  House  shall  have  the  approval  of  the  Sen- 
ate.' Again,  'When  the  President  dismisses  his  Prime  Min- 
ister, it  is  unnecessary  for  him  to  secure  the  counter-signature 
of  the  Cabinet  Ministers.'     Again  'when  a  bill  is  passed  by  the 


350  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Two  Houses  it  shall  have  the  force  of  the  law.'  We  were  sur- 
prised to  read  the  above  provisions. 

"According  to  the  precedents  of  other  nations  the  Constitu- 
tion has  never  been  made  by  Parliament.  If  we  should  desire 
a  good  and  workable  Constitution,  we  should  seek  a  fundamental 
solution.  Indeed  Parliament  is  more  important  than  any  other 
organ  in  the  country ;  but  when  the  national  welfare  is  im- 
perilled, we  must  take  action.  As  the  present  Parliament  does 
not  care  about  the  national  welfare,  it  is  requested  that  in 
view  of  the  critical  condition  of  the  country,  drastic  measures 
be  taken  and  both  the  House  of  Representatives  and  the  Sen- 
ate be  dissolved  so  that  they  may  be  reorganized  and  the  Con- 
stitution may  be  made  without  any  further  delay.  Thus  the 
form  of  the  Republican  Government  be  preserved,  etc." 

Of  late  petitions  and  telegrams  have  been  received  from  the 
military  and  civil  officials,  merchants,  scholars,  etc.,  containing 
similar  demands.  The  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives have  held  the  Constitution  Conference  for  about  one  year, 
and  the  Constitution  has  not  yet  been  completed.  Moreover 
at  this  critical  time  most  of  the  M.  P's.  of  both  Houses  have 
tendered  their  resignation.  Hence  it  is  impossible  to  secure 
quorums  to  discuss  business.  There  is  therefore  no  chance  to 
revise  the  articles  already  passed.  Unless  means  be  devised  to 
hasten  the  making  of  the  Constitution,  the  heart  of  the  people 
will  never  be  satisfied. 

I,  the  President,  who  desire  to  comply  with  the  will  of  the 
populace  and  to  consolidate  the  foundation  of  the  nation,  grant 
the  request  of  the  Tuchuns  and  the  people.  It  is  hereby  or- 
dered that  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives  be  dis- 
solved, and  that  another  election  be  held  immediately.  Thus  a 
Constitutional  Government  can  be  maintained.  It  must  be 
pointed  out  that  the  object  for  the  reorganization  of  Parlia- 
ment is  to  hasten  the  making  of  the  Constitution,  and  not  to 
abolish  the  Legislative  Organ  of  the  Republic.  I  hope  all  the 
citizens  of  the  Republic  will  understand  my  motives. 

A  great  agitation  and  much  public  uneasiness  fol- 
lowed the  publication  of  this  document ;  and  the  parlia- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  351 

mentarians,  who  had  abeady  been  leaving  Peking  in 
small  numbers,  now  evacuated  the  capital  en  masse  for 
the  South.  The  reasonable  and  wholly  logical  attitude 
of  the  Constitutionalists  is  well-exhibited  in  the  last 
Memorandum  they  submitted  to  the  President  some 
days  prior  to  his  decision  to  issue  the  Mandate  above- 
quoted  ;  and  a  perusal  of  this  document  will  show  what 
may  be  expected  in  the  future.  It  will  be  noted  that  the 
revolting  ^lihtary  Governors  are  boldly  termed  rebels 
and  that  the  constitutional  view  of  everything  they  may 
contrive  as  from  the  13th  June,  1917,  is  that  it  will  be 
bereft  of  all  legality  and  simply  mark  a  fresh  inter- 
regnum. Furthermore,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the 
situation  is  brought  back  by  the  Mandate  of  the  13th 
June  to  where  it  was  on  the  6th  June,  1916,  with  the 
death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  and  that  a  period  of  civil  com- 
motion seems  inevitable. 

MEMORANDUM 

To  the  President :  Our  previous  memorandum  to  Your  Ex- 
cellency must  have  received  your  attention.  We  now  beg  fur- 
ther to  inform  you  that  the  rebels  are  now  practically  in  an 
embarrassing  predicament  on  account  of  internal  differences, 
the  warning  of  the  friendly  Powers,  and  the  protest  of  the 
Southwestern  provinces.  Their  position  is  becoming  daily  more 
and  more  untenable.  If  Your  Excellency  strongly  holds  out 
for  another  ten  days  or  so,  their  movement  will  collapse. 

Some  one,  however,  has  the  impudence  to  suggest  that  with 
the  entry  of  Chang  Hsun's  troops  into  the  Capital,  and  delay 
in  the  settlement  of  the  question  will  mean  woe  and  disaster. 
But  to  us,  there  need  be  no  such  fear.  As  the  troops  in  the 
Capital  have  no  mind  to  oppose  the  rebels,  Tsao  Kun  and  his 
troops  alone  will  be  adequate  for  their  purposes  in  the  Capital. 
But  now  the  rebels,  troops  have  been  halting  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  Capital  for  the  last  ten  days.     This  shows  that  they 


352  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

dare  not  open  hostilities  against  the  Government,  which  step 
will  certainly  bring  about  foreign  intervention  and  incur  the 
strong  opposition  of  the  Southwestern  provinces.  Having  re- 
fused to  participate  in  the  rebellion  at  the  invitation  of  Ni  Shih- 
chung  and  Chang  Tso-lin,  Chang  Hsun  will  certainly  not  do 
what  Tsao  Kun  has  not  dared  to  do.  But  the  rebels  have  secret 
agents  in  the  Capital  to  circulate  rumours  to  frighten  the  pub- 
lic and  we  hope  that  the  President  will  remain  calm  and  unper- 
turbed, lest  it  will  give  an  opportunity  for  the  rebel  agents  to 
practise  their  evil  tricks. 

Respecting  Parliament,  its  re-assembly  was  one  of  the  two 
most  important  conditions  by  means  of  which  the  political  dif- 
ferences between  the  North  and  the  South  last  year  were  healed. 
The  dissolution  of  Parliament  would  mean  the  violation  of  the 
terms  of  settlement  entered  into  between  the  North  and  the 
South  last  year  and  an  open  challenge  to  the  South.  Would 
the  South  remain  silent  respecting  this  outrageous  measure? 
If  the  South  rises  in  arms  against  this  measure,  what  explana- 
tion can  the  Central  Government  give?  It  will  only  serve  to 
hasten  the  split  between  the  North  and  the  South.  From  a 
legal  point  of  view,  the  Power  of  Government  is  vested  in  the 
Provisional  Constitution.  When  the  Government  exercises 
power  which  is  not  provided  for  by  the  Constitution,  it  simply 
means  high  treason. 

Some  one  has  suggested  that  it  would  not  be  an  illegal  act 
for  the  Government  to  dissolve  Parliament,  since  it  is  not  pro- 
vided in  the  Provisional  Constitution  as  to  how  Parliament 
should  be  dissolved,  nor  does  that  instrument  specifically  pro- 
hibit the  Government  from  dissolving  Parliament.  But  this 
is  a  misinterpretation.  For  instance,  the  Provisional  Consti- 
tution has  not  provided  that  the  President  shall  not  proclaim 
himself  Emperor,  nor  does  it  prohibit  him  from  so  doing.  Ac- 
cording to  such  interpretation,  it  would  not  be  illegal,  if  the 
President  were  to  proclaim  himself  Emperor  of  the  country. 

In  short,  the  action  taken  by  Ni  Shih-chung  and  others  is 
nothing  short  of  open  rebellion.  From  the  legal  point  of  view, 
any  suggestion  of  compromise  would  be  absurd.  It  has  already 
been  a  fatal  mistake  for  the  President  to  have  allowed  them  to 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  353 

ido  what  they  like,  and  if  he  again  yields  to  their  pressure 
by  dissolving  Parliament,  he  will  be  held  responsible,  when 
the  righteous  troops  rise  and  punish  the  rebels.  If  the  Presi- 
dent, deceived  by  ignoble  persons,  take  upon  himself  to  dis- 
solve the  assembly,  his  name  will  go  down  in  history  as  one 
committing  high  treason  against  the  Government,  and  the 
author  of  the  break  between  the  North  and  the  South.  The 
President  has  been  known  as  the  man  by  whose  hands  the  Re- 
public was  built.  We  have  special  regard  for  his  benevolent 
character  and  kind  disposition.  We  are  reluctant  to  see  him 
intimidated  and  misled  by  evil  counsels  to  take  a  step  which  will 
undo  all  his  meritorious  services  to  the  country  and  shatter  the 
unique  reputation  he  has  enjoyed. 

The  unrolling  of  these  dramatic  events  was  the  signal 
for  the  greatest  subterranean  activity  on  the  part  of  the 
Japanese,  who  were  now  everywhere  seen  rubbing  their 
hands  and  congratulating  themselves  on  the  course  his- 
tory was  taking.  General  Tanaka,  Vice-Chief  of  the 
Japanese  General  Staff,  who  had  been  on  an  extensive 
tour  of  inspection  in  China,  so  planned  as  to  include 
every  arsenal  north  of  the  Yangtsze  had  arrived  at  the 
psychological  moment  in  Peking  and  was  now  deeply 
engaged  through  Japanese  field-officers  in  the  employ 
of  the  Chinese  Government,  in  pulling  every  string  and 
in  trying  to  commit  the  leaders  of  this  unedifying  plot  in 
such  a  way  as  to  make  them  puppets  of  Japan.  The 
Japanese  press,  seizing  on  the  American  Note  of  the  5th 
June  as  an  excuse,  had  been  belabouring  the  United 
States  for  some  days  for  its  "interference"  in  Chinese 
affairs,  and  also  for  having  ignored  Japan's  "special  po- 
sition" in  China,  which  according  to  these  publicists 
demanded  that  no  Power  take  any  action  in  the  Far 
East,  or  give  any  advice,  without  first  consulting  Japan. 
That  a  stern  correction  will  have  to  be  offered  to  this 


354  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

presumption  as  soon  as  the  development  of  the  war 
permits  it  is  certain.  But  not  only  Japanese  military 
officers  and  journalists  were  endlessly  busy:  so-called 
Japanese  advisers  to  the  Chinese  Government  had  done 
their  utmost  to  assist  the  confusion.  Thus  Dr.  Ariga, 
the  Constitutional  expert,  when  called  in  at  the  last  mo- 
ment for  advice  by  President  Li  Yuan-hung  had  flatly 
contradicted  Dr.  Morrison,  who  with  an  Englishman's 
love  of  justice  and  constitutionalism  had  insisted  that 
there  was  only  one  thing  for  the  President  to  do — ^to  be 
bound  by  legality  to  the  last  no  matter  what  it  might 
cost  him.  Dr.  Ariga  had  falsely  stated  that  the  issue 
was  a  question  of  expediency,  thus  deliberately  assisting 
the  forces  of  disruption.  This  is  perhaps  only  what  was 
to  be  expected  of  a  man  who  had  advised  Yuan  Shih-kai 
to  make  himself  Emperor — knowing  full  well  that  he 
could  never  succeed  and  that  indeed  the  whole  enter- 
prise from  the  point  of  view  of  Japan  was  an  elaborate 
trap. 

The  provincial  response  to  the  action  taken  on  the 
13th  June  became  what  every  one  had  expected:  the 
Southwestern  group  of  provinces,  with  their  military 
headquarters  at  Canton,  began  openly  concerting  meas- 
ures to  resist  not  the  authority  of  the  President,  who  was 
recognized  as  a  just  man  surrounded  by  evil-minded 
persons  who  never  hesitated  to  betray  him,  but  to  destroy 
the  usurping  generals  and  the  corrupt  camarilla  behind 
them;  whilst  the  Yangtsze  provinces,  with  their  head- 
quarters at  Nanking,  which  had  hitherto  been  pledged  to 
"neutrality,"  began  secretly  exchanging  views  with  the 
genuinely  Republican  South.  The  group  of  Tientsin 
generals  and  "politicals,"  confused  by  these  develop- 
ments, remained  inactive;  and  this  was  no  doubt  re- 


The  Prkmieu  Gexkkal  Tuax  Chi-jui,  Head  ok  the  Cab- 
inet Which  Decided  to  Declare  War  ox  Germany 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  355 

sponsible  for  the  mad  coup  attempted  by  the  semi-illiter- 
ate General  Chang  Hsun.  In  the  small  hours  of  July 
1st  General  Chang  Hsun,  relying  on  the  disorganiza- 
tion in  the  capital  which  we  have  dealt  with  in  our  pre- 
ceding account,  entered  the  Imperial  City  with  his 
troops  by  p rearrangement  with  the  Imperial  Family 
and  at  4  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  1st  July  the 
Manchu  boy-emperor  Hsuan  Tung,  who  lost  the  Throne 
on  the  12th  February,  1912,  was  enthroned  before  a 
small  assembly  of  Manchu  nobles,  courtiers  and  syco- 
phantic Chinese.  The  capital  woke  up  to  find  military 
patrols  everywhere  and  to  hear  incredulously  that  the 
old  order  had  returned.  The  police,  obeying  instruc- 
tions, promptly  visited  all  shops  and  dwelling-houses 
and  ordered  every  one  to  fly  the  Dragon  Flag.  In  the 
afternoon  of  the  same  day  the  following  Restoration 
Edict  was  issued,  its  statements  being  a  tissue  of  false- 
hoods, the  alleged  memorial  from  President  Li  Yuan 
Hung,  which  foUow^s  the  principal  document,  being  a 
bare-faced  forgery,  whilst  no  single  name  inserted  in 
the  text  save  that  of  Chang  Hsun  had  any  right  to  be 
there.  There  is  also  every  reason  to  believe  that  the 
Manchu  court  party  was  itself  coerced,  terror  being  felt 
from  the  beginning  regarding  the  consequences  of  this 
mad  act  which  was  largely  possible  because  Peking  is  a 
Manchu  city. 

IMPERIAL    EDICT 

Issued  the  13th  day  of  the  5th  Moon  of  the  9th  year  of 
Hsuan  Tung. 

While  yet  in  our  boyhood  the  inheritance  of  the  great 
domain  was  unfortunately  placed  in  our  possession ;  and  since 
we  were  then  all  alone,  we  were  unable  to  weather  the  numerous 
diflBculties.     Upon  the  outbreak  of  the  uprising  in  the  year  of 


356  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Hsin  Hai,  (1911)  Our  Empress,  Hsiao  Ting  Chin,  owing  to  her 
Most  High  Virtue  and  Most  Deep  Benevolence  was  unwilling  to 
allow  the  people  to  suffer,  and  courageously  placed  in  the  hands 
of  the  late  Imperial  Councillor,  Yuan  Shih-kai,  the  great  do- 
minion which  our  forefathers  had  built  up,  and  with  it  the 
lives  of  the  millions  of  Our  People,  with  orders  to  establish  a 
provisional  government. 

The  power  of  State  was  thus  voluntarily  given  to  the  whole 
country  with  the  hope  that  disputes  might  disappear,  disturb- 
ances might  stop  and  the  people  enabled  to  live  in  peace.  But 
ever  since  the  form  of  State  was  changed  into  a  Republic,  con- 
tinuous strife  has  prevailed  and  several  wars  have  taken  place. 
Forcible  seizure,  excessive  taxation  and  bribery  have  been  of 
everyday  occurrence.  Although  the  annual  revenue  has  in- 
creased to  400  millions  this  amount  is  still  insufficient  to  meet 
the  needs.  The  total  amount  of  foreign  obligations  has 
reached  a  figure  of  more  than  ten  thousand  millions  yet  more 
loans  are  being  contracted.  The  people  within  the  seas  are 
shocked  by  this  state  of  affairs  and  interest  in  life  has  forsaken 
them.  The  step  reluctantly  taken  by  Our  Empress  Hsiao 
Ting  Chin  for  the  purpose  of  giving  respite  to  the  people  has 
resulted  untowardly  in  increasing  the  burdens  of  Our  People. 
This  indeed  Our  Empress  Hsiao  Ting  Chin  was  unable  to  fore- 
see, and  the  result  must  have  made  her  Spirit  in  Heaven  to 
weep  sorely.  And  it  is  owing  to  this  that  we  have  been  praying 
to  Heaven  day  and  night  in  the  close  confines  of  the  palace, 
meditating  and  weeping  in  silent  suffering. 

Recently  party  strife  has  resulted  in  war  and  the  country 
has  remained  too  long  in  an  unsettled  condition.  The  Republic 
has  fallen  to  pieces  and  means  of  remedy  have  been  exhausted. 

Chang  Hsun,  Feng  Kuo-chang  and  Lu  Yung-ting  have 
jointly  memorialized  the  Throne  stating  that  the  minds  of 
people  are  disturbed  and  they  are  longing  to  see  the  old  regime 
restored,  and  asking  that  the  throne  be  reoccupied  in  order  to 
comfort  the  people. 

Chu  Hung-chi  and  others  have  also  memorialized  us  stating 
that  the  country  is  in  imminent  danger  and  that  the  people 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  357 

have  lost  their  faith  in  the  Republic,  and  asking  that  we  ascend 
the  Throne  in  obedience  to  the  mandate  of  Heaven  and  man. 

Li  Yuan  Hung  has  also  memorialized  the  throne,  returning 
the  great  power  of  State  to  us  in  order  to  benefit  the  country 
and  save  the  people. 

A  persual  of  the  said  memorials,  which  are  worded  in  earnest 
terms,  has  filled  our  heart  with  regret  and  fear.  On  the  one 
hand  We,  being  yet  in  Our  boyhood,  are  afraid  to  assume  the 
great  responsibilities  for  the  existence  of  the  country  but  on 
the  other  hand  We  are  unwilling  to  turn  our  head  away  from 
the  welfare  of  the  millions  simply  because  the  step  might  affect 
Our  own  safety. 

After  weighing  the  two  sides  and  considering  the  mandates  of 
Heaven  and  man,  we  have  decided  reluctantly  to  comply  with 
the  prayers,  and  have  again  occupied  the  Court  to  attend  to  the 
affairs  of  State  after  resuming  possession  of  the  great  power 
on  the  13th  day  of  the  5th  moon  of  the  9th  year  of  Hsuan 
Tung. 

A  new  beginning  will  be  made  with  our  people.  Hereafter 
the  principles  of  morality  and  the  sacred  religion  shall  be  our 
constitution  in  spirit,  and  order,  righteousness,  honesty  and 
conscience  will  be  practised  to  rebind  the  minds  of  the  people 
who  are  now  without  bonds.  People  high  and  low  will  be  uni- 
formly treated  with  sincerity,  and  will  not  depend  on  obedience 
of  law  alone  as  the  means  of  co-operation.  Administration 
and  orders  will  be  based  on  conscientious  realization  and  no 
one  will  be  allowed  to  treat  the  form  of  State  as  material  for 
experiment.  At  this  time  of  exhaustion  when  its  vitality  is 
being  wasted  to  the  last  drop  and  the  existence  of  the  country  is 
hanging  in  the  balance,  we,  as  if  treading  on  thin  ice  over  deep 
waters,  dare  not  in  the  slightest  degree  indulge  in  license  on 
the  principle  that  the  Sovereign  is  entitled  to  enjoyment.  It  is 
our  wish  therefore  that  all  officials,  be  they  high  or  low,  should 
purify  their  hearts  and  cleanse  themselves  of  all  forms  of  old 
corruption,  constantly  keeping  in  mind  the  real  interests  of  the 
people.  Every  bit  of  vitality  of  the  people  they  shall  be  able 
to  preserve  shall  go  to  strengthen  the  life  of  the  country  for 


358  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

whatever  it  is  worth.     Only  by  doing  so  can  the  danger  be 
averted  and  Heaven  moved  by  our  sincerity. 

THE    NINE    ARTICLES 

Herewith  we  promulgate  the  following  principal  things, 
which  we  must  either  introduce  as  reforms  or  abolish  as  un- 
desirable in  restoration. 

1.  We  shall  obey  the  edict  of  Emperor  Teh  Tsung  Chin 
(Kuang  Hsu),  namely,  that  the  sovereign  power  shall  be  con- 
trolled by  the  Court  (state)  but  the  detailed  administration 
shall  be  subject  to  public  opinion.  The  country  shall  be  called 
The  Empire  of  Ta  Ching;  and  the  methods  of  other  constitu- 
tional monarchies  shall  be  carefully  copied. 

2.  The  allowance  for  the  Imperial  House  shall  be  the  same 
as  before,  namely,  $4,000,000  per  year.  The  sum  shall  be 
paid  annually  and  not  a  single  cent  is  to  be  added. 

3.  We  shall  strictly  obey  the  instructions  of  our  forefathers 
to  the  extent  that  no  member  of  the  imperial  family  shall  be 
allowed  to  interfere  with  administrative  affairs. 

4.  The  line  of  demarcation  between  Man  (Manchu)  and 
Han  (Chinese)  shall  be  positively  obliterated.  All  Manchurian 
and  Mongolian  posts  which  have  already  been  abolished  shall 
not  be  restored.  As  to  intermarrige  and  change  of  customs 
the  officials  concerned  are  hereby  commanded  to  submit  their 
views  on  the  points  concerning  them  respectively. 

5.  All  treaties  and  loan  agreements,  money  for  which  has 
already  been  paid,  formally  concluded  and  signed  with  any 
eastern  and  western  countries  before  this  13th  day  of  the  5th 
Moon  of  the  9th  year  of  Hsuan  Timg,  shall  continue  to  be 
valid. 

6.  The  stamp  duty  which  was  introduced  by  the  Republic  is 
hereby  abolished  so  that  the  people  may  be  relieved  of  their 
burdens.  As  to  other  petty  taxes  and  contributions  the  Vice- 
roys and  Governors  of  the  provinces  are  hereby  commanded 
to  make  investigations  and  report  on  the  same  for  their  aboli- 
tion. 

7.  The  criminal  code  of  the  Republic  is  unsuited  to  this 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  359 

country.  It  is  hereby  abolished.  For  the  time  being  the  pro- 
visional criminal  code  as  adopted  in  the  first  year  of  Hsuan 
Tung  shall  be  observed. 

8.  The  evil  custom  of  political  parties  is  hereby  forbidden. 
Old  political  offenders  are  all  pardoned.  We  shall,  however, 
not  be  able  to  pardon  those  who  deliberately  hold  themselves 
aloof  and  disturb  peace  and  order. 

9.  All  of  our  people  and  officials  shall  be  left  to  decide  for 
themselves  the  custom  of  wearing  or  cutting  their  queues  as 
commanded  in  the  9th  moon  of  the  3rd  year  of  Hsuan  Tung. 

We  swear  that  we  and  our  people  shall  abide  by  these  articles. 
The  Great  Heaven  and  Earth  bear  witness  to  our  words.  Let 
this  be  made  known  to  all. 

Counter-signed  by  Chang  Hsun, 

Member  of  the  Imperial  Privy  Council. 

Alil^GED    MEMORIAIi    BY    PRESIDENT    I>I    YUAN    HUNG 

In  a  memorial  submitted  this  day,  offering  to  return  the 
sovereign  power  of  State  and  praying  that  we  agan  ascend  the 
throne  to  control  the  great  empire,  Li  Yuan  Hung  states  that 
some  time  ago  he  was  forced  by  mutinous  troops  to  steal  the 
great  throne  and  falsely  remained  at  the  head  of  the  adminis- 
tration but  failed  to  do  good  to  the  difficult  situation.  He 
enumerates  the  various  evils  in  the  establishment  of  a  Republic 
and  prays  that  we  ascend  the  throne  to  again  control  the  Em- 
pire with  a  view  that  the  people  may  thereby  be  saved.  As  to 
himself  he  awaits  punishment  by  the  properly  instituted  author- 
ities, etc.  As  his  words  are  so  mournful  and  full  of  remorse 
they  must  have  been  uttered  from  a  sincere  heart.  Since  it 
was  not  his  free  choice  to  follow  the  rebellion,  the  fact  that  he 
has  returned  the  great  power  of  administration  to  us  shows 
that  he  knows  the  great  principle  of  righteousness.  At  this 
time  of  national  danger  and  uncertainty,  he  has  taken  the  lead 
of  the  people  in  obeying  their  sovereign,  and  decided  before 
others  the  plan  to  save  the  country  from  ruin.  The  merit  is 
indeed  great,  and  we  are  highly  pleased  with  his  achievement. 
Li  Yuan-hung  is  hereby  to  have  conferred  on  him  the  dignity  of 


360  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

Duke  of  the  first  class  so  as  to  show  our  great  appreciation. 
Let  him  accept  our  Edict  and  forever  receive  our  blessings. 
Counter-signed  by  Chang  Hsun, 

Member  of  the  Privy  Council. 

PRIVY    COUNCIL 

At  this  time  of  restoration  a  Privy  Council  is  hereby  estab- 
lished in  order  that  we  may  be  assisted  in  our  duties  and  that 
responsibility  may  be  made  definite.  Two  Under-secretaries  of 
the  Council  are  also  created.  Other  officials  serving  outside 
of  the  capital  shall  remain  as  under  the  system  in  force  during 
the  first  year  of  Hsuan  Tung.  All  civil  and  military  officials 
who  are  now  serving  at  their  various  posts  are  hereby  com- 
manded to  continue  in  office  as  hitherto. 

Counter-signed  by  Chang  Hsun. 

(Hereafter  follow  many  appointments  of  reaction- 
ary Chinese  officials.) 

The  general  stupefaction  at  the  madness  of  this  act 
and  the  military  occupation  of  all  posts  and  telegraph- 
offices  in  Peking  allowed  48  hours  to  go  by  before  the 
reaction  came.  On  the  2nd  July  Edicts  still  continued 
to  appear  attempting  to  galvanize  to  life  the  corpse  of 
Imperialism  and  the  puzzled  populace  flew  the  Dragon 
Flag.  On  the  morning  of  the  3rd,  however,  the  news 
suddenly  spread  that  President  Li  Yuan-hung,  who  had 
virtually  been  made  a  prisoner  in  the  Presidential  Pal- 
ace, had  escaped  at  nine  o'clock  the  night  before  by 
motorcar  accompanied  by  two  aides-de-camp,  and  after 
attempting  to  be  received  at  the  French  Hospital  in  the 
Legation  Quarter,  had  proceeded  to  the  Japanese  Lega- 
tion where  he  was  offered  a  suitable  residence.  On  the 
evening  of  the  3rd  the  Japanese  Legation  issued  the  fol- 
lowing official  communique  (in  French)  defining  its 
attitude : 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  361 

TRANSLATION" 

President  LI,  accompanied  by  two  members  of  his  staff,  came 
at  9.30  on  the  evening  of  July  2  to  the  residence  of  General 
Saito,  Mihtary  Attache  of  the  Japanese  Legation,  and  asked 
protection  from  him.  He  arrived  in  a  spontaneous  manner  and 
without  previous  notice. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  Imperial  Japanese  Legation, 
following  international  usage,  has  decided  to  accord  him  the 
necessary  protection  and  has  placed  at  his  disposal  a  part  of 
the  military  barracks. 

The  Legation  further  declares  that  as  long  as  President  Li 
remains  there,  it  will  not  permit  any  political  action  on  his 
part. 

Following  this  sensational  development  it  became 
known  that  President  Li  Yuan  Hung  had  completely 
frustrated  the  efforts  of  the  Imperialists  by  sending 
away  a  number  of  important  telegraphic  Mandates  by 
courier  to  Tientsin  as  well  as  the  Presidential  Seal.  By 
a  masterly  move  in  one  of  these  Mandates  General  Tuan 
Chi-jui  was  reappointed  Premier,  whilst  Vice-Presi- 
dent Feng  Kuo-chang  was  asked  to  ofSciate  as  Presi- 
dent, the  arrangements  being  so  complete  as  at  once  to 
catch  Chang  Hsiin  in  his  own  net. 

Here  is  the  text  of  these  four  historically  important 
messages : 

(1)  Dated  July  1.  Today  Inspector  General  Chang  Hsun 
entered  the  city  with  his  troops  and  actually  restored  the 
monarchy.  He  stopped  traffic  and  sent  Liang  Ting-fen  and 
others  to  my  place  to  persuade  me.  Yuan-hung  refused  in  firm 
language  and  swore  that  he  would  not  recognize  such  a  step. 
It  is  his  hope  that  the  Vice-President  and  others  will  take 
effective  means  to  protect  the  Republic.        Li  Yuan  Hung. 

(2)  Dated  July  1.  As  Heaven  does  not  scorn  calamity  so 
has  the  monarchy  been  restored.     It  is  said  that  in  an  edict 


362  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

issued  by  the  Chlng  House  it  is  stated  that  Yuan-hung  had 
actually  memorialized  to  return  the  power  of  State  to  the  said 
House.  This  is  an  extraordinary  announcement.  China 
changed  from  autocracy  to  a  Republic  by  the  unanimous  wish 
of  the  five  races  of  the  country.  Since  Yuan-hung  was  en- 
trusted by  the  people  with  the  great  responsibilities  it  is  his 
natural  duty  to  maintain  the  Republic  to  the  very  end.  Noth- 
ing more  or  less  than  this  will  he  care  to  say.  He  is  sending 
this  in  order  to  avoid  misunderstanding. 

Li  Yuan  Hung. 

(3)  The  President  to  the  Vice-President. 

To  the  Vice-President  Feng  at  Nanking — It  is  to  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  two  telegrams  sent  on  the  1st  have  safely 
reached  3^ou.  I  state  with  deepest  regret  and  greatest  sor- 
row that  as  the  result  of  my  lack  of  ability  to  handle  the  situa- 
tion the  political  crisis  has  eventually  affected  the  form  of  gov- 
ernment. For  this  Yuan-hung  realizes  that  he  owes  the  coun- 
try apology.  The  situation  in  Peking  is  daily  becoming  more 
precarious.  Since  Yuang-hung  is  now  unable  to  exercise  his 
power  the  continuity  of  the  Republic  may  be  suddenly  inter- 
rupted. You  are  also  entrusted  by  the  citizens  with  great 
responsibilities ;  I  ask  you  to  temporarily  exercise  the  power 
and  functions  of  the  President  in  your  own  office  in  accordance 
■with  the  provisions  of  Article  42  of  the  Provisional  Constitu- 
tion and  Article  5  of  the  Presidential  Election  Law.  As  the 
means  of  communication  is  effectively  blocked  it  is  feared  that 
the  sending  of  my  seal  will  meet  with  difficulty  and  obstruction. 
Tuan  Chih-chuan  (Tuan  Chi-jui)  has  been  appointed  Premier, 
and  is  also  ordered  to  temporarily  protect  the  seal,  and  later  to 
devise  a  means  to  forward  it  on  to  you.  Hereafter  every  thing 
pertaining  to  the  important  question  of  saving  the  country 
shall  be  energetically  pushed  by  you  and  Chih-chuan  with  ut- 
most vigour.  The  situation  is  pressing  and  your  duty  is  clear. 
In  great  anxiety  and  expectation  I  am  sending  you  this  tele- 
gram. Li  Yuan  Hung. 

(4)  Dated  July  3.  To  Vice-President  Feng,  Tu  Chuns  and 
Governors  of  the  Provinces,  Provincial  Assemblies,  Inspector 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  363 

General  Lu: — I  presume  that  the  two  telegrams  dated  1st 
and  one  dated  3rd  inst.  have  safely  reached  your  place.  With 
bitter  remorse  to  myself  I  now  make  the  statement  that  the 
political  crisis  has  resulted  in  affecting  the  form  of  government. 
Tuan  Chih-chuan  has  been  appointed  on  the  1st  inst.  as  Pre- 
mier ;  and  the  Vice-President  has  been  asked  to  exercise  the 
power  and  functions  of  the  President  in  accordance  of  office  by 
the  Vice-President.  Premier  Tuan  is  authorized  to  act  at  his 
discretion.  All  the  seal  and  documents  have  been  sent  to  Tient- 
sin, and  Premier  Tuan  has  been  told  to  keep  and  guard  the 
same  for  the  time  being.  He  has  also  been  asked  to  forward 
the  same  to  the  Vice-President.  The  body  guards  of  the  Presi- 
dent's Office  have  suddenly  been  replacd  and  I  have  been 
pressed  to  give  up  the  Three  Lakes.  Yuan-hung  has  therefore 
removed  to  a  sanctuary.  As  regards  the  means  to  save  the 
country  I  trust  that  you  will  consult  and  work  unitedly  with 
Vice-President  Feng  and  Premier  Tuan.  In  great  expectation, 
and  with  much  of  my  heart  not  poured  out. 

Li  Yuan  Hung. 

Meanwhile,  whilst  these  dramatic  events  were  oc- 
curring in  Peking,  others  no  less  sensational  were  tak- 
ing place  in  the  provinces.  The  Tientsin  group,  sud- 
denly realizing  that  the  country  was  in  danger,  took 
action  very  swiftly,  disclosing  that  in  spite  of  all  dis- 
putes Republicanism  had  become  very  dear  to  every 
thinking  man  in  the  country,  and  that  at  last  it  was 
possible  to  think  of  an  united  China.  The  Scholar 
Liang  Chi  Chao,  spokesman  of  Chinese  Liberalism,  in 
an  extraordinarily  able  message  circularized  the  prov- 
inces in  terms  summarizing  everything  of  importance. 
Beginning  with  the  fine  literary  flight  that  "heaven 
has  refused  to  sympathize  with  our  difficulties  by  allow- 
ing traitors  to  be  born"  he  ends  with  the  astounding 
phrase  that  although  he  had  proposed  to  remain  silent 
to  the  end  of  his  days,  "at  the  sight  of  the  fallen  nest 


364  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

he  has,  however,  spat  the  stopper  out  of  his  throat," 
and  he  calls  upon  all  China  to  listen  to  his  words  which 
are  simply  that  the  Republic  must  be  upheld  or  disso- 
lution will  come. 

Arms  now  united  with  Literature.  General  Tuan 
Chi-jui,  immediately  accepting  the  burden  placed  on 
him,  proceeded  to  the  main  entrenched  camp  outside 
Tientsin  and  assumed  command  of  the  troops  massed 
there,  issuing  at  the  same  time  the  following  manifesto : 

TUAN    CHI-JUl's    MANIFESTO 

To  Vice-President  Feng  Kuo-chang,  Inspector  General  of 
Wumin,  Tu  Chuns,  Governors,  Tu-tungs.  .  .  . 

Heaven  is  chastening  this  country  by  the  series  of  disturb- 
ances that  have  taken  place.  Chang  Hsun,  filled  with  sinister 
designs,  has  occupied  the  capital  by  bringing  up  his  troops 
under  the  pretext  of  effecting  a  compromise  with  the  astound- 
ing result  that  last  night  the  Republican  form  of  government 
was  overthrown.  The  question  of  the  form  of  Government  is 
the  very  fundamental  principle  on  which  the  national  existence 
depends.  It  requires  assiduous  efforts  to  settle  the  form  of 
government  and  once  a  decision  has  been  reached  on  the  sub- 
ject, any  attempt  to  change  the  same  is  bound  to  bring  on 
unspeakable  disasters  to  the  country.  Today  the  people  of 
China  are  much  more  enlightened  and  democratic  in  spirit 
than  ever  before.  It  is,  therefore,  absolutely  impossible  to 
subjugate  the  millions  by  holding  out  to  the  country  the  maj- 
esty of  any  one  family. 

When  the  Republic  of  China  was  being  founded,  the  Ching 
House,  being  well  aware  of  the  general  inclinations  of  modern 
peoples,  sincerely  and  modestly  abdicated  its  power.  Believing 
that  such  spirit  deserved  handsome  recognition  the  people 
were  willing  to  place  the  Ching  House  under  the  protection  of 
special  treatment  and  actually  recorded  the  covenant  on  paper, 
whereby  contentment  and  honour  were  vouchsafed  the  Ching 
House.     Of  the  end  of  more  than  20  dynasties  of  Chinese  his- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  365 

tory,  none  can  compare  with  the  Ching  dynasty  for  peace  and 
safety. 

Purely  for  sake  of  satisfying  his  ambitions  of  self-elevation 
Chang  Hsun  and  others  have  audaciously  committed  a  crime  of 
inconceivable  magnitude  and  are  guilty  of  high  treason.  Like 
Wang  Mang  and  Tung  Tso  he  seeks  to  sway  the  whole  nation 
by  utilizing  a  young  and  helpless  emperor.  Moreover  he  has 
given  the  country  to  understand  that  Li  Yuan-hung  has  me- 
morialized the  Ching  House  that  many  evils  have  resulted  from 
republicanism  and  that  the  ex-emperor  should  be  restored  to 
save  the  masses.  That  Chang  Hsun  has  been  guilty  of  usurpa- 
tion and  forging  documents  is  plain  and  the  scandal  is  one 
that  shocks  all  the  world. 

Can  it  be  imagined  that  Chang  Hsun  is  actuated  by  a  patri- 
otic motive.''  Surely  despotism  is  no  longer  tolerated  in  this 
stage  of  modern  civilization.  Such  a  scheme  can  only  provoke 
universal  opposition.  Five  years  have  already  passed  since  the 
friendly  Powers  accorded  their  recognition  of  the  Chinese  Re- 
public and  if  we  think  we  could  afford  to  amuse  ourselves  with 
changes  in  the  national  fabric,  we  could  not  expect  foreign 
powers  to  put  up  with  such  childishness.  Internal  strife  is 
bound  to  invite  foreign  intervention  and  the  end  of  the  country 
will  then  be  near. 

Can  it  be  possible  that  Chang  Hsun  has  acted  in  the  interest 
of  the  Ching  House?  The  young  boy-emperor  lives  in  peace 
and  contentment  and  has  not  the  slightest  idea  of  ever  ruling 
China  again.  It  is  known  that  his  tutors  have  been  warning 
him  of  the  dangers  of  intriguing  for  power.  That  the  boy- 
emperor  has  been  dragged  on  the  throne  entirely  against  his 
own  wishes  is  undeniable.  History  tells  us  that  no  dynasty  can 
live  for  ever.  It  is  an  unprecedented  privilege  for  the  Ching 
dynasty  to  be  able  to  end  with  the  gift  of  special  treatment. 
How  absurd  to  again  place  the  Tsing  house  on  the  top  of  a 
high  wall  so  that  it  may  fall  once  more  and  disappear  for  ever. 

Chi-jui,  after  his  dismissal,  resolved  not  to  participate  in 
political  affairs,  but  as  he  has  had  a  share,  however  insignifi- 
cant, in  the  formation  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  and  having 


366  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

served  the  Republic  for  so  long  he  cannot  bear  to  see  its  de- 
struction without  stretching  out  a  helping  hand.  Further,  he 
has  been  a  recipient  of  favours  from  the  defunct  dynasty,  and 
he  can  not  bear  to  watch  unmoved,  the  sight  of  the  Ching 
House  being  made  the  channel  of  brigandage  with  suicidal  re- 
sults. Wherever  dutj^  calls,  Chi-jui  will  go  in  spite  of  the  dan- 
ger of  death.  You,  gentlemen,  are  the  pillars  of  the  Republic 
of  China  and  therefore  have  your  own  duties  to  perform.  In 
face  of  this  extraordinary  crisis,  our  indignation  must  be  one. 
For  the  interest  of  the  country  we  should  abide  by  our  oath  of 
unstinted  loyalty;  and  for  the  sake  of  the  Tsing  House  let  us 
show  our  sympathy  by  sane  and  wise  deeds.  I  feel  sure  you 
will  put  forth  every  ounce  of  your  energy  and  combine  your 
efforts  to  combat  the  great  disaster.  Though  I  am  a  feeble 
old  soldier,  I  will  follow  you  on  the  back  of  my  steed. 

(Sgd)     TuAN  Chi-jui. 

Following  the  publication  of  this  manifesto  a  gen- 
eral movement  of  troops  began.  On  the  5th  July  the 
important  Peking-Tientsin  railway  was  reported  in- 
terrupted forty  miles  from  the  capital — at  Langfang 
which  is  the  station  where  Admiral  Seymour's  relief  ex- 
pedition in  1900  was  nearly  surrounded  and  exterm- 
inated. Chang  Hsun,  made  desperate  by  the  swift 
answer  to  his  coup,  had  moved  out  of  Peking  in  force 
stiffening  his  own  troops  with  numbers  of  ^Nlanchu  sol- 
diery, and  announcing  that  he  would  fight  it  out  to  the 
bitter  end,  although  this  proved  as  false  as  the  rest  had 
been.  The  first  collision  occurred  on  the  evening  of 
the  5th  July  and  was  disastrous  for  the  King-maker. 
The  whole  Northern  army,  with  the  exception  of  a 
Manchu  Division  in  Peking,  was  so  rapidly  concen- 
trated on  the  two  main  railways  leading  to  the  capital 
that  Chang  Hsun's  army,  hopelessly  outnumbered  and 
outmanoeuvred,    fell    back    after    a    brief    resistance. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  367 

Chang  Hsun  himself  was  plainly  stupefied  by  the  dis- 
covery that  imperialism  of  the  classic  type  was  as  much 
out  of  date  in  the  North  as  in  the  South ;  and  within  one 
week  of  his  coup  he  was  prepared  to  surrender  if  his 
life  and  reputation  were  spared.  By  the  9th  July  the 
position  was  this :  the  Repubhcan  forces  had  surrounded 
Peking:  Chang  Hsun  had  resigned  every  appointment 
save  the  command  of  his  own  troops :  the  Manchu  Court 
party  had  drafted  a  fresh  Edict  of  Renunciation,  but 
being  terrorized  by  the  pigtailed  troops  surrounding  the 
Palace  did  not  dare  to  issue  it. 

The  usual  bargaining  now  commenced  with  the  Le- 
gation Quarter  acting  as  a  species  of  middleman.  No 
one  was  anxious  to  see  warfare  carried  into  the  streets 
of  Peking,  as  not  only  might  this  lead  to  the  massacres 
of  innocent  people,  but  to  foreign  complications  as  well. 
The  novelty  had  already  been  seen  of  a  miniature  air- 
raid on  the  Imperial  city,  and  the  panic  that  exploding 
bombs  had  carried  into  the  hearts  of  the  JManchu  Im- 
perial Family  made  them  ready  not  only  to  capitulate 
but  to  run  away.  The  chief  point  at  issue  was,  how- 
ever, not  the  fate  of  the  monarchy,  which  was  a  dead 
thing,  but  simply  what  was  going  to  happen  to  Chang 
Hsun's  head — a  matter  which  was  profoundly  distress- 
ing Chang  Hsun.  The  Republican  army  had  placed  a 
price  of  £10,000  on  it,  and  the  firebrands  were  advo- 
cating that  the  man  must  be  captured,  dead  or  alive, 
and  suffer  decapitation  in  front  of  the  Great  Dynastic 
Gate  of  the  Palace  as  a  revenge  for  his  perfidy.  Round 
this  issue  a  subtle  battle  raged  which  was  not  brought 
to  a  head  until  the  evening  of  the  11th  July,  when  all 
attempts  at  forcing  Chang  Hsun  to  surrender  uncon- 
ditionally having  failed,  it  was  announced  that  a  gen- 


368  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

eral  attack  would  be  made  on  his  forces  at  daylight  the 
next  morning. 

Promptly  at  dawn  on  the  12th  July  a  gun-signal 
heralded  the  assault.  Large  Republican  contingents 
entered  the  city  through  various  Gates,  and  a  storm 
of  firing  aroused  terror  among  the  populace.  The 
main  body  of  Chang  Hsun's  men,  entrenched  in  the 
great  walled  enclosure  of  the  Temple  of  Heaven,  were 
soon  surrounded,  and  although  it  would  have  been  pos- 
sible for  them  to  hold  out  for  several  days,  after  a  few 
hours'  firing  a  parley  began  and  they  quietly  surren- 
dered. Similarly  in  the  Imperial  city,  where  Chang 
Hsun  had  taken  up  his  residence,  this  leader,  in  spite  of 
his  fire-eating  declarations,  soon  fled  to  the  Legation 
Quarter  and  besought  an  asylum.  His  men  held  out 
until  two  in  the  afternoon,  when  their  resistance  col- 
lapsed and  the  cease-fire  sounded.  The  number  of  casu- 
alties on  both  sides  was  infinitesimal,  and  thus  after 
eleven  days'  farce  the  Manchu  dynasty  found  itself 
worse  off  than  ever  before.  It  is  necessary,  however, 
not  to  lose  sight  of  the  main  problem  in  China,  which  is 
the  establishment  of  a  united  government  and  a  cessation 
of  internecine  warfare, — issues  which  have  been  some- 
what simplified  by  Chang  Hsun's  escapade,  but  not 
solved.  That  a  united  government  will  ultimately  be 
established  is  the  writer's  belief,  based  on  a  knowledge  of 
all  the  facts.  But  to  attain  that  further  provincial 
struggles  are  inevitable,  since  China  is  too  large  a  unit 
to  find  common  ground  without  much  suffering  and  bit- 
terness. President  Li  Yuan  Hung  having  declared 
that  nothing  would  induce  him  to  resume  office,  Vice- 
President  Feng  Kuo-chang  has  become  the  legal  suc- 
cessor and  has  quietly  assumed  office.     Chang  Hsun's 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHIISTA  369 

abortive  coup  has  already  cleared  the  air  in  North 
China  to  this  extent :  that  the  Manchu  Imperial  Family 
is  to  be  removed  from  Peking  and  the  Imperial  allow- 
ance greatly  reduced,  whilst  the  proscription  of  such 
out-and-out  imperialists  as  Kang  Yu-wei  has  destroyed 
the  last  vestiges  of  public  support.  Finally  the  com- 
pletion of  China's  foreign  policy,  i.  e.  the  declaration  of 
war  against  Germany  and  Austria,  has  at  last  been  made 
on  the  14th  August,  1917,  and  a  consistent  course  of 
action  mapped  out. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE     FINAL     PROBLEM  I — REMODELLING     THE     POLITICO- 
ECONOMIC    RELATIONSHIP    BETWEEN    CHINA 
AND   THE   WORLD 

The  careful  narrative  we  have  made — supported  as  it  is 
by  documents — of  the  history  of  China  since  the  incep- 
tion of  the  Repubhc  six  years  ago  should  not  fail  to 
awaken  profound  astonishment  among  those  who  are  in- 
terested in  the  spread  of  good  government  throughout 
the  world.  Even  casual  readers  will  have  no  difficulty 
in  realizing  how  many  lives  have  been  lost  and  how 
greatly  the  country  has  been  crippled  both  owing  to  the 
bhnd  foreign  support  given  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  during 
four  long  and  weary  years  and  to  the  stupid  adhesion  to 
exploded  ideas,  when  a  little  intelligence  and  a  little  gen- 
erosity and  sympathy  would  have  guided  the  nation 
along  very  different  paths.  To  have  to  go  back,  as 
China  was  forced  to  do  in  1916,  and  begin  over  again 
the  work  which  should  have  been  performed  in  1912  is 
a  handicap  which  only  persistent  resolution  can  over- 
come; for  the  nation  has  been  so  greatly  improverished 
that  years  must  elapse  before  a  complete  recovery  from 
the  disorders  which  have  upset  the  internal  balance  can 
be  chronicled;  and  when  we  add  that  the  events  of  the 
period  May- July,  1917,  are  likely  still  further  to  in- 
crease the  burden  the  nation  carries,  the  complicated 
nature  of  the  outlook  will  be  readily  understood. 

Happily  foreign  opinion  has  lately  taken  turn  for  the 
better.     Whilst  the  substitution  of  a  new  kind  of  rule  in 

370 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  371 

place  of  the  Yuan  Shih-kai  regime,  with  its  thinly  dis- 
guised Manchuism  and  its  secret  worship  of  fallen  gods, 
was  at  first  looked  upon  as  a  political  collapse  tinged 
with  tragedy — most  foreigners  refusing  to  believe  in  an 
Asiatic  Republic — the  masculine  decision  of  the  9th 
February,  1917,  which  diplomatically  ranged  China 
definitely  on  the  side  of  the  Liberal  Powers,  has  caused 
something  of  a  volte  face.  Until  this  decision  had  been 
made  it  was  the  fashion  to  declare  that  China  was  not 
only  not  fit  to  be  a  Repubhc  but  that  her  final  dissolu- 
tion was  only  a  matter  of  time.  Though  the  empire  dis- 
appeared because  it  had  become  an  impossible  rule  in 
the  modern  world — being  womanish,  corrupt,  and 
mediaeval — to  the  foreign  mind  the  empire  remained  the 
acme  of  Chinese  civilization;  and  to  kill  it  meant  to  lop 
off  the  head  of  the  Chinese  giant  and  to  leave  lying  on 
the  ground  nothing  but  a  corpse.  It  was  in  vain  to 
insist  that  this  simile  was  wrong  and  that  it  was  pre- 
cisely because  Chinese  civilization  had  exhausted  itself 
that  a  new  conception  of  government  had  to  be  called 
in  to  renew  the  vitality  of  the  people.  Men,  and  par- 
ticularly diplomats,  refused  to  understand  that  this  em- 
bodied the  heart  and  soul  of  the  controversy,  and  that 
the  sole  mandate  for  the  Republic,  as  well  as  the  su- 
preme reason  why  it  had  to  be  upheld  if  the  country 
was  not  to  dissolve,  has  always  lain  in  the  fact  that  it 
postulates  something  which  is  the  very  antithesis  of  the 
system  it  has  replaced  and  which  should  be  wholly  suc- 
cessful in  a  single  generation,  if  courage  is  shown  and 
the  whip  unflinchingly  used. 

The  chief  trouble,  in  the  opinion  of  the  writer,  has 
been  the  simplicity  of  the  problem  and  not  its  com- 
plexity.    By  eliminating  the  glamour  which  surrounded 


372  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

the  Throne,  and  by  kicking  away  all  the  pomp  and  cir- 
cumstance which  formed  the  age-old  ritual  of  govern- 
ment, the  glaring  simplicity  and  barrenness  of  Chinese 
life — when  contrasted  with  the  complex  West — has 
been  made  evident.  Bathed  in  the  hard  light  of  modern 
realities,  the  poetic  China  which  Haroun-al-Raschid 
painted  in  his  Aladdin,  and  which  still  lives  in  the  beau- 
tiful art  of  the  country,  has  vanished  forever  and  its 
place  has  been  taken  by  a  China  of  prose.  To  those 
who  have  always  pictured  Asia  in  terms  of  poetry 
this  has  no  doubt  been  a  very  terrible  thing — a  thing 
synonymous  with  political  death.  And  yet  in  point  of 
fact  the  elementary  things  remain  much  as  they  have 
always  been  before,  and  if  they  appear  to  have  acquired 
new  meaning  it  is  simply  because  they  have  been  moved 
into  the  foreground  and  are  no  longer  masked  by  a 
gaudy  superstructure. 

For  if  you  eliminate  questions  of  money  and  sup- 
pose for  a  moment  that  the  national  balance-sheet  is 
entirely  in  order,  China  is  the  old  China  although  she 
is  stirred  by  new  ideas.  Here  you  have  by  far  the 
greatest  agricultural  community  in  the  world,  living 
just  as  it  has  always  lived  in  the  simplest  possible  man- 
ner, and  remitting  to  the  cities  (of  which  there  are  not 
ten  with  half -a-million  inhabitants )  the  increment  which 
the  harvests  yield.  These  cities  have  made  much 
municipal  progress  and  developed  an  independence 
which  is  confessedly  new.  Printing  presses  have 
spread  a  noisy  assertiveness,  as  well  as  a  very  critical 
and  litigious  spirit,  which  tends  to  resent  and  oppose 
authority.^     Trade,  although  constantly  proclaimed  to 

1  The  growth  of  the  Chinese  press  is  remarkable.     Although  no  complete 
statistics  are  available  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  number  of  peri- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  373 

be  in  a  bad  way,  is  steadily  growing  as  new  wants  are 
created  and  fashions  change.  An  immense  amount  of 
new  building  has  been  done,  particularly  in  those 
regions  which  the  Revolution  of  1911  most  devastated. 
The  archaic  fiscal  system,  having  been  tumbled  into 
open  ruin,  has  been  partially  replaced  by  European  con- 
ceptions which  are  still  only  half-understood,  but  which 
are  not  really  opposed.  The  country,  although  boast- 
ing a  population  which  is  only  some  fifty  millions  less 
than  the  population  of  the  nineteen  countries  of  Europe, 
has  an  army  and  a  police-force  so  small  as  to  allow  one 
to  say  that  China  is  virtually  disarmed  since  there  are 
only  900,000  men  with  weapons  in  their  hands.  Cast- 
ing about  to  discover  what  really  tinges  the  outlook,  that 
must  simply  be  held  to  be  the  long  delay  the  world  has 
made  in  extending  the  same  treatment  to  China  as  is 
now  granted  to  the  meanest  community  of  Latin 
America.  It  has  been  almost  entirely  this,  coupled 
with  the  ever-present  threat  of  Japanese  chauvinism, 
which  has  given  China  the  appearance  of  a  land  that 
is  hopelessly  water-logged,  although  the  National  Debt 
is  relatively  the  smallest  in  the  world  and  the  people 
the  most  industrious  and  law-abiding  who  have  ever 
lived.  In  such  circumstances  that  ideas  of  collapse 
should  have  spread  so  far  is  simply  due  to  a  faulty  esti- 
mate of  basic  considerations. 

For  we  have  to  remember  that  in  a  countr^^  in  which 
the  thoroughly  English  doctrine  of  laissez  faire  has  been 

odicals  in  China  now  approximates  10,000,  the  daily  vernacular  newspapers 
in  Peking  alone  exceeding  60.  Although  no  newspaper  in  China  prints 
more  than  20,000  copies  a  day,  the  reading  public  is  growing  at  a  phe- 
nomenal rate,  it  being  estimated  that  at  least  50  million  people  read  the 
daily  publications,  or  hear  what  they  say, — a  fact  which  is  deemed  so  politi- 
cally important  that  all  political  parties  and  groups  have  their  chains  of 
organs  throughout  the  country. 


374  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

so  long  practised  that  it  has  become  second  nature,  and 
in  which  the  philosophic  spirit  is  so  undisputed  that  the 
pillars  of  society  are  just  as  much  the  beggars  who  beg 
as  the  rich  men  who  support  them,  influences  of  a  pecu- 
liar character  play  an  immense  role  and  can  be  only 
very  slowly  overcome.  Passivity  has  been  so  long  en- 
throned that  of  the  Chinese  it  may  be  truly  said  that 
they  are  not  so  much  too  proud  to  fight  as  too  indiffer- 
ent,— which  is  not  a  fruitful  state  of  affairs.  Looking 
on  the  world  with  callous  detachment  the  masses  go 
their  own  way,  only  pausing  in  their  work  on  their  an- 
cient Festival  days  which  they  still  celebrate  just  as 
they  have  always  celebrated  them  since  the  beginning 
of  their  history.  The  petty  daily  activities  of  a  vast 
legion  of  people  grouped  together  in  this  extraordinary 
way,  and  actuated  by  impulses  which  seem  sharply  to 
conflict  with  the  impulses  of  the  other  great  races  of 
the  world,  appear  incredible  to  Westerners  who  know 
what  the  outer  perils  really  are,  and  who  believe  that 
China  is  not  only  at  bay  but  encircled — caught  in  a 
network  of  political  agreements  and  commitments  which 
have  permanently  destroyed  her  power  of  initiative  and 
reduced  her  to  inanition.  To  find  her  lumbering  on 
undisturbed,  ploughing  the  fields,  marrying  and  giving 
in  marriage,  buying,  selling,  cursing  and  laughing, 
carrying  out  rebellions  and  little  plots  as  though  the 
centuries  that  stretch  ahead  were  still  her  willing  slaves, 
has  in  the  end  become  to  onlookers  a  veritable  night- 
mare. Puzzled  by  a  phenomenon  which  is  so  discon- 
certing as  to  be  incapable  of  any  clear  definition,  they 
have  ended  by  declaring  that  an  empty  Treasury  is  an 
empty  rule,  adding  that  as  it  is  solely  from  this  monetary 
viewpoint  that  the  New  China  ought  to  be  judged,  their 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  375 

opinion  is  the  one  which  will  finally  be  accepted  as 
authoritative.  The  situation  is  admittedly  dangerous; 
and  it  is  imperative  that  a  speedy  remedy  be  sought; 
for  the  heirs  and  assigns  of  an  estate  which  has  been 
mismanaged  to  the  brink  of  bankruptcy  must  secure  at 
all  costs  that  no  public  receivership  is  made. 

What  is  the  remedy?  That  must  consist  simply 
enough  in  attacking  the  grand  simplicities  directly;  in 
recognizing,  as  we  have  clearly  shown  that  the  bases 
of  Chinese  life  having  collapsed  through  Euro-Japanese 
pressure,  the  politico-economic  relationship  between  the 
Republic  and  the  world  must  be  remodelled  at  the 
earliest  possible  opportunity,  every  agreement  which 
has  been  made  since  the  Treaties  of  1860  being  care- 
fully and  completely  revised.^ 

To  say  this  is  to  give  utterance  to  nothing  very  new 
or  brilliant:  it  is  the  thought  which  has  been  present  in 
every  one's  mind  for  a  number  of  years.  So  far  back  as 
1902,  when  Great  Britain  negotiated  with  China  the  in- 
operative Mackay  Commercial  Treaty,  provision  was 
not  only  made  for  a  complete  reform  of  the  Tariff — im- 
port duties  to  be  made  two  and  a  half  times  as  large  in 
return  for  a  complete  abolition  of  likin  or  inter-provin- 
cial trade-taxation — but  for  the  abolition  of  extraterri- 
toriality when  China  should  have  erected  a  modern  and 
efficient  judicial  system.  And  although  matters 
equallj^  important,  such  as  the  funding  of  all  Chinese  in- 

1  The  mediaeval  condition  of  Chinese  trade  taxation  is  well  illustrated  by 
a  Memorandum  which  the  reader  will  find  in  the  appendix.  One  examj)le 
may  be  quoted.  Timber  shipped  from  the  Yalu  river,  i.e.  from  Chinese 
territory,  to  Peking,  pays  duties  at  five  different  places,  the  total  amount 
of  which  aggregates  20  per  cent  of  its  market  value;  whilst  timber  from 
America,  with  transit  dues  and  Peking  Octroi  added,  only  pays  10  per  cent! 
China  is  probably  the  only  country  that  has  ever  existed  that  discriminates 
against  its  own  goods  and  gives  preference  to  the  foreigner, — through  the 
operation  of  the  Treaties. 


376  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

demnities  and  loans  into  one  Consolidated  Debt,  as  well 
as  the  withdrawal  of  the  right  of  foreign  banks  to  make 
banknote  issues  in  China,  were  not  touched  upon,  the 
same  principles  would  undoubtedly  have  been  applied 
in  these  instances,  as  being  conductive  to  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  Chinese  autonomy,  had  Chinese  negotiators 
been  clever  enough  to  urge  them  as  being  of  equal  im- 
portance to  the  older  issues.  For  it  is  primarily  debt, 
and  the  manipulation  of  debt,  which  is  the  great  enemy. 

Three  groups  of  indebtedness  and  three  groups  of 
restrictions,  corresponding  with  the  three  vital  periods 
in  Chinese  history,  lie  to-day  Hke  three  great  weights  on 
the  body  of  the  Chinese  giant.  First,  there  is  the  im- 
broglio of  the  Japanese  war  of  1894-5;  second,  the 
settlement  following  the  Boxer  explosion  of  1900;  and 
third,  the  cost  of  the  revolution  of  1911-1912.  We  have 
already  discussed  so  exhaustively  the  Boxer  Settle- 
ment and  the  finance  of  the  Revolutionary  period  that  it 
is  necessary  to  deal  with  the  first  period  only. 

In  that  first  period  China,  having  been  rudely  handled 
by  Japan,  recovered  herself  only  by  indulging  in  the 
sort  of  diplomacy  which  had  become  traditional  under 
the  Manchus.  Thankful  for  any  help  in  her  distress, 
she  invited  and  welcomed  the  intervention  of  Russia, 
which  gave  her  back  the  Liaotung  Peninsula  and  pre- 
served for  her  the  shadow  of  her  power  when  the  sub- 
stance had  already  been  so  sensationally  lost.  Men  are 
apt  to  forget  to-day  that  the  financial  accommodation 
which  allowed  China  to  liquidate  the  Japanese  war- 
debt  was  a  remarkable  transaction  in  which  Russia 
formed  the  controlling  element.  In  1895  the  Tsar's 
Government  had  intervened  for  precisely  the  same  mo- 
tives that  animate  every  State  at  critical  times  in  his- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  377 

tory,  that  is,  for  reasons  of  self-interest.  The  rapid 
victory  which  Japan  had  won  had  revived  in  an  acute 
form  the  whole  question  of  the  future  of  the  vast  block 
of  territory  which  lies  south  of  the  Amur  regions  and 
is  bathed  by  the  Yellow  Sea.  Russian  statesmen  sud- 
denly became  conscious  that  the  policy  of  which  Mura- 
vieff-Amurski  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury had  been  the  most  brilliant  exponent — the  policy 
of  reaching  "warm  water" — was  in  danger  of  being 
crucified,  and  the  work  of  many  years  thrown  away. 
Action  on  Russia's  part  was  imperative ;  she  was  great 
enough  to  see  that;  and  so  that  it  should  not  be 
said  that  she  was  merely  depriving  a  gallant  nation 
of  the  fruits  of  victory  and  thereby  issuing  to  her  a 
direct  challenge,  she  invited  the  chief  Powers  in  Treaty 
relations  with  China  to  co-operate  with  her  in  readjust- 
ing what  she  described  as  the  threatened  balance. 
France  and  Germany  responded  to  that  invitation; 
England  demurred.  France  did  so  because  she  was 
already  the  devoted  Ally  of  a  nation  that  was  a  guar- 
antee for  the  security  of  her  European  frontiers:  Ger- 
many because  she  was  anxious  to  see  that  Russia  should 
be  pushed  into  Asiatic  commitments  and  drawn  away 
from  the  problems  of  the  Near  East.  England  on 
her  part  very  prudently  declined  to  be  associated  with 
a  transaction  which,  while  not  opposed  to  her  interests, 
was  filled  with  many  dubious  elements. 

It  was  in  Petrograd  that  this  account  was  liquidated. 
The  extraordinary  chapter  which  only  closed  with  the 
disastrous  Peace  of  Portsmouth  opened  for  Russia  in  a 
very  brilliant  way.  The  presence  in  Moscow  of  the 
veteran  statesman  Li  Hung-chang  on  the  occasion  of 
the  Tsar's  Coronation  afforded  an  opportunity  for  ex- 


378  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

haustively  discussing  the  whole  problem  of  the  Far 
East.  China  required  money:  Russia  required  the  ac- 
ceptance of  plans  which  ultimately  proved  so  disastrous 
to  her.  Under  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty  of  Shimono- 
seki  (April,  1895)  China  had  agreed  to  pay  Japan  as 
a  war-indemnity  200  million  Treasury  taels  in  eight  in- 
stalments: that  is  50  million  taels  within  six  months,  a 
further  50  millions  within  twelve  months,  and  the  re- 
maining 100  millions  in  six  equal  instalments  spread 
over  seven  years,  as  well  as  an  additional  sum  of  50 
millions  for  the  retrocession  of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula. 

China,  therefore,  needed  at  once  80  million  taels. 
Russia  undertook  to  lend  her  at  the  phenomenally  low 
rate  of  4  per  cent  the  sum  of  £16,000,000  sterhng — 
the  interest  and  capital  of  which  the  Tsar's  Government 
guaranteed  to  the  French  bankers  undertaking  the  flo- 
tation. In  return  for  this  accommodation,  the  well- 
known  Russo- Chinese  Declaration  of  the  24th  June 
(6th  July)  1895  was  made  in  which  the  vital  article  IX 
states  that — "In  consideration  of  this  Loan  the  Chinese 
Government  declares  that  it  will  not  grant  to  any  for- 
eign Power  any  right  or  privilege  of  no  matter  what 
description  touching  the  control  or  administration  of 
the  revenues  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  Should,  how- 
ever, the  Chinese  Government  grant  to  any  foreign 
Power  rights  of  this  nature,  it  is  understood  that  the 
mere  fact  of  having  done  so  wiU  extend  those  rights  to 
the  Russian  Government," 

This  clause  has  a  monumental  significance:  it  started 
the  scramble  in  China:  and  all  the  history  of  the  past 
22  years  is  piled  like  a  pyramid  on  top  of  it.  Now  that 
the  Romanoffs  have  been  hurled  from  the  throne,  Russia 
must  prove  eager  to  reverse  the  policy  which  brought 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  379 

Japan  to  her  Siberian  frontiers  and  which  pinned  a 
brother  democracy  to  the  ground. 

For  China,  instead  of  being  nearly  bankrupt  as  so 
many  have  asserted,  has,  thanks  to  the  new  scale  of 
indebtedness  which  the  war  has  established,  become  one 
of  the  most  debt-free  countries  in  the  world,  her  entire 
national  debt  (exclusive  of  railway  debt)  amounting  to 
less  than  150  millions  sterling,  or  seven  shillings  per  head 
of  population,  which  is  certainly  not  very  terrible.  No 
student  who  has  given  due  attention  to  the  question 
can  deny  that  it  is  primarily  on  the  proper  handling 
of  this  nexus  of  financial  interests,  and  not  by  establish- 
ing any  artificial  balance  of  power  between  foreign  na- 
tions, that  the  peace  of  the  Far  East  really  hinges. 
The  method  of  securing  national  redemption  is  ready- 
made;  Western  nations  should  use  the  Parliament  of 
China  as  an  instrument  of  reform,  and  by  limiting 
themselves  to  this  one  method  secure  that  civil  author- 
ity is  reinforced  to  such  a  point  that  its  behests  have 
behind  them  all  the  wealth  of  the  West.  In  questions 
of  currency,  taxation,  railways  and  every  other  vexa- 
tious problem,  it  is  solely  by  using  this  instrument  that 
satisfactory  results  can  be  attained.^     For  once  Chinese 

1  We  need  only  give  a  single  example  of  what  we  mean.  If,  in  the 
matter  of  the  reform  of  the  currency,  instead  of  authorizing  trade-agencies, 
i.e.  the  foreign  Exchange  Banks,  to  make  a  loan  to  China,  which  is  neces- 
sarily hedged  round  with  conditions  favourable  to  such  trade-agencies,  the 
Powers  took  the  matter  directly  in  their  own  hands;  and  selecting  the  Bank 
of  China — the  national  fiscal  agent — as  the  instrument  of  reform  agreed 
to  advance  all  the  sums  necessary,  provided  a  Banking  Law  was  passed  by 
the  Parliament  of  China  of  a  satisfying  nature,  and  the  necessary  guar- 
antees were  forthcoming,  it  woidd  soon  be  possible  to  have  a  uniform  Na- 
tional Currency  which  would  be  everv^vhere  accepted  and  lead  to  a  phe- 
nomenal trade  expansion.  It  should  be  noted  that  China  is  still  on  a 
Copper  Standard  basis, — the  people's  buying  and  selling  being  conducted 
in  multiples  of  copper  cent-pieces  of  which  there  has  been  an  immense 
over-issue,  the  latest  figures  showing  that  there  are  no  less  than  23,000,000,- 
000  1-cent,  ten  cash)  pieces  in  circulation  or  C2  coins  per  head  of  popula- 
tion— roughly   twenty-five   millions    sterling   in   value, — or    160,000   tons   of 


380  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

realize  that  parliamentary  government  is  not  merely 
an  experimental  thing  but  the  last  chance  the  country 
is  to  be  given  to  govern  itself,  they  will  rally  to  the 
call  and  prove  that  much  of  the  trouble  and  turmoil 
of  past  years  has  been  due  to  the  misunderstanding  of 
the  internal  problem  by  Western  minds,  which  has  in- 
cited the  population  to  intrigue  against  one  another  and 
remain  disunited.  And  if  we  insist  that  there  is  urgent 
need  for  a  settlement  of  these  matters  in  the  terms  we 
have  indicated,  it  is  because  we  know  very  prcisely  what 
Japanese  thought  on  this  subject  really  is. 

AVhat  is  that  thought — whither  does  it  lead? 

It  may  be  broadly  said  that  Japanese  activities 
throughout  the  Far  East  are  based  on  a  thorough 
and  adequate  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  apart  from 
the  winning  of  the  hegemony  of  China,  there  is  the  far 
more  difficult  and  knotty  problem  of  overshadowing 
and  ultimately  dislodging  the  huge  network  of  foreign 
interests — particularly  British  interests — which  sev- 
enty-five years  of  Treaty  intercourse  have  entwined 
about  the  country.  These  interests,  growing  out  of  the 
seed  planted  in  the  early  Canton  Factory  days,  had 
their  origin  in  the  termination  by  the  act  of  the  British 
Government  of  the  trading  monopoly  enjoyed  until  the 
thirties  of  last  century  by  the  East  India  Company. 
Left  without  proper  definition  until  the  Treaty  of  Nan- 
king in  1842  had  formally  won  the  principle  of  trading- 
copper!  The  number  of  silver  dollars  and  subsidiary  silver  coins  is  not 
accurately  known, — nor  is  the  value  of  the  silver  bullion;  but  it  certainly 
cannot  greatly  exceed  this  sura.  In  addition  there  is  about  £15,000,000  of 
paper  money.  A  comprehensive  scheme  of  reform,  placed  in  the  hands  of 
the  Bank  of  China,  would  require  at  least  £15,000,000;  but  this  sum  would 
be  sufficient  to  modernize  the  currency  and  establish  a  universal  silver 
dollar  standard. 

The  Bank  of  China  requires  at  least  600  branches  throughout  the  coun- 
try to  become  a  true  fiscal  agent.     It  has  today  one-tenth  of  this  number. 


The  Famous,  or  Infamous  General  Chang  Hsun,  the 
Leading  Reactionary  in  China  To-day,  Who  Still 
Commands  a  Force  of  30,000  Men  Astride  of  the 
PuKow  Railway 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  381 

rights  at  five  open  ports,  and  thus  estabhshed  a  first 
basis  of  agreement  between  England  and  China  (to 
which  all  the  trading  powers  hastened  to  subscribe), 
these  interests  expanded  in  a  half-hearted  way  until 
1860,  when  in  order  to  terminate  friction,  the  principle 
of  extraterritoriality  was  boldly  borrowed  from  the 
Turkish  Capitulations,  and  made  the  rock  on  which  the 
entire  fabric  of  international  dealings  in  China  was 
based.  These  treaties,  with  their  always-recurring 
"most-favoured  nation"  clause,  and  their  implication  of 
equal  treatment  for  all  Powers  alike,  constitute  the 
Public  Law  of  the  Far  East,  just  as  much  as  the 
Treaties  between  the  Nations  constitute  the  Public  Law 
of  Europe;  and  any  attempt  to  destroy,  cripple,  or 
limit  their  scope  and  function  has  been  very  generally 
deemed  an  assault  on  all  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
alike.  By  a  thoroughly  Machiavellian  piece  of  reason- 
ing, those  who  have  been  responsible  for  the  framing  of 
recent  Japanese  policy,  have  held  it  essential  to  their 
plan  to  keep  the  world  chained  to  the  principle  of  ex- 
traterritoriality and  Chinese  Tariff  and  economic  sub- 
jection because  these  things,  imposing  as  they  necessa- 
rily do  restrictions  and  limitations  in  many  fields,  leave 
it  free  to  the  Japanese  to  place  themselves  outside  and 
beyond  these  restrictions  and  limitations ;  and,  by  means 
of  special  zones  and  secret  encroachments,  to  extend  their 
influence  so  widely  that  ultimately  foreign  treaty-]3orts 
and  foreign  interests  may  be  left  isolated  and  at  the 
mercy  of  the  "Higher  machinery"  which  their  hegemony 
is  installing.  The  Chinese  themselves,  it  is  hoped,  will 
be  gradually  cajoled  into  acquiescing  in  this  very  ex- 
traordinary state  of  affairs,  because  being  unorganized 
and  split  into  suspicious  groups,  they  can  be  manipu- 


382  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

lated  in  such  a  way  as  to  offer  no  effective  mass  resist- 
ance to  the  Japanese  advance,  and  in  the  end  may  be 
induced  to  accept  it  as  inevitable. 

If  the  reader  keeps  these  great  facts  carefully  in 
mind,  a  new  light  will  dawn  on  him  and  the  urgency 
of  the  Chinese  question  will  be  disclosed.  The  Jap- 
anese Demands  of  1915,  instead  of  being  fantastic  and 
far-fetched,  as  many  have  supposed,  are  shown  to  be 
very  intelligently  drawn-up,  the  entire  Treaty  posi- 
tion in  China  having  been  most  exhaustively  studied, 
and  every  loophole  into  the  vast  region  left  untouched 
by  the  exterritorialized  Powers  marked  down  for  in- 
vasion. For  Western  nations,  in  spite  of  exorbitant 
demands  at  certain  periods  in  Chinese  history,  having 
mainly  limited  themselves  to  acquiring  coastal  and  com- 
munication privileges,  which  were  desired  more  for 
genuine  purposes  of  trade  than  for  encompassing  the 
destruction  of  Chinese  autonomy,  are  to-day  in  a  dis- 
advantageous position  which  the  Japanese  have  shown 
they  thoroughly  understand  by  not  only  tightening 
their  hold  on  Manchuria  and  Shantung,  but  by  going 
straight  to  the  root  of  the  matter  and  declaring  on 
every  possible  occasion  that  they  alone  are  responsible 
for  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  Far  East, — and  this  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  their  plan  of  1915  was  exposed 
and  partially  frustrated.  But  the  chief  force  behind 
the  Japanese  Foreign  Office,  it  should  be  noted,  is  mili- 
tarist ;  and  it  is  a  point  of  honour  for  the  Military  Party 
to  return  to  the  charge  in  China  again  and  again  until 
there  is  definite  success  or  definite  failure. 

Now  in  view  of  the  facts  which  have  been  so  volum- 
inously set  forth  in  preceding  chapters,  it  is  imperative 
for  men  to  realize  that  the  struggle  in  the  Far  East  is 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  383 

like  the  Balkan  Question  a  thing  rooted  in  geography 
and  peoples,  and  cannot  be  brushed  aside  or  settled  by 
compromises.  The  whole  future  of  Chinese  civilization 
is  intimately  bound  up  with  the  questions  involved,  and 
the  problem  instead  of  becoming  easier  to  handle  must 
bcome  essentially  more  difficult  from  day  to  day. 
Japan's  real  objective  being  the  termination  of  the  im- 
plied trusteeship  which  Europe  and  America  still  exer- 
cise in  the  Far  East,  the  course  of  the  European  war 
must  intimately  effect  the  ultimate  outcome.  If  that 
end  is  satisfactory  for  democracies,  China  may  reason- 
ably claim  to  share  in  the  resulting  benefits;  if  on  the 
other  hand,  the  Liberal  Powers  do  not  win  an  over- 
whelming victory  which  shall  secure  the  sanctity  of 
Treaties  for  all  time,  it  will  go  hard  for  China.  Out- 
wardly, the  immediate  goal  which  Japan  seeks  to  attain 
is  merely  to  become  the  accredited  spokesman  of  Eastern 
Asia,  the  official  representative ;  and,  using  this  attorney- 
ship as  a  cloak  for  the  advancement  of  objects  which 
other  Powers  would  pursue  on  different  principles,  so 
impregnably  to  entrench  herself  where  she  was  no  busi- 
ness to  be  that  no  one  will  dare  to  attempt  to  turn  her 
out.  For  this  reason  we  see  revived  in  Manchuria  on 
a  modified  scale  the  Eighteenth  Century  device,  once 
so  essential  a  feature  of  Dutch  policy  in  the  struggle 
against  Louis  XIV,  namely  the  creation  of  "barrier- 
cities"  for  closing  and  securing  a  frontier  by  giving 
them  a  special  constitution  which  withdraws  them  from 
ordinary  jurisdiction  and  places  foreign  garrisons  in 
them.  This  is  precisely  what  is  going  on  from  the  Yalu 
to  Eastern  Mongolia,  and  this  procedure  no  doubt  will 
be  extended  in  time  to  other  regions  as  opportunities 
arise.     Already  in  Shantung  the  same  policy  is  being 


384  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

pursued  and  there  are  indications  that  it  is  being 
thought  of  in  Fuhkien;  whilst  the  infantry  garrison 
which  was  quietly  installed  at  Hankow — 600  miles  up 
the  Yangtsze  river — at  the  time  of  the  Revolution  of 
1911  is  apparently  to  be  made  permanent.  Allowing 
her  policy  to  be  swayed  by  men  who  know  far  too  little 
of  the  sea,  Japan  stands  in  imminent  danger  of  forget- 
ting the  great  lesson  which  Mahan  taught,  that  for  is- 
land-peoples sea-power  is  everything  and  that  land  con- 
quests which  diminish  the  efficacy  of  that  power  are 
merely  a  delusion  and  snare.  Plunging  farther  and 
farther  into  the  vast  regions  of  Manchuria  and  Mon- 
golia which  have  been  the  graves  of  a  dozen  dynasties, 
Japan  is  displaying  increasing  indifference  for  the  one 
great  lesson  which  the  war  has  yielded — the  overwhelm- 
ing importance  of  the  sea.^  Necessarily  guardian  of 
the  principles  on  which  intercourse  in  Asia  is  based,  be- 
cause she  framed  those  principles  and  fought  for  them 
and  has  built  up  great  edifices  under  their  sanction, 
British  sea-power — now  allied  forever,  let  us  hope,  with 
American  power — nevertheless  remains  and  will  con- 
tinue to  remain,  in  spite  of  what  may  be  half-surrep- 
titiously  done  to-day,  the  dominant  factor  in  the  Far 
East  as  it  is  in  the  Far  West.     Withdrawn  from  view 

lit  should  be  carefully  noted  that  not  only  has  Japan  no  unfriendly  feel- 
ings for  Germany  but  that  German  Professors  have  been  appointed  to 
oifice  during  the  war.  In  the  matter  of  enemy  trading  Japan's  policy  has 
been  even  more  extraordinary.  Until  there  was  a  popular  outcry  among 
the  Entente  Allies,  German  merchants  were  allowed  to  trade  more  or  less 
as  usual.  They  were  not  denied  the  use  of  Japanese  steamers,  shipping 
companies  being  simply  "advised"  not  to  deal  with  them,  the  two  German 
banks  in  Yokohama  and  Kobe  being  closed  only  in  the  Autumn  of  1916. 
It  was  not  until  April,  1917,  that  Enemy  Trading  Regulations  were  for- 
mally promulgated  and  enforced, — that  is  when  the  war  was  very  far  ad- 
vanced— the  action  of  China  against  Germany  being  no  doubt  largely  re- 
sponsible for  this  step. 

That  the  Japanese  nation  greatly  admires  the  German  system  of  govern- 
ment and  is  in  the  main  indifferent  to  the  results  of  the  war  has  long  beep 
evident  to  observers  on  the  spot. 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  885 

for  the  time  being,  because  of  the  exigencies  of  the  hour, 
and  because  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  is  still 
counted  a  binding  agreement,  Western  sea-power 
nevertheless  stands  there,  a  heavy  cloud  in  the  offing, 
full  of  questionings  regarding  what  is  going  on  in  the 
Orient,  and  fully  determined,  let  us  pray,  one  day  to  re- 
ceive frank  answers.  For  the  right  of  every  race,  no 
matter  how  small  or  weak,  to  enjoy  the  inestimable 
benefits  of  self-government  and  independence  may  be 
held  to  have  been  so  absolutely  established  that  it  is  a 
mere  question  of  time  for  the  doctrine  not  only  to  be 
universally  accepted  but  to  be  universally  applied.  In 
many  cases,  it  is  true,  the  claims  of  certain  races  are  as 
yet  incapable  of  being  expressed  in  practical  state- 
forms;  but  where  nationalities  have  long  been  well- 
defined,  there  can  be  no  question  whatsoever  that  a 
properly  articulated  autonomy  must  be  secured  in  such 
a  way  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  annexations. 

Now  although  in  their  consideration  of  Asia  it  is 
notorious  that  Western  statesmen  have  not  cared  to 
keep  in  mind  political  concepts  which  have  become  en- 
throned in  Europe,  owing  to  the  fact  that  an  active 
element  of  opposition  to  such  concepts  was  to  be  found 
in  their  own  policies,  a  vast  change  has  undoubtedly 
been  recently  worked,  making  it  certain  that  the  claims 
of  nationalism  are  soon  to  be  given  the  same  force  and 
value  in  the  East  as  in  the  West.  But  before  there 
can  be  any  question  of  Asia  for  the  Asiatics  being 
adopted  as  a  root  principle  by  the  whole  world,  it  will 
have  to  be  established  in  some  unmistakable  form  that 
the  surrender  of  the  policy  of  conquest  which  Europe 
has  pursued  for  four  centuries  East  of  the  Suez  Canal 
will  not  lead  to  its  adoption  by  an  Asiatic  Power  under 


386  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

specious  forms  which  hide  the  glittering  sword.  If 
that  can  be  secured,  then  the  present  conflict  will  have 
truly  been  a  War  of  Liberation  for  the  East  as  well  as 
for  the  West.  For  although  Japan  has  been  engaged 
for  some  years  in  declaring  to  all  Asiatics  under  her 
breath  that  she  holds  out  the  hand  of  a  brother  to 
them,  and  dreams  of  the  days  when  the  age  of  European 
conquests  will  be  nothing  but  a  distant  memory,  her 
actions  have  consistently  belied  her  words  and  shown 
that  she  has  not  progressed  in  political  thought  much 
beyond  the  crude  conceptions  of  the  Eighteenth  Cen- 
tury. Thus  Korea,  which  fell  under  her  sway  because 
the  nominal  independence  of  the  country  had  long 
made  it  the  centre  of  disastrous  international  intrigues, 
is  governed  to-day  as  a  conquered  province  by  a  mili- 
tary viceroy  without  a  trace  of  autonomy  remaining 
and  without  any  promise  that  such  a  regime  is  only  tem- 
porary. Although  nothing  in  the  undertakings  made 
with  the  Powers  has  ever  admitted  that  a  nation  which 
boasts  of  an  ancient  line  of  kings,  and  which  gave  Japan 
much  of  her  own  civilization,  should  be  stamped  under 
foot  in  such  manner,  the  course  which  politics  have 
taken  in  Korea  has  been  disastrous  in  the  extreme  ever 
since  Lord  Lansdowne  in  1905,  as  British  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  pointed  out  in  a  careful  dispatch  to 
the  Russian  Government  that  Korea  was  a  region  which 
fell  naturally  under  the  sway  of  Japan.  Not  only  has 
a  tragic  fate  overcome  the  sixteen  million  inhabitants  of 
that  country,  but  there  has  been  a  covert  extension  of 
the  principles  applied  to  them  to  the  people  of  China. 
Now  if  as  we  say  European  concepts  are  to  have 
universal  meaning,  and  if  Japan  desires  European 
treatment,  it  is  time  that  it  is  realized  that  the  policy 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  387 

followed  in  Korea,  combined  with  the  attempt  to 
extend  that  treatment  to  soil  where  China  rightly  claims 
undisputed  sovereignty,  forms  an  insuperable  barrier 
to  Japan  being  admitted  to  the  inner  council  of  the 
nations/  No  one  wishes  to  deny  to  Japan  her  proper 
place  in  the  world,  in  view  of  her  marvellous  industrial 
progress,  but  that  place  must  be  one  which  fits  in  with 
modern  conceptions  and  is  not  one  thing  to  the  West 
and  another  to  the  East.  Even  the  saying  which  was 
made  so  much  of  during  the  Russian  war  of  1904,  that 
Korea  in  foreign  hands  was  a  dagger  pointed  at  the 
heart  of  Japan — has  been  shown  to  be  inherently  false 
by  the  lessons  of  the  present  struggle,  the  Korean 
dagger-point  being  120  sea  miles  from  the  Japanese 
coast.  Such  argomients  clearly  show  that  if  the  truce 
which  was  hastily  patched  up  in  1905  is  to  give  way  to 
a  permanent  peace,  that  can  be  evolved  only  by  lock- 

1  A  very  remarkable  confirmation  of  these  statements  is  afforded  in  the 
latest  Japanese  decision  regarding  Manchuria  which  will  be  immediately 
enforced.  The  experience  of  the  past  three  years  having  proved  conclu- 
sively that  the  Chinese,  in  spite  of  their  internal  strife,  are  united  to  a  man 
in  their  determination  to  prevent  Japan  from  tightening  her  hold  on  Man- 
churia and  instituting  an  open  Protectorate,  the  Tokio  Government  has 
now  drawn  up  a  subtle  scheme  which  it  is  believed  will  be  effective.  A 
Bill  for  the  unification  of  administration  in  South  Manchuria  has  passed 
the  Japanese  Cabinet  Conference  and  will  soon  be  formally  promulgated. 
Under  the  provisions  of  this  Bill,  the  Manchuria  Railway  Company  will  be- 
come the  actual  organ  of  Japanese  administration  in  South  Manchuria;  the 
Japanese  Consular  Service  will  be  subordinate  to  the  administration  of  the 
Railway;  and  all  the  powers  hitherto  vested  in  the  Consular  Service,  politi- 
cal, commercial,  judicial  and  administrative,  will  be  made  part  of  the 
organization  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway.  This  is  not  all.  From 
another  Japanese  source  we  learn  that  a  law  is  about  to  take  effect  by 
which  the  administration  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  will  be  trans- 
ferred directly  to  the  control  of  the  Government-General  of  Korea,  thus 
making  the  Railway  at  once  an  apparently  commercial  but  really  political 
organization.  In  future  the  revenues  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway 
are  to  be  paid  direct  to  the  Government-General  of  Korea;  and  the  yearly 
appropriation  for  the  upkeep  and  administration  of  the  Railway  is  to  be 
fixed  at  Yen  12,000,000.  These  arrangements,  especially  the  amalgamation 
of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway,  are  to  take  effect  from  the  1st  July, 
1917,  and  are  an  attempt  to  do  in  the  dark  what  Japan  dares  not  yet 
attempt  in  the  open. 


388  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

ing  on  to  the  Far  East  the  principles  which  are  in 
process  of  being  vindicated  in  Europe.  In  other 
words,  precisely  as  Poland  is  to  be  given  autonomy,  so 
must  Korea  enjoy  the  same  privileges,  the  whole  Jap- 
anese theory  of  suzerainty  on  the  Eastern  Asiatic  Con- 
tinent being  abandoned.  To  re-establish  a  proper  bal- 
ance of  power  in  the  Far  East,  the  Korean  nation,  which 
has  had  a  known  historical  existence  of  1,500  years,  must 
be  reinstated  in  something  resembling  its  old  position; 
for  Korea  has  always  been  the  keystone  of  the  Far 
Eastern  arch,  and  it  is  the  destruction  of  that  arch 
more  than  anything  else  which  has  brought  the  collapse 
of  China  so  perilously  near. 

Once  the  legitimate  aspirations  of  the  Korean  peo- 
ple have  been  satisfied,  the  whole  Manchurian-Mon- 
golian  question  will  assume  a  different  aspect,  and  a 
true  peace  between  China  and  Japan  will  be  made  pos- 
sible. It  is  to  no  one's  interest  to  have  a  PoHsh  ques- 
tion in  the  Far  East  with  all  the  bitterness  and  the 
crimes  which  such  a  question  must  inevitably  lead  to; 
and  the  time  to  obviate  the  creation  of  such  a  question  is 
at  the  very  beginning  before  it  has  become  an  obsession 
and  a  great  international  issue.  Although  the  Jap- 
anese annexation  may  be  held  to  have  settled  the  ques- 
tion once  and  for  all,  we  have  but  to  point  to  Poland  to 
show  that  a  race  can  pass  through  every  possible  humili- 
ation and  endure  every  possible  species  of  truncation 
without  dying  or  abating  by  one  whit  its  determination 
to  enjoy  what  happier  races  have  won. 

The  issue  is  a  vital  one.  China  by  her  recent  acts 
has  given  a  categorical  and  unmistakable  reply  to  all 
the  insidious  attempts  to  place  her  outside  and  beyond 
the  operation  of  international  law  and  all  those  sane- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  389 

tions  which  make  life  worth  hving;  and  because  of  the 
formal  birth  of  a  Foreign  Policy  it  can  be  definitely 
expected  that  this  nation,  despite  its  internal  troubles 
and  struggles,  will  never  rest  content  until  she  has  cre- 
ated a  new  nexus  of  world-relationships  which  shall 
affirm  and  apply  every  one  of  the  principles  experience 
elsewhere  has  proved  are  the  absolute  essentials  to  peace 
and  happiness.  China  is  already  many  decades  ahead 
of  Japan  in  her  theory  of  government,  no  matter  what 
the  practice  may  be,  the  marvellous  revolution  of  1911 
having  given  back  to  this  ancient  race  its  old  position 
of  leader  in  ideas  on  the  shores  of  the  Yellow  Sea. 
The  whole  dream  Japan  has  cherished,  and  has  sought 
to  give  form  to  during  the  war,  is  in  the  last  analysis 
antiquated  and  forlorn  and  must  ultimately  dissolve 
into  thin  air;  for  it  is  monstrous  to  suppose,  in  an  age 
when  European  men  have  sacrificed  everything  to  free 
themselves  from  the  last  vestiges  of  feudalism,  that  in 
the  Far  East  the  cult  of  Sparta  should  remain  a  hal- 
lowed and  respected  doctrine.  Japan's  policy  in  the 
Far  East  during  the  period  of  the  war  has  been  uni- 
formly mischievous  and  is  largely  responsible  for  the 
fierce  hatreds  which  burst  out  in  1917  over  the  war  issue; 
and  China  will  be  forced  to  raise  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment  the  whole  question  of  the  validity  of  the  under- 
takings extorted  from  her  in  1915  under  the  threat  of  an 
ultimatum.  Although  the  precise  nature  of  Anglo- 
Japanese  diplomacy  during  the  vital  eleven  days  from 
the  4th  to  the  15th  August,  1914,  [i.  e.  from  the  Brit- 
ish declaration  of  war  on  Germany  to  the  Japanese  ulti- 
matum regarding  Kiaochow]  remains  a  sealed  book, 
China  suspects  that  Japan  from  the  very  beginning  of 
the  present  war  world-struggle  has  taken  advantage  of 


390  THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE 

England's  vast  commitments  and  acted  ultra  vires, 
China  hopes  and  beheves  that  Britain  will  never  again 
renew  the  Japanese  alliance,  which  expires  in  1921,  in  its 
present  form,  particularly  now  that  an  Anglo-American 
agreement  has  been  made  possible.  China  knows  that 
in  spite  of  all  coquetting  with  both  the  extreme  radical 
and  military  parties  which  is  going  on  daily  in  Peking 
and  the  provinces,  the  secret  object  of  Japanese  diplom- 
acy is  either  the  restoration  of  the  Manchu  dynasty,  or 
the  enthronement  of  some  pliant  usurper,  a  puppet- 
Emperor  being  what  is  needed  to  repeat  in  China  the 
history  of  Korea.  Japan  would  be  willing  to  go  to 
any  lengths  to  secure  the  attainment  of  this  reaction- 
ary object.  Faithful  to  her  "divine  mission,"  she  is 
ceaselessly  stirring  up  trouble  and  hoping  that  time 
may  still  be  left  her  to  consolidate  her  position  on  the 
Asiatic  mainland,  one  of  her  latest  methods  being  to 
busy  herself  at  distant  points  in  the  Pacific  so  that 
Western  men  for  the  sake  of  peace  may  be  ultimately 
willing  to  abandon  the  shores  of  the  Yellow  Seas  to 
her  unchallenged  mastery. 

The  problem  thus  outlined  becomes  a  great  dramatic 
thing.  The  lines  which  trace  the  problem  are  immense, 
stretching  from  China  to  every  shore  bathed  by  the 
Pacific  and  then  from  there  to  the  distant  west. 
Whenever  there  is  a  dull  calm,  that  calm  must  be  treated 
solely  as  an  intermission,  an  interval  between  the  acts, 
a  preparation  for  something  more  sensational  than  the 
last  episode,  but  not  as  a  permanent  settlement  which 
can  only  come  by  the  methods  we  have  indicated.  For 
the  Chinese  question  is  no  longer  a  local  problem,  but  a 
great  world-issue  which  statesmen  must  regulate  by 
conferences  in  which  universal  principles  will  be  vin- 


REPUBLIC  IN  CHINA  391 

dicated  if  they  wish  permanently  to  ehminate  what  is 
ahnost  the  last  remaining  international  powder-maga- 
zine. A  China  that  is  henceforth  not  only  admitted  to 
the  family  of  nations  on  terms  of  equality  but  welcomed 
as  a  representative  of  Liberalism  and  a  subscriber  to  all 
those  sanctions  on  which  the  civilization  of  peace  rests, 
will  directly  tend  to  adjust  every  other  Asiatic  problem 
and  to  prevent  a  recrudescence  of  those  evil  phenomena 
which  are  the  enemies  of  progress  and  happiness.  Is 
it  too  much  to  dream  of  such  a  consummation?  We 
think  not.  It  is  to  America  and  to  England  that  China 
looks  to  rehabilitate  herself  and  to  make  her  Republic 
a  reality.  If  they  lend  her  their  help,  if  they  are  con- 
sistent, there  is  still  no  reason  why  this  democracy  on 
the  shores  of  the  Yellow  Sea  should  not  be  reinstated 
in  the  proud  position  it  occupied  twenty  centuries  ago, 
when  it  furnished  the  very  silks  which  clothed  the  daugh- 
ters of  the  Caesars. 


APPENDIX 
DOCUMENTS  IN  GROUP  I 

(1)  The  so-called  Nineteen  Articles,  being  the  grant  made 
by  the  Throne  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Wuchang  Rebellion  in 
1911  in  a  vain  attempt  to  satisfy  the  nation. 

(2)  The  Abdication  Edicts  issued  on  the  12th  February, 
1912,  endorsing  the  establishment  of  the  Republic. 

(3)  The  terms  of  abdication,  generally  referred  to  as  "The 
articles  of  Favourable  Treatment,"  in  which  special  provision 
is  made  for  the  "rights"  of  Manchus,  Mongols,  Mohammedans 
and  Tibetans,  who  are  considered  as  being  outside  the  Chinese 
nation. 

THE  NINETEEN  ARTICLES 

1.  The  Ta-Ching  Dynasty  shall  reign  for  ever. 

2.  The  person  of  the  Emperor  shall  be  inviolable. 

3.  The  power  of  the  Emperor  shall  be  limited  by  a  Constitu- 
tion. 

4.  The  order  of  the  succession  shall  be  prescribed  in  the  Con- 
stitution. 

5.  The  Constitution  shall  be  drawn  up  and  adopted  by  the 
National  Assembly,  and  promulgated  by  the  Emperor. 

6.  The  power  of  amending  the  Constitution  belongs  to  Par- 
liament. 

7.  The  members  of  the  Upper  House  shall  be  elected  by  the 
people  from  among  those  particularly  eligible  for  the  position. 

8.  Parliament  shall  select,  and  the  Emperor  shall  appoint, 
the  Premier,  who  will  recommend  the  other  members  of  the 
Cabinet,  these  also  being  appointed  by  the  Emperor.  The  Im- 
perial Princes  shall  be  ineligible  as  Premier,  Cabinet  Ministers, 
or  administrative  heads  of  provinces. 

9.  If  the  Premier,  on  being  impeached  by  Parliament,  does 
not  dissolve  Parliament  he  must  resign  but  one  Cabinet  shall 
not  be  allowed  to  dissolve  Parliament  more  than  once. 

10.  The  Emperor  shall  assume  direct  control  of  the  army 

393 


394  APPENDIX 

and  navy,  but  when  that  power  is  used  with  regard  to  internal 
affairs,  he  must  observe  special  conditions,  to  be  decided  upon 
by  Parliament,  otherwise  he  is  prohibited  from  exercising  such 
power. 

11.  Imperial  decrees  cannot  be  made  to  replace  the  law  ex- 
cept in  the  event  of  immediate  necessity  in  which  case  decrees 
in  the  nature  of  a  law  may  be  issued  in  accordance  with  special 
conditions,  but  only  when  they  are  in  connection  with  the  exe- 
cution of  a  law  or  what  has  by  law  been  delegated. 

12.  International  treaties  shall  not  be  concluded  without  the 
consent  of  Parliament,  but  the  conclusion  of  peace  or  a  dec- 
laration of  war  may  be  made  by  the  Emperor  if  Parliament 
is  not  sitting,  the  approval  of  Parliament  to  be  obtained  after- 
wards. 

13.  Ordinances  in  connection  with  the  administration  shall  be 
settled  by  Acts  of  Parliament. 

14.  In  case  the  Budget  fails  to  receive  the  approval  of  Par- 
liament the  Government  cannot  act  upon  the  previous  year's 
Budget,  nor  may  items  of  expenditure  not  provided  for  in  the 
Budget  be  appended  to  it.  Further,  the  Government  shall  not 
be  allowed  to  adopt  extraordinary  financial  measures  outside 
the  Budget. 

15.  Parliament  shall  fix  the  expenses  of  the  Imperial  house- 
hold, and  any  increase  or  decrease  therein. 

16.  Regulations  in  connection  with  the  Imperial  family  must 
not  conflict  with  the  Constitution. 

17.  The  two  Houses  shall  establish  the  machinery  of  an  ad- 
ministrative court. 

18.  The  Emperor  shall  promulgate  the  decisions  of  Parlia- 
ment. 

19.  The  National  Assembly  shall  act  upon  Articles  8,  9,  10, 
12,  13,  14,  15  and  18  until  the  opening  of  Parliament. 

EDICTS  OF  ABDICATION 
I 

We  (the  Emperor)  have  respectfully  received  the  following 
Imperial  Edict  from  Her  Imperial  Majesty  the  Empress 
Dowager  Lung  Yu: — 


APPENDIX  895 

As  a  consequence  of  the  uprising  of  the  Republican  Army, 
to  which  the  different  provinces  immediately  responded,  the 
Empire  seethed  like  a  boiling  cauldron  and  the  people  were 
plunged  into  utter  misery.  Yuan  Shih-kai  was,  therefore,  es- 
pecially commanded  some  time  ago  to  dispatch  commissioners 
to  confer  with  the  representatives  of  the  Republican  Army  on 
the  general  situation  and  to  discuss  matters  pertaining  to  the 
convening  of  a  National  Assembly  for  the  decision  of  the 
suitable  mode  of  settlement  has  been  discovered.  Separated  as 
the  South  and  the  North  are  by  great  distances,  the  unwilling- 
ness of  either  side  to  yield  to  the  other  can  result  only  in  the 
continued  interruption  of  trade  and  the  prolongation  of  hos- 
tilities, for,  so  long  as  the  form  of  government  is  undecided,  the 
Nation  can  have  no  peace.  It  is  now  evident  that  the  hearts 
of  the  majority  of  the  people  are  in  favour  of  a  republican  form 
of  government :  the  provinces  of  the  South  were  the  first  to 
espouse  the  cause,  and  the  generals  of  the  North  have  since 
pledged  their  support.  From  the  preference  of  the  people's 
hearts,  the  Will  of  Heaven  can  be  discerned.  How  could  We 
then  bear  to  oppose  the  will  of  the  millions  for  the  glory  of  one 
Family !  Therefore,  observing  the  tendencies  of  the  age  on  the 
one  hand  and  studying  the  opinions  of  the  people  on  the  other. 
We  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  hereby  vest  the  sovereignty 
in  the  People  and  decide  in  favour  of  a  republican  form  of  con- 
stitutional government.  Thus  we  would  gratify  on  the  one 
hand  the  desires  of  the  whole  nation  who,  tired  of  anarchy,  are 
desirous  of  peace,  and  on  the  other  hand  would  follow  in  the 
footsteps  of  the  Ancient  Sages,  who  regarded  the  Throne  as  the 
sacred  trust  of  the  Nation. 

Now  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  elected  by  the  Tucheng-yuan  to  be 
the  Premier.  During  this  period  of  transference  of  govern- 
ment from  the  old  to  the  new,  there  should  be  some  means  of 
uniting  the  South  and  the  North.  Let  Yuan  Shih-kai  organize 
with  full  powers  a  provisional  republican  government  and  con- 
fer with  the  Republican  Army  as  to  the  methods  of  union,  thus 
assuring  peace  to  the  people  and  tranquillity  to  the  Empire, 
and  forming  the  one  Great  Republic  of  China  by  the  union  as 
heretofore,  of  the  five  peoples,  namely,  Manchus,  Chinese,  Mon- 


396  APPENDIX 

gols,  Mohammedans,  and  Tibetans  together  with  their  terri- 
tory in  its  integrity.  We  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  thus 
enabled  to  Hve  in  retirement,  free  from  responsibiHties,  and 
cares  and  passing  the  time  in  ease  and  comfort,  shall  enjoy  with- 
out interruption  the  courteous  treatment  of  the  Nation  and  see 
with  Our  own  eyes  the  consummation  of  an  illustrious  govern- 
ment.    Is  not  this  highly  advisable? 

Bearing  the  Imperial  Seal  and  Signed  by  Yuan  Shih-kai,  the 
Premier ; 

Hoo  Wei-teh,  Acting  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs ; 

Chao  Ping-chun,  Minister  of  the  Interior; 

Tan  Hsuch-heng,  Acting  Minister  of  Navy ; 

Hsi  Yen,  Acting  Minister  of  Agriculture,  Works   and  Com- 
merce ; 

Liang  Shih-yi,  Acting  Minister  of  Communications ; 

Ta  Shou,  Acting  Minister  of  the  Dependencies. 

^5th  day  of  the  12th  moon  of  the  3rd  year  of  Hsuan  Tung. 

II 

We  have  respectfully  received  the  following  Imperial  Edict 
from  Her  Imperial  Majesty  the  Empress  Dowager  Lung  Yu: — 

On  account  of  the  perilous  situation  of  the  State  and  the 
intense  sufferings  of  the  people,  We  some  time  ago  commanded 
the  Cabinet  to  negotiate  with  the  Republican  Army  the  terms 
for  the  courteous  treatment  of  the  Imperial  House,  with  a  view 
to  a  peaceful  settlement.  According  to  the  memorial  now  sub- 
mitted to  Us  by  the  Cabinet  embodying  the  articles  of  courteous 
treatment  proposed  by  the  Republican  Army,  they  undertake 
to  hold  themselves  responsible  for  the  perpetual  offering  of 
sacrifices  before  the  Imperial  Ancestral  Temples  and  the  Im- 
perial Mausolea  and  the  completion  as  planned  of  the  Man- 
soleum  of  His  Late  Majesty  the  Emperor  Kuang  Hsu.  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  is  understood  to  resign  only  his  political 
power,  while  the  Imperial  Title  is  not  abolished.  There  have 
also  been  concluded  eight  articles  for  the  courteous  treatment 
of  the  Imperial  House,  four  articles  for  the  favourable  treat- 
ment of  Manchus,  Mongols,  Mohammedans,  and  Tibetans.     We 


APPENDIX  397 

find  the  terms  of  perusal  to  be  fairly  comprehensive.  We  hereby 
proclaim  to  the  Imperial  Kinsmen  and  the  Manchus,  Mongols, 
Mohammedans,  and  Tibetans  that  they  should  endeavour  in 
the  future  to  fuse  and  remove  all  racial  differences  and  preju- 
dices and  maintain  law  and  order  with  united  efforts.  It  is  our 
sincere  hope  that  peace  will  once  more  be  seen  in  the  country  and 
all  the  people  will  enjoy  happiness  under  a  republican  govern- 
ment. 

Bearing  the  Imperial  Seal  and  Signed  by  Yuan  Shih-kai,  the 

Premier ; 
Hoo  Wei-teh,  Acting  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs ; 
Chao  Ping-chun,  Minister  of  the  Interior; 
Tan  Hsuen-heng,  Acting  Minister  of  the  Navy ; 
Hsi  Yen,  Acting  Minister   of  Agriculture,  Works   and  Com- 
merce; 
Liang  Shih-yi,  Acting  Minister  of  Communications ; 
Ta  Shou,  Acting  Minister  of  the  Dependencies. 

25th  day  of  the  12th  moon  of  the  3rd  year  of  Hsuan  Tung. 

in 

We  have  respectfully  received  the  following  Edict  from  Her 
Imperial  Majesty  the  Empress  Dowager  Lung  Yu: — 

In  ancient  times  the  ruler  of  a  country  emphasized  the  Im- 
portant duty  of  protecting  the  lives  of  his  people,  and  as  their 
shepherd  could  not  have  the  heart  to  cause  them  injury.  Now 
the  newly  established  form  of  government  has  for  its  sole  object 
the  appeasement  of  the  present  disorder  with  a  view  to  the  res- 
toration of  peace.  If,  however,  renewed  warfare  were  to  be 
indefinitely  maintained,  by  disregarding  the  opinion  of  the  ma- 
jority of  the  people,  the  general  condition  of  the  country  might 
be  irretrievably  ruined,  and  there  might  follow  mutual  slaughter 
among  the  people,  resulting  In  the  horrible  effects  of  a  racial 
war.  As  a  consequence,  the  spirits  of  Our  Imperial  Ancestors 
might  be  greatly  disturbed  and  millions  of  people  might  be  ter- 
rorized. The  evil  consequences  cannot  be  described.  Between 
the  two  evils.  We  have  adopted  the  lesser  one.  Such  is  the 
motive  of  the  Throne  in  modelling  its  policy  in  accordance 


398  APPENDIX 

with  the  progress  of  time,  the  change  of  circumstances,  and  the 
earnest  desires  of  Our  People.  Our  Ministers  and  subjects  both 
in  and  out  of  the  MetropoHs  should,  in  conformity  with  Our 
idea,  consider  most  carefully  the  public  weal  and  should  not 
cause  the  country  and  the  people  to  suffer  from  the  evil  conse- 
quences of  a  stubborn  pride  and  of  prejudiced  opinions. 

The  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  the  General  Commandant  of 
the  Gendarmerie,  Chiang  Kuei-ti,  and  Feng  Kuo-chang,  are 
ordered  to  take  strict  precautions,  and  to  make  explanations  to 
the  peoples  so  clearly  and  precisely  as  to  enable  every  and  all 
of  them  to  understand  the  wish  of  the  Throne  to  abide  by  the 
ordinance  of  heaven,  to  meet  the  public  opinion  of  the  people 
and  to  be  just  and  unselfish. 

The  institution  of  the  different  offices  by  the  State  has  been 
for  the  welfare  of  the  people,  and  the  Cabinet,  the  various 
Ministries  in  the  Capital,  the  Vice-royalties,  Governorships, 
Commissionerships,  and  Taotaiships,  have  therefore  been  estab- 
lished for  the  safe  protection  of  the  people,  and  not  for  the 
benefit  of  one  man  or  of  one  family.  Metropolitan  and  Pro- 
vincial officials  of  all  grades  should  ponder  over  the  present 
difficulties  and  carefully  perform  their  duties.  We  hereby  hold 
it  the  duty  of  the  senior  officials  earnestly  to  advise  and  warn 
their  subordinates  not  to  shirk  their  responsibilities,  in  order 
to  conform  with  Our  original  sincere  intention  to  love  and  to 
take  care  of  Our  people. 

Bearing  the  Imperial  Seal  and  Signed  by  Yuan  Shih-kai,  the 
Premier; 

Hoo  Wei-teh,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs; 

Chao-ping-chun,  Minister  of  the  Interior; 

Tan  Hseuh-heng,  Acting  Minister  of  the  Navy ; 

Hsi  Yen,  Acting  Minister  of  Agriculture,  Works  and  Com- 
merce ; 

Liang  Shih-yi,  Acting  Minister  of  Communications ; 

Ta  Shou,  Acting  Minister  of  the  Dependencies. 

25th   day   of   the   12th  moon   of   the   3rd  year  of  Hsuan 
Tung. 


APPENDIX  399 


TERMS  OP  ABDICATION 

N.  B.  These  terms  are  generally  referred  to  in  China  as 
"The  Articles  of  Favourable  Treatments." 

A. — Concerning  the  Emperor. 

The  Ta  Ching  Emperor  having  proclaimed  a  republican 
form  of  government,  the  Republic  of  China  will  accord  the  fol- 
lowing treatment  to  the  Emperor  after  his  resignation  and 
retirement. 

Article  1.  After  abdication  the  Emperor  may  retain  his 
title  and  shall  receive  from  the  Republic  of  China  the  respect 
due  to  a  foreign  sovereign. 

Article  2.  After  the  abdication  the  Throne  shall  receive 
from  the  Republic  of  China  an  annuity  of  Tls.  4,000,000  until 
the  establishment  of  a  new  currency,  when  the  sum  shall  be 
$4,000,000. 

Article  3.  After  abdication  the  Emperor  shall  for  the  pres- 
ent be  allowed  to  reside  in  the  Imperial  Palace,  but  shall  later 
remove  to  the  Eho  Park,  retaining  his  bodyguards  at  the  same 
strength  as  hitherto. 

Article  4.  After  abdication  the  Emperor  shall  continue  to 
perform  the  religious  ritual  at  the  Imperial  Ancestral  Temples 
and  Mausolea,  which  shall  be  protected  by  guards  provided  by 
the  Republic  of  China. 

Article  5.  The  Mausoleum  of  the  late  Emperor  not  being 
completed,  the  work  shall  be  carried  out  according  to  the  orig- 
inal plans,  and  the  services  in  connexion  with  the  removal  of 
the  remains  of  the  late  Emperor  to  the  new  Mausoleum  shall  be 
carried  out  as  originally  arranged,  the  expense  being  borne  by 
the  Republic  of  China. 

Article  6.  All  the  retinue  of  the  Imperial  Household  shall  be 
employed  as  hitherto,  but  no  more  eunuchs  shall  be  appointed. 

Article  7.  After  abdication  all  the  private  property  of  the 
Emperor  shall  be  respected  and  protected  by  the  Republic  of 
China. 

Article  8.  The  Imperial  Guards  will  be  retained  without 
change  in  members  or  emolument,  but  they  will  be  placed  under 
the  control  of  the  Department  of  War  of  the  Repubhc  of  China. 


400  APPENDIX 

B. — Concerning   the   Imperial    Clansmen. 

Article  1.  Princes,  Dukes  and  other  hereditary  nobility 
shall  retain  their  titles  as  hitherto. 

Article  2.  Imperial  Clansmen  shall  enjoy  public  and  private 
rights  in  the  Republic  of  China  on  an  equality  with  all  other 
citizens. 

Article  3.  The  private  property  of  the  Imperial  Clansmen 
shall  be  duly  protected. 

Article  4.  The  Imperial  Clansmen  shall  be  exempt  from 
military  service. 

C. — Concerning  Manchus,  Mongols,  Mohammedans  and 
Tibetans. 

The  Manchus,  Mongols,  Mohammedans  and  Tibetans  having 
accepted  the  Republic,  the  following  terms  are  accorded  to 
them : — 

Article  1.     They  shall  enjoy  full  equality  with  Chinese. 

Article  2.  They  shall  enjoy  the  full  protection  of  their 
private  property. 

Article  3.  Princes,  Dukes  and  other  hereditary  nobility 
shall  retain  their  titles  as  hitherto. 

Article  4.  Impoverished  Princes  and  Dukes  shall  be  pro- 
vided with  means  of  livelihood. 

Article  5.  Provision  for  the  livelihood  of  the  Eight  Banners, 
shall  with  all  dispatch  be  made,  but  until  such  provision  has 
been  made  the  pay  of  the  Eight  Banners  shall  be  continued  as 
hitherto. 

Article  6.  Restrictions  regarding  trade  and  residence  that 
have  hitherto  been  binding  on  them  are  abolished,  and  they  shall 
now  be  allowed  to  reside  and  settle  in  any  department  or  dis- 
trict. 

Article  7.  Manchus,  Mongols,  Mohammedans  and  Tibetans 
shall  enjoy  complete  religious  freedom. 


APPENDIX 
DOCUMENTS  IN  GROUP  II 

(1)  The  Provisional  Constitution  passed  at  Nanking  in 
January,  1912. 

(2)  The  Presidential  Election  Law  passed  on  the  4th 
October,  1913,  by  the  full  Parliament,  under  which  Yuan  Shih 
Kai  was  elected  President, — and  now  formally  incorporated  as 
a  separate  chapter  in  the  Permanent  Constitution. 

(3)  The  Constitutional  Compact,  promulgated  on  1st  May, 
1914.  This  "law"  which  was  the  first  result  of  the  coup  d'etat 
of  4ih  November,  1913,  and  designed  to  take  the  place  of  the 
Nanking  Constitution  is  wholly  illegal  and  disappeared  with 
the  death  of  Yuan  Shih  Kai. 

(4)  The  Presidential  Succession  Law. 

This  instrument,  like  the  Constitutional  Compact,  was  wholly 
illegal  and  drawn  up  to  make  Yuan  Shih  Kai  dictator  for  life. 

THE  PROVISIONAL  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE 
REPUBLIC  OF  CHINA 

Passed  at  Nanking  in  1912,  currently  referred  to  as  the  old 

Constitution 

CHAPTER  I. GENERAL  PROVISIONS 

Article  1.  The  Republic  of  China  is  composed  of  the  Chinese 
people. 

Art.  2.  The  sovereignty  of  the  Chinese  Republic  is  vested 
in  the  people. 

Art.  3.  The  territory  of  the  Chinese  Republic  consists  of 
the  18  provinces,  Inner  and  Outer  Mongolia,  Tibet  and  Ching- 
hai. 

Art.  4.  The  sovereignty  of  the  Chinese  Republic  is  exer- 
cised by  the  National  Council,  the  Provisional  President,  the 

Cabinet  and  the  Judiciary. 

401 


402  APPENDIX 

CHAPTER   II. CITIZENS 

Art.  5.     Citizens  of  the  Chinese  Republic  are  all  equal,  and 
there  shall  be  no  racial  class  or  religious  distinctions. 
Art.  6.      Citizens  shall  enjoy  the  following  rights: — 

(a)  The  person  of  the  citizens  shall  not  be  arrested,  im- 
prisoned, tried  or  punished  except  in  accordance  with 
law. 

(b)  The  habitations  of  citizens  shall  not  be  entered  or 
searched  except  in  accordance  with  law. 

(c)  Citizens  shall  enjoy  the  right  of  the  security  of  their 
property  and  the  freedom  of  trade. 

(d)  Citizens  shall  have  the  freedom  of  speech,  of  composi- 
tion, of  publication,  of  assembly  and  of  association. 

(e)  Citizens  shall  have  the  right  of  the  secrecy  of  their 
letters. 

'     (f)   Citizens  shall  have  the  liberty  of  residence  and  removal, 
(g)    Citizens  shall  have  the  freedom  of  religion. 

Art.  7.  Citizens  shall  have  the  right  to  petition  the  Par- 
liament. 

Art.  8.  Citizens  shall  have  the  right  of  petitioning  the  ex- 
ecutive officials. 

Art.  9.  Citizens  shall  have  the  right  to  institute  proceed- 
ings before  the  Judiciary,  and  to  receive  its  trial  and  judgment. 

Art.  10.  Citizens  shall  have  the  right  of  suing  officials  in 
the  Administrative  Courts  for  violation  of  law  or  against  their 
rights. 

Art.  11.  Citizens  shall  have  the  right  of  participating  in 
civil  examinations. 

Art.  12.  Citizens  shall  have  the  right  to  vote  and  to  be 
voted  for. 

Art.  13.  Citizens  shall  have  the  duty  to  pay  taxes  acfcord- 
ing  to  law. 

Art.  14!.  Citizens  shall  have  the  duty  to  enlist  as  soldiers 
according  to  law. 

Art.  15.  The  rights  of  citizens  as  provided  in  the  present 
Chapter  shall  be  limited  or  modified  by  laws,  provided  such  lim- 
itation or  modification  shall  be  deemed  necessary  for  the  promo- 


APPENDIX  403 

tion  of  public  welfare,  for  the  maintenance  of  public  order,  or 
on  account  of  extraordinary  exigency. 

CHAPTER  III. THE  NATIONAL  COUNCIL, 

Art.  16.  The  legislative  power  of  the  Chinese  Republic  is 
exercised  by  the  National  Council. 

Art.  17.  The  Council  shall  be  composed  of  members  elected 
by  the  several  districts  as  provided  in  Article  18. 

Art.  18.  The  Provinces,  Inner  and  Outer  Mongolia,  and 
Tibet  shall  each  elect  and  depute  five  members  to  the  Council, 
and  Chinghai  shall  elect  one  member. 

The  election  districts  and  methods  of  elections  shall  be  de- 
cided by  the  localities  concerned. 

During  the  meeting  of  the  Council  each  member  shall  have  one 
vote. 

Art.  19.  The  National  Council  shall  have  the  following 
powers : 

(a)  To  pass  all  Bills. 

(b)  To  pass  the  budgets  of  the  Provisional  Government. 

(c)  To  pass  laws  of  taxation  of  currency,  and  weights  and 
measures  for  the  whole  country. 

(d)  To  pass  measures  for  the  calling  of  public  loans  and  to 
conclude  contracts  affecting  the  National  Treasury. 

(e)  To  give  consent  to  matters  provided  in  Articles  34,  35, 
and  40. 

(f)  To  reply  to  inquiries  from  the  Provisional  Government. 

(g)  To  receive  and  consider  petitions  of  citizens. 

(h)  To  make  suggestions  to  the  Government  on  legal  or  other 
matters. 

(i)  To  introduce  interpellations  to  members  of  the  Cabinet, 
and  to  insist  on  their  being  present  in  the  Council  in 
making  replies  thereto. 

(j)  To  insist  on  the  Government  investigating  into  any  al- 
leged bribery  and  infringement  of  laws  by  officials. 

(k)  To  impeach  the  Provisional  President  for  high  treason 
by  a  majority  vote  of  three-fourths  of  the  quorum  con- 
sisting of  more  than  four-fifths  of  the  total  number  of 
the  members. 


404  APPENDIX 

(1)  To  Impeach  members  of  the  Cabinet  for  failure  to  per- 
form their  official  duties  or  for  violation  of  the  law  by 
majority  votes  of  two-thirds  of  the  quorum  consisting 
of  over  three-fourths  of  the  total  number  of  the  mem- 
bers. 

Art.  20.  The  National  Council  shall  itself  convoke,  con- 
duct and  adjourn  its  own  meetings. 

Art.  21.  The  meetings  of  the  Advisory  Council  shall  be 
conducted  publicly,  but  secret  meetings  may  be  held  at  the  sug- 
gestion of  members  of  the  Cabinet  or  by  the  majority  vote  of 
its  quorum. 

Art.  22.  Matters  passed  by  the  Advisory  Council  shall  be 
communicated  to  the  Provisional  President  for  promulgation 
and  execution. 

Art.  23.  If  the  Provisional  President  should  veto  matters 
passed  by  the  National  Council  he  shall,  within  ten  days  after 
he  has  received  such  resolutions,  return  the  same  with  stated 
reasons  to  the  Council  for  reconsideration.  If  by  a  two-thirds 
vote  of  the  quorum  of  the  Council,  it  shall  be  dealt  with  in  ac- 
cordance with  Article  22. 

Art.  24.  The  Chairman  of  the  National  Council  shall  be 
elected  by  ballots  signed  by  the  voting  members  and  the  one 
receiving  more  than  one-half  of  the  total  number  of  the  votes 
cast  shall  be  elected. 

Art.  25.  Members  of  the  National  Council  shall  not,  out- 
side the  Council,  be  responsible  for  their  opinion  expressed  and 
votes  cast  in  the  Council. 

Art.  26.  Members  of  the  Council  shall  not  be  arrested  with- 
out the  permission  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  except  for 
crimes  pertaining  to  civil  and  international  warfare. 

Art.  27.  Procedure  of  the  National  Council  shall  be  de- 
cided by  its  own  members. 

Art.  28.  The  National  Council  shall  be  dissolved  on  the  day 
of  the  convocation  of  the  National  Assembly,  and  its  powers 
shall  be  exercised  by  the  latter. 


APPENDIX  405 

CHAPTEE  IV. THE  PROVISIONAL  PRESIDENT  AND  VICE-PRESIDENT 

Art.  29.  The  Provisional  President  and  Vice-President 
shall  be  elected  by  the  National  Council,  and  he  who  receives 
two-thirds  of  the  total  number  of  votes  cast  by  a  sitting  of  the 
Council  consisting  of  over  three-fourths  of  the  total  number 
of  members  shall  be  elected. 

Art.  30.  The  Provisional  President  represents  the  Provi- 
sional Government  as  the  fountain  of  all  executive  powers  and 
for  promulgating  all  laws. 

Art.  31.  The  Provisional  President  may  issue  or  cause  to 
be  issued  orders  for  the  execution  of  laws  and  of  powers  dele- 
gated to  him  by  the  law. 

Art.  32.  The  Provisional  President  shall  be  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  whole  of  China. 

Art.  33.  The  Provisional  President  shall  ordain  and  estab- 
lish the  administrative  system  and  official  regulations,  but  he 
must  first  submit  them  to  the  National  Council  for  its  approval. 

Art.  34.  The  Provisional  President  shall  appoint  and  re- 
move civil  and  military  officials,  but  in  the  appointment  of  Mem- 
bers of  the  Cabinet,  Ambassadors  and  Ministers  he  must  have 
the  concurrence  of  the  National  Council. 

Art.  35.  The  Provisional  President  shall  have  power,  with 
the  concurrence  of  the  National  Council,  to  declare  war  and 
conclude  treaties. 

Art.  36.  The  Provisional  President  may,  in  accordance 
with  law,  declare  a  state  of  siege. 

Art.  37.  The  Provisional  President  shall,  representing  the 
whole  country,  receive  Ambassadors  and  Ministers  of  foreign 
countries. 

Art.  38.  The  Provisional  President  may  introduce  Bills  into 
the  National  Council. 

Art.  39.  The  Provisional  President  may  confer  decorations 
and  other  insignia  of  honour. 

Art.  40.  The  Provisional  President  may  declare  general 
amnesty,  grant  special  pardon,  commute  punishment,  and  re- 
store rights,  but  in  the  case  of  a  general  amnesty  he  must  have 
the  concurrence  of  the  National  Council. 

Art.  41.     In  case  the  Provisional  President  is  impeached  by 


406  APPENDIX 

the  National  Council  he  shall  be  tried  by  a  special  Court  con- 
sisting of  nine  judges  elected  among  the  justices  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  realm. 

Art.  42.  In  case  the  Provisional  President  vacates  his  office 
for  various  reasons,  or  is  unable  to  discharge  the  powers  and 
duties  of  the  said  office,  the  Provisional  Vice-President  shall 
take  his  place. 

CHAPTEK.    V. MEMBEKS    OF    THE    CABINET 

Art.  43.  The  Premier  and  the  Chiefs  of  the  Government 
Departments  shall  be  called  Members  of  the  Cabinet  (literally, 
Secretaries  of  State  Affairs). 

Art.  44.  Members  of  the  Cabinet  shall  assist  the  Provi- 
sional President  in  assuming  responsibilities. 

Art.  45.  Members  of  the  Cabinet  shall  countersign  all  Bills 
introduced  by  the  Provisional  President,  and  all  laws  and  orders 
issued  by  him. 

Art.  46.  Members  of  the  Cabinet  and  their  deputies  may 
be  present  and  speak  in  the  National  Council. 

Art.  47.  Upon  members  of  the  Cabinet  have  been  impeached 
by  the  National  Council,  the  Provisional  President  may  re- 
move them  from  office,  but  such  removal  shall  be  subject  to  the 
reconsideration  of  the  National  Council. 

CHAPTER  VI. THE  JUDICIAEY 

Art.  48.  The  Judiciary  shall  be  composed  of  those  judges 
appointed  by  the  Provisional  President  and  the  Minister  of 
Justice. 

The  organization  of  the  Courts  and  the  qualifications  of 
judges  shall  be  determined  by  law. 

Art.  49.  The  Judiciary  shall  try  civil  and  criminal  cases, 
but  cases  involving  administrative  affairs  or  arising  from  other 
particular  causes  shall  be  dealt  with  according  to  special  laws. 

Art.  50.  The  trial  of  cases  in  the  law  Courts  shall  be  con- 
ducted publicly,  but  those  affecting  public  safety  and  order 
may  be  in  camera. 

Art.  51.  Judges  shall  be  independent,  and  shall  not  be  ob- 
ject to  the  interference  of  higher  officials. 


APPENDIX  407 

Art.  52.  Judges  during  their  continuance  in  office  shall  not 
have  their  emoluments  decreased  and  shall  not  be  transferred 
to  other  offices,  nor  shall  they  be  removed  from  office  except 
when  they  are  convicted  of  crimes,  or  of  offences  punishable 
according  to  law  by  removal  from  office. 

Regulations  for  the  punishment  of  judges  shall  be  determined 
by  law. 

CHAPTER  Vn. SUPPLEMENTARY  ARTICLES 

Art.  53.  Within  ten  months  after  the  promulgation  of  this 
Provisional  Constitution  the  Provisional  President  shall  con- 
vene a  National  Assembly,  the  organization  of  which  and  the 
laws  for  the  election  of  whose  members  shall  be  decided  by  the 
National  Council. 

Art.  54.  The  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall 
be  adopted  by  the  National  Assembly,  but  before  the  promulga- 
tion of  the  Constitution,  the  Provisional  Constitution  shall  be 
as  effective  as  the  Constitution  itself. 

Art.  55.  The  Provisional  Constitution  may  be  amended  by 
the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the  members  of  the  National  Council 
or  upon  the  application  of  the  Provisional  President  and  being 
passed  by  over  three-fourths  of  the  quorum  of  the  Council  con- 
sisting of  over  four-fifths  of  the  total  number  of  its  members. 

Art.  56.  The  present  Provisional  Constitution  shall  take 
effect  on  the  date  of  its  promulgation,  and  the  fundamental 
articles  for  the  organization  of  the  Provisional  Government 
shall  cease  to  be  effective  on  the  same  date. 

Sealed  by 
The  National  Council. 

THE  PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTION  LAW 

Passed  October  Jp,  1913,  hy  the  National  Assembly  and  promtd- 
gated  by  the  then  Provisional  President  on  October  5  of 
the  same  year. 

Article  1.  A  citizen  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  who  is  entitled 
to  all  the  rights  of  citizenship,  is  40  years  or  more  in  age  and 
has  resided  in  China  for  not  less  than  ten  years,  is  eligible  for 
election  as  President. 


408  APPENDIX 

Art.  2.  The  President  shall  be  elected  by  an  Electoral  Col- 
lege organized  by  the  members  of  the  National  Assembly  of  the 
Chinese  Republic. 

The  said  election  shall  be  held  by  a  quorum  of  two-thirds  or 
more  of  the  entire  membership  of  the  said  Electoral  College  and 
shall  be  conducted  by  secret  ballot.  A  candidate  shall  be 
deemed  elected  when  the  number  of  votes  in  his  favour  shall 
not  be  less  than  three-fourths  of  the  total  number  of  votes  cast 
at  the  election.  If  no  candidate  secures  the  requisite  number 
of  votes  after  two  ballotings,  a  final  balloting  shall  be  held  with 
the  two  persons,  securing  the  greatest  number  of  votes  at  the 
second  balloting,  as  candidates.  The  one  securing  a  majority 
of  votes  shall  be  elected. 

Art.  3.  The  term  of  office  of  the  President  shall  be  five 
years ;  and  if  re-elected,  he  may  hold  office  for  one  more  term. 

Three  months  previous  to  the  expiration  of  the  term,  the 
members  of  the  National  Assembly  shall  convene  and  organize 
by  themselves  the  Electoral  College  to  elect  the  President  for 
the  next  period. 

Art.  4.  The  President  on  talcing  office  shall  make  oath  as 
follows : 

"I  hereby  swear  that  I  will  most  sincerely  obey  the  constitu- 
tion and  faithfully  discharge  the  duties  of  the  President." 

Art.  5.  Should  the  post  of  the  President  become  vacant,  the 
Vice-President  shall  succeed  to  the  same  to  the  end  of  the  term 
of  the  original  President. 

Should  the  President  be  unable  to  discharge  his  duties  for 
any  cause  the  Vice-President  shall  act  in  his  stead. 

Should  the  Vice-President  vacate  his  post  at  the  same  time, 
the  Cabinet  shall  officiate  for  the  President.  In  this  event  the 
members  of  the  National  Assembly  of  the  Chinese  Republic  shall 
convene  themselves  within  three  months  to  organize  an  Electoral 
College  to  elect  a  new  President. 

Art.  6.  The  President  shall  vacate  office  on  the  expiry  of 
his  term.  Should  the  election  of  the  next  President  or  Vice- 
President  be  not  effected  for  any  cause,  or  having  been  elected 
should  they  be  unable  to  be  inaugurated,  the  President  and 


APPENDIX  409 

Vice-President  whose  terms  have  expired  shall  quit  their  posts 
and  the  Cabinet  shall  officiate  for  them. 

Art.  7.  The  election  of  the  Vice-President  shall  be  accord- 
ing to  the  fixed  regulations  for  the  election  of  the  President, 
and  the  election  of  the  Vice-President  shall  take  place  at  the 
same  time  when  the  President  is  elected.  Should  there  be  a 
vacancy  for  the  Vice-Presidency  a  Vice-President  shall  be 
elected  according  to  the  provisions  herein  set  forth. 

APPENDIX 

Before  the  completion  of  the  Formal  Constitution,  with  re- 
gard to  the  duties  and  privileges  of  the  President  the  Pro- 
visional Constitution  regarding  the  same  shall  temporarily  be 
followed. 

"THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  COMPACT" 

Drafted  hy  Dr.  Frank  Johnson  Goodnow,  Legal  Adviser  to 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  and  promulgated  on  May  1,  1914- 

CHAPTER  I. THE   NATION 

Article  1.  The  Chung  Hua  Min  Kuo  is  organized  by  the 
people  of  Chung  Hua. 

Art.  2.  The  sovereignty  of  Chung  Hua  Min  Kuo  originates 
from  the  whole  body  of  the  citizens. 

Art.  3.  The  territory  of  the  Chung  Hua  Min  Kuo  is  the 
same  as  that  possessed  by  the  former  Empire. 

CHAPTER  n. THE  PEOPLE 

Art.  4.  The  people  of  the  Chung  Hua  Min  Kuo  are  all 
equal  in  law,  irrespective  of  race,  caste,  or  religion. 

Art.  5.  The  people  are  entitled  to  the  following  rights  of 
liberty : — 

(1)  No  person  shall  be  arrested,  imprisoned,  tried,  or  pun- 
ished except  in  accordance  with  law. 

(2)  The  habitation  of  any  person  shall  not  be  entered  or 
searched  except  in  accordance  with  law. 

(3)  The  people  have  the  right  of  possession  and  protection 


410  APPENDIX 

of  property  and  the  freedom  of  trade  within  the  bounds  of  law. 

(4)  The  people  have  the  right  of  freedom  of  speech,  of 
writing  and  publication,  of  meeting  and  organizing  association, 
within  the  bounds  of  law. 

(5)  The  people  have  the  right  of  the  secrecy  of  correspond- 
ence within  the  bounds  of  law. 

(6)  The  people  have  the  liberty  of  residence  and  removal, 
within  the  bounds  of  law. 

(7)  The  people  have  freedom  of  religious  belief,  within  the 
bounds  of  law. 

Art.  6.  The  people  have  the  right  to  memorialize  the  Li 
!Fa  Yuan  according  to  the  provisions  of  law. 

Art.  7.  The  people  have  the  right  to  institute  proceedings 
at  the  judiciary  organ  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
law. 

Art.  8.  The  people  have  the  right  to  petition  the  admin- 
istrative organs  and  lodge  protests  with  the  Administrative 
Court  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  law. 

Art.  9.  The  people  have  the  right  to  attend  examinations 
held  for  securing  officials  and  to  join  the  public  service  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  provisions  of  law. 

Art.  10.  The  people  have  the  right  to  vote  and  to  be  voted 
for  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  law. 

Art.  11.  The  people  have  the  obligation  to  pay  taxes  ac- 
cording to  the  provisions  of  law. 

Art.  12.  The  people  have  the  obligation  to  serve  in  a  mili- 
tary capacity  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  law. 

Art.  13.  The  provisions  made  in  this  Chapter,  except  when 
in  conflict  with  the  Army  or  Naval  orders  and  rules,  shall  be 
applicable  to  military  and  naval  men. 

CHAPTER   III. THE   PRESIDENT 

Art.  14.  The  President  is  the  Head  of  the  nation,  and  con- 
trols the  power  of  the  entire  administration. 

Art.  15.  The  President  represents  the  Chung  Hua  Min 
Kuo. 

Art.  16.  The  President  is  responsible  to  the  entire  body  of 
citizens. 


APPENDIX  411 

Art.  17.  The  President  convokes  the  Li  Fa  Yuan,  declares 
the  opening,  the  suspension  and  the  closing  of  the  sessions. 

The  President  may  dissolve  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  with  the  ap- 
proval of  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan ;  but  in  that  case  he  must  have 
the  new  members  elected  and  the  House  convoked  within  six 
months  from  the  day  of  dissolution. 

Art.  18.  The  President  shall  submit  Bills  of  Lair  and  the 
Budget  to  the  Li  Fa  Yuan. 

Art.  19.  For  the  purposes  of  improving  the  public  welfare 
or  enforcing  law  or  in  accordance  with  the  duties  imposed  upon 
him  by  law,  the  President  may  issue  orders  and  cause  orders  to 
be  issued,  but  he  shall  not  alter  the  law  by  his  order. 

Art.  20.  In  order  to  maintain  public  peace  or  to  prevent 
extraordinary  calamities  at  a  time  of  great  emergency  when 
time  will  not  permit  the  convocation  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan,  the 
President  may,  with  the  approval  of  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan 
[Senate],  issue  provisional  orders  which  shall  have  the  force  of 
law;  but  in  that  case  he  shall  ask  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  [House  of 
Representative]  for  indemnification  at  its  next  session. 

The  provisional  orders  mentioned  above  shall  immediately 
become  void  when  they  are  rejected  by  the  Li  Fa  Yuan. 

Art.  21.  The  President  shall  fix  the  official  systems  and  of- 
ficial regulations.  The  President  shall  appoint  and  dismiss 
military  and  civil  officials. 

Art.  22.  The  President  shall  declare  war  and  conclude 
peace. 

Art.  23.  The  President  is  the  Commander-in-Chief  of,  and 
controls,  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  whole  country.  The  Pres- 
ident shall  decide  the  system  of  organization  and  the  respective 
strength  of  the  Army  and  Navy. 

Art.  24.  The  President  shall  receive  the  Ambassadors  and 
Ministers  of  the  foreign  countries. 

Art.  25.     The  President  makes  treaties. 

But  the  approval  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  must  be  secured  if  the 
articles  should  change  the  territories  or  increase  the  burdens 
of  the  citizens. 

Art.  26.  The  President  may,  according  to  law,  declare 
Martial  Law. 


412  APPENDIX 

Art.  27.  The  President  may  confer  titles  of  nobility,  dec- 
orations and  other  insignia  of  honour. 

Art.  28.  The  President  may  declare  general  amnesty,  spe- 
cial pardon,  commutation  of  punishment,  or  restoration  of 
rights.  In  case  of  general  amnesty  the  approval  of  the  Li  Fa 
Yuan  must  be  secured. 

Art.  29.  When  the  President,  for  any  cause,  vacates  his 
post  or  is  unable  to  attend  to  his  duties,  the  Vice-President  shall 
assume  his  duties  and  authority  in  his  stead. 

CHAPTER   IV. THE    LEGISLATURE 

Art.  30.  Legislation  shall  be  done  by  the  Legislature  or- 
ganized with  the  members  elected  by  the  people. 

The  organization  of  the  Legislature  and  the  method  of  elect- 
ing the  legislative  members  shall  be  fixed  by  the  Provisional  Con- 
stitution Conference. 

Art.  31.  The  duties  and  authorities  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan 
shall  be  as  follows: 

(1)  To  discuss  and  pass  all  bills  of  law. 

(2)  To  discuss  and  pass  the  Budget. 

(3)  To  discuss  and  pass  or  approve  articles  relating  to 
raising  of  public  loans  and  national  financial  responsibilities. 

(4)  To  reply  to  the  inquiries  addressed  to  it  by  the  Govern- 
ment. 

(5)  To  receive  petitions  of  the  people. 

(6)  To  bring  up  bills  on  law. 

(7)  To  bring  up  suggestions  and  opinions  before  the  Presi- 
dent regarding  law  and  other  affairs. 

(8)  To  bring  out  the  doubtful  points  of  the  administration 
and  request  the  President  for  an  explanation ;  but  when  the 
President  deems  it  necessary  for  a  matter  to  be  kept  secret  he 
may  refuse  to  give  the  answer. 

(9)  Should  the  President  attempt  treason  the  Li  Fa  Yuan 
may  institute  judicial  proceedings  in  the  Supreme  Court  against 
him  by  a  three-fourths  or  more  vote  of  a  four-fifths  attendance 
of  the  total  membership. 

Regarding  the  clauses  from  1  to  8  and  articles  20,  25,  28,  55 
and  27,  the  approval  of  a  majority  of  more  than  half  of  the 
attending  members  will  be  required  to  make  a  decision. 


APPENDIX  413 

Art.  39.  The  regular  annual  session  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan 
will  be  four  months  in  duration ;  but  when  the  President  deems 
it  necessary  it  may  be  prolonged.  The  President  may  also  call 
special  sessions  when  it  is  not  in  session. 

Art.  33.  The  meetings  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  shall  be  "open 
sessions,"  but  they  may  be  held  in  secret  at  the  request  of  the 
President  or  the  decision  of  the  majority  of  more  than  half  of 
the  members  present. 

Art.  34.  The  law  bills  passed  by  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  shall  be 
promulgated  by  the  President  and  enforced. 

When  the  President  vetoes  a  law  bill  passed  by  the  Li  Fa 
Yuan  he  must  give  the  reason  and  refer  it  again  to  the  Li  Fa 
Yuan  for  reconsideration.  If  such  bill  should  be  again  passed 
by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the  members  present  at  the  Li  Fa  Yuan 
but  at  the  same  time  the  President  should  firmly  hold  that  it 
would  greatly  harm  the  internal  administration  or  diplomacy 
to  enforce  such  law  or  there  will  be  great  and  important  ob- 
stacles against  enforcing  it,  he  may  withhold  promulgation 
with  the  approval  of  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan. 

Art.  35.  The  Speaker  and  vice-Speaker  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan 
shall  be  elected  by  and  from  among  the  members  themselves  by 
ballot.  The  one  who  secures  more  than  half  of  the  votes  cast 
shall  be  considered  elected. 

Art.  36.  The  members  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  shall  not  be  held 
responsible  to  outsiders  for  their  speeches,  arguments  and  vot- 
ing in  the  House. 

Art.  37.  Except  when  discovered  in  the  act  of  committing 
a  crime  or  for  internal  rebellion  or  external  treason,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  shall  not  be  arrested  during  the  session 
period  without  the  permission  of  the  House. 

Art.  38.  The  House  laws  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  shall  be  made 
by  the  House  itself. 

CHAPTER  V. THE  ADMINISTRATION 

Art.  39.  The  President  shall  be  the  Chief  of  the  Admin- 
istration. A  Secretary  of  State  shall  be  provided  to  assist 
him. 

Art.  40.     The  affairs  of  the  Administration  shall  be  sepa- 


414  APPENDIX 

rately  administered  by  the  Ministries  of  Foreign  Affairs,  of  In- 
terior, of  Finance,  of  Army,  of  Navy,  of  Justice,  of  Education, 
of  Agriculture  and  Commerce  and  of  Communications. 

Art.  41.  The  Minister  of  each  Ministry  shall  control  the 
affairs  in  accordance  with  law  and  orders. 

Art.  42.  The  Secretary  of  State,  Ministers  of  the  Min- 
istries and  the  special  representative  of  the  President  may  take 
seats  in  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  and  express  their  views. 

Art.  43.  The  Secretary  of  State  or  any  of  the  Ministers 
when  they  commit  a  breach  of  law  shall  be  liable  to  impeach- 
ment by  the  Censorate  ( Suchengting)  and  trial  by  the  Ad- 
ministrative Court. 

CHAPTER   VI. THE    JUDICIARY 

Art.  44.  The  judicial  power  shall  be  administered  by  the 
Judiciary  formed  by  the  judicial  officials  appointed  by  the 
President. 

The  organization  of  the  Judiciary  and  the  qualifications  of 
the  Judicial  officials  shall  be  fixed  by  law. 

Art.  45.  The  Judiciary  shall  independently  try  and  decide 
cases  of  civil  and  criminal  law  suits  according  to  law.  But  with 
regard  to  administrative  law  suits  and  other  special  law  cases 
they  shall  be  attended  to  according  to  the  provisions  of  this 
law. 

Art.  46.  As  to  the  procedure  the  Supreme  Court  should 
adopt  for  the  impeachment  case  stated  in  clause  9  of  article  31, 
special  rules  will  be  made  by  law. 

Art.  47.  The  trial  of  law  suits  in  the  judicial  courts  should 
be  open  to  the  public ;  but  when  they  are  deemed  to  be  harmful 
to  peace  and  order  or  good  custom,  they  may  be  held  in  camera. 

Art.  48.  The  judicial  officials  shall  not  be  given  a  reduced 
salary  or  shifted  from  their  posts  when  functioning  as  such, 
and  except  when  a  sentence  has  been  passed  upon  him  for  pun- 
ishment or  he  is  sentenced  to  be  removed,  a  judicial  official  shall 
not  be  dismissed  from  his  post. 

The  regulations  regarding  punishment  shall  be  fixed  by 
law. 


APPENDIX  415 

CHAPTER    VII. THE    TSAN    CHENG   YUAN 

Art.  49.  The  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan  shall  answer  the  inquiries 
of  the  President  and  discuss  important  administrative  affairs. 

The  organization  of  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan  shall  be  fixed  bj^ 
the  Provisional  Constitution  Conference. 

CHAPTER  Vni. FINANCES 

Art..  50.  Levying  of  new  taxes  and  dues  and  change  of 
tariff  shall  be  decided  by  law. 

The  taxes  and  dues  which  are  now  in  existence  shall  con- 
tinue to  be  collected  as  of  old  except  as  changed  by  law. 

Art.  51.  With  regard  to  the  annual  receipts  and  expendi- 
tures of  the  nation,  they  shall  be  dealt  with  in  accordance  with 
the  Budget  approved  by  the  Li  Fa  Yuan. 

Art.  52.  For  special  purposes  continuous  expenditures  for 
a  specified  number  of  years  may  be  included  in  the  budget. 

Art.  53.  To  prepare  for  any  deficiency  of  the  budget  and 
expenses  needed  outside  of  the  estimates  in  the  budget,  a  special 
reserve  fund  must  be  provided  in  the  budget. 

Art.  54.  The  following  items  of  expenditures  shall  not  be 
cancelled  or  reduced  except  with  the  approval  of  the  Presi- 
dent : — 

1.  Any  duties  belonging  to  the  nation  according  to  law. 

2.  Necessities  stipulated  by  law. 

3.  Necessities  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  treaties. 

4.  Expenses  for  the  Army  and  Navy. 

Art.  55.  For  national  war  or  suppression  of  internal  dis- 
turbance or  under  unusual  circumstances  when  time  will  not 
permit  to  convoke  the  Li  Fa  Yuan,  the  President  may  make 
emergency  disposal  of  finance  with  the  approval  of  the  Tsan 
Cheng  Yuan,  but  in  such  case  he  shall  ask  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  for 
indemnification  at  its  next  session. 

Art.  56.  When  a  new  Budget  cannot  be  established,  the 
Budget  of  the  previous  year  will  be  used.  The  same  procedure 
will  be  adopted  when  the  Budget  fails  to  pass  at  the  time  when 
the  fiscal  year  has  begun. 

Art.  57.  When  the  closed  accounts  of  the  receipts  and  ex- 
penditures of  the  nation  have  been  audited  by  the  Board  of 


416  APPENDIX 

Audit,  they  shall  be  submitted  by  the  President  to  the  Li  Fa 
Yuan  for  approval. 

Art.  58.  The  organization  of  the  Board  of  Audit  shall  be 
fixed  by  the  Provisional  Constitution  Conference. 

CHAPTER  IX. PROCEDURE  OF   CONSTITUTION   MAKING 

Art.  59.  The  Constitution  of  Chung  Hua  Min  Kuo  shall 
be  drafted  by  the  Constitution  Draft  Committee,  which  shall 
be  organized  with  the  members  elected  by  and  from  among  the 
members  of  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan.  The  number  of  such  draft- 
ing Committee  shall  be  limited  to  ten. 

Art.  60.  The  Bill  on  the  Constitution  of  Chung  Hua  Min 
Kuo  shall  be  fixed  by  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan. 

Art.  61.  When  the  Bill  on  the  Constitution  of  the  Chung 
Hua  Min  Kuo  has  been  passed  by  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan,  it 
shall  be  submitted  by  the  President  to  the  Citizens'  Conference 
for  final  passage. 

The  organization  of  the  Citizens'  Conference  shall  be  fixed  by 
the  Provisional  Constitution  Conference. 

Art.  62.  The  Citizens'  Conference  shall  be  convoked  and 
dissolved  by  the  President. 

Art.  63.  The  Constitution  of  Chung  Hua  Min  Kuo  shall  be 
promulgated  by  the  President. 

CHAPTER   X. APPENDIX 

Art.  64. — Before  the  Constitution  of  Chung  Hua  Min  Kuo 
comes  into  force  this  Provisional  Constitution  shall  have  equal 
force  to  the  Permanent  Constitution. 

The  order  and  instructions  in  force  before  the  enforcement 
of  this  Provisional  Constitution  shall  continue  to  be  valid,  pro- 
vided that  they  do  not  come  into  conflict  with  the  provisions  of 
this  Provisional  Constitution. 

Art.  65.  The  articles  published  on  the  12th  of  the  Second 
Month  of  the  First  Year  of  Chung  Hua  Min  Kuo,  regarding  the 
favourable  treatment  of  the  Ta  Ching  Emperor  after  his  abdi- 
cation, and  the  special  treatment  of  the  Ching  Imperial  Clan,  as 
well  as  the  special  treatment  of  the  Manchus,  Mongols,  Ma- 
homedans  and  Tibetans  shall  never  lose  their  effect. 


APPENDIX  417 

As  to  the  Articles  dealing  with  the  special  treatment  of  Mon- 
gols in  connexion  with  the  special  treatment  articles,  it  is  guar- 
anteed that  they  shall  continue  to  be  effective,  and  that  the 
same  will  not  be  changed  except  by  law. 

Art.  66.  This  Provisional  Constitution  may  be  amended  at 
the  request  of  two-thirds  .of  the  members  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan,  or 
the  proposal  of  the  President,  by  a  three-fourths  majority  of  a 
quorum  consisting  of  four-fifths  or  more  of  the  whole  member- 
ship of  the  House.  The  Provisional  Constitution  Conference 
will  then  be  convoked  by  the  President  to  undertake  the  amend- 
ment. 

Art.  67.  Before  the  establishment  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  the 
Tsan  Cheng  Yuan  shall  have  the  duty  and  authority  of  the 
former  and  function  in  its  stead. 

Art.  68.  This  Provisional  Constitution  shall  come  into 
force  from  the  date  of  promulgation.  The  Temporary  Provi- 
sional Constitution  promulgated  on  the  11th  day  of  the  Third 
Month  of  the  First  Year  of  the  Min  Kuo  shall  automatically 
cease  to  have  force  from  the  date  on  which  this  Provisional 
Constitution  comes  into  force. 

THE  PRESIDENTIAL  SUCCESSION. 

Passed  by  a  puppet  political  body  and  promulgated  by  Yuan 
Shih-Jcai  on  December  29,  IQlJf, 

Article  1.  A  male  citizen  of  the  Republic  of  Chung  Hua, 
possessing  the  rights  of  citizenship,  40  or  more  years  of  age 
and  having  resided  in  the  Republic  for  not  less  than  20  years 
shall  be  eligible  for  election  as  President. 

Art.  2.  The  Presidential  term  shall  be  ten  years  with  eli- 
gibility for  re-election. 

Art.  3.  At  the  time  of  the  Presidential  Election  the  then 
President  shall,  representing  the  opinion  of  the  people  carefully 
and  reverently  nominate  (recommend)  three  persons,  with  the 
qualifications  stated  in  the  first  Article,  as  candidates  for  the 
Presidential  Office. 

The  names  of  these  nominated  persons  shall  be  written  by  the 
then  President  on  a  gold  Chla-ho-plate,  sealed  with  the  National 


418  APPENDIX 

Seal  and  placed  in  a  gold  box,  which  shall  be  placed  in  a  stone 
house  in  the  residence  of  the  President. 

The  key  of  the  box  will  be  kept  by  the  President  while  the 
keys  to  the  Stone  Plouse  shall  be  kept  separately  by  the  Presi- 
dent, the  Chairman  of  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan  and  the  Secretary 
of  State.  The  Stone  House  may  not  be  opened  without  an 
order  from  the  President. 

Art.  4.  The  Presidential  Electoral  College  shall  be  organ- 
ized with  the  following  members  : 

1.  Fifty  members  elected  from  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan. 

2.  Fifty  members  elected  from  the  Li  Fa  Yuan. 

The  said  members  shall  be  elected  by  ballot  among  the  mem- 
bers themselves.  Those  who  secure  the  largest  number  of  votes 
shall  be  elected.  The  election  shall  be  presided  over  by  the 
Minister  of  Interior.  If  it  should  happen  that  the  Li  Fa  Yuan 
is  in  session  at  the  time  of  the  organization  of  the  Presidential 
Electoral  College,  the  fifty  members  heading  the  roll  of  the 
House  and  then  in  the  Capital,  shall  be  automatically  made 
members  of  the  Electoral  College. 

Art.  5.  The  Electoral  College  shall  be  convocated  by  the 
President  and  organized  within  three  days  before  the  electon. 

Art.  6.  The  house  of  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan  shall  be  used 
as  a  meeting  place  for  the  Presidential  Electoral  College.  The 
chairman  of  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan  shall  act  as  the  chairman 
of  the  College. 

If  the  Vice-President  is  the  chairman  of  the  Tsan  Cheng 
Yuan  or  for  other  reasons,  the  chairman  of  the  Li  Fa  Yuan 
shall  act  as  the  chairman. 

Art.  7.  On  the  day  of  the  Presidential  Election  the  Presi- 
dent shall  respectfully  make  known  to  the  Presidential  Elec- 
toral College  the  names  of  the  persons  recommended  by  him  as 
qualified  candidates  for  the  Presidential  office. 

Art.  8.  The  Electoral  College  may  vote  for  the  re-election 
of  the  then  President,  besides  three  candidates  recommended  by 
him. 

Art.  9.  The  single  ballot  system  will  be  adopted  for  the 
Presidential  Election.  There  should  be  an  attendance  of  not 
less  than  three-fourths  of  the  total  membership.     One  who  re- 


APPENDIX  419 

ceives  a  two-thirds  majority  or  greater  of  the  total  number  of 
votes  cast  shall  be  elected.  If  no  one  secures  a  two-thirds  ma- 
jority the  two  persons  receiving  the  largest  number  of  votes 
shall  be  put  to  the  final  vote. 

Art.  10.  When  the  year  of  election  arrives  should  the 
members  of  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan  consider  it  a  political  neces- 
sity, the  then  President  may  be  re-elected  for  another  term  by 
a  two-thirds  majority  of  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan  without  a  for- 
mal election.  The  decision  shall  then  be  promulgated  by  the 
President. 

Art.  11.  Should  the  President  vacate  his  post  before  the 
expiration  of  his  term  of  office  a  special  Presidential  Electoral 
College  shall  be  organized  within  three  days.  Before  the  elec- 
tion takes  place  the  Vice-President  shall  officiate  as  President 
according  to  the  provisions  of  Article  29  of  the  Constitutional 
Compact  and  if  the  Vice-President  should  also  vacate  his  post 
at  the  same  time,  or  be  absent  from  the  Capital  or  for  any  other 
reasons  be  unable  to  take  up  the  office,  the  Secretary  of  State 
shall  officiate  but  he  shall  not  assume  the  duties  of  clauses  1  and 
2,  either  as  a  substitute  or  a  temporary  executive. 

Art.  12.  On  the  day  of  the  Presidential  Election,  the  per- 
son officiating  as  President  or  carrying  on  the  duties  as  a  sub- 
stitute shall  notify  the  Chairman  of  the  Special  Presidential 
Electoral  College  to  appoint  ten  members  as  witnesses  to  the 
opening  of  the  Stone  House  or  the  Gold  Box,  which  shall  be  car- 
ried reverently  to  the  House  and  opened  before  the  assembly 
and  its  contents  made  known  to  them.  Votes  shall  then  be 
forthwith  cast  for  the  election  of  one  of  the  three  candidates 
recommended  as  provided  for  in  article  9. 

Art.  13.  Whether  at  the  re-election  of  the  old  President  or 
the  assumption  office  of  the  new  President,  he  shall  take  oath 
in  the  following  words  at  the  time  of  taking  over  the  office : 

"I  swear  that  I  shall  with  all  sincerity  adhere  to  the  Consti- 
tution and  execute  the  duties  of  the  President.  I  reverently 
swear." 

Before  the  promulgation  of  the  Constitution  it  shall  be  spe- 
cifically stated  in  the  oath  that  the  President  shall  adhere  to  the 
Constitutional  Compact. 


420  APPENDIX 

Art.  14.  The  term  of  office  for  the  Vice-President  shall  be 
the  same  as  that  of  the  President.  Upon  the  expiration  of  the 
term,  three  candidates,  possessing  the  qualifications  of  article 
1,  shall  be  nominated  by  the  re-elected  or  the  new  President,  for 
election.  The  regulations  governing  the  election  of  the  Presi- 
dent shall  be  applicable. 

Should  the  Vice-President  vacate  his  post  before  the  expira- 
tion of  his  term  for  some  reasons,  the  President  shall  proceed 
according  to  the  provisions  of  the  preceding  article. 

Art.  15.  The  Law  shall  be  enforced  from  the  date  of  pro- 
mulgation. 

On  the  day  of  enforcement  of  this  Law  the  Law  on  the  Elec- 
tion of  the  President  as  promulgated  on  the  5th  day  of  the  10th 
Month  of  the  2nd  Year  of  the  Min  Kuo  shall  be  cancelled. 


APPENDIX 
DOCUMENTS  IN  GROUP  III 

(1)  The  Russo-Chinese  agreement  of  5th  November,  1913, 
which  affirmed  the  autonomy  of  Outer  Mongolia. 

(2)  The  Russo-Chinese-Mongolian  tripartite  agreement  of 
the  7th  June,  1915,  ratifying  the  agreement  of  the  5th  Novem- 
ber, 1913. 

(3)  The  Chino- Japanese  Treaties  and  annexes  of  the  25th 
May?  1915,  in  settlement  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands  of  the 
18th  January,  1915. 

THE   RUSSO-CHINESE   AGREEMENT  REGARDING 
OUTER  MONGOLIA 

(Translation  from  the  official  French  Text.) 

DECLARATION 

The  Imperial  Russian  Government  having  formulated  the 
principles  on  which  its  relations  with  China  on  the  subject  of 
Outer  Mongolia  should  be  based;  and  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  China  having  signified  its  approval  of  the  afore- 
said principles,  the  two  Governments  have  come  to  the  follow- 
ing agreement: 

Article  I.  Russia  recognizes  that  Outer  Mongolia  is  placed 
under  the  suzerainty  of  China. 

Art.  II.     China  recognizes  the  autonomy  of  Outer  Mongolia. 

Art.  III.  Similarly,  recognizing  the  exclusive  right  of  the 
Mongols  of  Outer  Mongolia  to  carry  on  the  internal  administra- 
tion of  autonomous  Mongolia  and  to  regulate  all  commercial 
and  industrial  questions  affecting  that  country,  China  under- 
takes not  to  interfere  in  these  matters,  nor  to  dispatch  troops 
to  Outer  Mongolia  nor  to  appoint  any  civil  or  military  officer 
nor  to  carry  out  any  colonization  scheme  in  this  region.  It  is 
nevertheless  understood  that  an  envoy  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 

421 


422  APPENDIX 

ment  may  reside  at  Urga  and  be  accompanied  by  the  necessary 
staff  as  well  as  an  armed  escort.  In  addition  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment may,  in  case  of  necessity,  maintain  her  agents  for  the 
protection  of  the  interests  of  her  citizens  at  certain  points  in 
Outer  Mongolia  to  be  agreed  upon  during  the  exchange  of  views 
provided  for  in  Article  V  of  this  agreement.  Russia  on  her 
part  undertakes  not  to  quarter  troops  in  Outer  Mongolia,  ex- 
cepting Consular  Guards,  nor  to  interfere  in  any  question  af- 
fecting the  administration  of  the  country  and  will  likewise  ab- 
stain from  all  colonization. 

Art.  IV.  China  declares  herself  ready  to  accept  the  good 
offices  of  Russia  in  order  to  establish  relations  in  conformity 
with  the  principles  mentioned  above  and  with  the  stipulations 
of  the  Russo-Mongolian  Commercial  Treaty  of  the  21st  Oc- 
tober, 1912. 

Art.  V.  Questions  affecting  the  interests  of  Russia  and 
China  in  Outer  Mongolia  which  have  been  created  by  the  new 
conditions  of  affairs  in  that  country  shall  be  discussed  at  sub- 
sequent meetings.  In  witness  whereof  the  undersigned,  duly 
authorized  to  that  effect,  have  signed  and  sealed  the  Present 
Declaration.  Done  in  Duplicate  in  Peking  on  the  5th  Novem- 
ber, 1913,  corresponding  to  the  5th  Day^of  the  11th  Month  of 
the  Second  Year  of  the  Republic  of  Ch'ina. 
(Signed)     B.  Krupensky.  (Signed)     Sun  Pao  Chi. 

ADDENDUM 

In  signing  the  Declaration  of  to-day's  date  covering  Outer 
Mongolia,  the  undersigned  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Rus- 
sias,  duly  authorized  to  that  effect,  has  the  honour  to  declare 
in  the  name  of  his  Government  to  His  Excellency  Monsieur  Sun 
Pao  Chi,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Republic  of  China 
as  follows : 

I.  Russia  recognizes  that  the  territory  of  Outer  Mongolia 
forms  part  of  the  territory  of  China. 

II.  In  all  questions  affecting  matters  of  a  political  or  ter- 
ritorial nature,  the  Chinese  Government  will  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  the  Russian  Government  by  means  of  negotia- 


APPENDIX  423 

tions  at  which  the  authorities  of  Outer  Mongolia  shall  take 
part. 

III.  The  discussions  which  have  been  provided  for  in  Article 

V  of  the  Declaration  shall  take  place  between  the  three  con- 
tracting parties  at  a  place  to  be  designated  bj  them  for  that 
purpose  for  the  meeting  of  their  delegates. 

IV.  Autonomous  Outer  Mongolia  comprises  the  regions 
hitherto  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Chinese  Amban  of  Urga, 
the  Tartar  General  of  Uliasoutai  and  the  Chinese  Amban  of 
Kobdo.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  there  are  no  detailed  maps 
of  Mongolia,  and  that  the  boundaries  of  the  administrative  di- 
visions of  this  country  are  ill-defined,  it  is  hereby  agreed  that 
the  precise  boundaries  of  Outer  Mongolia,  as  well  as  the  de- 
limitation of  the  district  of  Kobdo  and  the  district  of  Altai, 
shall  be  the  subject  of  subsequent  negotiations  as  provided  for 
by  Article  V  of  the  Declaration. 

The  undersigned  seizes  the  present  occasion  to  renew  to  His 
Excellency  Sun  Pao  Chi  the  assurance  of  his  highest  considera- 
tion. (Signed)     B.  Krupensky. 

In  signing  the  Declaration  of  to-day's  date  covering  Outer 
Mongolia,  the  undersigned  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
Republic  of  China,  duly  authorized  to  that  effect,  has  the  hon- 
our to  declare  in  the  name  of  his  Government  to  His  Excellency 
Monsieur  Krupensky,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Rus- 
sias  as  follows : 

I.  Russia  recognizes  that  the  territory  of  Outer  Mongolia 
forms  part  of  the  territory  of  China. 

II.  In  all  questions  affecting  matters  of  a  political  or  ter- 
ritorial nature,  the  Chinese  Government  will  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  the  Russian  Government  by  means  of  negotia- 
tions at  which  the  authorities  of  Outer  Mongolia  shall  take 
part. 

III.  The  discussions  which  have  been  provided  for  in  Article 

V  of  the  Declaration  shall  take  place  between  the  three  con- 
tracting parties  at  a  place  to  be  designated  by  them  for  that 
purpose  for  the  meeting  of  their  delegates. 

IV.  Autonomous    Outer    Mongolia    comprises    the    regions 


424  APPENDIX 

hitherto  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Chinese  Amban  of  Urga, 
the  Tartar  General  of  Uliasoutai  and  the  Chinese  Amban  of 
Kobdo.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  there  are  no  detailed  maps 
of  Mongolia,  and  that  the  boundaries  of  the  administrative  di- 
visions of  this  country  are  ill-defined,  it  is  hereby  agreed  that 
the  precise  boundaries  of  Outer  Mongolia,  as  well  as  the  delim- 
itation of  the  district  of  Kobdo  and  the  district  of  Altai,  shall 
be  the  subject  of  subsequent  negotiations  as  provided  for  by 
Article  V  of  the  Declaration. 

The  Undersigned  seizes  the  present  occasion  to  renew  to  His 
Excellency  Monsieur  Krupensky  the  assurance  of  his  highest 
consideration.  (Signed)      Sun  Pao   Chi. 

SINO-RUSSO  MONGOLIAN  AGREEMENT 

(Translation  from  the  French) 

The  President  of  the  Republic  of  China,  His  Imperial  Ma^ 
esty  the  Emperor  of  all  Russias,  and  His  Holiness  the  Bogdo 
Djembzoun  Damba  Khoutoukhtou  Khan  of  Outer  Mongolia, 
animated  by  a  sincere  desire  to  settle  by  mutual  agreement 
various  questions  created  by  a  new  state  of  things  in  Outer 
Mongolia,  have  named  for  that  purpose  their  Plenipotentiary 
Delegates,  that  is  to  say: 

The  President  of  the  Republic  of  China,  General  Py-Koue- 
Fang  and  Monsieur  Tcheng-Loh,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  China  to  Mexico ; 

His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  Russias,  His  Coun- 
cillor of  State,  Alexandre  Miller,  Diplomatic  Agent  and  Con- 
sul-General  in  Mongolia;  and  His  Holiness  the  Bogdo  Djemb- 
zoun Damba  Khoutoukhtou  Khan  of  Outer  Mongolia,  Erdeni 
Djonan  Beise  Shirnin  Damdin,  Vice-Chief  of  Justice,  and 
Touchetou  Tsing  Wang  Tchakdourjab,  Chief  of  Finance,  who 
having  verified  their  respective  full  powers  found  in  good  and 
due  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  following: 

Article  1.  Outer  Mongolia  recognizes  the  Sino-Russian 
Declaration  and  the  Notes  exchanged  between  China  and  Rus- 
sia of  the  fifth  day  of  the  eleventh  month  of  the  second  year 
of  the  Republic  of  China  (23rd  October,  1913.     Old  style.) 


APPENDIX  425 

Art.  2.  Outer  Mongolia  recognizes  China's  suzerainty. 
China  and  Russia  recognize  the  autonomy  of  Outer  Mongolia 
forming  part  of  Chinese  territory. 

Art,  3.  Autonomous  Mongolia  has  no  right  to  conclude  in- 
ternational treaties  with  foreign  powers  respecting  political  and 
territorial  questions. 

As  respects  questions  of  a  political  and  territorial  nature  in 
Outer  Mongolia,  the  Chinese  Government  engages  to  conform 
to  Article  II  of  the  Note  exchanged  between  China  and  Russia 
on  the  fifth  day  of  the  eleventh  month  of  the  second  year  of  the 
Republic  of  China,  23rd  October,  1913. 

Art.  4.  The  title:  "Bogdo  Djembzoun  Damba  Khoutou- 
khtou  Khan  of  Outer  Mongolia"  is  conferred  by  the  President 
of  the  Republic  of  China.  The  calendar  of  the  Republic  as 
well  as  the  Mongol  calendar  of  cyclical  signs  are  to  be  used  in 
official  documents. 

Art.  5.  China  and  Russia,  conformably  to  Article  2  and  3 
of  the  Sino-Russian  Declaration  of  the  fifth  day  of  the  eleventh 
month  of  the  second  year  of  the  Republic  of  China,  23rd  Oc- 
tober, 1913,  recognize  the  exclusive  right  of  the  autonomous 
government  of  Outer  Mongolia  to  attend  to  all  the  affairs  of  its 
internal  administration  and  to  conclude  with  foreign  powers 
international  treaties  and  agreements  respecting  questions  of 
a  commercial  and  industrial  nature  concerning  autonomous 
Mongolia. 

Art.  6.  Conformably  to  the  same  Article  III  of  the  Dec- 
laration, China  and  Russia  engage  not  to  interfere  in  the  sys- 
tem of  autonomous  internal  administration  existing  in  Outer 
Mongolia. 

Art.  7.  The  military  escort  of  the  Chinese  Dignitary  at 
Urga  provided  for  by  Article  III  of  the  above-mentioned  Dec- 
laration is  not  to  exceed  two  hundred  men.  The  military  es- 
corts of  his  assistants  at  Ouliassoutai,  at  Kobdo,  and  at  the 
Mongolian-Kiachta  are  not  to  exceed  fifty  men  each.  If,  by 
agreement  with  the  autonomous  government  of  Outer  Mongolia, 
assistants  of  the  Chinese  Dignitary  are  appointed  in  other  lo- 
calities of  Outer  Mongolia,  their  military  escorts  are  not  be 
exceed  fifty  men  each. 


426  APPENDIX 

Art.  8.  The  Imperial  Government  of  Russia  is  not  to  send 
more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  as  consular  guard  for  its 
representative  at  Urga.  The  military  escorts  of  the  Imperial 
consulates  and  vice-consulates  of  Russia,  which  have  already 
been  established  or  which  may  be  established  by  agreement 
with  the  autonomous  government  of  Outer  Mongolia,  in  other 
localities  of  Outer  Mongolia,  are  not  to  exceed  fifty  men 
each. 

Art.  9.  On  all  ceremonial  or  official  occasions  the  first  place 
of  honour  is  due  to  the  Chinese  Dignitary.  He  has  the  right, 
if  necessary,  to  present  himself  in  private  audience  with  His 
Holiness  Bogdo  Djembzoun  Damba  Khoutoukhtou  Khan  of 
Outer  Mongolia.  The  Imperial  Representative  of  Russia  en- 
joys the  same  right  of  private  audience. 

Art.  10.  The  Chinese  Dignitary  at  Urga  and  his  assistants 
in  the  different  localities  of  Outer  Mongolia  provided  for  by 
Article  VII  of  this  agreement  are  to  exercise  general  control 
lest  the  acts  of  the  autonomous  government  of  Outer  Mon- 
golia and  its  subordinate  authorities  may  impair  the  suzerain 
rights  and  the  interests  of  China  and  her  subjects  in  auto- 
nomous Mongolia. 

Art.  11.  Conformably  to  Article  IV  of  the  Note  exchanged 
between  China  and  Russia  on  the  fifth  day  of  the  eleventh  month 
of  the  second  year  of  the  Republic  of  China  (23rd  October, 
1915),  the  territory  of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia  comprises 
the  regions  which  were  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Chinese 
Amban  at  Ourga,  or  the  Tartar-General  at  Ouliassoutai  and  of 
the  Chinese  Amban  at  Kobdo ;  and  connects  with  the  boundary 
of  China  by  the  limits  of  the  banners  of  the  four  aimaks  of 
Khalkha  and  of  the  district  of  Kobdo,  bounded  by  the  district 
of  Houloun-Bourie  on  the  east,  by  Inner  Mongolia  on  the  south, 
by  the  Province  of  Sinkiang  on  the  southwest,  and  by  the  dis- 
tricts of  Altai  on  the  West. 

The  formal  delimitation  between  China  and  autonomous  Mon- 
golia is  to  be  carried  out  by  a  special  commission  of  delegates 
of  China,  Russia  and  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia,  which  shall 
set  itself  to  the  work  of  delimitation  within  a  period  of  two 
years  from  the  date  of  signature  of  the  present  Agreement. 


APPENDIX  427 

Art.  12.  It  is  understood  that  customs  duties  are  not  to 
be  established  for  goods  of  whatever  origin  they  may  be,  im- 
ported by  Chinese  merchants  into  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia. 
Nevertheless,  Chinese  merchants  shall  pay  all  the  taxes  on  in- 
ternal trade  which  have  been  established  in  autonomous  Outer 
Mongolia  and  which  may  be  established  therein  in  the  future, 
payable  by  the  Mongols  of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia.  Sim- 
ilarly the  merchants  of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia,  when  im- 
porting any  kind  of  goods  of  local  production  into  "Inner 
China,"  shall  pay  all  the  taxes  on  trade  which  have  been  es- 
tablished in  "Inner  China"  and  which  may  be  established  therein 
in  the  future,  payable  by  Chinese  merchants.  Goods  of  for- 
eign origin  imported  from  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia  into 
"Inner  China"  shall  be  subject  to  the  customs  duties  stipulated 
in  the  regulations  for  land  trade  of  the  seventh  year  of  the 
reign  of  Kouang-Hsu  (^1881). 

Art.  13.  Civil  and  criminal  actions  arising  between  Chinese 
subjects  residing  in  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia  are  to  be  ex- 
amined and  adjudicated  by  the  Chinese  Dignitary  at  Urga  and 
by  his  assistants  in  the  other  localities  of  autonomous  Outer 
Mongolia. 

Art.  14.  Civil  and  criminal  actions  arising  between  Mon- 
gols of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia  and  Chinese  subjects  re- 
siding therein  are  to  be  examined  and  adjudicated  by  the  Chi- 
nese Dignitary  at  Urga  and  his  assistants  in  the  other  lo- 
calities of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia,  or  their  delegates,  and 
the  Mongolian  authorities.  If  the  defendant  or  accused  of  au- 
tonomous Outer  Mongolia,  the  joint  examination  and  decision 
of  the  case  are  to  be  held  at  the  Chinese  Dignitary's  place  at 
Niga  and  that  of  his  assistants  in  the  other  localities  of  au- 
tonomous Outer  Mongolia ;  if  the  defendant  or  the  accused  is  a 
Mongol  of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia  and  the  claimant  or  the 
complalnment  is  a  Chinese  subject,  the  case  is  to  be  examined 
and  decided  in  the  same  manner  in  the  Mongolian  yamen.  The 
guilty  are  to  be  punished  according  to  their  own  laws.  The 
interested  parties  are  free  to  arrange  their  disputes  amicably 
by  means  of  arbitrators  chosen  by  themselves. 

Art.  15.     Civil  and  criminal  actions  arising  between  Men- 


428  APPENDIX 

gols  of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia  and  Russian  subjects  re- 
siding therein  are  to  be  examined  and  decided  conformably  to 
the  stipulations  of  Article  XVI  of  the  Russo-Mongolian  Com- 
mercial protocol  of  21st  October,  1912. 

Art.  16.  All  civil  and  criminal  actions  arising  between 
Chinese  and  Russian  subjects  in  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia 
are  to  be  examined  and  decided  in  the  following  manner :  in  an 
action  wherein  the  claimant  or  the  complainant  is  a  Russian 
subject  and  the  defendant  or  accused  is  a  Chinese  subject,  the 
Russian  Consul  personally  or  through  his  delegate  participates 
in  the  judicial  trial,  enjoying  the  same  right  as  the  Chinese 
Dignitary  at  Urga  or  his  delegate  or  his  assistants  in  the  other 
localities  of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia.  The  Russian  Con- 
sul or  his  delegate  proceeds  to  the  hearing  of  the  claimant  and 
the  Russian  witnesses  in  the  court  in  session,  and  interrogates 
the  defendant  and  the  Chinese  witnesses  through  the  medium  of 
the  Chinese  Dignitary  at  Urga  or  his  delegates  or  of  his  assis- 
tants in  the  other  localities  of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia ; 
the  Russian  Consul  or  his  delegate  examines  the  evidence  pre- 
sented, demands  security  for  "revindication"  and  has  recourse 
to  the  opinion  of  experts,  if  he  considers  such  expert  opinion 
necessary  for  the  elucidation  of  the  rights  of  the  parties,  etc. ; 
he  takes  part  in  deciding  and  in  the  drafting  of  the  judgment, 
which  he  signs  with  the  Chinese  Dignitary  at  Urga  or  his  dele- 
gates or  his  assistants  in  the  other  localities  of  Autonomous 
Outer  Mongolia.  The  execution  of  the  judgment  constitutes  a 
duty  of  the  Chinese  authorities. 

The  Chinese  Dignitary  at  Urga  and  his  Assistants  in  the 
other  localities  of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia  may  likewise 
personally  or  through  their  delegates  be  present  at  the  hearing 
of  an  action  in  the  Consulates  of  Russia  wherein  the  defendant 
or  the  accused  is  a  Russian  subject  and  the  claimant  or  the 
complainant  is  a  Chinese  subject.  The  execution  of  the  judg- 
ment constitutes  a  duty  of  the  Russian  authorities. 

Art.  17.  Since  a  section  of  the  Kiachta-Urga-Kalgan  tele- 
graph line  lies  in  the  territory  of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia, 
it  is  agreed  that  the  said  section  of  the  said  telegraph  line  con- 
stitutes the  complete  property  of  the  Autonomous  Government 


APPENDIX  429 

of  Outer  Mongolia.  The  details  respecting  the  establishment 
on  the  borders  of  that  country  and  Inner  Mongolia  of  a  sta- 
tion to  be  administered  by  Chinese  and  Mongolian  employes  for 
the  transmission  of  telegrams,  as  well  as  the  questions  of  the 
tariff  for  telegrams  transmitted  and  of  the  apportionment  of 
the  receipts,  etc.,  are  to  be  examined  and  settled  by  a  special 
commission  of  technical  delegates  of  China,  Russia  and  Au- 
tonomous Outer  Mongolia. 

Art.  18.  The  Chinese  postal  institutions  at  Urga  and  Mon- 
golian Kiachta  remain  in  force  on  the  old  basis. 

Art.  19.  The  Autonomous  Government  of  Outer  Mongolia 
will  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  Chinese  Dignitary  at  Urga  and 
of  his  assistants  at  Oullassoutai,  Kobdo  and  MongolIan-KIachta 
as  well  as  of  their  staff,  the  necessary  houses,  which  are  to  con- 
stitute the  complete  property  of  the  Government  of  the  Repub- 
lic of  China.  Similarly,  necessary  grounds  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  residences  of  the  said  staff  are  to  be  granted  for  their 
escorts. 

Art.  20.  The  Chinese  Dignitary  at  Urga  and  his  assistants 
in  the  other  localities  of  autonomous  Outer  Mongolia  and  also 
their  staff  are  to  enjoy  the  right  to  use  the  courier  stations  of 
the  autonomous  Mongolian  Government  conformably  to  the 
stipulations  of  Article  XI  of  the  Russo-Mongolian  Protocol  of 
21st  October,  1912. 

Art.  21.  The  stipulations  of  the  SIno-RussIan  declaration 
and  the  Notes  exchanged  between  China  and  Russia  of  the  5th 
day  of  the  11th  month  of  the  2nd  year  of  the  Republic  of  China, 
23rd  October,  1913,  as  well  as  those  of  the  Russo-Mongolian 
Commercial  Protocol  of  the  21st  October,  1912,  remain  in  full 
force. 

Art.  22.  The  present  Agreement,  drawn  up  in  triplicate  in 
Chinese,  Russian,  Mongolian  and  French  languages,  comes  Into 
force  from  the  day  of  its  signature.  Of  the  four  texts  which 
have  been  duly  compared  and  found  to  agree,  the  French  text 
shall  be  authoritative  in  the  Interpretation  of  the  Present 
Agreement. 

Done  at  Kiachta  the  7th  day  of  the  Sixth  Month  of  the 
Fourth  year  of  the  Republic  of  China,  corresponding  to  the 


430  APPENDIX 

Twenty-fifth  of  May,  Seventh  of  June,  One  Thousand  Nine 
Hundred  Fifteen. 


CHINO-JAPANESE  TREATIES  AND  ANNEXES 

COMPLETE    ENGLISH    TEXT    OF    THE    DOCUMENTS 

The  followmg  is  an  authoritative  translation  of  the  two 
Treaties  and  thirteen  Notes  exchanged  between  His  Excellency 
the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China  and  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  Japan  through  their  respective  plenipotentiaries : 

TEEATY    RESPECTING    THE    PROVINCE    OF    SHANTUNG 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China  and 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  having  resolved  to  con- 
clude a  Treaty  with  a  view  to  the  maintenance  of  general  peace 
in  the  Extreme  East  and  the  further  strengthening  of  the  re- 
lations of  friendship  and  good  neighbourhood  now  existing  be- 
tween the  two  nations,  have  for  that  purpose  named  as  their 
Plenipotentiaries,  that  is  to  say: 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China,  Lou 
Tseng-tsiang,  Chung-ching,  First  Class  Chia  Ho  Decoration, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

And  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  Hioki  Eki,  Jushii, 
Second  Class  of  the  Imperial  Order  of  the  Sacred  Treasure, 
Minister  Plenipotentiary,  and  Envoy  Extraordinary: 

Who,  after  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  full 
powers  and  found  them  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed 
upon  and  concluded  the  following  Articles : — 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  give  full  as- 
sent to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese  Government  may 
hereafter  agree  with  the  German  Government  relating  to  the 
disposition  of  all  rights,  interests  and  concessions  which  Ger- 
many, by  virtue  of  treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses  in  relation  to 
the  Province  of  Shantung. 

Art.  2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  as  regards 
the  railway  to  be  built  by  China  herself  from  Chefoo  or  Lung- 
kow  to  connect  with  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  railway,  if  Ger- 
many abandons  the  privilege  of  financing  the  Chefoo-Weihsien 


APPENDIX  431 

line,  China  will  approach  Japanese  capitalists  to  negotiate  for 
a  loan. 

Art.  3.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  in  the  interest  of 
trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  China 
herself  as  soon  as  possible  certain  suitable  places  in  the  Province 
of  Shantung  as  Commercial  Ports. 

Art.  4.  The  present  treaty  shall  come  into  force  on  the  day 
of  its  signature. 

The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  His  Excellency  the 
President  of  the  Republic  of  China  and  His  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror of  Japan,  and  the  ratification  thereof  shall  be  exchanged 
at  Tokio  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  of  the 
High  Contracting  Parties  have  signed  and  sealed  the  present 
Treaty,  two  copies  in  the  Chinese  language  and  two  in  Japan- 
ese. 

Done  at  Peking  this  twenty-fifth  day  of  the  fifth  month  of 
the  fourth  year  of  the  Republic  of  China,  corresponding  to  the 
same  day  of  the  same  month  of  the  fourth  year  of  Taisho. 

EXCHANGE     OF    NOTES     RESPECTING    SHANTUNG 

— Note — 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  years  of  the  Republic  of 
China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre. 

In  the  name  of  the  Chinese  Government  I  have  the  honour  to 
make  the  following  declaration  to  your  Government : — "Within 
the  Province  of  Shantung  or  along  its  coast  no  territory  or 
island  will  be  leased  or  ceded  to  any  foreign  Power  under  any 
pretext." 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 


432  APPENDIX 

— Reply- 
Peking,    the    25th    day    of    the    5th 
month  of  the  4!th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Ex- 
cellency's note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  made  the  follow- 
ing declaration  in  the  name  of  the  Chinese  Government: — 
"Within  the  Province  of  Shantung  or  along  its  coast  no  ter- 
ritory or  island  will  be  leased  or  ceded  to  any  foreign  Power 
under  any  pretext." 

In  reply  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  this  dec- 
laration. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 

His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

EXCHANGE    OF    NOTES    EESPECTING    THE    OPENING    OF    PORTS    IN! 

SHANTUNG 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4ith  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre. 

I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  the  places  which  ought  to  be 
opened  as  Commercial  Ports  by  China  herself,  as  provided  in 
Article  3  of  the  Treaty  respecting  the  Province  of  Shantung 
signed  this  day,  will  be  selected  and  the  regulations  therefor, 
will  be  drawn  up,  by  the  Chinese  Government  itself,  a  decision 
concerning  which  will  be  made  after  consulting  the  Minister  of 
Japan. 


I  avail,  etc., 
(Signed)  LoiJ  Tseng-tsiang. 


His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 


APPENDIX  433 

—Reply- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Ex- 
cellency's note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  stated  "that  the 
places  which  ought  to  be  opened  as  Commercial  Ports  by  China 
herself,  as  provided  in  Article  3  of  the  Treaty  respecting  the 
province  of  Shantung  signed  this  day,  will  be  selected  and  the 
regulations  therefor,  will  be  drawn  up  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment itself,  a  decision  concerning  which  will  be  made  after  con- 
sulting the  Minister  of  Japan." 

In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)   Hioki  Kei. 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

EXCHANGE     OF     NOTES     RESPECTING     THE    RESTORATION     OF     THE 
LEASED    TERRITORY    OF    KIAOCHOW    BAY 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

In  the  name  of  my  Government  I  have  the  honour  to  make 
the  following  declaration  to  the  Chinese  Government : — 

When,  after  the  termination  of  the  present  war,  the  leased 
territory  of  Kiaochow  Bay  is  completely  left  to  the  free  dis- 
posal of  Japan,  the  Japanese  Government  will  restore  the  said 
leased  territory  to  China  under  the  following  conditions : — 

1.  The  whole  of  Kiaochow  Bay  to  be  opened  as  a  Commer- 
cial Port. 

2.  A  concession  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Japan  to 
be  established  at  a  place  designated  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment. 

3.  If  the  foreign  Powers  desire  it,  an  international  conces- 
sion may  be  established, 

4.  As  regards  the  disposal  to  be  made  of  the  buildings  and 


434  APPENDIX 

properties  of  Germany  and  the  conditions  and  procedure  re- 
lating thereto,  the  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment shall  arrange  the  matter  by  mutual  agreement  before 
the  restoration. 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

— Reply — 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  Ex- 
cellency's note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  made  the  follow- 
ing declaration  in  the  name  of  your  Government: — 

"When,  after  the  termination  of  the  present  war  the  leased 
territory  of  Kiaochow  Bay  is  completely  left  to  the  free  dis- 
posal of  Japan,  the  Japanese  Government  will  restore  the  said 
leased  territory  to  China  under  the  following  conditions : — 

1.  The  whole  of  Kiaochow  Bay  to  be  opened  as  a  Commercial 
Port. 

2.  A  concession  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Japan 
to  be  established  at  a  place  designated  by  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment. 

3.  If  the  foreign  Powers  desire  it,  an  international  concession 
may  be  established. 

4.  As  regards  the  disposal  to  be  made  of  the  buildings  and 
properties  of  Germany  and  the  conditions  and  procedure  relat- 
ing thereto,  the  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment shall  arrange  the  matter  by  mutual  agreement  before  the 
restoration." 

In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  this  declara- 
tion. 

I  avail,  etc.. 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 


APPENDIX  435 

TREATY    RESPECTING    SOUTH    MANCHURIA    AND    EASTERN    INNER 

MONGOLIA 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China  and 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  having  resolved  to  con- 
clude a  Treaty  with  a  view  to  developing  their  economic  rela- 
tions in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  have 
for  that  purpose  named  as  their  Plenipotentiaries,  that  is  to 
say; 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China,  Lou 
Tseng-tsiang,  Chung -clung ,  First  Class  Chia-ho  Decoration, 
and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  And  His  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror of  Japan,  Hioki  Eki,  Jushii,  Second  Class  of  the  Imperial 
Order  of  the  Sacred  Treasure,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  and 
Envoy  Extraordinary; 

Who,  after  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  full 
powers,  and  found  them  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have 
agreed  upon  and  concluded  the  following  Articles : — 

Article  1.  The  two  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that 
the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  and  the  terms  of 
the  South  Manchuria  Railway  and  the  Antung-Mukden  Rail- 
way, shall  be  extended  to  99  years. 

Art.  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  may,  by 
negotiation,  lease  land  necessary  for  erecting  suitable  buildings 
for  trade  and  manufacture  or  for  prosecuting  agricultural  en- 
terprises. 

Art.  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside  and  travel 
in  South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in  business  and  manufacture 
of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Art.  4.  In  the  event  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  desiring 
jointly  to  undertake  agricultural  enterprises  and  industries  in- 
cidental thereto,  the  Chinese  Government  may  give  its  permis- 
sion. 

Art.  5.  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to  in  the  preceding 
three  articles,  besides  being  required  to  register  with  the  local 
Authorities  passports  which  they  must  procure  under  the  exist- 
ing regulations,  shall  also  submit  to  the  police  laws  and  ordi- 
nances and  taxation  of  China. 

Civil  and  criminal  cases  in  which  the  defendants  are  Jap- 


436  APPENDIX 

anese  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  the  Japanese  Consul: 
those  in  which  the  defendants  are  Chinese  shall  be  tried  and 
adjudicated  by  Chinese  Authorities.  In  either  case  an  officer 
may  be  deputed  to  the  court  to  attend  the  proceedings.  But 
mixed  civil  cases  between  Chinese  and  Japanese  relating  to 
land  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  delegates  of  both  na- 
tions conjointly  in  accordance  with  Chinese  law  and  local 
usage. 

When,  in  future,  the  judicial  system  in  the  said  region  is 
completely  reformed,  all  civil  and  criminal  cases  concerning 
Japanese  subjects  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  entirely  by 
Chinese  law  courts. 

Art.  6.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees,  in  the  interest  of 
trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  China  her- 
self, as  soon  as  possible,  certain  suitable  places  in  Eastern  In- 
ner Mongolia  as  Commercial  Ports. 

Art.  7.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  speedily  to  make 
a  fundamental  revision  of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  Loan 
Agreement,  taking  as  a  standard  the  provisions  in  railway  loan 
agreements  made  heretofore  between  China  and  foreign  finan- 
ciers. 

When  in  future,  more  advantageous  terms  than  those  in 
existing  railway  loan  agreements  are  granted  to  foreign  finan- 
ciers in  connection  with  railway  loans,  the  above  agreement  shall 
again  be  revised  in  accordance  with  Japan's  wishes. 

Art.  8.  All  existing  treaties  between  China  and  Japan  re- 
lating to  Manchuria  shall,  except  where  otherwise  provided  for 
by  this  Treaty,  remain  in  force. 

Art.  9.  The  present  Treaty  shall  come  into  force  on  the 
date  of  its  signature.  The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified  by 
His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China  and  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  and  the  ratifications  thereof 
shall  be  exchanged  at  Tokio  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  of  the  two 
High  Contracting  Parties  have  signed  and  sealed  the  present 
Treaty,  two  copies  in  the  Chinese  language  and  two  in 
Japanese. 

Done  at  Peking  this  twenty-fifth  day  of  the  fifth  month  of 


APPENDIX  437 

the  fourth  year  of  the  Republic  of  China,  corresponding  to  the 
same  day  of  the  same  month  of  the  fourth  year  of  Taisho. 

EXCHANGE    OF    NOTES 

Respecting  the  Terms  of  Lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny 
and  the  Terms  of  South  Manchurian  and  Antung-Mukden  Rail- 
•ways. 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of   the   4the   year   of   the  Republic   of 
China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honour  to  state  that,  respecting  the  provisions 
contained  in  Article  1  of  the  Treaty  relating  to  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  signed  this  day,  the  term 
of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  shall  expire  in  the  86th  year 
of  the  Republic  or  1997.  The  date  for  restoring  the  South 
Manchuria  Railway  to  China  shall  fall  due  in  the  91st  year  of 
the  Republic  or  2002.  Article  12  in  the  original  South  Man- 
churian Railway  Agreement  providing  that  it  may  be  redeemed 
by  China  after  36  years  from  the  day  on  which  the  traffic  is 
opened  is  hereby  cancelled.  The  term  of  the  Antung-Mukden 
Railway  shall  expire  in  the  96th  year  of  the  Republic  or  2007. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

—Reply- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Ex- 
cellency's note  of  this  day's  date,  in  which  you  stated  that  re- 
specting the  provisions  contained  in  Article  1  of  the  Treaty  re- 
lating to  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  signed 
this  day,  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  shall  ex- 
pire in  the  86th  year  of  the  Republic  or  1997.  The  date  for 
restoring  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  to  China  shall  fall 


438  APPENDIX 

due  in  the  91st  year  of  the  Republic  or  2002.  Article  12  in  the 
original  South  Manchurian  Railway  Agreement  providing  that 
it  may  be  redeemed  by  China  after  36  years  from  the  day  on 
which  the  traffic  is  opened,  is  hereby  cancelled.  The  term  of 
the  Antung-Mukden  Railway  shall  expire  in  the  96th  year  of 
the  Republic  or  2007. 

In  reply  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

EXCHANGE    OF    NOTES    RESPECTING    THE    OPENING    OF    POETS    IN 
EASTEEN    INNEE    MONGOLIA 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of   the   4th   year   of   the   Republic    of 
China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  the  places  which  ought  to  be 
opened  as  Commercial  Ports  by  China  herself,  as  provided  in 
Article  6  of  the  Treaty  respecting'South  Manchuria  and  East- 
ern Inner  Mongolia  signed  this  day,  will  be  selected,  and  the 
regulations  therefor,  will  be  drawn  up,  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment itself,  a  decision  concerning  which  will  be  made  after 
consulting  the  Minister  of  Japan. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

-Reply- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Ex- 


APPENDIX  439 

cellency's  note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  stated  "that  the 
places  which  ought  to  be  opened  as  Commercial  Ports  by  China 
herself,  as  provided  in  Article  6  of  the  Treaty  respecting  South 
Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  signed  this  day,  will 
be  selected,  and  the  regulations  therefor,  will  be  drawn  up,  by 
the  Chinese  Government  itself,  a  decision  concerning  which  will 
be  made  after  consulting  the  Minister  of  Japan." 

In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 

His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

SOUTH    MANCHUEIA 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of    the   4th    year    of    the    Republic    of 
China. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  Japanese  subjects  shall,  as 
soon  as  possible,  investigate  and  select  mines  in  the  mining  areas 
in  South  Manchuria  specified  hereinunder,  except  those  being 
prospected  for  or  worked,  and  the  Chinese  Government  will 
then  permit  them  to  prospect  or  work  the  same ;  but  before  the 
Mining  regulations  are  definitely  settled,  the  practice  at  pres- 
ent in  force  shall  be  followed.     Provinces  Fengtien : — 


Locality 

District 

Mineral 

Niu  Hsin  T'ai 

Pen-hsi 

Coal 

Tien  Shih  Fu  Kou 

a 

« 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Hai-lung 

<c 

T'ieh  Ch'ang 

Tung-hua 

« 

Nuan  Ti  T'ang 

Chin 

« 

An  Shan  Chan  region 

From  Liaoyang 

to  Pen-hsi 

Iron 

440  APPENDIX 


KiRIN 

{Southern  portion) 

Locality 

District 

Mineral 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Ho-lung 

C.  &I. 

Kang  Yao 

Chi-lin  (Kirin) 

Coal 

Chia  P'i  Kou 

Hua-tien 

I  avail,  etc., 

Gold 

His  Excellency, 

(Signed)  Lou 

TSENG-TSIANG. 

Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

■Rot^Itt 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 

^       n  of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 

Excellency,  "^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Ex- 
cellency's note  of  this  day  respecting  the  opening  of  mines  in 
South  Manchuria,  stating;  "Japanese  subjects  shall,  as  soon 
as  possible,  investigate  and  select  mines  in  the  mining  areas 
in  South  Manchuria  specified  hereinunder,  except  those  being 
prospected  for  or  worked,  and  the  Chinese  Government  will 
then  permit  them  to  prospect  and  or  work  the  same ;  but  before 
the  Mining  regulations  are  definitely  settled,  the  practice  at 
present  in  force  shall  be  followed. 

1  Provinces  Fengtien. 


Locality 

District 

Mineral 

1.  Niu  Hsin  T'ai 

Pen-hsi 

Coal 

2.  Tien  Shih  Fu  Kou 

a 

« 

3.  Sha  Sung  Kang 

Hai-lung 

it 

4.  T'ieh  Ch'ang 

Tung-hua 

a 

5.  Nuan  Ti  T'ang 

Chin 

a 

6.  An  Shan  Chan  region  From  Liaoyang 

to  Pen-hsi 

Iron 

Kirin 

{Southern  portion) 

1.  Sha  Sung  Kang 

Ho-lung 

C.  &I. 

2.  Kang  Yao 

Chi-lin  (Kirin) 

Coal 

3.  Chia  P'i  Kou 

Hua-tien 
I  avail,  etc.. 

Gold 

His  Excellency, 

(Signed) 

Hioki  Eki. 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Republic  of  China. 


APPENDIX  441 

EXCHANGE  OF  NOTES  RESPECTING  RAILWAYS  AND  TAXES  IN  SOUTH 
MANCHURIA    AND    EASTERN    INNER    MONGOLIA 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of 
the  4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

In  the  name  of  my  Government. 

I  have  the  honour  to  make  the  following  declaration  to  your 
Government : — 

China  will  hereafter  provide  funds  for  building  necessary 
railways  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia;  if 
foreign  capital  is  required  China  may  negotiate  for  a  loan 
with  Japanese  capitalists  first ;  and  further,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, when  making  a  loan  in  future  on  the  security  of  the 
taxes  in  the  above-mentioned  places  (excluding  the  salt  and 
customs  revenue  which  have  already  been  pledged  by  the  Chi- 
nese Central  Government)  may  negotiate  for  it  with  Japanese 
capitalists  first. 

I  avail,  etc. 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)     Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

-Reply- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the'Sth  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excel- 
lency's note  of  this  day's  date  respecting  railways  and  taxes 
in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  in  which  you 
stated  : 

"China  will  hereafter  provide  funds  for  building  necessary 
railways  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia ; 
if  foreign  capital  is  required  China  may  negotiate  for  a  loan 
with  Japanese  capitalists  first;  and  further,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, when  making  a  loan  in  future  on  the  security  of 
taxes  in  the  above  mentioned  places  (excluding  the  salt  and 
customs  revenue  which  has  already  been  pledged  by  the  Chinese 


442  APPENDIX 

Central  Government)  may  negotiate  for  it  with  Japanese  cap- 
italists first. 

In  reply  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  Signed)     Hioki  Eki. 

Lou   Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

EXCHANGE  OF  NOTES  KESPECTING  THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  ADVISEES 
IN    SOUTH    MANCHURIA 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4!th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

In  the  name  of  the  Chinese  Government,  I  have  the  honour 
to  make  the  following  declaration  to  your  Government: — 

"Hereafter,  if  foreign  advisers  or  instructors  on  political, 
financial,  military  or  police  matters  are  to  be  employed  in  South 
Manchuria,  Japanese  may  be  employed  first." 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)     Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

— Reply — 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your 
Excellency's  note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  made  the  fol- 
lowing declaration  in  the  name  of  your  Government: — 

"Hereafter  if  foreign  advisers  or  instructors  in  political, 
financial,  military  or  police  matters  are  to  be  employed  in 
South  Manchuria,  Japanese  may  be  employed  first." 

In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 

I  avail,  etc.. 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)     Hioki  Eki. 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


APPENDIX  443 

EXCHANGE   OF   NOTES   RESPECTING   THE   EXPL.ANATION    OF   "lEASE 
BY   negotiation"   IN    SOUTH    MANCHURIA 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  the  term  lease  by  negotiation 
contained  in  Article  2  of  the  Treaty  respecting  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  signed  this  day  shall 
be  understood  to  imply  a  long-term  lease  of  not  more  than 
thirty  years  and  also  the  possibility  of  its  unconditional 
renewal. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)      Hioki  Eki. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

— Reply — 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Ex- 
cellency's note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  state. 

"The  term  lease  by  negotiation  contained  in  Article  2  of  the 
Treaty  respecting  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia signed  this  day  shall  be  understood  to  imply  a  long-term 
lease  of  not  more  than  thirty  years  and  also  the  possibility  of 
its  unconditional  renewal." 

In  reply  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 
I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)     Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 


444  APPENDIX 

EXCHANGE  OF  NOTES  RESPECTING  THE  ARRANGEMENT  FOR  POLICE 

LAWS  AND  ORDINANCES  AND  TAXATION  IN  SOUTH  MANCHURIA 

AND    EASTERN    INNER    MONGOLIA 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of 
the  4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  the  Chinese  Authorities  will 
notify  the  Japanese  Consul  of  the  police  laws  and  ordinances 
and  the  taxation  to  which  Japanese  subjects  shall  submit  ac- 
cording to  Article  5  of  the  Treaty  respecting  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  signed  this  day  so  as  to  come  to 
an  understanding  with  him  before  their  enforcement. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)     Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

— Reply — 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Ex- 
cellency's note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  state: 

"The  Chinese  Authorities  will  notify  the  Japanese  Consul  of 
the  Police  laws  and  ordinances  and  the  taxation  to  which  Jap- 
anese subjects  shall  submit  according  to  Article  5  of  the  Treaty 
respecting  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
signed  this  day  so  as  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  him 
before  their  enforcement." 

In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)      Hioki  Ekl 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


APPENDIX  445 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of 
the  4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honour  to  state  that,  inasmuch  as  preparations 
have  to  be  made  regarding  Articles  2,  3,  4  &  5  of  the  Treaty 
respecting  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
signed  this  day,  the  Chinese  Government  proposes  that  the 
operation  of  the  said  Articles  be  postponed  for  a  period  of 
three  months  beginning  from  the  date  of  the  signing  of  the 
said  Treaty. 

I  hope  your  Government  will  agree  to  this  proposal. 
I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)     Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

— Reply — 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 
of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Ex- 
cellency's note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  stated  that 
"inasmuch  as  preparations  have  to  be  made  regarding  Articles 
2,  3,  4  &  5  the  Treaty  respecting  South  Manchuria  and  East- 
ern Inner  Mongolia  signed  this  day,  the  Chinese  Government 
proposes  that  the  operation  of  the  said  Articles  be  postponed 
for  a  period  of  three  months  beginning  from  the  date  of  the 
signing  of  the  said  Treaty." 

In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)     Hioki  Eki. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


446  APPENDIX 

EXCHANGE   OF   NOTES  RESPECTING  THE   MATTER   OF   HANYEHPING 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of 
the  4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  if  in  future  the  Hanyehping 
Company  and  the  Japanese  capitahsts  agree  upon  co-operation, 
the  Chinese  Government,  in  view  of  the  intimate  relations  sub- 
sisting between  the  Japanese  capitalists  and  the  said  Company, 
will  forthwith  give  its  permission.  The  Chinese  Government 
further  agrees  not  to  confiscate  the  said  Company,  nor,  without 
the  consent  of  the  Japanese  capitalists  to  convert  it  into  a 
state  enterprise,  nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign  capital 
other  than  Japanese. 

I  avail,  etc.. 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)     Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

— Reply- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month 

_,       „  of  the  4th  year  of  Taisho. 

Excellency,  "^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your 
Excellency's  note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  state: 

"If  in  future  the  Hanyehping  Company  and  the  Japanese 
capitalists  agree  upon  co-operation,  the  Chinese  Government, 
in  view  of  the  intimate  relations  subsisting  between  the  Japan- 
ese capitalists  and  the  said  Company,  will  forthwith  give  its 
permission.  The  Chinese  Government  further  agrees  not  to 
confiscate  the  said  Company,  nor,  without  the  consent  of  the 
Japanese  capitalists  to  convert  it  into  a  state  enterprise,  nor 
cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign  capital  other  than  Jap- 
anese." 

In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)     Hioki  Eki. 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


APPENDIX  447 

EXCHANGE   OF   NOTES  KESPECTING   THE   FUKIEN   aUESTION 

—Note- 
Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of 
the  4th  year  of  the  Repubhc  of  China. 
Excellency, 

A  report  has  reached  me  to  the  effect  that  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment has  the  intention  of  permitting  foreign  nations  to 
establish,  on  the  coast  of  Fukien  Province,  dock -yards,  coaling 
stations  for  military  use,  naval  bases,  or  to  set  up  other  mili- 
tary establishments ;  and  also  of  borrowing  foreign  capital  for 
the  purpose  of  setting  up  the  above-mentioned  establishments. 
I  have  the  honour  to  request  that  Your  Excellency  will  be 
good  enough  to  give  me  reply  stating  whether  or  not  the  Chi- 
nese Government  really  entertains  such  an  intention. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)     Hioki  Eki. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

— Reply — 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of 
the  4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excel- 
lency's note  of  this  day's  date  which  I  have  noted. 

In  reply  I  beg  to  inform  you  that  the  Chinese  Government 
hereby  declares  that  it  has  given  no  permission  to  foreign 
nations  to  construct,  on  the  coast  of  Fukien  Province,  dock- 
yards, coaling  stations  for  military  use,  naval  bases,  or  to  set 
up  other  military  establishment ;  nor  does  it  entertain  an  inten- 
tion of  borrowing  foreign  capital  for  the  purpose  of  setting 
up  the  above-mentioned  establishmments. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)     Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 


APPENDIX 
DOCUMENTS  IN  GROUP  IV 

(1)  The  Draft  of  the  Permanent  Constitution  completed  in 
May,  1917. 

(2)  The  proposed  Provincial  System,  i.e.,  the  local  govern- 
ment law. 

(3)  Memorandum  by  the  Ministry  of  Commerce  on  Tariff  Re- 
vision, illustrating  the  anomalies  of  present  trade  taxation. 

(4)  The   leading   outstanding   cases   between   China   and   the 
Foreign  Powers. 

DRAFT    OF    THE    NATIONAIi    CONSTITUTION    OF    CHINA 

(As  it  stood  on  May  28th,  1917,  in  its  second  reading  at  the 
Constitutional  Conference.) 

The  Constitutional  Conference  of  the  Republic  of  China,  in 
order  to  enhance  the  national  dignity,  to  unite  the  national 
dominion,  to  advance  the  interest  of  society  and  to  uphold  the 
sacredness  of  humanity,  hereby  adopt  the  following  constitu- 
tion which  shall  be  promulgated  to  the  whole  country,  to  be 
universally  observed,  and  handed  down  unto  the  end  of  time. 

CHAPTER    I.       THE    FORM    OF    GOVERNMENT 

Article  1.  The  Republic  of  China  shall  forever  be  a  con- 
solidated Republic. 

CHAPTER    n.       NATIONAL    TERRITORY 

Art.  2.  The  National  Territory  of  the  Republic  of  China 
shall  be  in  accordance  with  the  dominion  hithertofore  existing. 

No  change  in  National  Territory  and  its  divisions  can  be 
made  save  in  accordance  with  the  law. 

CHAPTER    ....        GOVERNING    AUTHORITY 

Art The  power  of  Government  of  the  Republic  of 

China  shall  be  derived  from  the  entire  body  of  citizens. 

448 


APPENDIX  449 

CHAPTER    m.       THE    CITIZENS 

Art.  3.  Those  who  are  of  Chinese  nationality  according  to 
law  shall  be  called  the  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China. 

Art.  4f.  Among  the  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China, 
there  shall  be,  in  the  eyes  of  the  law,  no  racial,  class,  or 
religious  distinctions,  but  all  shall  be  equal. 

Art.  5.  No  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  be 
arrested,  detained,  tried,  or  punished  save  in  accordance  with 
the  law.  Whoever  happens  to  be  detained  in  custody  shall  be 
entitled,  on  application  therefore,  to  the  immediate  benefit  of 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  bringing  him  before  a  judicial  court 
of  competent  jurisdiction  for  an  investigation  of  the  case  and 
appropriate  action  according  to  law. 

Art.  6.  The  private  habitations  of  the  citizens  of  the  Re- 
public of  China  shall  not  be  entered  or  searched  except  in 
accordance  with  the  law. 

Art.  7.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  have 
the  right  of  secrecy  of  correspondence,  which  may  not  be  vio- 
lated except  as  provided  by  law. 

Art.  8.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  have 
liberty  of  choice  of  residence  and  of  profession  which  shall  be 
unrestricted  except  in  accordance  with  law. 

Art.  9.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  have 
liberty  to  call  meetings  or  to  organize  societies  which  shall  be 
unrestricted  except  in  accordance  with  the  law. 

Art.  10.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  have 
freedom  of  speech,  writing  and  publication  which  shall  be 
unrestricted  except  in  accordance  with  the  law. 

Art.  11.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  be 
entitled  to  honour  Confucius  and  shall  enjoy  freedom  of  re- 
ligious belief  which  shall  be  unrestricted  except  in  accordance 
with  the  law. 

Art.  12.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  enjoy 
the  inviolable  right  to  the  security  of  their  property  and  any 
measure  to  the  contrary  necessitated  by  public  interest  shall  be 
determined  by  law. 

Art The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  enjoy 

all  other  forms  of  freedom  aside  from  those  hithertofore  men- 


450  APPENDIX 

tioned,  provided  they  are  not  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the 
Constitution. 

Art.  13.  The  citizens  of  the  RepubHc  of  China  shall  have 
the  right  to  appeal  to  the  Judicial  Courts  according  to  law. 

Art.  14.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  have 
the  right  to  submit  petitions  or  make  complaints  according  to 
law. 

Art.  15".  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  have 
the  right  to  vote  and  to  be  voted  for  according  to  law. 

Art.  16.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  have 
the  right  to  hold  official  posts  according  to  law. 

Art.  17.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  per- 
form the  obligation  of  paying  taxes  according  to  law. 

Art.  18.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  per- 
form the  obligation  of  military  service  according  to  law. 

Art.  19.  The  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  China  shall  be 
under  the  obligation  to  receive  primary  education  according 
to  law. 

CHAPTER    rV.       THE    NATIONAL    ASSEMBLY 

Art.  20.  The  legislative  power  of  the  Republic  of  China 
shall  be  exercised  by  the  National  Assembly  exclusively. 

Art.  21.  The  National  Assembly  shall  consist  of  a  Senate 
and  House  of  Representatives. 

Art.  22.  The  Senate  shall  be  composed  of  the  Senators 
elected  by  the  highest  local  legislative  assemblies  and  other 
electoral  bodies. 

Art.  23.  The  House  of  Representatives  shall  be  composed 
of  the  representatives  elected  by  the  various  electoral  districts 
in  proportion  to  the  population. 

Art.  24.  The  members  of  both  Houses  shall  be  elected  ac- 
cording to  law. 

Art.  25.  In  no  case  shall  one  person  be  a  member  of  both 
Houses  simultaneously. 

Art.  26.  No  member  of  either  House  shall  hold  any  official 
post,  civil  or  military  during  his  term. 

Art.  27.  The  qualifications  of  the  members  of  either  House 
shall  be  determined  by  the  respective  Houses. 

Art.  28.     The  term  of  office  for  a  member  of  the  Senate 


APPENDIX  451 

shall  be  six  years.  One-third  of  the  members  shall  retire  and 
new  ones  be  elected  every  two  years. 

Art.  ^9.  The  term  of  office  for  a  member  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  shall  be  three  years. 

Art.  30.  Each  House  shall  have  a  President  and  a  Vice- 
President  who  shall  be  elected  from  among  its  members. 

Art.  31.  The  National  Assembly  shall  itself  convene,  open 
and  close  its  sessions,  but  as  to  extraordinary  sessions,  they 
shall  be  called  under  one  of  the  following  circumstances : 

(1)  A  signed  request  of  more  than  one-third  of  the  members 
of  each  House. 

(2)  A  mandate  of  the  President. 

Art.  32.  The  ordinary  sessions  of  the  National  Assembly 
shall  begin  on  the  first  day  of  the  eighth  month  in  each  year. 

Art.  33.  The  period  for  the  ordinary  session  of  the  Na- 
tional Assembly  shall  be  four  months  which  may  be  prolonged, 
but  the  prolonged  period  shall  not  exceed  the  length  of  the 
ordinary  session. 

Art.  34.     (Eliminated.) 

Art.  35.  Both  Houses  shall  meet  in  joint  session  at  the 
opening  and  closing  of  the  National  Assembly. 

If  one  House  suspends  its  session,  the  other  House  shall  do 
likewise  during  the  same  period. 

When  the  House  of  Representatives  is  dissolved,  the  Senate 
shall  adjourn  during  the  same  period. 

Art.  36.  The  work  of  the  National  Assembly  shall  be  con- 
ducted in  the  Houses  separately.  No  bill  shall  be  introduced  in 
both  Houses  simultaneously. 

Art.  37.  Unless  there  be  an  attendance  of  over  half  of  the 
total  number  of  members  of  either  House,  no  sitting  shall  be 
held. 

Art.  38.  Any  subject  discussed  in  either  House  shall  be 
decided  by  the  votes  of  the  majority  of  members  attending 
the  sitting.  The  President  of  each  House  shall  have  a  decid- 
ing vote  in  case  of  a  tie. 

Art.  39.  A  decision  of  the  National  Assembly  shall  re- 
quire the  decision  of  both  Houses. 

Art.  4*0.     The  sessions  of  both  Houses  shall  be  held  in  public, 


452  APPENDIX 

except  on  request  of  the  government,  or  decision  of  the  Houses 
when  secret  sessions  may  be  held. 

Art.  41.  Should  the  House  of  Representatives  consider 
either  the  President  or  the  Vice-President  of  the  Republic  of 
China  has  committed  treason,  he  may  be  impeached  by  the  de- 
cision of  a  majority  of  over  two-thirds  of  the  members  present, 
there  being  a  quorum  of  over  two-thirds  of  the  total  member- 
ship of  the  House. 

Art.  42.  Should  the  House  of  Representatives  consider 
that  the  Cabinet  Ministers  have  violated  the  law,  an  impeach- 
ment may  be  instituted  with  the  approval  of  over  two-thirds  of 
the  members  present. 

Art.  43.  The  House  of  Representatives  may  pass  a  vote 
of  want  of  Confidence  in  the  Cabinet  Ministers. 

Art.  44.  The  Senate  shall  try  the  impeached  President, 
Vice-President  and  Cabinet  Ministers. 

With  regard  to  the  above-mentioned  trial,  no  judgment  of 
guilt  or  violation  of  the  law  shall  be  passed  without  the  ap- 
pi*oval  of  over  two-thirds  of  the  members  present. 

When  a  verdict  of  "Guilty"  is  pronounced  on  the  President 
or  Vice-President,  he  shall  be  deprived  of  his  post,  but  the 
infliction  of  punishment  shall  be  determined  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Justice. 

When  the  verdict  of  "Guilty"  is  pronounced  upon  a  Cabi- 
net Minister,  he  shall  be  deprived  of  his  office  and  may  forfeit 
his  public  rights.  Should  the  above  penalty  be  insufficient  for 
his  offence,  he  shall  be  tried  by  the  Judicial  Court. 

Art.  ....  Either  of  the  two  Houses  shall  have  power  to 
request  the  government  to  inquire  into  any  case  of  delinquency 
or  unlawful  act  on  the  part  of  any  official  and  to  punish  him 
accordingly. 

Art.  45.  Both  Houses  shall  have  the  right  to  offer  sugges- 
tions to  the  Government. 

Art.  46.  Both  Houses  shall  receive  and  consider  the  peti- 
tions of  the  citizens. 

Art.  47.  Members  of  either  House  may  introduce  inter- 
pellations to  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  and  demand  their 
attendance  in  the  House  to  reply  thereto. 


APPENDIX  453 

Art.  48.  Members  of  either  House  shall  not  be  responsible 
to  those  outside  the  House  for  opinions  expressed  and  votes 
cast  in  the  House. 

Art.  49.  No  member  of  either  House  during  session  shall 
be  arrested  or  detained  in  custody  without  the  permission  of 
his  respective  House,  unless  he  be  arrested  in  the  commission  of 
the  offence  or  act. 

When  any  member  of  either  House  has  been  so  arrested,  the 
government  should  report  the  cause  to  his  respective  House. 
Such  member's  House,  during  session,  may  with  the  approval 
of  its  members  demand  for  the  release  of  the  arrested  member 
and  for  temporary  suspension  of  the  legal  proceedings. 

Art.  50.  The  annual  allowances  and  other  expenses  of  the 
members  of  both  Houses  shall  be  fixed  by  law. 

(chapter  V  on  Resident  Committee  of  the  National  Assembly 
with  4  articles  has  been  eliminated.) 

CHAPTER    VI.       THE    PRESIDENT 

Art.  55.  The  administrative  power  of  the  Republic  of  China 
shall  be  vested  in  the  President  with  the  assistance  of  the 
Cabinet  Ministers. 

*  Art  56.  A  person  of  the  Republic  of  China  in  the  full 
enjoyment  of  public  rights,  of  the  age  of  forty  years  or  more, 
and  resident  in  China  for  at  least  ten  years,  is  eligible  for 
election  as  President. 

*  Art.  57.  The  President  shall  be  elected  by  a  Presidential 
Election  Convention,  composed  of  the  members  of  the  Na- 
tional Assembly. 

For  the  above  election,  an  attendance  of  at  least  two-thirds 
of  the  number  of  electors  shall  be  required,  and  the  voting 
shall  be  performed  by  secret  ballot.  The  person  obtaining 
three-fourths  of  the  total  votes  cast  shall  be  elected ;  but  should 
no  definite  result  be  obtained  after  the  second  ballot,  the  two 
candidates  obtaining  the  most  votes  in  the  second  ballot  shall 
be  voted  for  and  the  candidate  receiving  the  majority  vote 
shall  be  elected. 

*  Art.  58.  The  period  of  office  of  the  President  shall  be  five 
years,  and  if  re-elected,  he  may  hold  office  for  another  term. 


454.  APPENDIX 

Three  months  previous  to  the  expiration  of  the  term,  the 
members  of  the  National  Assembly  of  the  Republic  shall  them- 
selves convene  and  organize  the  President  Election  Convention 
to  elect  a  President  for  the  next  term. 

*  Art.  59.  When  the  President  is  being  inaugurated,  he 
shall  make  an  oath  as  follows :  "I  hereby  solemnly  swear  that 
I  will  most  faithfully  obey  the  Constitution  and  discharge  the 
duties  of  the  President." 

*  Art.  60.  Should  the  post  of  the  President  become  vacant, 
the  Vice-President  shall  succeed  him  until  the  expiration  of 
the  term  of  office  of  the  President.  Should  the  President  be 
unable  to  discharge  his  duties  for  any  cause,  the  Vice-Presi- 
dent shall  act  for  him. 

Should  the  Vice-President  vacate  his  post  at  the  same  time, 
the  Cabinet  shall  officiate  for  the  President,  but  at  the  same 
time,  the  members  of  the  National  Assembly  shall  within  three 
months  convene  themselves  and  organize  the  Presidential  Elec- 
tion Convention  to  elect  a  new  President. 

*  Art.  61.  The  President  shall  be  relieved  of  his  office  at  the 
expiration  of  his  term  of  his  office.  If,  at  the  end  of  the  period, 
the  new  President  has  not  been  elected,  or,  having  been  elected, 
be  unable  to  assure  office  and  when  the  Vice-President  is  also 
unable  to  act  as  President,  the  Cabinet  shall  officiate  for  the 
President. 

*  Art.  62.  The  election  of  the  Vice-President  shall  be  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  regulations  fixed  for  the  election  of  the  Presi- 
dent ;  and  the  election  of  the  Vice-President  shall  take  place 
simultaneously  with  the  election  of  the  President.  Should  the 
post  of  the  Vice-President  become  vacant,  a  new  Vice-President 
shall  be  elected. 

Art.  63.  The  President  shall  promulgate  all  laws  and  su- 
pervise and  secure  their  enforcement. 

Art.  64.  The  President  may  issue  and  publish  mandates 
for  the  execution  of  laws  in  accordance  with  the  powers  dele- 
gated to  him  by  the  law. 

Art.  65.      (Eliminated.) 

Art.  66.     The  President  shall  appoint  and  remove  all  civil 


APPENDIX  455 

and  military  officials,  with  the  exception  of  those  specially 
provided  for  by  the  Constitution  or  laws. 

Art.  67.  The  President  shall  be  the  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  Republic. 

The  organization  of  the  Army  and  Navy  shall  be  fixed  by 
law. 

Art.  68.  Intercourse  with  foreign  countries,  the  President 
shall  be  the  representative  of  the  Republic. 

Art.  69.  The  President  may,  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
National  Assembly,  declare  war,  but,  in  case  of  defence  against 
foreign  invasion,  he  may  request  recognition  of  the  National 
Assembly  after  the  declaration  of  the  war. 

Art.  70.  The  President  may  conclude  treaties ;  but  with 
regards  to  treaties  of  peace,  and  those  effecting  legislation, 
they  shall  not  be  valid,  if  the  consent  of  the  National  Assembly 
is  not  obtained. 

Art.  71.  The  President  may  proclaim  martial  law  accord- 
ing to  law;  but  if  the  National  Assembly  should  consider  that 
there  is  no  such  necessity,  he  should  declare  the  withdrawal 
of  the  martial  law. 

Art.  72.      (Eliminated.) 

Art.  73.  The  President  may,  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Justice,  grant  pardons,  commute  punishment, 
and  restore  rights ;  but  with  regard  to  a  verdict  of  impeach- 
ment, unless  with  the  concurrence  of  the  National  Assembly, 
he  shall  not  make  any  announcement  of  the  restoration  of 
rights. 

Art.  74.  The  President  may  suspend  the  session  of  either 
the  Senate  or  the  House  of  Representatives  for  a  period  not 
exceeding  ten  days,  but  during  any  one  session,  he  may  not 
exercise  this  right  more  than  once. 

Art.  75.  With  the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  or  more  of 
the  members  of  the  Senate  present,  the  President  may  dissolve 
the  House  of  Representatives,  but  there  must  not  be  a  second 
dissolution  during  the  period  of  the  same  session. 

When  the  House  of  Representatives  is  dissolved  by  the 
President,  another  election  shall  take  place  immediately,  and 


456  APPENDIX 

the  convocation  of  the  House  at  a  fixed  date  within  five  months 
should  be  effected  to  continue  the  session. 

Art.  76.  With  the  exception  of'  high  treason,  no  criminal 
charges  shall  be  brought  against  the  President  before  he  has 
vacated  his  office. 

Art.  77.  The  salaries  of  the  President  and  Vice-President 
shall  be  fixed  by  law. 

CHAPTER  VII.       THE  CABINET 

Art.  78.  The  Cabinet  shall  be  composed  of  the  Cabinet 
Ministers. 

Art.  79.  The  Premier  and  the  Ministers  of  the  various  min- 
istries shall  be  called  the  Cabinet  Ministers. 

Art.  80.  The  appointment  of  the  Premier  sl^all  be  approved 
by  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Should  a  vacancy  in  the  Premiership  occur  during  the  time 
of  adjournment  of  the  National  Assembly,  the  President  may 
appoint  an  Acting-Premier,  but  it  shall  be  required  that  the 
appointment  must  be  submitted  to  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives for  approval  within  seven  days  after  the  convening  of 
the  next  session. 

Art.  81.  Cabinet  Ministers  shall  assist  the  President  and 
shall  be  responsible  to  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Without  the  counter-signature  of  the  Cabinet  Minister  to 
whose  Ministry  the  Mandate  or  dispatch  applies,  the  mandate 
or  dispatch  of  the  President  in  connection  with  State  affairs 
shall  not  be  valid ;  but  this  shall  not  apply  to  the  appointment 
or  dismissal  of  the  Premier. 

Art.  82.  When  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence  in  the  Cabi- 
net Ministers  is  passed,  if  the  President  does  not  dissolve  .the 
House  of  Representatives  according  to  the  provisions  made  in 
Art.  75,  he  should  remove  the  Cabinet  Ministers. 

Art.  83.  The  Cabinet  Ministers  shall  be  allowed  to  attend 
both  Houses  and  make  speeches,  but  in  case  of  introducing 
bills  for  the  Executive  Department,  their  delegates  may  act  for 
them. 


APPENDIX  457 

CHAPTER    Vin.       COURTS    OF    JUSTICE 

Art.  84.  The  Judicial  authority  of  the  Republic  of  China 
shall  be  exercised  by  the  Courts  of  Justice  exclusively. 

Art.  85.  The  organization  of  the  Courts  of  Justice  and 
the  qualifications  of  the  Judges  shall  be  fixed  by  law. 

The  appointment  of  the  Chief-Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court 
should  have  the  approval  of  the  Senate. 

Art.  86.  The  Judiciary  shall  attend  to  and  settle  all  civil, 
criminal  administrative  and  other  cases,  but  this  does  not 
include  those  cases  which  have  been  specially  provided  for  by 
the  Constitution  or  law. 

Art.  87.  The  trial  of  cases  in  the  law  courts  shall  be  con- 
ducted publicly,  but  those  affecting  public  peace  and  order  or 
propriety  may  be  held  in  camera. 

Art.  88.  The  Judges  shall  be  independent  in  the  conducting 
of  trials  and  none  shall  be  allowed  to  interfere. 

Art.  89.  Except  in  accordance  with  law,  judges,  during 
their  continuation  of  office  shall  not  have  their  emoluments  de- 
creased, nor  be  transferred  to  other  offices,  nor  shall  they  be 
removed  from  office. 

During  his  tenure  of  office,  no  judge  shall  be  deprived  of  his 
office  unless  he  is  convicted  of  crime,  or  for  offences  punishable 
by  law.  But  the  above  does  not  include  cases  of  reorganization 
of  Judicial  Courts  and  when  the  qualification  of  the  Judges  are 
modified.  The  punishments  and  fines  of  the  Judicial  Officials 
shall  be  fixed  by  law. 

CHAPTER    IX.       LEGISLATION 

Art.  90.  The  members  of  both  Houses  and  the  Executive 
Department  may  introduce  bills  of  law,  but  if  any  bill  of  law 
is  rejected  by  the  House  it  shall  not  be  re-introduced  during  the 
same  session. 

Art.  91.  Any  bill  of  law  which  has  been  passed  by  the 
National  Assembly  shall  be  promulgated  by  the  President 
within  15  days  after  receipt  of  the  same. 

Art.  92.  Should  the  President  disapprove  of  any  bill  of 
law  passed  by  the  National  Assembly,  he  shall  within  the  period 
allowed  for  promulgation,  state  the  reason  of  his  disapproval 


458  APPENDIX 

and  request  the  re-consideration  of  the  same  by  the  National 
Assembly. 

If  a  bill  of  law  has  not  yet  been  submitted  with  a  request  for 
consideration  and  the  period  for  promulgation  has  passed ;  it 
shall  become  law.  But  the  above  shall  not  apply  to  the  case 
when  the  session  of  the  National  Assembly  is  adjourned,  or,  the 
House  of  Representatives  dissolved  before  the  period  for  the 
promulgation  is  ended. 

Art.  93.  The  law  shall  not  be  altered  or  repealed  except  in 
accordance  with  the  law. 

Art.  94.  Any  law  that  is  in  conflict  with  the  Constitution 
shall  not  be  valid. 

CHAPTER    X.       NATIONAI,    FINANCE 

Art.  95.  The  introductions  of  new  taxes  and  alterations 
in  the  rate  of  taxation  shall  be  fixed  by  law. 

Art.  96.      (Eliminated.) 

Art.  97.  The  approval  fo  the  National  Assembly  must  be 
obtained  for  National  loans,  or  the  conclusion  of  agreements 
which  tend  to  increase  the  burden  of  the  National  Treasury. 

Art Financial  bills   involving  direct   obligation   on 

the  part  of  the  citizens  shall  first  be  submitted  to  the  House  of 
Representatives. 

Art.  98.  The  Executive  Department  of  the  Government 
shall  prepare  a  budget  setting  forth  expenditures  and  receipts 
of  the  Nation  for  the  fiscal  year  which  shall  be  submitted  to  the 
House  of  Representatives  within  15  days  after  the  opening  of 
the  session  of  the  National  Assembly. 

Should  the  Senate  amend  or  reject  the  budget  passed  by  the 
House  of  Representatives,  it  shall  request  the  concurrence  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  in  its  amendment  or  rejection, 
and,  if  such  concurrence  is  not  obtained,  the  budget  shall  be 
considered  as  passed. 

Art.  99.  In  case  of  special  provisions,  the  Executive  De- 
partment may  fix  in  advance  in  the  budget  the  period  over 
which  the  appropriations  are  to  be  spread  and  may  provide  for 
the  successive  appropriations  continuing  over  this  period. 

Art.  100.     In  order  to  provide  for  a  safe  margin  for  under- 


APPENDIX  459 

estimates  or  for  items  left  out  of  the  budget,  the  Executive 
Department  may  include  contingent  items  in  the  budget  under 
the  heading  of  Reserve  Fund.  The  sum  expended  under  the 
above  provision  shall  be  submitted  to  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives at  the  next  session  for  recognition. 

Art.  101.  Unless  approved  bj  the  Executive  Department, 
the  National  Assembly  shall  have  no  right  to  abolish  or  curtail 
any  of  the  following  items : 

(1)  Items  in  connection  with  obligations  of  the  Government 
according  to  law. 

(2)  Items  necessitated  by  the  observance  of  treaties. 

(3)  Items  legally  fixed. 

(4)  Successive  appropriations  continuing  over  a  period. 
Art.   102.     The  National  Assembly   shall  not  increase  the 

annual  expenditures  as  set  down  in  the  budget. 

Art.  103.  In  case  the  budget  is  not  yet  passed,  when  the 
fiscal  year  begins,  the  Executive  Department  may,  during  this 
period,  follow  the  budget  for  the  preceding  year  by  limiting 
its  expenditures  and  receipts  by  one-twelfth  of  the  total 
amount  for  each  month. 

Art.  104.  Should  there  be  a  defensive  war  against  foreign 
invasion,  or  should  there  be  a  suppression  of  internal  rebellion, 
or  provide  against  extraordinary  calamity,  when  it  is  impos- 
sible to  issue  writs  for  summoning  the  National  Assembly,  the 
Executive  Department  may  adopt  financial  measures  for  the 
emergency,  but  it  should  request  the  recognition  thereof  by 
the  House  of  Representatives  within  seven  days  after  the  con- 
vening of  the  next  session  of  the  National  Assembly. 

Art.  105.  Orders  on  the  Treasury  for  payments  on  account 
of  the  annual  expenditures  of  the  Government  shall  first  be 
passed  by  the  Auditing  Department. 

Art.  106.  Accounts  of  the  annual  expenditures  and  annual 
receipts  for  each  year  should  first  be  referred  to  the  Auditing 
Department  for  investigation  and  then  the  Executive  Depart- 
ment shall  report  the  same  to  the  National  Assembly. 

If  the  account  be  rejected  by  the  House  of  Representatives, 
the  Cabinet  shall  be  held  responsible. 

Art.  107.     The  method  of  organization  of  the  Auditing  De- 


460  APPENDIX 

partraent  and  the  qualification  of  the  Auditors  shall  be  fixed 
by  law. 

During  his  tenure  of  office,  the  auditor  shall  not  be  dis- 
missed or  transferred  to  any  other  duty  or  his  salary  be  re- 
duced except  in  accordance  with  the  law. 

The  manner  of  punishment  of  Auditors  shall  be  fixed  by  law. 

Art.  108.  The  Chief  of  the  Auditing  Department  shall  be 
elected  by  the  Senate.  The  Chief  of  the  Auditing  Department 
may  attend  sittings  of  both  Houses  and  report  on  the  Audit 
with  explanatory  statements. 

CHAPTEE    XI.       AMENDMENTS,    INTERPRETATION    AND    INVIOLABIL- 
ITY   OF    THE    CONSTITUTION 

Art.  109.  The  National  Assembly  may  bring  up  bills  for 
the  amendment  of  the  National  Constitution. 

Bills  of  this  nature  shall  not  take  eff'ect  unless  approved 
by  two-thirds  of  the  members  of  each  House  present. 

No  bill  for  the  amendment  of  the  Constitution  shall  be 
introduced  unless  signed  by  one-fourth  of  the  members  of  each 
House. 

Art.  110.  The  amendment  of  the  National  Constitution 
shall  be  discussed  and  decided  by  the  National  Constitutional 
Conference. 

Art.  111.  No  proposal  for  a  change  of  the  form  of  Gor- 
cmment  shall  be  allowed  as  a  subject  for  amendment. 

Art.  112.  Should  there  be  any  doubt  as  to  the  meaning 
of  the  text  of  the  Constitution,  it  shall  be  interpreted  by  the 
National  Constitutional  Conference. 

Art.  113.  The  National  Constitutional  Conference  shall 
be  composed  of  the  members  of  the  National  Assembly. 

Unless  there  be  a  quorum  of  two-thirds  of  the  total  number 
of  the  members  of  the  National  Assembly,  no  Constitutional 
Conference  shall  be  held,  and  unless  three-fourths  of  the  mem- 
bers present  vote  in  favour,  no  amendment  shall  be  passed. 
But  with  regard  to  the  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  only 
two-thirds  of  the  members  present  is  required  to  decide  an 
issue. 

Art The  National  Constitution  shall  be  the  Supreme 


APPENDIX  461 

Law  of  the  land  and  shall  be  inviolable  under  any  circumstances 
unless  duly  amended  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  specified 
in  this  Constitution. 

V  A  Chapter  on  Provincial  or  local  organization  is  to  be 

inserted  under  Chapter ,  providing  for  certain  powers 

and  rights  to  be  given  to  local  governments  with  the  residual 
power  left  in  the  hands  of  the  central  government.  The  exact 
text  is  not  yet  settled. 

Note:  The  Mark  (*)  indicated  that  the  article  has  already 
been  formally  adopted  as  a  part  of  the  finished  Constitution. 

The  mark  (  V  )  indicates  that  the  article  has  not  yet  passed 
through  the  second  reading. 

Those  without  marks  have  passed  through  the  second  read- 
ing on  May  28th,  1917.  Articles  bearing  no  number  are  addi- 
tions to  the  original  draft  as  presented  to  the  Conference  by 
the  Drafting  Committee. 

THE  LOCAL  SYSTEM 
DRAFT  SUBMITTED  TO  PARLIAMENT 

The  following  Regulations  on  the  Local  System  have  been 
referred  to  the  Parliamentary  Committee  for  consideration: — 

Article  1.  The  Local  System  shall  embrace  provinces  and 
hsien  districts. 

Any  change  for  the  existing  division  of  provinces  and  hsien 
districts  shall  be  decided  by  the  Senate.  As  to  Mongolia, 
Tibet,  Chinghai  and  other  places  where  no  provinces  and  hsien 
districts  have  been  fixed,  Parliament  shall  enforce  these  regula- 
tions there  in  future. 

Art.  2.  A  province  shall  have  the  following  duties  and 
rights:  (a)  To  fix  local  laws.  (6)  To  manage  provincial 
properties,  (c)  To  attend  to  the  affairs  in  connexion  with 
police  organization,  sanitation,  conservancy,  roads,  and  public 
works,  {d)  To  develop  education  and  industry  in  accordance 
with  the  order  and  mandates  of  the  Central  Government,  (e) 
To  improve  its  navigation  and  telegraphic  lines,  or  to  under- 
take such  enterprises  with  the  co-operation  of  other  provinces. 
(/)  To  organize  precautionary  troops  for  the  protection  of 


462  APPENDIX 

local  interests,  the  method  of  whose  organization,  uniforms  and 
arms  shall  be  similar  to  those  of  the  National  Army.  With  the 
exception  of  the  matter  of  declaring  war  against  foreign  coun- 
tries, the  President  shall  have  no  power  to  transfer  these  troops 
to  other  provinces :  and  unless  the  province  is  unable  to  sup- 
press its  own  internal  troubles,  it  shall  not  ask  the  Central 
Government  for  the  service  of  the  National  Army,  (g)  The 
province  shall  defray  its  own  expenses  for  the  administration 
and  the  maintenance  of  precautionary  troops ;  but  the  provinces 
which  have  hitherto  received  subsidies,  shall  continue  to  receive 
same  from  the  National  Treasury  with  the  approval  of  Parlia- 
ment, (/i)  Land,  Title  Deed,  License,  Mortgage,  Tobacco  and 
Wine,  Butchery,  Fishery  and  all  other  principal  and  additional 
taxes  shall  be  considered  as  local  revenues,  (i)  The  province 
may  fix  rates  for  local  tax  or  levy  additional  tax  on  the  Na- 
tional Taxes.  ( j  )  The  province  shall  have  a  provincial  treas- 
ury. (Zf)  It  may  raise  provincial  public  loans.  (Z)  It  shall 
elect  a  certain  number  of  Senators,  (m)  It  shall  fix  regula- 
tions for  the  smaller  local  Self-Governing  Bodies. 

Art.  3.  Besides  the  above  rights  and  privileges,  a  province 
shall  bear  the  following  responsibilities : 

(a)  In  case  of  financial  difficulties  of  the  Central  Govern- 
ment, it  shall  share  the  burden  according  to  the  proportion  of 
its  revenue,  (b)  It  shall  enforce  the  laws  and  mandates  pro- 
mulgated by  the  Central  Government,  (c)  It  shall  enforce  the 
measures  entrusted  by  the  Central  Government,  but  the  latter 
shall  bear  the  expenses,  {d)  In  case  the  local  laws  and  regula- 
tions are  in  conflict  with  those  of  the  Central  Government  the 
latter  may  with  the  approval  of  Parliament  cancel  or  modify 
the  same,  {e)  In  case  of  great  necessity  the  provincial  tele- 
graph, railway,  etc.,  may  be  utilized  by  the  Central  Govern- 
ment. (/)  In  case  of  negligence,  or  blunder  made  by  the  pro- 
vincial authorities,  which  injures  the  interests  of  the  nation, 
the  Central  Government,  with  the  approval  of  Parliament,  may 
reprimand  and  rectify  same,  (g)  It  shall  not  make  laws  on  the 
grant  of  monopoly  and  of  copyrights  ;  neither  issue  bank  notes, 
manufacture  coins,  make  implements  of  weights  and  measures ; 
neither  grant  the  right  to  local  banks  to  manage  the  Govern- 


APPENDIX  463 

ment  Treasury ;  nor  sign  contracts  with  foreigners  on  the  pur- 
chase or  sale  of  lands  and,  mines,  or  mortgage  land  tax  to  them 
or  construct  naval  harbours  or  arsenals,  (/i)  All  local  laws, 
budgets,  and  other  important  matters  shall  be  reported  to  the 
President  from  time  to  time,  (i)  The  Central  Government 
may  transfer  to  itself  the  ownership  of  enterprises  or  rights 
which  Parliament  has  decided  should  become  national,  (j)  In 
case  of  a  quarrel  arising  between  the  Central  Government  and 
the  province,  or  between  provinces,  it  shall  be  decided  by  Parlia- 
ment. (A;)  In  case  of  refusal  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  Central 
Government,  the  President  with  the  approval  of  Parliament 
may  change  the  Shenchang  (Governor)  or  dissolve  the  Pro- 
vincial Assembly,  (l)  The  President  with  the  approval  of 
Parliament  may  suppress  by  force  any  province  which  defies 
the  Central  Authorities. 

Art.  4.  A  Shenchang  shall  be  appointed  for  each  province 
to  represent  the  Central  Government  in  the  supervision  of  the 
local  administration.  The  appointment  shall  be  made  with 
the  approval  of  the  Senate,  the  term  of  office  for  the  Shenchang 
shall  be  four  years,  and  his  annual  salary  shall  be  $24,000, 
which  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  National  Treasury. 

Art.  5.  The  administration  measures  entrusted  by  the  Gov- 
ernment to  the  Shenchang  shall  be  enforced  by  the  adminis- 
trative organs  under  his  supervision,  and  he  shall  be  responsi- 
ble for  same. 

Art.  6.  In  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  and  mandates  of  the 
Central  Government,  or  of  the  laws  and  regulations  of  his 
province,  he  may  issue  orders. 

Art.  7.  The  province  shall  establish  the  following  five  De- 
partments, namely  Interior,  Police,  Finance,  Education  and 
Industry.  There  shall  be  one  Department  Chief  for  each  De- 
partment, to  be  appointed  by  the  Shenchang. 

Art.  8.  A  Provincial  Council  shall  be  organized  to  assist 
the  Shenchang  to  enforce  the  administrative  measures,  and  it 
shall  be  responsible  to  the  Provincial  Assembly  for  same. 

This  Council  shall  be  composed  of  all  the  Departmental 
Chiefs,  and  five  members  elected  out  of  the  Provincial  Assembly. 
It  shall  discuss  the  Bills  on  Budget,  on  administration,  and  on 


464  APPENDIX 

the  organization  of  police  forces,  submitted  by  the  Shenchang. 

Art.  9.  If  one  member  of  the  Council  be  impeached  by  the 
Provincial  Assembly,  the  Shenchang  shall  replace  him,  but  if 
the  whole  body  of  the  Council  be  impeached,  the  Shenchang  shall 
either  dissolve  the  Assembly  or  dismiss  all  his  Departmental 
Chiefs.  In  one  session  the  Assembly  shall  not  be  dissolved 
twice,  and  after  two  months  of  the  dissolution,  it  shall  be  con- 
vened again. 

Art.  10.  The  organization  and  election  of  the  Provincial 
Assembly  shall  be  fixed  by  law. 

Art.  11.  The  Provincial  Assembly  shall  have  the  following 
duties  and  powers:  (a)  It  may  pass  such  laws  as  allowed  by 
the  Constitution,  (b)  It  may  pass  the  bills  on  the  provincial 
Budget  and  Accounts,  (c)  It  may  impeach  the  members  of  the 
Provincial  Council,  (d)  It  may  address  interpellations  or  give 
suggestions  to  the  Provincial  Council.  (^)  It  may  elect  Mem- 
bers for  the  Provincial  Council.  (/)  It  may  attend  to  the  peti- 
tions submitted  by  the  public. 

Art.  12.  A  Magistrate  shall  be  appointed  for  each  hsien 
district  to  enforce  administrative  measures.  He  shall  be  ap- 
pointed directly  by  the  Shenchang,  and  his  term  of  office  shall 
be  three  years. 

Art.  13.  The  Central  Government  shall  hold  examinations 
in  the  provinces  for  candidates  for  the  Magistracy.  In  a  prov- 
ince half  of  the  total  number  of  magistrates  shall  be  natives  of 
the  province  and  the  other  half  of  other  provinces ;  but  a  native 
shall  hold  office  of  Magistrate  300  li  away  from  his  home. 

Art.  14.  The  organization  for  the  legislative  organ  of  the 
hsien  district  shall  be  fixed  by  law. 

TARIFF  REVISION  IN  CHINA 

The  following  is  a  translation  of  a  memorandum  prepared 
by  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Commerce  regarding  aboli- 
tion of  likin  and  an  increase  of  the  Customs  duties : — 

THE  MEMORANDUM 

"Disproportionate  taxation  on  commodities  at  inland  towns 
and  cities  tends  to  cripple  the  productive  power  of  a  country. 


APPENDIX  465 

Acting  upon  this  principle,  France  in  the  17th,  England,  Amer- 
ica, Germany  and  Austria  in  the  18th  Century  abolished  such 
kind  of  taxation,  the  Customs  tariif  remaining,  which  is  a  levy 
on  imports  at  the  first  port  of  entry.  Its  purpose  is  to  increase 
the  cost  of  production  of  imported  goods  and  to  serve  as  a  pro- 
tection of  native  products  (sic).  Raw  materials  from  abroad 
are,  however,  exempt  from  Customs  duty  in  order  to  provide 
cheap  material  for  home  manufactures.  An  altogether  differ- 
ent state  of  affairs,  however,  exists  in  this  country.  Likin  sta- 
tions are  found  throughout  the  country,  while  raw  materials 
are  taxed.  Take  the  Hangchow  silk  for  instance.  When 
transported  to  the  Capital  for  sale,  it  has  to  pay  a  tax  on  raw 
material  of  18  per  cent.  Foreign  imported  goods  on  the  other 
hand,  are  only  taxed  at  the  rate  of  five  per  cent,  ad  valorem 
Customs  duty  at  the  first  port  of  entry  with  another  2.5  per 
cent,  transit  duty  at  one  of  the  other  ports  through  which  the 
goods  pass.  Besides  these  only  landing  duty  is  imposed  upon 
imported  goods  at  the  port  of  destination.  Upon  timber  being 
shipped  from  Fengtien  and  Antung  to  Peking,  it  has  to  pay 
duties  at  five  different  places,  the  total  amount  of  which  aggre- 
gates 20  per  cent,  of  its  market  value,  while  timber  from  Amer- 
ican is  taxed  only  ten  per  cent.  Timber  from  JueichoAV  to 
Hankow  and  Shanghai  is  taxed  at  six  different  places,  the  total 
amount  of  duty  paid  aggregating  17.5  per  cent.,  while  timber 
imported  from  abroad  to  these  ports  is  required  to  pay  Cus- 
toms duty  only  one-third  thereof.  The  above-mentioned  rates 
on  native  goods  are  the  minimum.  Not  every  merchant  can, 
however,  obtain  such  special  "exemption,"  without  a  long  nego- 
tiation and  special  arrangements  wdth  the  authorities.  Other- 
wise, a  merchant  must  pay  25  per  cent,  of  the  market  value  of 
his  goods  as  duty.  For  this  reason  the  import  of  timber  into 
this  country  has  greatly  increased  within  the  last  few  years, 
the  total  amount  of  which  being  valued  at  $13,000,000  a  year. 
Is  this  not  a  great  injustice  to  native  merchants? 

THE   CHINESE   METHOD 

^^Respecting  the  improvement  of  the  economic  condition  of 
the  people,  a  country  can  hardly  attain  this  object  without 


466  APPENDIX 

developing  its  foreign  commerce.  The  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica, Germany  and  Japan  have  one  by  one  abolished  their  export 
duty  as  well  as  made  appropriations  for  subsidies  to  encourage 
the  export  of  certain  kinds  of  commodities.  We,  on  the  other 
hand,  impose  likin  all  along  the  line  upon  native  commodities 
destined  for  foreign  market  in  addition  to  export  duty.  Goods 
for  foreign  market  are  more  heavily  taxed  than  for  home  con- 
sumption. Take  the  Chekiang  silk  for  instance.  Silk  for 
export  is  more  heavily  taxed  than  that  for  home  use.  Differ- 
ent rates  of  taxation  are  imposed  upon  tea  for  foreign  and 
home  market.  Other  kinds  of  native  products  for  export  are 
also  heavily  taxed  with  the  result  that,  within  the  last  two 
decades,  the  annual  exports  of  this  country  are  exceeded  by 
imports  by  over  Tls.  640,000,000,000.  From  the  32nd  year 
of  the  reign  of  Kuang  Hsu  to  the  4th  year  of  the  Republic, 
imports  exceed  exports  on  the  average  by  Tls.  120,000,000. 
These  figures  speak  for  themselves. 

LIKIN 

"Likin  stations  have  been  established  at  places  where  railway 
communication  is  available.  Tliis  has  done  a  good  deal  of  harm 
to  transportation  and  the  railway  traffic.  Lately  a  proposal 
has  been  made  in  certain  quarters  that  likin  stations  along  the 
railways  be  abolished;  and  the  measure  has  been  adopted  by 
the  Peking-Tientsin  and  Tientsin-Pukow  Railways  at  certain 
places.  When  the  towns  and  cities  throughout  the  country  are 
connected  by  railways,  there  will  be  no  place  for  likin  stations. 
With  the  increase  in  the  number  of  treaty  ports,  the  "likin 
zone"  will  be  gradually  diminished.  Thencefrom  the  proceeds 
from  likin  will  be  decreased  year  by  year. 

"Owing  to  the  collection  of  likin  the  development  of  both 
home  and  foreign  trade  has  been  arrested  and  the  people  are 
working  under  great  disadvantages.  Hence  in  order  to  develop 
foreign  and  home  trade,  the  Government  must  do  away  with 
likin,  which  will  bring  back  business  prosperity,  and  in  time 
the  same  will  enable  the  Government  to  obtain  new  sources  of 
revenues. 

"From  the  above-mentioned  considerations,  the  Government 


APPENDIX  467 

can  hardly  develop  and  encourage  trade  without  the  abolition 
of  likin.  By  treaty  with  Great  Britain,  America  and  Japan, 
the  Government  can  increase  the  rate  of  Customs  tariff  to  cover 
losses  due  to  the  abolition  of  likin.  The  question  under  con- 
sideration is  not  a  new  one.  But  the  cause  which  has  prevented 
the  Government  from  reaching  a  prompt  decision  upon  this 
question  is  the  fear  that,  after  the  abolition  of  likin,  the  pro- 
ceeds from  the  increased  Customs  tariff  would  not  be  sufficient 
to  cover  the  shortage  caused  by  the  abolition  of  likin. 

COST  OF  ABOLITION  OF  LIKIN 

But  such  a  fear  should  disappear  when  the  Authorities  re- 
member the  following  facts : — 

(a)  The  loss  as  the  result  of  the  abolition  of  likin:  $38,- 

9oo;ooo. 

(b)  The  loss  as  the  result  of  the  abolition  of  a  part  of  duty 
collected  by  the  native  Custofms  houses:  $7,300,000. 

(c)  Annual  proceeds  from  different  kinds  of  principal  and 
miscellaneous  taxes  which  shall  be  done  away  with  the  abolition 
of  likin  $11,800,000. 

The  above  figures  are  determined  by  comparing  the  actual 
amount  of  proceeds  collected  by  the  Government  in  the  3rd 
and  4th  years  of  the  Republic  with  the  estimated  amount  in 
the  Budget  of  the  fifth  3^ear.  The  total. amount  of  loss  caused 
by  the  aboHtion  of  likin  will  be  $58,000,000. 

INCREASE  OF  CUSTOMS  TARIFF 

The  amount  of  increase  in  the  Customs  tariff  which  the»  Gov- 
ernment expects  to  collect  is  as  follows : — 

(a)  The  increase  in  import  duties  $29,000,000. 

(b)  The  increase  in  export  duties  Tls.  6,560,000. 

The  above  figures  are  determined  according  to  the  Customs 
returns  of  the  2nd,  3rd,  and  4th  years  of  the  Republic.  By  de- 
ducting Tls.  2,200,000  of  transit  duty,  the  net  increase  will  be 
Tls.  33,600,000  taels,  which  is  equal  to  $48,500,000.  For  the 
sake  of  prudence,  allowance  of  five  per  cent,  of  the  total  amount 
is  made  against  any  incidental  shortage.  The  net  revenue  thus 
increased  would  amount  to  $46,100,000.     Against  the  loss  of 


468  APPENDIX 

$58,000,000,  there  will  be  a  shortage  of  some  $11,900,000. 
This,  however,  will  not  be  difficult  to  make  good  by  new  sources 
of  revenue  as  the  result  of  a  tariff  revision: — 

(a)  Tax  on  goods  at  the  time  of  manufacture  $800,000. 

(b)  Tax  on  goods  at  the  time  of  sale  $8,000,000. 

(c)  Tax  on  cattle  and  slaughtering  houses  $2,000,000. 

(d)  Tax  on  foodstuffs  $4,000,000. 

"Under  (a)  and  (b)  are  the  taxes  to  be  collected  on  native 
made  foreign  imitation  goods  and  various  kinds  of  luxurious 
articles.  Under  (c)  and  (d)  are  taxes  which  are  already  en- 
forced in  the  provinces  but  which  can  be  increased  to  that  much 
by  reorganizing  the  method  of  collection.  The  total  sum  of 
the  proceeds  set  forth  under  above  items  will  amount  to  $14,- 
800,000.  These  will  be  quite  sufficient  to  cover  the  loss  caused 
by  the  abolition  of  likin. 

A  VITAL  INTEREST 

"As  the  abolition  of  likin  concerns  the  vital  interest  of  the 
merchants  and  manufacturers,  it  should  be  carried  out  without 
delay.  The  commercial  and  industrial  enterprises  of  the  coun- 
try can  only  thrive  after  likin  is  abolished  and  only  then  can 
new  sources  of  revenue  be  obtained.  This  measure  will  form 
the  fundamental  factor  of  our  industrial  and  economical  de- 
velopment. But  one  thing  to  which  we  should  like  to  call  the 
special  attention  of  the  Government  is  the  procedure  to  be 
adopted  to  negotiate  with  the  Foreign  countries  respecting  the 
adoption  of  this  measure.  The  first  step  in  this  connexion 
should  be  the  increase  of  the  present  Customs  tariff  to  the 
actual  five  per  cent,  ad  talorem  rate.  When  this  is  done,  pro- 
posal should  be  made  to  the  Powers  having  treaty  relations  with 
us  concerning  the  abolition  of  likin  and  revision  of  Customs 
tariff.  The  transit|destination  duties  on  imported  goods  should 
at  the  same  time  be  done  away  with.  This  would  not  entail  any 
disadvantage  to  the  importers  of  foreign  goods  and  any  diplo- 
matic question  would  not  be  difficult  of  solution.  Meantime 
preparatory  measures  should  be  devised  for  reorganizing  the 
method  of  collecting  duties  set  forth  abovetso  that  the  abolition 
of  likin  can  take  place  as  soon  as  the  Government  obtains  the 


APPENDIX  469 

consent  of  the  foreign  Powers  respecting  the  increase  of  Cus- 
toms tariff." 

MEMORANDUM 

THE  LEADING  OUTSTANDING  CASES  BETWEEN  CHINA  AND  THE 
FOREIGN    POWERS 

(Author's  note.  The  following  memorandum  was  drawn  up 
by  Dr.  C.  C.  Wu,  Councillor  at  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  and 
son  of  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,  the  Foreign  Minister,  and  is  a  most 
competent  and  precise  statement.  It  is  a  noteworthy  fact 
that  not  only  is  Dr.  C.  C.  Wu  a  British  barrister  but  he  dis- 
tinguished himself  above  all  his  fellows  in  the  year  he  was  called 
to  the  Bar.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the  Lao  Hsi-kai  case 
does  not  figure  in  this  summary,  China  taking  the  view  that 
French  action  throughout  was  ultra  vires,  and  beyond  dis- 
cussion.) 

BY  DR.  c.  c.  wu 

Republican  China  inherited  from  imperial  China  the  vast  and 
rich  territory  of  China  Proper  and  its  Dependencies,  but  the 
inheritance  was  by  no  means  free  from  incumbrances  as  in  the 
case  of  Outer  Mongolia,  Tibet  and  Manchuria,  and  other  im- 
pediments in  the  form  of  unfavourable  treaty  obligations  and 
a  long  list  of  outstanding  foreign  cases  affecting  sovereign  and 
territorial  rights. 

I  have  been  asked  by  the  Editor  of  the  North-China  Daily 
News  to  contribute  an  article  on  some  of  the  outstanding 
questions  between  China  and  foreign  powers,  instancing  Tibet, 
Manchuria,  Mongolia,  and  to  give  the  Chinese  point  of  view 
on  these  questions.  Although  the  subject  is  a  delicate  one  to 
handle,  particularly  in  the  press,  being  as  it  is  one  in  which  in- 
ternational susceptibilities  are  apt  to  be  aroused,  I  have  yet 
accepted  the  invitation  in  the  belief  that  a  calm  and  temperate 
statement  of  the  Chinese  case  will  hurt  no  one  whose  case  will 
bear  public  discussion  but  will  perhaps  do  some  good  by  bring- 
ing about  a  clear  understanding  of  the  points  at  issue  between 
China  and  the  foreign  Powers  concerned,  and  thus  facilitating 
an  early  settlement  which  is  so  earnestly  desired  by  China.     I 


470  APPENDIX 

may  say  that  I  have  appreciated  the  British  sense  of  justice 
and  fairplay  displayed  by  the  "North-China  Daily  News"  in 
inviting  a  statement  of  the  Chinese  case  in  its  own  columns  on 
questions  one  of  which  concerns  British  interests  in  no  small 
degree,  and  the  discussion  cannot  be  conducted  under  a  better 
spirit  than  that  expressed  in  the  motto  of  the  senior  British 
journal  in  the  Far  East:     "Impartial  not  Neutral.'* 

1°       MANCHURIA 

The  treaty  between  China  and  Japan  of  1915  respecting 
South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  giving  that 
power  special  rights  and  privileges  in  those  regions  has  given 
rise  to  many  knotty  problems  for  the  diplomatists  of  the  two 
countries  to  solve.     Two  of  such  problems  are  mentioned  here. 

JAPANESE  POLICE  BOXES  IN  MANCHURIA  AND  MONGOLIA 

Since  the  last  days  of  the  Tsings,  the  Japanese  have  been 
establishing  police  boxes  in  different  parts  of  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  always  under  protest  of 
the  local  and  Peking  authorities.  Since  the  treaty  of  1915,  a 
new  reason  has  become  available  in  the  right  of  mixed  resi- 
dence given  to  Japanese  in  these  regions.  It  is  said  that  for 
the  protection  and  control  of  their  subjects,  and  indeed  for  the 
interest  of  the  Chinese  themselves,  it  is  best  that  this  measure 
should  be  taken.  It  is  further  contended  that  the  stationing 
of  police  officers  is  but  a  corollary  to  the  right  of  exterritorial- 
ity, and  that  it  is  in  no  way  a  derogation  of  Chinese  sovereignty. 

It  is  pointed  out  by  the  Chinese  Government  that  in  the 
treaty  of  1915,  express  provision  is  made  for  Japanese  in  South 
Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  to  submit  to  the  police 
laws  and  ordinances  and  taxation  of  China  (Article  5).  This 
leaves  the  matter  in  no  doubt.  If  the  Japanese  wish  to  facili- 
tate the  Chinese  police  in  their  duty  of  protection  and  control 
of  the  Japanese,  they  have  many  means  at  their  command  for 
so  doing.  It  is  unnecessary  to  point  out  that  the  establish- 
ment of  foreign  police  on  Chinese  soil  (except  in  foreign  set- 
tlements and  concessions  where  it  is  by  the  permission  of  the 
Chinese  Government)  is,  to  our  thinking,  at  any  rate,  a  very 


APPENDIX  471 

grave  derogation  to  China's  sovereign  rights.  Furthermore, 
from  actual  experience,  we  know  that  the  activities  of  these 
foreign  pohce  will  not  be  confined  to  their  countrymen;  in  a 
dispute  between  a  Chinese  and  a  Japanese  both  will  be  taken 
to  the  Japanese  station  by  the  Japanese  policeman.  This  ex- 
istence of  an  imperium  in  imperio,  so  far  from  accomplishing 
its  avowed  object  of  "improving  the  relations  of  the  countries 
and  bringing  about  the  development  of  economic  interests  to  no 
small  degree,"  will,  it  is  feared,  be  the  cause  of  continual  fric- 
tion between  the  officials  and  people  of  the  two  countries. 

As  to  the  legal  contention  that  the  right  of  police  control  is  a 
natural  corollary  to  the  right  of  exterritoriality,  it  must  be 
said  that  ever  since  the  grant  of  consular  jurisdiction  to  for- 
eigners by  China  in  her  first  treaties,  this  is  the  first  time  that 
such  a  claim  has  been  seriously  put  forward.  We  can  only  say 
that  if  this  interpretation  of  exterritoriality  is  correct  the 
other  nations  enjojang  exteriorality  in  China  have  been  very 
neglectful  in  the  assertion  of  their  just  rights. 

In  the  Chengchiatun  case,  the  claim  of  establishing  police 
boxes  wherever  the  Japanese  think  necessary  was  made  one  of 
the  demands.  The  Chinese  Government  in  its  final  reply  which 
settled  the  case  took  the  stand  as  above  outlined. 

It  may  be  mentioned  in  passing  that  in  Amoy  the  Japanese 
have  also  endeavoured  to  establish  similar  police  rights.  The 
people  of  that  city  and  province,  and  indeed  of  the  whole  coun- 
try, as  evidenced  by  the  protests  received  from  all  over  China, 
have  been  very  much  exercised  over  the  matter.  It  is  sincerely 
hoped  that  with  the  undoubted  improvement  of  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries  within  the  last  several  months,  the 
matter  will  be  smoothly  and  equitably  settled. 

liEGAIi  STATUS   OF  KOREANS  IN   CHIENTAO 

The  region  which  goes  by  the  name  of  Chientao,  a  Japanese 
denomination,  comprises  several  districts  in  the  Yenchi  Circuit 
of  Kirin  Province  north  of  the  Tumen  Kiang  (or  the  Tinmen 
River)  which  here  forms  the  boundary  between  China  and 
Korea.  For  over  thirty  years  Koreans  have  been  allowed 
here  to  cultivate  the  waste  lands  and  acquire  ownership  therein, 


472  APPENDIX 

a  privilege  which  has  not  been  permitted  to  any  other  foreigners 
in  China  and  which  has  been  granted  to  these  Koreans  on  ac- 
count of  the  peculiar  local  conditions.  According  to  reliable 
sources,  the  Korean  population  now  amounts  to  over  200,000 
which  is  more  than  the  Chinese  population  itself.  In  1909  an 
Agreement,  known  as  the  Tumen  Kiang  Boundary  Agreement, 
was  arrived  at  between  China  and  Japan,  who  was  then  the 
acknowledged  suzerain  of  Korea,  dealing,  inter  alia,  with  the 
status  of  these  Koreans.  It  was  provided  that  while  Koreans 
were  to  continue  to  enjoy  protection  of  their  landed  property, 
they  were  to  be  subject  to  Chinese  laws  and  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  Chinese  courts.  The  subsequent  annexation  of  Korea  did 
not  affect  this  agreement  in  point  of  international  law,  and  as  a 
matter  of  practice  Japan  has  adhered  to  it  until  September, 
1915.  Then  the  Japanese  Consul  suddenly  interfered  in  the 
administration  of  justice  by  the  local  authorities  over  the 
Koreans  and  claimed  that  he  should  have  jurisdiction. 

The  Japanese  claim  is  based  on  the  Treaty  Respecting  South 
Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  signed  in  May,  1915, 
article  5  of  which  provides  that  civil  and  criminal  cases  in 
which  the  defendants  are  Japanese  shall  be  tried  and  adjudi- 
cated by  the  Japanese  consul. 

The  Chinese  view  is  that  this  article  is  inapplicable  to 
Koreans  in  this  region  and  that  the  Tumen  Kiang  Agreement 
continues  in  force.  This  view  is  based  on  a  saving  clause  in 
article  8  of  the  Treaty  of  1915  which  says  that  "all  existing 
treaties  between  China  and  Japan  relating  to  Manchuria  shall, 
except  where  otherwise  provided  for  by  treaty,  remain  in 
force." 

In  the  first  place,  the  origin  of  the  Tumen  Kiang  Agreement 
supports  this  view.  When  the  Japanese  assumed  suzerainty 
over  Korea  they  raised  certain  questions  as  to  the  boundary 
between  China  and  Korea.  There  were  also  outstanding  sev- 
eral questions  regarding  railways  and  mines  between  China  and 
Japan.  Japan  insisted  that  the  boundary  question  and  the 
railway  and  mining  questions  be  settled  at  the  same  time.  As 
a  result,  two  agreements  were  concluded  in  1909  one  respecting 
the  boundary  question,  the  Tumen  Kiang  Agreement,  and  the 


APPENDIX  473 

other  respecting  railways  and  mines  whereby  Japan  obtained 
many  new  and  valuable  privileges  and  concessions,  such  as  the 
extension  of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  to  the  Korean  fron- 
tier, the  option  on  the  Hsinminfu-Fakumen  line,  and  the 
working  of  the  Fushun  and  Yentai  mines,  while  in  return  China 
obtained  a  bare  recognition  of  existing  rights,  namely  the 
boundary  between  Chma  and  Korea  and  the  jurisdiction  over 
the  Koreans  in  the  Yenchi  region.  The  two  settlements  were 
in  the  nature  of  quid  pro  quo  though  it  is  clear  that  the  Japan- 
ese side  of  the  scale  heavily  outweighed  that  of  the  Chinese. 
Now  Japan  endeavours  to  repudiate,  for  no  apparent  reason  so 
far  as  we  can  see,  the  agreement  which  formed  the  considera- 
tion whereby  she  obtained  so  many  valuable  concessions. 

Secondly,  while  Koreans  are  now  Japanese  subjects,  it  is 
contended  by  the  Chinese  that  the  particular  Koreans  inhabit- 
ing the  Yenchi  region  are,  as  regards  China,  in  a  different  posi- 
tion from  Japanese  subjects  elsewhere.  These  Koreans  enjoy 
the  rights  of  free  residence  and  of  cultivating  and  owning  land 
in  the  interior  of  China,  rights  denied  to  other  foreigners,  includ- 
ing Japanese  who,  even  by  the  new  treaty,  may  only  lease  land 
in  South  Manchuria.  For  this  exceptional  privilege,  they  are 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  Chinese  laws  and  Chinese  courts, 
a  duty  not  imposed  on  other  foreigners.  It  would  be  "blowing 
hot  and  cold  at  the  same  time"  in  the  language  of  English 
lawyers  if  it  is  sought  to  enjoy  the  special  privileges  without 
performing  the  duties. 

Thirdly,  Japanese  under  the  Treaty  of  1915  are  required  to 
register  their  passports  with  the  local  authorities.  On  the 
other  hand,  Koreans  in  Yenchi  have  never  been  nor  are  they 
now  required  to  procure  passports.  This  would  seem  to  be 
conclusive  proof  that  Koreans  in  that  region  are  not  within  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  of  1915  but  are  still  governed  by  the 
Tumen  Kiang  Agreement. 

The  question  is  something  more  than  one  of  academic  or 
even  merely  judicial  importance.  As  has  been  stated,  the 
Koreans  in  Yenchi  outnumber  the  Chinese  and  the  only  thing 
that  has  kept  the  region  Chinese  territory  In  fact  as  well  as 
in  name  is  the  possession  by  the  Chinese  of  jurisdiction  over 


474  APPENDIX 

every  Inhabitant,  whether  Chinese  or  Korean.  Were  China  to 
surrender  that  jurisdiction  over  a  majority  of  those  inhabit- 
ants, it  would  be  tantamount  to  a  cession  of  territory. 

2°    MACAO 

The  dispute  between  China  and  Portugal  over  the  Macao 
question  has  been  one  of  long  standing.  The  first  treaty  of 
commerce  signed  between  them  on  August  13, 1862,  at  Tientsin, 
was  not  ratified  in  consequence  of  a  dispute  respecting  the 
Sovereignty  of  Macao.  By  a  Protocol  signed  at  Lisbon  on 
March  26,  1887,  China  formally  recognized  the  perpetual  occu- 
pation and  government  of  Macao  and  its  dependencies  by  Por- 
tugal, as  any  other  Portuguese  possession ;  and  in  December 
of  the  same  year,  when  the  formal  treaty  was  signed,  provision 
was  made  for  the  appointment  of  a  Commission  to  delimit  the 
boundaries  of  Macao ;  "but  as  long  as  the  delimitation  of  the 
boundaries  Is  not  concluded,  everything  in  respect  to  them  shall 
continue  as  at  present  without  addition,  diminution,  or  altera- 
tion by  either  of  the  Parties." 

In  the  beginning  of  1908,  a  Japanese  steamer,  the  Tatsu 
Maru,  engaged  in  gun-running  was  captured  by  a  Chinese 
customs  cruiser  near  the  Kau-chau  archipelago  (Nove  Ilhas). 
The  Portuguese  authorities  demanded  her  release  on  the  ground 
that  she  was  seized  In  Portuguese  territorial  waters  thus  raising 
the  question  of  the  status  of  the  waters  surrounding  Macao. 

In  the  same  year  the  Portuguese  authorities  of  Macao  at- 
tempted the  Imposition  of  land  tax  in  Maliaoho,  and  proposed 
to  dredge  the  waterways  in  the  vicinity  of  Macao.  The  Chi- 
nese Government  thereupon  Instructed  Its  Minister  In  France, 
who  was  also  accredited  to  Portugal,  to  make  personal  repre- 
sentations to  the  Portuguese  Foreign  Office  in  regard  to  the 
unwarrantable  action  of  the  local  Portuguese  authorities. 
The  Portuguese  Government  requested  the  withdrawal  of  Chi- 
nese troops  on  the  Island  of  Lappa  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  the 
appointment  of  a  new  Demarcation  Commissioner,  reserving  to 
itself  the  right  to  refer  to  the  Hague  Tribunal  any  dispute  that 
may  arise  between  the  Commissioners  appointed  by  the  respec- 
tive Governments. 


APPENDIX  475 

After  protracted  negotiations  it  was  agreed  between  the 
Chinese  Minister  and  the  Portuguese  Government  by  an  ex- 
change of  notes  that  the  respective  Governments  should  each 
appoint  a  Demarcation  Commissioner  to  dehmit  the  boundaries 
of  Macao  and  its  dependencies  in  pursuance  of  the  Lisbon  Pro- 
tocol and  Article  2  of  the  Sino-Portuguese  Treaty  of  1887, 
subject  to  the  decision  of  their  respective  Governments. 

THE    PORTUGUESE    CLAIM 

In  February,  1909,  Portugal  appointed  General  Jaoquim 
Machado  and  China  Mr.  Kao  Erh-chien  as  their  respective 
Commissioners  and  they  met  at  Hongkong  in  June  of  the  same 
year. 

The  Portuguese  claim  consisted  of  the  whole  of  the  Peninsula 
of  Macao  as  far  north  as  Portas  do  Cerco,  the  Island  of  Lappa, 
Green  Island  (Ilha  Yerde),  Ilhas  de  Taipa,  Ilha  de  Coloane, 
Ilha  Macarira,  Ilha  da  Tai-Vong-Cam,  other  small  islands, 
and  the  waters  of  Porto  Interior.  The  Portuguese  Commis- 
sioner also  demanded  that  the  portion  of  Chinese  territory  be- 
tween Portas  do  Cerco  and  Peishanling  be  neutralized. 

In  the  absence  of  evidence,  documentary  or  otherwise,  China 
could  not  admit  Portugal's  title  to  half  the  territory  claimed, 
but  was  prepared  to  concede  all  that  part  of  the  Peninsula  of 
Macao  south  of  Portas  do  Cerco  which  was  already  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  original  Portuguese  Possession  of  Macao,  and  also 
to  grant  the  developed  parts  of  Ilhas  de  Coloane  as  Portuguese 
settlements.  The  ownership  of  territorial  waters  was  to  re- 
main vested  in  China. 

The  negotiations  having  proved  fruitless  were  transferred 
to  Lisbon  but  on  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  in  Portugal 
they  were  suspended.  No  material  progress  has  been  made 
since. 

3°    TIBET 

In  November,  1911,  the  Chinese  garrison  in  Lhassa,  in  sym- 
pathy with  the  revolutionary  cause  in  China,  mutinied  against 
Amban  Lien-yu,  a  Chinese  Bannerman,  and  a  few  months  later 
the  Tibetans,  by  order  of  the  Dalai  Lama,  revolted  and  be- 
sieged the  Chinese  forces  in  Lhassa  till  they  were  starved  out 


476  APPENDIX 

and  eventually  evacuated  Tibet.  Chinese  troops  in  Kham  were 
also  ejected.  An  expedition  was  sent  from  Szechuan  and 
Yunnan  to  Tibet,  but  Great  Britain  protested  and  caused  its 
withdrawal. 

In  August,  1912,  the  British  Minister  in  Peking  presented 
a  Memorandum  to  the  Chinese  Government  outlining  the  atti- 
tude of  Great  Britain  towards  the  Tibetan  question.  China 
was  asked  to  refrain  from  dispatching  a  military  expedition 
into  Tibet,  as  the  re-establishment  of  Chinese  authority  would, 
it  is  stated,  constitute  a  violation  of  the  Anglo-Chinese  Treaty 
of  1906.  Chinese  suzerainty  in  regard  to  Tibet  was  recognized. 
But  Great  Britain  could  not  consent  to  the  assertion  of 
Chinese  sovereignty  over  a  State  enjoying  independent  treaty 
relations  with  her.  In  conclusion,  China  was  invited  to  come 
to  an  agreement  regarding  Tibet  on  the  lines  indicated  in  the 
Memorandum,  such  agreement  to  be  antecedent  to  Great  Brit- 
ain's recognition  of  the  Republic.  Great  Britain  also  imposed 
an  embargo  on  the  communications  between  China  and  Tibet 
via  India. 

In  deference  to  the  wishes  of  the  British  Government,  China 
at  once  issued  orders  that  the  expeditionary  force  should  not 
proceed  beyond  Giamda.  In  her  reply  she  declared  that  the 
Chinese  Government  had  no  intention  of  converting  Tibet  into 
another  province  of  China  and  that  the  preservation  of  the 
traditional  system  of  Tibetan  government  was  as  much-  the 
desire  of  China  as  of  Great  Britain.  The  dispatch  of  troops 
into  Tibet  was,  however,  necessary  for  the  fulfilment  of  the 
responsibilities  attaching  to  China's  treaty  obligations  with 
Great  Britain,  which  required  her  to  preserve  peace  and  order 
throughout  that  vast  territory,  but  she  did  not  contemplate 
the  idea  of  stationing  an  unlimited  numfcer  of  soldiers  in  Tibet. 
China  considered  that  the  existing  treaties  defined  the  status 
of  Tibet  with  sufficient  clearness,  and  therefore  there  was  no 
need  to  negotiate  a  new  treaty.  She  expressed  the  regret  that 
the  Indian  Government  had  placed  an  emfcargo  on  the  com- 
munications between  China  and  Tibet  via  India,  as  China  was 
at  peace  with  Great  Britain  and  regretted  that  Great  Britain 
should  threaten  to  withhold  recognition  of  the  Republic,  such 


APPENDIX  477 

recognition  being  of  mutual  advantage  to  both  countries. 
Finally,  the  Chinese  Government  hoped  that  the  British  Gov- 
ernment would  reconsider  its  attitude. 

THE  SIMLA  CONFERENCE 

In  May,  1913,  the  British  Minister  renewed  his  suggestion 
of  the  previous  year  that  China  should  come  to  an  agreement 
on  the  Tibetan  question,  and  ultimately  a  Tripartite  Confer- 
ence was  opened  on  October  13,  at  Simla  with  Mr.  Ivan  Chen, 
Sir  Henry  McMahon,  and  Lonchen  Shatra  as  plemipotentiaries 
representing  China,  Great  Britain,  and  Tibet,  respectively. 

The  following  is  the  substance  of  the  Tibetan  proposals : — 

1.  Tibet  shall  be  an  independent  State,  repudiating  the 
Anglo-Chinese  Convention  of  1906. 

2.  The  boundary  of  Tibet  in  regard  to  China  includes  that 
portion  of  Sinkiang  south  of  Kuenlun  Range  and  Altyn  Tagh, 
the  whole  territory  of  Chinghai,  the  western  portion  of  Kansuh 
and  Szechuan,  including  Tachienlu,  and  the  northwestern  por- 
tion of  Yunnan,  including  Atuntzu. 

3.  Great  Britain  and  Tibet  to  negotiate,  independent  of 
China,  new  trade  regulations. 

4.  No  Chinese  officials  and  troops  to  be  stationed  in  Tibet. 

5.  China  to  recognize  Dalai  Lama  as  the  head  of  the 
Buddhist  Religion  and  institutions  in  Mongolia  and  China. 

6.  China  to  compensate  Tibet  for  forcible  exactions  of 
money  or  property  taken  from  the  Tibetan  Government. 

The  Chinese  Plenipotentiary  made  the  following  counter- 
proposals : — 

1.  Tibet  forms  an  integral  part  of  Chinese  territory  and 
Chinese  rights  of  every  description  which  have  existed  in  con- 
sequence of  this  integrity  shall  be  respected  by  Tibet  and 
recognized  by  Great  Britan.  China  engages  not  to  convert 
Tibet  into  a  province  and  Great  Britain  not  to  annex  Tibet  or 
any  portion  of  it. 

2.  China  to  appoint  a  Resident  at  Lhassa  with  an  escort 
of  2,600  soldiers. 

3.  Tibet  undertakes  to  be  guided  by  China  in  her  foreign 
and  military  affairs  and  not  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  any 


478  APPENDIX 

foreign  Power  except  through  the  intermediary  of  China  but 
this  engagement  does  not  exclude  direct  relations  between  Brit- 
ish Trade  Agents  and  Tibetan  authorities  as  provided  in  the 
Anglo-Chinese  Convention  of  1906. 

4.  Tibet  to  grant  amnesty  to  those  Tibetans  known  for  their 
pro-Chinese  inclinations  and  to  restore  to  them  their  property. 

5.  Clause  5  of  Tibetan  claims  can  be  discussed. 

6.  Revision  of  Trade  Regulations  of  1893  and  1908,  if 
found  necessary,  must  be  made  by  all  the  parties  concerned. 

7.  In  regard  to  the  limits  of  Tibet  China  claims  Giamda 
and  all  the  places  east  of  it. 

THE    BOUNDARY    DEADLOCK 

The  British  plenipotentiary  sustained  in  the  main  the 
Tibetan  view  concerning  the  limits  of  Tibet.  He  suggested  the 
creation  of  Inner  and  Outer  Tibet  by  a  line  drawn  along  the 
Kuenlun  Range  to  the  96th  longitude,  turning  south  reaching 
a  point  south  of  the  34th  latitude,  then  in  south-easterly  direc- 
tion to  Niarong,  passing  Hokow,  Litang,  Batang  in  a  western 
and  then  southern  and  southwestern  direction  to  Rima,  thus 
involving  the  inclusion  of  Chiamdo  in  Outer  Tibet  and  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Chinese  garrison  stationed  there.  He  pro- 
posed that  recognition  should  be  accorded  to  the  autonomy  of 
Outer  Tibet  whilst  admitting  the  right  of  the  Chinese  to  re- 
establish such  a  measure  of  control  in  Inner  Tibet  as  would 
restore  and  safeguard  their  historic  position  there,  without 
in  any  way  infringing  the  integrity  of  Tibet  as  a  geographical 
and  political  entity.  Sir  Henry  McMahon  also  submitted  to 
the  Conference  a  draft  proposal  of  the  Convention  to  the  pleni- 
potentiaries. After  some  modification  this  draft  was  initialled 
by  the  British  and  Tibetan  delegates  but  the  Chinese  delegate 
did  not  consider  himself  authorized  to  do  so.  Thereupon  the 
British  member  after  making  slight  concessions  in  regard  to 
representation  in  the  Chinese  Parliament  and  the  boundary  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Lake  Kokonor  threatened,  in  the  event  of 
his  persisting  in  his  refusal,  to  eliminate  the  clause  recognizing 
the  suzerainty  of  China,  and  ipso  facto  the  privileges  apper- 
taining thereto  from  the  draft  Convention  already  initialled  by 


APPENDIX  479 

the  British  and  Tibetan  plenipotentiaries.  In  order  to  save 
the  situation,  the  Chinese  delegate  initialled  the  documents,  but 
on  the  clear  understanding  that  to  initial  and  to  sign  were  two 
different  things  and  that  to  sign  he  must  obtain  instructions 
from  his  Government. 

China,  dissatisfied  with  the  suggested  division  into  an  Inner 
and  Outer  Tibet  the  boundaries  of  which  would  involve  the 
evacuation  of  those  districts  actually  in  Chinese  effective  occu- 
pation and  under  its  administration,  though  otherwise  in  accord 
with  the  general  principles  of  the  draft  Convention,  declared 
that  the  initialled  draft  was  in  no  way  binding  upon  her  and 
took  up  the  matter  with  the  British  Government  in  London  and 
with  its  representative  in  Peking.  Protracted  negotiations 
took  place  thereafter,  but,  in  spite  of  repeated  concessions 
from  the  Chinese  side  in  regard  to  the  Chinese  side  in  regard 
to  the  boundary  question,  the  British  Government  would  not 
negotiate  on  any  basis  other  than  the  initialled  convention. 
On  July  3  an  Agreement  based  on  the  terms  of  the  draft  Con- 
vention but  providing  special  safeguards  for  the  interests  of 
Great  Britain  and  Tibet  in  the  event  of  China  continuing  to 
withhold  her  adherence,  was  signed  between  Great  Britain  and 
Tibet,  not,  however,  before  Mr.  Ivan  Chen  had  declared  that 
the  Chinese  Government  would  recognize  any  treaty  or  similar 
document  that  might  then  or  thereafter  be  signed  between 
Great  Britain  and  Tibet. 

china's  standpoint 

With  the  same  spirit  of  compromise  and  a  readiness  to  meet 
the  wishes  of  the  British  Government  and  even  to  the  extent  of 
making  considerable  sacrifices  in  so  far  as  they  were  compatible 
with  her  dignity,  China  has  more  than  once  offered  to  renew 
negotiations  with  the  British  Government  but  the  latter  has  up 
to  the  present  declined  to  do  so.  China  wants  nothing  more 
than  the  re-establishment  of  Chinese  suzerainty  over  Tibet, 
with  recognition  of  the  autonomy  of  the  territory  immediately 
under  the  control  of  the  Lhassa  Government ;  she  is  agreeable 
to  the  British  idea  of  forming  an  effective  buffer  territory  in 
so  far  as  it  is  consistent  with  equity  and  justice;  she  is  anxious 


480  APPENDIX 

that  her  trade  interest  should  be  looked  after  by  her  trade 
agents  as  do  the  British,  a  point  which  is  agreeable  even  to  the 
Tibetans  though  apparently  not  to  the  British ;  in  other  words, 
she  expects  that  Great  Britain  would  at  least  make  with  her  an 
arrangement  regarding  Tibet  which  should  not  be  any  less  dis- 
advantageous to  her  than  that  made  with  Russia  respecting 
Outer  Mongolia. 

Considering  that  China  has  claimed  and  exercised  sovereign 
rights  over  Tibet,  commanded  the  Tibetan  army,  supervised 
Tibetan  internal  administration,  and  confirmed  the  appoint- 
ments of  Tibetan  officials,  high  and  low,  secular  and  even  eccle- 
siastical, such  expectations  are  modest  enough,  surely.  At  the 
present  moment,  with  communication  via  India  closed,  with 
no  official  representative  or  agent  present,  with  relations  un- 
settled and  unregulated,  the  position  of  China  vis-a-vis  Tibet 
is  far  from  satisfactory  and  altogether  anomalous,  while  as 
between  China  and  Great  Britain  there  is  always  this  import- 
ant question  outstanding.  An  early  settlement  in  a  reciprocal 
spirit  of  give  and  take  and  giving  reasonable  satisfaction  to  the 
legitimate  aspirations  and  claims  of  all  parties  is  extremely 
desirable. 

4j°    outer    MONGOLIA 

The  world  is  more  or  less  acquainted  with  the  events  in  Urga 
in  December,  1911,  and  the  proclamation  of  independence  of 
Outer  Mongolia  with  Jetsun  Dampa  Hutukhtu  as  its  ruler. 
By  the  Russo-Chinese  Declaration  of  November  5,  1913,  and 
the  Tripartite  Convention  of  Kiakhta  of  1914  China  has  re- 
established her  suzerainty  over  Outer  Mongolia  and  obtained 
the  acknowledgement  that  it  forms  a  part  of  the  Chinese  terri- 
tory. There  remains  the  demarcation  of  boundary  between 
Inner  and  Outer  Mongolia  which  will  take  place  shortly,  and 
the  outstanding  question  of  the  status  of  Tannu  Uriankhai 
where  Russia  is  lately  reported  to  be  subjecting  the  inhabitants 
to  Russian  jurisdiction  and  expelling  Chinese  traders. 

The  Tannu  Uriankhai  lands,  according  to  the  Imperial  In- 
stitutes of  the  Tsing  Dynasty,  were  under  the  control  of  the 
Tartar  General  of  Uliasutai,  the  Sain  Noin  Aimak,  the  Jasaktu 
Khan  Aimak  and  the  Jetsun  Dampa  Hutkhta,  and  divided  into 


APPENDIX  481 

forty-eight  somons  (tsoling).  Geographically,  according  to 
the  same  authority,  Tannu  Uriankhai  is  bounded  on  the  north 
by  Russia,  east  by  Tushetu  Khan  Aimak,  west  by  the  various 
aimks  of  Kobdo,  and  south  by  Jasaktu  Khan  Aimak.  By  a 
Joint  Demarcation  Commission  in  1868  the  Russo  Chinese 
boundary  in  respect  to  Uriankhai  was  denmited  and  eight 
wooden  boundary  posts  were  erected  to  mark  their  respective 
frontiers. 

In  1910,  however,  a  Russian  officer  removed  and  burnt  the 
boundary  post  at  Chapuchi  Yalodapa.  The  matter  was  taken 
up  by  the  then  Waiwupu  with  the  Russian  Minister.  He  re- 
plied to  the  effect  that  the  limits  of  Uriankhai  were  an  unsettled 
question  and  the  Russian  Government  would  not  entertain  the 
Chinese  idea  of  taking  independent  steps  to  remark  the  boun- 
dary or  to  replace  the  post  and  expressed  dissatisfaction  with 
the  work  of  the  Joint  Demarcation  Commission  of  1868,  a  dis- 
satisfaction which  would  seem  to  be  somewhat  tardily  expressed, 
to  say  the  least.  The  case  was  temporarily  dropped  on  ac- 
count of  the  secession  of  Uliasutai  from  China  in  the  following 
year. 

While  Uriankhai  forms  part  of  Autonomous  Outer  Mongolia, 
yet  since  Outer  Mongolia  is  under  China's  suzerainty,  and  its 
territory  is  expressly  recognized  to  form  part  of  that  of  China, 
China  cannot  look  on  with  indifference  to  any  possible  cession 
of  territory  by  Outer  Mongolia  to  Russia.  Article  3  of  the 
Kiakhta  Agreement,  1915,  prohibiting  Outer  Mongolia  from 
concluding  treaties  with  foreign  powers  respecting  political 
and  territorial  question  acknowledges  China's  right  to  negoti- 
ate and  make  such  treaties.  It  is  the  firm  intention  of  the 
Chinese  Government  to  maintain  its  territorial  integrity  basing 
its  case  on  historical  records,  on  treaty  rights  and  finally  on  the 
principle  of  nationality.  It  is  notorious  that  the  Mongols  will 
be  extremely  unwilling  to  see  Uriankhai  incorporated  into  the 
Russian  Empire.  While  Russia  is  spending  countless  lives 
and  incalculable  treasure  in  fighting  for  the  sacred  principle  of 
nationality  in  Europe,  we  cannot  believe  that  she  will  delib- 
erately violate  the  same  principle  in  Asia. 


INDEX 


Abdication  Edict  of  1912,  text  of, 

396 
Absolutism,  the  myth  of,  4 
Agreement     between     the     Revolu- 
tionary    Party     and     Europe 
and   Asia   Trading   Co.,   143 
America    drops    out    of    the    Six- 
Power  group,  50 
American  press  agents,  68 
treaty  opening  Korea,  78 
America's  Chinese  policj%  315 
Anglo-Japanese  treaty,  107 
Annuity  of  Manchu  Imperial  Fam- 
ily, 41 
Antimg-Mukden  railway,   103,   108 
Ariga,  Dr.,  354 

Army  Reorganization  Council,  30 
"Articles  of   Favourable   Treatment 
for    the    Manchus,"    37,    41; 
text  of,  397 

Babachapu,  294 
Bannerman  families,  291 
Belgian  loan,  the,  207i 
Syndicate,  45 


Chang  Kuo-kan,  268 

Chang  Tso-lin,  Gen.,  294,  300 

Chang,  Tsung-hsiang,  268 

Chang  Yao  Ching  and  the  Europe 

and  Asia  Trading  Co.,  143 
Chengehiatun  incident,  the,  293-304 
Chekiang     revolts     against     Yuan 

Shih-kai,  262 
Chen  Yi,  Gen.,  263 
Chia  Ching,  emperor,  2 
Chiang  Chao-tsung,  Gen.,  348 
Chiang  Chun,  the,  63 
Chien  Lung,  emperor,  2 
Chih  Fa  Chu,  or  Military  Court,  at 

Pekin,  62 
Chihli  province,  11 
China  and  her  foreign  residents,  307 
and    the    Foreign    Powers,    out- 
standing cases  between,  467 
and  the  German  submarine  war, 

315 
considers     war     with     Germany, 

329-338 
declares    war    against    Germany, 

369 
Black    Dragon   Society's   review   of      China's  break  with  Germany,  causes 


European    war    issues,    126- 
128 

Boycott  on  Japanese  commerce,  145 
Boxer  Indemnities  postponed,  337 
rebellion,  the,   17;   and  European 
intervention,   29 
Black    Dragon    Society,    the,    125; 

memorandum   of,    126-138 
British  policies  in  China,  68 
position  towards  the  Yuan  Shih- 
kai  regime,  84 

Cambaluc  of  Marco  Polo,  the,  4 
Canton  province,  11 
Cassini  Convention,  the,  125 
Catholic,  Roman,  controversies,  5 
Central     Government,     organization 

of,  40-44 
Chang  Cheng-wu,  Gen.,  59;   execu- 
tion of,  47 
Chang  Chih-tung,  276 
Chang  Hsun,  Gen.,  53,  67,  264,  281, 
343,  344,  366,  367 


483 


leading  to,   320-325 
economics,  weakness  of,  18 
financial  reorganization,  379 
future  in  Manchuria,  95 
Imperial     Government,    negative- 

ness  disguised,  7 
indignation  at  Japan   ultimatum, 

145 
note   to   Germany   severing  rela- 
tions, 328 
neutrality  position,  318 
new  regime,  372-374 
passivity,  374 
polity,  principles  of,  9» 
protest    against    submarine   war, 

315 
reception  of  Wilson's  Peace  note, 

312-314 
reply  to  Demands  of  Japan,  107- 

116 
reply   to   Japan's   ultimatum,   122 
reply  to  President  Wilson,  317 
tariff  question,  375 


484) 


INDEX 


Chinese  army,  German  trained,  310 
boycott  of  the  French,  306 
intrigues   in   Korea,  23 
Ching,  Prince,  33 
Chingputang,     the     (Progressives), 

280 
Chino-Japanese  relations,  78-83 
secret  alliance  proposed,   130 
treaties  of  1915,  text  of,  430 
Chou    An    Hui     (Society    for    the 

Preservation  of  Peace),  148 
Chow  Tzu-chi,  268 
Chu    Chi-chun's    telegram    devising 

plans  for  electing  Yuan  Shih- 

kai  as  Emperor,  224,  226 
Ch'un,  Prince   Regent,  36 
Chungking,  open  port,  97 
Clauservitz,  war-principle  of,  80 
Conference    of    Governors    on    the 

war  question,  336 
Confucian     worship     re-established 

by  Yuan  Shih-kai,  64 
Conquest,  Manchu,  of  XVIIth  Cen- 
tury, 3,  5 
Mongul,  of  Xlllth  Century,  3 
Consolidating  national  debt,  376 
Constitution  first  granted  in  Japan, 

76 
Permanent,  work  on,  282 
"Constitutional  Compact"   of  Yuan 

Shih-kai,  63;  text  of,  409 
monarchy   planned,    147 
Continental    quadrilateral,    the,    of 

Japan,  299 
Coup  d'etat,  the,  of  Sept.,  1899,  28 
Coup   d'etat,   the   parliamentarv  of 

1913,  56 
Crisp,     Birch,     attempts     to     float 

loan,  45 


Dane,  Sir  Richard,  292 
Death  of  Empress  Lun  Yi,  60 
Decree  cancelling  the   Empire,  258 
Defence    of    the    monarchial    move- 
ment, by  Yang  Tu,   150-171; 
by  Dr.  Goodnow,  175-185 
Dementi,    1913,    of    Yuan    Shih-kai, 

85 
Diet  of  Japan,  first  summoned,  76 
Diplomatic     relations     with     China 

broken,  330-330 
Distance    in    China,    philosophy   of, 
7,  8 


Eastern  Asia,  contestants  for  land- 
power  in,  78 


Emperor,    analysis    of    powers    of, 
4-7 
Chia  Ching,  2 
Chien  Lung,  2 
Hsiaouri,  64 
Hsuan  Tung,  36,  347 
K'anghsi,  2,  5 
Kwanghsu,  26,  31,  36,   60 

Emperors,  immurement  of  in  For- 
bidden City,  2 

Empire,  the  dissolution  of,  265 

Empress  Lun  Yi,  death  of,  60 
Tzu  Hsi,  60 

Election  of  1913,  52 
of    Yuan    Shih-kai    as    emperor, 

machinery   of,   221-229 
the,    of    1915,    220-230;     records 
ordered  burnt,  234 

Electoral  College,  provision  for, 
66 

Europe  and  Asia  Trading  Co.,  the, 
140 

European  War,  the,  its  efi'ect  in 
China,  71,  309-312;  China's 
predilection  for  Teutonism, 
310,  311;  consideration  of 
war-partnership  with  the 
Allies,  311;  Japan's  opposi- 
tion, 312;  German  propa- 
ganda, 312;  Pres.  Wilson's 
Peace  Note,  313;  China's  re- 
ply, 314;  the  submarine  ques- 
tion, 315;  note  to  Germany, 
316;  reply  to  America,  317; 
Chinese  diplomacy  enters  a 
new  field,  319;  Japan's  poli- 
cies, 323;  China  considers 
breaking  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany,  325;  Parlia- 
ment's action,  326;  Ger- 
many's reply  to  China's  note, 
326;  diplomatic  relations  sev- 
ered, 328;  German  Minister 
leaves  Pekin,  329;  Liang  Ch'i- 
chao's  Memorandum,  329; 
Kang  Yu-wei's  Memorandum, 
333;  Cabinet  decides  on  war, 
337;  interpellation  to  the 
Government,  338;  Parliament 
mobbed,  339;  Cabinet  resigns, 
340;  Japan's  subterranean  ac- 
tivities, 341,  353;  note  of  the 
United  States,  345;  war 
against  Germany  declared, 
369 

Europeans  failed  to  recognize  true 
state  of  Chinese  government, 
7 


INDEX 


485 


Feng    Kuo-ohang,    Gen.,    53,    186n, 

246,  263,  325,  345,  361,  368 
Fengtien,  Manchurian   province,   11 
Feudal  organization  of  Japan,  74- 

76 
Finance  between  the  provinces,  14 
the    binding    chain    between    pro- 
vincial      and       metropolitan 
China,  9-11 
Financial  troubles,  40,  46,  61,  257, 

292 
Foochow  arsenal,  98 
Forbidden     City,     immurement     of 

emperors   in,   2 
Foreign  Debt  Commission,  50 
intervention  threatened,  48 
loan,  the  first,  16 
loans,  44 
Foreigners    in    China,    position    of, 

307 
Four-Power   group,   the,  44,  45 
France's  status   after  the  war,  127 
Franco-Belgian   Syndicate,  44 
French  diplomacy  in  China,  306 
Republic,     Goodnow     review     of, 

179,   188 
the,  and  the  Lao-hsi-kai  dispute, 

304-306 
the,  Chinese  boycott  of,  306 
Fuhkien  province,  11 

German  Boxer  indemnity,  320 
diplomatic  relations  broken,  320- 

330 
minister  leaves  Pekin,  329 
negotiations  with  Yuan   Shih-kal, 

71 
propaganda  in  China,  310-312 
reply  to  China's  protest,  326 
war   declaration   considered,  329 
Germany,     war     against     declared, 

369 
Germany's    status    after    the    war, 

126 
Goodnow,   Dr.,    63,    66n;    legal    ad- 
viser of  Yuan  Shih-kai,   173; 
memorandum  of,   175-185 
Gordon,  General,  26 
Government,     the     Central,     defini- 
tion of,  40-44 
Governmental   system  of  the  Man- 

chu  dynasty,  8 
Great    Britain's     status    after    the 
war,  127,  136 

Hankow  editor  flogged  to  death,  62 
Hangchow,  open  port,  97 


Hanyang  arsenal,  97,  98 

Hanyehping   Company,   the,  91,  98, 
105,   110,  111,  115 

Heilungchiang,     Manchurian    prov- 
ince, 11 

Hioki,   Dr.,   Japanese   Minister,  87, 
89,  107 

Hsianfu  flight,  the,  2,  9 

Hsaiochan  camp,  the,  25 
Division,  the,  26 

Hsiaown,  emperor,   64 

Hsuan  Tung,  boy  emperor,  36,  347; 
enthroned,  355 

Huai  Chun,  the,  26 

Huang  Hsin,  53 

Hutuktu,    the    Living    Buddha    of 
Urga,  47 

Imperial  Clan  Society,  46 
Imperialist-Republican     conflict    of 

1917,  365-369 
Inner  Mongolia,  political  unrest  in. 

69 
Insurrection  of  the  "White  Wolfs  " 

62 
International   Debt   Commission,  44 

financial  contests,  45 
Interpellation  to  the  government  on 

the     question     of     war     with 

Germany,  338 
Ito,  Prince,  24 

Japan  and  Korea,  386-388 

and  the  Kiaochow  campaign,  84 

demands    participation    in     loan, 
45 

demands   the   Kiaochow   territory 
from  Germany,  71 

feudal  organization   of,   74-76 

first  Diet  summoned,  76 

forced   to   revise   the  Twenty-one 
Demands,  100 

forecasts      result     of     European 
War,  126-138 

formation  of  the  Shogunate  in,  75 

inquires     as     to     the     monarchial 
movement,  219 

militarism  in,  77 

receives     fugitive     President     Li 
Yuan-hung,  361 

recognizes  Yuan  Shih-kai  as  Dic- 
tator, 87 

socialism  in,  77 

the  new  Far  Eastern  policy  after 
Russian  war,  81 
Japan-China     secret    alliance    pro- 
posed, 130 


486 


INDEX 


Japanese  Constitution  first  granted, 

76 
driven  from  Tong  Kwan  Palace, 

24 
incident  at  Chengchiatun,  293-304( 
intrigues,  47 

Liberalism  vs.   Imperialism,  76 
merchants     and     Lun     Yat     Sen, 

alleged       secret       agreement, 

140-143 
war  indemnity,  16 
war   of   1894,   15,   16 
Japan's    activities   in   the   Yangtsze 

Valley,  97 
account  of  the   Chengchiatun   in- 
cident, 297 
alarm   at  the  Chinese   revolution, 

82 
animosity    towards     Yuan    Shih- 

kai,  83 
attitude    toward    Yuan    Shih-kai, 

70 
Chinese  policy,  72-85,  299-301 
"Continental    quadrilateral,"    299 
Doctrine   of   Maximum    Pressure, 

81 
Far  East  activities,  380-385 
German  policy,  384 
government    foundry    at    Waka- 

matsu,  97 
influence    in   China   on   European 

war    question,    311-313 
influence  on  the  monarchial  elec- 
tion, 228 
influence  over  China's  war  meas- 
ures, 324 
original     Twenty-one      Demands, 

89-92 
Pekin  Expeditionary  Force,  80 
police   rights  in  Manchuria,  300- 

303 
political  history,  74-78 
pressure  on  Yuan  Shih-kai,  124- 

126 
subterranean    activities    in    China 

in  1916,  341,  353 
ultimatum     to     China,      117-121; 

China's  reply,  122 
ultimatum,  China's  indignation  at, 

145 
Twenty-four   Demands,    101-107 
Jehol,  mountain  palaces  of,  2 
Jung  Lu,  viceroy  of  Chihli,  27 

Kameio  Nishihara,  336 
Kang  Yu  Wei,  27,  191,  333 
K'anghsi,  emperor,  2,  5 


Kato,  Japanese  Viscount,  94,   138 
Kawasaki   Kulanoske,   143 
Kiaochow    campaign,    unpopularity 

of  in  Japan,  84 
demanded  by  Japan,  71 
Kien,  Manchurian  province,  11 
Kirin-Changchun   railway,   90,    104 
Kiushiu,  island  of,  97 
Ko-lao-hui,  the,  origin  of,  I 
Korea,  the  opening  of,  22,  78 
Korean  question,  the,  386-388 
Kowshing,  British  steamer,  sinking 

of,  24 
Kublai  Khan,  4 
Kueichow  province,  revolt  of,  248, 

257 
Kuomingtang,  the,  49,  6Q,  279 
Kuo-ti,  the  question  of,  193 
Kwanghsu,  emperor,  26,  28,  31,  36, 

60 
Kwangsi   province,    revolt   of,   248, 

257 
Kwangtung    revolts    against    Yuan 

Shih-Kai,  262 


Landsdowne,  Lord,  386 

Lao-hsi-kai  dispute,  the  304-306 

Legations    in    Pekin,   their    attitude 
towards  Yuan  Shih-kai,  68 
inquire  as  to  the  monarchial  move- 
ment, 220 

Li  Hung  Chang,  24,  25 

Li  Lieh-chun,  Gen.,  53 

Li  Yuan-hung,  58;  elected  Presi- 
dent, 264;  assumes  the  oflice, 
271;  first  presidential  acts, 
273;  monarchists  plot  against 
him,  274;  his  early  life  and 
career,  276-279;  his  position 
as  to  breaking  diplomatic  re- 
lations with  Germany,  325; 
he  dissolves  Parliament,  349; 
escapes  from  Pekin,  360;  his 
important  telegrams,  361-363 

Liang  Ch'i-chao,  resigns  from  Min- 
istry of  Justice,  148;  his  ac- 
cusation of  Yuan  Shih-kai, 
192-215;  his  address  to  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  220-255;  opposes  the 
movement,  243;  directs  the 
Yunnan  revolt,  280;  writes 
note  to  Germany  on  the  sub- 
marine war,  316;  his  Memo- 
randum on  the  war  question, 
329;  upholds  the  Republic, 
363 


INDEX 


487 


Liang    Shih-yi,   political    power    of, 

217,   264, 
Likin  taxation,  introduction  of,  13 
Liu-Kuan-hsiung,   268 
Loan  Agreement,  details  of,  53 
first  foreign,  16 
foreign,  struggles  over,  44-46 
Local   Government   Law,   draft   of, 

461 
Lu  Yun  Ting,  Gen.,  248 
Lun  Yi,  empress,  death  of,  60 
Lung  Chi-Kwang,  Gen.,  54;  created 

Prince,  257 
Lung  Wu,  Empress,  36 


Mahommedan  rebellions,  3 
Manchu   conquest,    the,   of   XVIIth 
Century,  3,  5 
dynasty,  governmental  system  of, 
8 
plots  against,  1 
Imperial  Family  annuity,  41 
people,  number  and   distribution, 

371 

Manchuria,   Chinese  domination   of, 
95,  96 
Japan's  intrigues  in,  299-303 

Manchurian  policy  of  the  Twenty- 
One  Demands,  95 

Mandate  of  Cancellation,  the,  259 
Yuan  Shih-kai's  last,  267 

Manifesto  of  Gen.  Tuan  Chi-jui,  364 

Marco  Polo,  3 

Marriage,     immunity     of     Chinese 
women,  with  Manchus,  5n 

Meiji,  Japanese  Emperor,  76 

Memorandum     of     Dr.     Goodnow, 
175-185 
of  policy  of  the  Black  Dragon  So- 
ciety, 126-128,  130-138 
on  Tariff  Revision,  draft  of,  464 

Military  Governors,  independence 
of,  46;  attempt  to  coerce 
Parliament,  340;  leave  Pekin, 
343;  assemble  in  rebellion  at 
Tientsin,  344 
party  opposition  to  New  Repub- 
lic, 281 

Militarism  in  Japan,  77 

Mining     privileges     demanded     by 
Japan,  104,  108 

Ministerial   irresponsibility,  284 

Modern  commercialism.  Invasion  of, 
13 

Monarchial    movement,   Yang    Tu's, 
defence     of,     150-171;      Dr. 


Goodnow's  defence  of,  175-" 
185 

Monarchy  adopts  a  new  calendar, 
236 

Monarchy  vs.  Republicanism,  memo- 
randum by  Dr.  Goodnow, 
175-185 

Monetary  confusion  in  the  new  Re- 
public, 40 

Money  the  bond  of  Chinese  union, 
19 

Mongul  conquest,  the,  of  Xlllth 
Century,  3 

Mongolian  policy  of  the  Twenty- 
one  Demands,  94 

National  debt,  consolidation  of,  376 

Salvation  Fund,  145 
Nationalists,     the     (Kuomingtang), 

279 
Nanking,  36 
Conference,  the,  263,  264. 
Delegates,  42 

Provisional    Constitution,    42,    49, 
280 
New  calendar  adopted,  236 
New  Republic,  organization  of,  279; 
opposition     of     the     Military 
party,  281 
Neutrality  position  of  China,  318 
Ni  Shih-chung,  Gen.,  264,  347 
Nineteen  Articles,  the,  text  of,  393- 
397 
Fundamental  Articles,  the,  35 

Oath  of  office,  presidential,  43 
Outer  Mongolia  question,  47;  auton- 
omy conceded  to,  56 

"Palace  of  Generals,"  67 

Pamphlet  of  Yang  Tu,  150-171 

Parliament,  composition  of,  49n; 
provides  for  election  of  Presi- 
dent, 55;  Radical  members 
imseated,  56;  session  of  1916, 
280-290;  dissensions  over  dis- 
solution, 347;  is  dissolved,  349 

Parliamentary  change  by  the  "Con- 
stitutional Compact,"  65 
struggles,  54,  55 

Peace  note.  President  Wilson's, 
China's  reply  to,  313 

Peace  of  Portsmouth,  377 

Pekin,  distances  from,  8 

Peking  System  vs.  Manchu  Dynasty, 
19 


488 


INDEX 


Permanent    Constitution,    282,   342; 

draft  of,  448 
Ping-hsiang  collieries,  98 
Presidential  Election  Law  of  1913, 
407 
oath  of  oflBce,  43 

Succession  Law,  the,  66;  text  of, 
417 
Progressives,  the  (Chinputang),  280 
Provincial    capitals,    influence    and 
power  of,  10 
financial  system,  14 
system  of  government,  10-12,  282 
Provisional    Constitution    of     1912, 
text  of,  401 
Nanking  Constitution,  the,  42,  49 

Railway   concessions    demanded    by 
Japan,   90,   103 
construction,    progress    of,    under 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  69 

Rebellion  of  1813,  54 

Referendum  arranged  for  by  Sen- 
ate, 218 

Reform  Edicts  of  1898,  27 

Religious  provisions  of  "The  Con- 
stitutional Compact,"  63 

Reorganization  loan,  the,  50 

Republic  proclaimed,  36 
recognition  of  by  the  Powers,  51 

Republic's   anniversary,  non-observ- 
ance of,  224 
review  of  in  Goodnow  Memoran- 
dum, 177 

Republican-Imperialist  Conflict  of 
1917,  365-369 

Restoration  Edict  of  Hsuan  Tung, 
355 

Revolt  of  February,  1912,  42 

Revolution  of  1911,  19;  effect  on 
Japan,  82 

Revolutionary     base     at     Hankow, 
Hanyang  and  Wuchang,  34 
Party  and  the  Europe  and  Asia 
Trading  Co.  agreement,  143 

Rioting  in  Pekin,  340 

Russia  demands  participation  in 
loan,  45;  recognizes  the  inde- 
pendence of  Tibet,  47;  agrees 
to  autonomy  of  Outer  Mon- 
golia, 56 

Russian  loan,  the,  378 

Russia's  Chinese  policy,  376,  377 
role  in  the  Far  East,  80 
status  after  the  war,  127,  136 

Russo-Chinese  Agreement  of  1913, 
text  of,  421 


Russo-Chinese — continued 
Declaration,  the,  378 
-Mongolian  triparte  agreement  of 
1915,  text  of,  424 

Salt  Administration,  the,  52,  282 

Santuao  harbour,  98 

Secret  society  plots,  2 

Sectional  dispute,  42 

Senate,  rules  of,  285 

Shanghai,  specie  hoarded  at,  61 

Shansi  Bankers,  14 

Shantung  and  the  Twenty-One  De- 
mands, 94 
province.      Yuan      Shih-kai      ap- 
pointed governor,  28 

Shasi,  open  port,  97 

Shogunate,  establishment  of,  in 
Japan,  75 

Six-Power  group,  the,  45,  50 

Socialism  in  Japan,  77 

Society  for  the  Preservation  of 
Peace  (Chou  Au  Hui),  148 

Soochow,  open  port,  97 

South  Manchurian  railway,  90,  103, 
108,  109 

Southern  Confederacy  formed,  262; 
dissolution  of,  43 
Rebellion,  the  52-53 

Special  Constitutional  Drafting 
Committee,  54 

Specie  payment  suspended  in  Pekin, 
263 

Submarine  war  question,  315 

Sun  Yat  Sen,  Dr.,  39,  47,  69;  his 
alleged  secret  agreement  with 
Japan,  140-143 

Sung  Chiao-jen,  assassination  of,  48 

Simgari  River,  299 

Szechuan  province  revolts  against 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  263 

Taiping  rebellion,  3,  12 

Tanaka,  Gen.,  353 

Taonanfu  administration,  293 

Tariff  reformation,  375 

Tax  collection,  15 

Tayeh  iron  mines,  97 

Tibet,    independence    of    recognized 

by  Russia,  47 
Tieh  Liang,  30 
Tientsin    rebellion    of    the    Military 

Governors,  344 
Tong  Kwan  Palace,  the  battle  at,  23 
Tong  Shao-yi,  36 
Treaty  of  Shimonoseki,  378 


INDEX 


489 


Treaty-ports,  economical  effects  of, 
18 

Tsao-ao,  Gen.,  242-245 

Tsao  Ju-lin,  268 

Tsan  Cheng  Yuan,  passes  a  "king- 
making"  bill,  218 

Tseng  Kuo-fan,  Marquis,  26 

Tsung  Slie  Tang,  the,  46 

Tuan  Chi-jui,  Gen.  59,  221,  268,  271, 
275,  336,  337,  341,  342,  361 

Tung  Fu-hsiang,  28 

Twenty-Four  Demands,  Japan's  re- 
vised, 101-107;  China's  reply 
to,   112-116 

Twenty-One  Demands  of  Japan,  89- 
92;  Japan  forced  to  revise, 
100;  the  psychology  of,  124- 
126;  China's  reply  to,  107-113 

Tzu-Hsi,  Empress,  26,  27,  60 

United  States,  Goodnow's  review  of, 
177,  187 

Viceroy's,  prerogatives  of  in  Chinese 
government,  8-10 

Wai  Chiao  Pu  conference,  107 
Wakamatsu,    Japanese    government 

foundry  at,  97 
Wang  Yi-taiig,  268 
War  memorandums,  329,  333 
"White  Wolfs,"  insurrection  of,  62 
Wilson,  President,  50n,  312 
Wu,  C.  C,  Dr.,  467 
Wu  Chang-ching,  Gen.,  22 
Wu  Ting-fang,  Dr.,  342,  347,  348 

Yang  Tu,  champion  of  neo-imperial- 
lists,  148;  publisher  famous 
pamphlet,  149;  the  pamphlet, 
150-171 

Yangtsze  Valley,  Japanese  activi- 
ties in,  97 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  19;  the  bailiff  of  the 
Powers,  20;  his  early  life,  21; 
first  emerges  into  public  view, 
S3;  in  Seoul,  23;  appointed 
Imperial  Resident  at  Seoul, 
24;  leaves  Korea,  25;  in  com- 
mand of  Hsaiochan  camp,  25; 
refuses  to  depose  Empress 
Tzu-Hsi,  27;  appointed  Gov- 
ernor of  Shantung,  28;  de- 
feats the  Boxers,  29;  made 
Viceroy  of  Chili,  29;  reor- 
ganizes  the   army,   30;    made 


Grand  Councillor  and  Presi- 
dent of  the  Board  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  30;  made  "Senior 
Guardian  of  the  Heir  Appar- 
pent,"  32;  dismissed  from 
Pekin,  32;  appointed  Viceroy 
of  Hupeh  and  Hunan,  33; 
appointed  President  of  Grand 
Council,  33;  schemes  for  the 
abdication  of  the  Manchu 
Dynasty,  34-36 ;  attempted 
assassination  of,  37;  commis- 
sioned to  organize  the  Repub- 
lic, 37;  elected  Provisional 
President,  39;  takes  oath  of 
ofiBce,  43;  negotiates  the  Re- 
organization loan,  50;  negoti- 
ates and  controls  the  great 
foreign  loan,  50-53;  sup- 
presses the  Southern  rebel- 
lion, 54;  elected  full  Presi- 
dent, 55;  unseats  Radical 
members  of  Parliament,  56; 
entices  Vice-President  to 
Pekin,  59;  position  strength- 
ened by  death  of  Empress 
Lun  Yi,  61;  ruthless  suppres- 
sion of  opposition,  62;  brings 
out  the  Constitutional  Com- 
pact, 63;  promulgates  the 
Presidential  Succession  law, 
66;  creates  a  "Palace  of  Gen- 
erals," 67;  negotiates  with 
Germany,  71 ;  animosity  of 
Japan,  83;  his  dementi  of, 
1913,  85;  bribes  the  Japanese 
press,  87;  his  Dictatorship 
recognized  by  Japan,  87;  the 
precis  of  Japanese  Minister's 
coercive  conversation,  134; 
reviewed  in  Black  Dragon  So- 
ciety's Memorandum,  132;  in- 
trigues of  his  family,  145;  he 
yields  to  advocates  of  mon- 
archy, 146;  invokes  services  of 
Yang-tu,  148;  his  interview 
with  Gen.  Feng  Kuo-chang, 
lS6n;  his  accusation  by 
Liang  Chi-chao,  192-215; 
throws  responsibility  on  the 
Senate,  216;  his  Mandate  for 
a  referendum,  218;  elected 
Emperor,  230;  substitutes 
title  of  Emperor  for  Presi- 
dent, 228;  refuses,  then  ac- 
cepts the  throne,  230;  the  re- 
volt of  Yunnan,  236-248;  he 


490  INDEX 

rehearses  court  ceremonies,  Cancellation,  258;  his  retire- 
241 ;  his  position  weakens,  ment  sought,  262 ;  he  offers  to 
250;  the  communication  from  resign,  264;  his  death,  266; 
Liang  Ch'i-chao,  250-255 ;  at-  his  last  mandate,  267 ;  his  fun- 
tempts  to  placate  Japan,  256;  eral,  275;  his  policy  towards 
distributes  patents  of  no-  the  European  War,  309-312 
bility,  256;  financial  troubles,  Yunnan  revolt  of  1916,  236- 
257;    issues   the    Mandate    of  248 


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